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What does justice require in response to crime? The answer that our society gives in 
practice, through our institutions of criminal justice, is that justice requires punishment of 
criminal offenders. Some claim that we punish for its utility. However, our criminal justice 
practices would have to be organized quite differently if their purpose was only to prevent 
crime by deterring and rehabilitating criminals. We punish, at least partly, because it 
achieves justice. 
Whether we are correct to presuppose that punishment does justice, and how punishment 
might achieve justice, will be the topics of this thesis. How, specifically, can punishment 
be said to remedy the wrong that is caused by crime? How does punishment transform an 
unjust situation into a situation in which we may state that justice has been done? And are 
there other ways of remedying the wrong in crime, besides punishing? I shall consider both 
common intuitions and philosophical theories in my efforts to answer these questions.  
If we can identify a plausible theory of retributive justice that fits in the context of a 
democratic state under the rule of law, we shall have supplied a necessary premise for the 
moral justification of current penal practices. Whether this premise is also sufficient to 
justify the way that we actually sanction crime, constitutes another and more controversial 
matter. In the words of Allen W. Wood, “no sensible person could think that a morally 
justifiable response [to crime] would bear much resemblance to the organized system of 
brutality and abuse that is systematically practiced by existing courts and prisons”.1 His 
country of reference is the United States.2 The situation for inmates is considerably better 
in some other countries, such as my own country of Norway, but there too we can question 
whether actual penal practices fulfill the demands of justice to a sufficient degree.3 
                                                        
1 Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 207 
2 The American Civil Liberties Union, which regularly reports on the conditions in American prisons and 
jails, concludes that “[o]vercrowding, violence, sexual abuse, and other conditions pose grave risks to 
prisoner health and safety”. "Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Conditions",  (2018), aclu.org/issues/prisoners-
rights/cruel-inhuman-and-degrading-conditions. 
3 Norwegian authorities have repeatedly been criticized by the European Council and the UN Committee 
against Torture for the excessive use of solitary confinement, see Peter Scharff Smith et al., "Isolasjon i 




Given actual practices, it seems that we should neither expect nor desire a retributive 
theory to justify these practices. A retributive theory should rather identify an ideal for 
how criminal justice ought to be done. This ideal might then be used to point out how 
current practices must change in order to be justified. A real risk exists, however, that 
providing such a defense of ideally just penal practices will merely serve to justify actual 
practices. Retributive theories, Wood remarks, stand in danger of being used in the same 
way that theories of just war are utilized to “silence people’s consciences over actual wars, 
none of which (even the ‘best’ wars) have ever come close to meeting the conditions”.4 A 
retributive theory that is to function as an ideal cannot therefore ignore the empirical 
realities in which the current practices apply. The theory must address those empirical 
conditions that threaten to undermine the relevance of the ideal theory.  
One such empirical condition is the fact that a vast majority of those who are punished 
under current penal regimes are among the socioeconomically least privileged members 
of society.5 The poor and the socially marginalized make up a disproportionately large 
share of those who are punished. The same applies to those who have suffered adverse 
childhood experiences. In short, victims of social injustice tend to a greater degree to 
become targets of state punishment, which in turn tends to exacerbate social deprivation, 
even in the next generation.  
How might a theory of retributive justice take these empirical realities into account? The 
difficulty, of course, is to conceive of a criminal justice system that holds offenders 
individually accountable while at the same time taking into account structural iniquities 
that tend to influence our behavior. I shall discuss this issue – the relevance of social 
injustice for criminal justice – in the second part of the thesis. This second part, titled “The 
Justice of Not Punishing” builds on and considers exceptions to the conclusions of the first 
part, titled “The Justice of Punishing”. 
Before embarking upon the first part, I shall devote the remainder of this introductory 
chapter to explaining my method of inquiry, which is a negative approach to the topic of 
justice, understanding justice through injustice. The introductory chapter is divided into 
                                                        
4 Wood, Kantian Ethics, 207 





three parts, the first asking, “What is justice?”, the second asking, “What’s wrong?”, and 
the third asking how we might come to identify “The right wrong” in need of remedying. 
Thereafter follows a one-page overview of the chapters of the thesis. 
1.1 What is justice? 
“To invoke justice is the same thing as banging on the table”, legal philosopher Alf Ross 
claimed.6 It is merely an emotional expression that means nothing beyond the formal 
demand that everyone be treated equally according to a rule. Without a material criterion 
that determines what constitutes equality, such a principle is empty and meaningless. 
Anything can be posited as the material criterion, Ross claimed. Therefore, anything can 
be called just as long as it is bound by rules. Justice, and more broadly natural law based 
on a conception of justice, is in Ross’ memorable phrase, “like a harlot, at the disposal of 
everyone”.7  
Consider the many conflicting claims that are made about justice. For any hotly contested 
issue – taxation, university admissions, toll road rates, the Iraq war, ban on smoking – 
there are proponents on each side claiming to represent justice. Anything, it seems, can be 
called just with just the right arguments. The impression is much the same if we look 
beyond these current debates to more rigorously developed theories of justice. Hardly any 
philosophical issue has been dealt with more thoroughly since Plato set out to define justice 
in The Republic. Yet, we do not seem to be much closer to agreement. In fact, consensus 
on issues of justice may have become even more unrealistic as modern societies have 
become more pluralistic and we can no longer rely on universally respected religious and 
moral authorities for instruction. In the absence of a collective worldview, a common 
metaphysical outlook, some argue that we should seek a procedural, “post-metaphysical” 
source of legitimacy for ethical and political discourse.8 In legal discourse, the difficulty 
of reaching consensus on justice is a motive for avoiding the term altogether, seeking 
instead to ground the legitimacy of legal opinions in the correct application of legal 
method. Many legal practitioners will likely agree with scholar Johs. Andenæs that justice 
                                                        
6 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice (Berkley: University of California Press, 1959), 274. 
7 Ibid., 261. 
8 Jürgen Habermas, "Postscript", in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 





is a “challenging word with metaphysical overtones”, which is therefore understandably 
avoided in preparatory works and sentencing statements.9 
Critics of justice have correctly pointed to the fact that if we are to have use for the term, 
we must be able to somehow distinguish that which is properly just from that which merely 
appears to be just. But in order to do so it seems that we must already have an idea of what 
justice is, which, of course, is what we are trying to establish. And if we claim not to 
already know what justice is, then how will we recognize if a theory of justice is correct? 
It seems that we are trapped in what is known as “Meno’s Paradox”, formulated in Plato’s 
dialogue bearing Meno’s name. Meno articulates the paradox when Socrates states that he 
will attempt to determine what virtue is and claims to not yet hold any knowledge of it:  
Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature 
you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you 
know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even 
supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the 
thing you did not know?10 
To avoid the paradox, any theory of justice – including the theory of this thesis – must 
have a solid stepping-stone from which further knowledge of justice can be reached. 
Without it – if we know nothing – we are caught in the paradox of not knowing where to 
look. Plato’s solution was anamnesis, the idea that we recognize virtue because our eternal 
souls have seen true virtue before we were born. Although most would agree that this is 
no longer a particularly convincing theory, it contains the important notion for a refutation 
of the paradox, namely, the assumption that we somehow recognize what we are searching 
for.  
Our challenge is then: Can we recognize justice? At first view, the disagreement noted 
above seems to suggest that we cannot. From the fact that there is disagreement, however, 
we cannot deduce that there is no such thing as justice. Some of us could simply be 
incorrect when we try to identify justice, leaving the possibility that others are correct. The 
vagueness of the concept, its unclear borders and the inevitable disputes about hard cases, 
does not indicate that the concept is meaningless. As G. E. M. Anscombe is supposed to 
                                                        
9 Johs. Andenæs, "Prevensjon og rettferdighet i straffutmåling", in Ånd og rett, festskrift til Birger Lassen 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 11. 




have said, “the existence of dawn and dusk does not invalidate the distinction between 
night and day”. In other words: Although we may experience difficulty determining the 
borders of the concept of justice, the distinction between justice and injustice may 
nevertheless be valid. The phenomenon to which the concept loosely refers may be real. 
Consider for comparison another challenging concept, ‘beauty’. Like justice, the concept 
of beauty has “metaphysical overtones”, but also echoes and resonates with common 
human experiences. Although we may disagree about the definition of beauty and the 
borders of the concept, we nevertheless recognize some things as beautiful. Furthermore, 
such experiences are not completely random. For example, in the case of music that is 
perceived as beautiful, it usually follows certain patterns or “rules”, such as musical scales, 
harmonies, chord progressions that lead into other chords, etc. These rules or principles 
are not categorical. They do not settle once and for all the structure of beautiful music. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that they correspond with, or rather, strike a chord with, most 
people’s experience of what is beautiful.  
How can we know that there are such “rules” of beautiful music? We can know this by 
considering music that does not follow the rules properly, that does not, for instance, have 
chord progressions that lead well, and that is not considered beautiful. For example, there 
is a very strong lead from the chords C à C7 à F, as “proven” by hit songs such as 
“Danny Boy”, “Hey Jude” and countless others. If, on the other hand, someone was to play 
C à C7 à G, it would usually not be perceived as beautiful because the C7 does not lead 
well into G. (If you doubt this, try to name a single song that uses that progression). Such 
“rules” are subtle, but nevertheless real. When the rules are broken more blatantly, for 
example by playing a note that is out of pitch or out of key, people react, sometimes 
strongly. The exception – the transgression – thereby confirms the rule.  
Thus, a way to reflect upon and come to possess conscious knowledge of the rules and 
patterns of beauty in music – as opposed to merely experiencing beauty in a song – is to 
learn what beauty is not. Similarly, I propose that the best method for reflecting upon 
justice is to begin by reflecting upon what justice is not. The experience of injustice, I 
suggest, may be the stepping-stone from which we can reach further knowledge of justice. 




contemplating justice directly. I propose, therefore, that we take a negative approach to 
justice, understanding justice through injustice. 
There are two main reasons for this: First, because we recognize injustice in a more 
immediate and visceral way than we recognize justice. Second, because justice always 
occurs in response to a real or potential injustice, and we may gain insight into the meaning 
of justice by considering the function it serves in relation to the injustice.11 
(1) Regarding the first point, that we recognize injustice more immediately and viscerally 
than we do justice: The experience of injustice is an experience of a problem; an experience 
that something is not right, as one says. From this experience arises the need to fix the 
problem; to make it right. Inherent to the experience of injustice is thus the imperative to 
do justice. Therefore, “the experience of injustice lies at the core of ethics”, Arne Johan 
Vetlesen claims.12 It is from this most fundamental experience that the motive for ethics 
arises: The need to do something, to react against injustice. The feeling of injustice is thus 
the primordial feeling, prior to a sense of justice. Nancy Fraser makes the same point, 
stating that “justice is never actually experienced directly”, but through pondering the 
unjust “we begin to get a sense of what would count as an alternative”.13 Eric Heinze 
similarly claims that experiences of injustice “largely lack any sense of antecedent or 
distinctly formulated concepts of justice”.14 As is well known, even a three-year-old can 
complain, “That’s unfair!” but usually does not react when something is fair. We tend to 
have gut reactions to injustice, analogous to an audience that cringes upon hearing a high 
note that is completely out of pitch. The reaction usually does not require that we have 
consciously considered the justice of the arrangement that is now broken; it does not 
demand an intellectual awareness, just like the audience will react regardless of whether 
they have been conscious of the fact that the prior singing was in tune.  
                                                        
11 The injustice to which justice is a response may be real, for instance when somebody has committed a 
wrong against somebody else. Or it may be a potential or hypothetical injustice, such as when justice is a 
response to the possibility of (greater) injustice (for instance when existing social programs are considered 
just in contrast to the injustice that would occur if the programs were abolished). 
12 Arne Johan Vetlesen, Hva er etikk? (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2007), 9 
13 Nancy Fraser, "On Justice", New Left Review 74 (2012): 43 





From the experience of a rupture in one’s expectations may come an awareness of these 
expectations. The breach of the norm enables us to gain knowledge of the prior, normal 
state. This point is reminiscent of John Dewey and the pragmatist school’s claim that the 
need to know something appears with a problematic situation, i.e., when our habitual 
conduct is inadequate for attaining the goals that we have. Knowledge, like justice, is 
always a response to a problem. More specifically, in Dewey’s pragmatist psychology, 
emotions are understood as affective responses to action problems.15 If there are no 
problems related to doing an action, one will not react emotionally. Positive emotions, like 
pride and joy, arise when an action problem is successfully solved. Negative emotions, 
like shame and anger, arise when one’s expectations are frustrated, i.e., when one’s action 
or that of another does not live up to the norm that one holds for that type of action.16 
Emotions can thus serve a cognitive function: they can make us aware of the discrepancy 
between our expectations and how we or others have acted or have been acted upon. In 
this way, our emotional experiences of injustice can serve to make us aware of the just 
norm for action that has been breached. The opposite does not hold, however: We tend not 
to have emotional responses to the norm itself – when everything is fine and uneventful, 
we do not react emotionally. There is, thus, an emotional asymmetry between the 
experience of injustice and the experience of justice. The former is prior to the latter in the 
sense that it informs our knowledge of the latter. 
(2) However, if we understand the emotional experience of injustice as an affective 
response to frustrated normative expectations, this means that without the expectations, 
i.e., without the norm, there would not be an experience of injustice. In other words, if we 
did not first have a notion of how things ought to be, we would not recognize when they 
are not how they ought to be. Justice is, in this perspective, prior to injustice. On the other 
hand, as I have just argued, the imperative to do justice arises from the experience of 
injustice; in this perspective, injustice is prior to justice. Justice and injustice are thus 
mutually constitutive, meaning that we cannot conceive of one without the other. More 
specifically, they stand in a dialectical relationship: One is the negation of the other, to use 
                                                        
15 John Dewey, "The Theory of Emotion I and II", Psychological Review  (1895) 
16 We may differentiate instrumental expectations and moral or normative expectations. If you do not 
succeed in opening a jar of jam, your instrumental expectations are frustrated and you may become angry. 
If you lie to a friend about why you have not called him, your moral expectations for how you ought to 
behave are frustrated, and you may feel guilt for not living up to these expectations. Injustice is, of course, 




the terminology of Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, whom we shall see has stimulated this 
negative approach to justice.  
There is, in other words, a conceptual symmetry between justice and injustice, but an 
emotional asymmetry. The emotional asymmetry is the first reason for applying the 
negative method to studying justice. However, as we see, our emotional reactions to 
injustice depend on our normative beliefs about justice. These beliefs are open to rational 
critique, which means that our emotional reactions are not merely given, but amendable in 
light of our deliberations, and, of course, in turn informative for our deliberations. The 
second reason for applying the negative method is the potential for rational critique that it 
yields. The conceptual symmetry between justice and injustice – their dialectical 
relationship – enables us to assess justice by considering how an action functions as a 
remedy for that which is unjust in the situation.  
Consider the example of granting scholarships to university students. What is the just 
criterion by which a limited number of scholarships should be awarded? It may plausibly 
be claimed that it is just to award student scholarships according to the academic merits of 
the applicants. There is, presumably, a strong correlation between academic merits and the 
hard work and effort that the students have invested. If scholarships are awarded according 
to this criterion they will tend to award students who have sacrificed their leisure time in 
order to achieve the goal of attending university. These students might be deemed to 
deserve the scholarship more than those who have not made the equivalent sacrifice. 
It may also plausibly be claimed that it is just to award scholarships according to the need 
of the applicants. Affluent students can pay their own tuition and living-expenses while 
attending university, while poor students do not have this opportunity. If scholarships are 
awarded according to a criterion of need, they will tend to even the playing field by making 
good grades sufficient for poor students to attend university, as is already the case for 
affluent students. 
Take now a completely different and admittedly ludicrous criterion: Scholarships should 
be given to students born on a Tuesday. What is the difference between this third criterion 
and the first two? The third criterion does not address anything that can plausibly be 




at all for one’s academic abilities or one’s socioeconomic standing or anything else that 
might have bearing on one’s possibilities of attending university. There simply is no 
injustice in being born on a Tuesday, at least not in our society today.17 On the other hand, 
it is plausibly unjust, all things being equal, to work harder than others without reward. 
And it is plausibly unjust to be denied the opportunity to attend university due to poverty. 
The first two criteria pick out these injustices and, importantly, the act in question – giving 
out scholarships – would go some way toward remedying these injustices. 
There are, we see, two parts to a claim to justice: There is a claim that something is unjust, 
and there is a claim that a certain act will remedy that which is unjust. We might think of 
injustice as a divergence from a prior baseline, and justice as the act which cancels the 
divergence.18 If there is no injustice, as in the example of being born on a Tuesday, there 
cannot be justice. Justice, I will claim, is the name of the process of cancelling, annulling, 
or negating that which is unjust. The meaning of justice is thus to be found in the function 
it performs. Justice is what justice does: 
Justice is remedying injustice. 
This will be the definition of justice that I will apply throughout the thesis. I will argue that 
this definition is best suited not only to account for the many different theories of justice, 
but also to yield a potential for a normative critique of these theories. As I mentioned, the 
main inspiration for this definition is Hegel, who, in The Philosophy of Right explicated 
the dialectical relationship of right and wrong by which one cannot be understood without 
                                                        
17 By this, I simply mean that we cannot exclude the possibility that being born on a Tuesday may be 
considered a disadvantage (or an advantage) relative to some practice in some society in the future or 
unknown past. Until rather recently, nobody would consider it an advantage or disadvantage to be born 
early or late in the year. It turns out that one’s chances of succeeding in some sports, for instance, are greater 
the earlier in the year one is born, because sports teams for children are usually organized by birth year and 
the older kids have an advantage in their physical development. It is not inconceivable, then, that somebody 
would suggest measures intended to remedy the unfair disadvantage of the younger kids, and such a measure 
would then plausibly be just. Unless one can substantiate that it makes a difference to be born on a Tuesday, 
any measure addressing this group cannot be just (which means that it is either unjust or neither just nor 
unjust). 
18 I will elaborate on this dialectical structure in Section 1.3. and later in the Concluding Remarks (Chapter 
15). I argue there that justice and injustice proceed from a default equality that is neither just nor unjust, 
what I here termed a baseline. Note how familiar this way of conceiving justice as a counter-measure to 
injustice is. It is, for instance, evident in Aristotle’s analogy of the two lines, where corrective justice is 
defined as subtracting that stretch of line that has been unjustly taken from another and “returning” it to 
where it belongs, thereby cancelling the unjust shortening. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. 





the other.19 For Hegel, right should not be understood as that which is left “when wrong 
has been pruned away”,20 as Jeanne Schroeder and David Carlson put it, invoking the 
image of a sculpture that remains when surplus rock, the non-sculpture, is removed. Justice 
cannot be written in stone; its meaning cannot be fixed, although that is what most theories 
of justice have attempted. It is futile, Hegel would say, to think that one can capture the 
full meaning of right or justice in an objective principle. We have no such immediate 
access to “justice-in-itself” because justice is not a self-contained concept. We can only 
understand justice via its negative, for justice is the very process of negating its negative. 
Justice only appears when injustice disappears. Or better, justice is the process of injustice 
disappearing.21 Justice happens; it is something that occurs, and it cannot be frozen in its 
occurrence. 
There seems to be a paradox here. Isn’t Hegel’s very own characterizations of right an 
attempt to write its meaning in stone? Am I also not positing a fixed notion of what justice 
is in itself when I assert that justice must be understood as remedying injustice? Yes, but 
only in the formal sense of denoting the logical structure of the concept of justice. No 
claims have yet been made about the material aspect of justice, in other words, about when 
justice occurs. Thus, no attempt has been made to fix the meaning of justice as it actually 
appears. 
A purely abstract account of justice is without content because a concrete injustice must 
be provided for justice to be the process of remedying injustice. Accordingly, Hegel 
famously criticized Kant’s moral theory for providing only an abstract formula, and 
therefore being merely “empty formalism”.22 However, this does not mean that Kant’s 
abstract theory was incorrect as such. Even Hegel’s theories of abstract right and of 
morality are guilty of empty formalism if taken on their own. On the Hegelian view, all 
                                                        
19 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005). Hegel uses the terms 
Right and Wrong, which can be understood in a more narrowly legal sense than justice and injustice, 
respectively (though see Chapter 9 for a discussion of Hegel’s understanding of the term “Right”). See 
Section 1.2. where I explain my use of the words right, wrong, justice and injustice. 
20 Jeanne L. Schroeder and David Gray Carlson, "The Appearance of Right and the Essence of Wrong: 
Metaphor and Metonymy in Law", Cardozo Law Review 24, no. 6 (2003): 2486 
21 See ibid., 2483. See also Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 82 Addition: “[W]hen wrong vanishes, right 
receives an added fixity and value” (I will refer to this book’s paragraphs, which are constant throughout 
all editions). 





abstract theories of justice are one-sided, accounting only for one aspect of what justice is. 
Taken by themselves they are at best ideals, and as such, they are utopic, literally meaning 
that they exist no-place.23 It is in the process of negating wrong that right “becomes actual 
and valid, whereas at first it was only a contingent possibility”.24 Thus, in order to learn 
what justice actually is, as it exists in the real world, we have to supplement our formal 
understanding with an understanding of what justice concretely does. 
1.2 What’s wrong? Specifying the injustice to be 
considered 
If we are to consider justice as it actually occurs and not merely as an abstract idea, we 
have to consider concrete injustices and the way in which the response is accorded 
meaning as a remedy. I will in this thesis concentrate on one particular type of injustice: 
criminal wrongs. The question I will ask is: What is a just response to a criminal wrong? 
Or rephrased: How can the injustice of a crime be remedied? 
First, a terminological clarification: I will use the words “wrong” and “injustice” 
interchangeably when speaking of crimes, and the same goes for the words “justice” and 
“right” when speaking of sanctions of crimes. It may seem somewhat idiosyncratic to talk 
of the “injustice of a crime”, and I will therefore usually prefer to speak of its “wrongness” 
or its “being wrong”. One way something can be unjust is by being a wrong committed by 
someone, and among such wrongs or wrongdoings, there is the subcategory of criminal 
wrongs, and this type of injustice will be the topic of my thesis.25  
The discussion of how the injustice of crime can be remedied is meant to apply to a 
particular context, namely modern, democratic societies, such as the one in which I live. 
Of the two ways of doing philosophy that Michael Walzer describes – one, in which the 
philosopher “walks out of the cave” and finds a vantage point from which to gain objective 
and universal insight, and another, in which the role of the philosopher is “to interpret to 
                                                        
23 From Greek u: not/no + topos: place. 
24 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 82. 
25 We may talk of injustice without wrongs or wrongdoings – structural injustice is one example – and we 
may also talk of wrongs that are not instances of injustice, such as moral wrongs against oneself. In the 
category of crimes, however, injustice and wrong overlap on my terminology. Note that Part II will deal 
with injustice that is not due to wrongdoing – social injustice – but I will relate it to the discussion of how 





one’s fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share”, without “any great distance 
from the social world in which I live”26 – my way is the latter. I do not, in other words, 
aim to uncover what justice always and everywhere requires in response to wrongdoing. 
My approach to the topic is entirely consistent with the possibility that remedying wrongs 
means something different today than it did in, for instance, the ancient society of Great 
Zimbabwe, or in a small tribal society on the prairies of Canada. Hegel, too, noted that “[a] 
penal code belongs to its time and to the condition in which the civic community at that 
time is.”27 This does not mean, of course, that there are not overlapping conceptions of 
wrong and right in many or all cultures.28 Neither does it mean that we must embrace 
relativism, for we do retain the possibility of critically evaluating the conceptions of our 
own culture, as I shall discuss further in the next section. 
My starting point is the way in which crimes are usually sanctioned in modern, democratic 
societies.29 My main concern will thus be with retributive justice, which I define as doing 
justice through punishment.30 Chapter 15 will deal with an alternative to criminal trial and 
punishment, so-called restorative justice processes, in which victim(s), offender(s) and 
other directly involved parties determine the outcome of the case under the supervision of 
a facilitator. Several countries apply such processes as a supplement to, and to some extent 
as a replacement for, criminal trials for certain types of crime. Hence, both when discussing 
retributive and restorative justice I am considering actual practices in today’s society. My 
method can accordingly be described as interpretive and critical; interpretive, because I 
attempt to develop a coherent normative rationale for those practices that are actually in 
                                                        
26 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic books, 1983), 
XIV. 
27 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 218 Note. 
28 I will touch upon this issue in Chapter 7, where I discuss the wrong in undermining the mutual benefits 
of law. Some of these benefits are likely universally applicable to all humans, most notably because of our 
physical vulnerability. I will also there discuss the function of crime and punishment in sustaining the 
collective consciousness of the members of society. This function, Emile Durkheim says, is relative to the 
particular society in which it applies. For our purposes, the extent to which the functions described are pan-
human or specific to a society is of less importance. I am in any case dealing with modern, democratic 
societies today.   
29 I make an exception for the death penalty, which I will not discuss for lack of capacity and space. One 
could argue, however, that the death penalty is not compatible with the normative constraints that ought to 
apply to a criminal justice system in a modern, democratic state, and that the issue is therefore irrelevant to 
the context I am dealing with. I will not pursue this argument further, however. 




place; critical, because I evaluate the interpreted rationales, asking whether these sanctions 
really do remedy injustice in the way proposed. 
One’s view on how punishment serves a just function depends, as the negative approach 
to justice predicts, on what one takes as the injustice entailed by crime. In Chapters 3 to 9, 
I reconstruct and evaluate different plausible ways in which crime can be wrong and 
discuss how punishment can be understood to remedy those aspects of wrong. To give but 
a couple of examples here: If we take the wrong in crime to be the criminal’s “freeloading”, 
i.e., benefiting unfairly from the law-abidance of others, reaping the fruits of mutual 
cooperation without paying the price, so to speak, punishment will remedy this injustice 
by conferring a burden on the offender, thereby removing this unfair benefit. If, on the 
other hand, we view the wrong in crime as a denial of the norm ensuring equal respect for 
all free and rational agents, then punishment can be seen to re-establish the norm, ensuring 
its actuality, by treating the criminal in accordance with the maxim of her crime and, hence, 
as a free and rational agent. In these and other ways, the conception of the wrongness in 
crime determines the way that we conceive of the just function of punishment. 
However, recall that the dialectic goes both ways: One’s view on how punishment serves 
a just function picks out what it is about crime that is wrong. Accordingly, some acts may 
be only slightly wrong or not wrong at all upon one theory of retributive justice, while 
seriously wrong upon another such theory. As we shall see, this affords us with a potential 
for a critique of the theories. However, this potential presupposes a standard against which 
a conception of the wrong in crime can be compared.  
I will here take as such a standard for “criminal wrongs” those acts which are typically 
criminalized in modern, democratic states governed under the rule of law. The definition 
is admittedly formal and it is also somewhat vague, because not all states that might fit the 
description have criminalized the same acts. Drug crimes is one type of crime where there 
are considerable differences between states and where there are currently rapid 
developments. Another is sex crimes. Apart from some such hotly contested issues, 




that ought to be criminalized, and there is also at least rough agreement about the relative 
seriousness of different types of crime.31  
1.3 The right wrong 
Assume now that a discrepancy exists between theory and practice. The aspect of wrong 
entailed by a conception of retributive justice does not overlap with the type of acts that 
are actually criminalized or does not fit with common perceptions of the gravity of 
different offences. Should we interpret such a discrepancy as a sign that the theory is 
wrong, or should we take it as an imperative to change current practices and perceptions 
of justice? This question goes to the heart of the problem of how to establish a critical 
perspective on justice. We are back, in other words, to the question of the stepping-stone 
from which to reach knowledge of justice. 
An advantage of the concept of justice as remedying injustice is that it allows us to break 
down a claim of justice into analyzable parts that can each be critically evaluated. The 
dialectic of justice and injustice enables us to consider the internal coherence of a claim to 
justice, allowing us to understand how a certain act, Y, can be understood as a remedy for 
a problem, X. This, in turn, yields a potential for critically examining the appropriateness 
of both X and Y as interpretations of the acts in question.  
Let us first look at how the logical structure of the concept of justice yields a potential for 
critique, before specifying three criteria that can help us assess which conception of wrong 
is most appropriate, determining the right wrong to remedy in a situation. 
1.3.1 “The Negative Hume’s Law” 
Identifying a wrong in a situation is not sufficient to draw a conclusion about what ought 
to be done about it. The fact that a bank robber has gotten away with a large profit does 
                                                        
31 There seems to be rough agreement, for instance, that murder is worse than rape, which is worse than 
assault, which is worse than theft, to name a few types of crime. There is also agreement that two robberies 
are worse than one. To the extent that there is popular disagreement about the ways in which crimes are 
sanctioned, it tends to be directed at the perceived leniency of punishments. However, in surveys where 
people have been asked to determine appropriate punishments for concrete cases, e.g. a robbery, a rape, a 
case of domestic violence, the public tends not to wish for harsher punishments. People tend, in fact, to be 
milder in sentencing than the control group consisting of currently serving judges. Leif Petter Olaussen, 
Hva synes folk om straffenivået? En empirisk undersøkelse (Oslo: Novus forlag, 2013). Flemming Balvig, 




not by itself tell us whether and how we ought to respond. The fact that someone has been 
murdered does not entail the justice of any particular response. Hume’s law forbids such 
inferences. ‘Is’ does not imply ‘ought’. In the same way, the fact that someone is poor does 
not by itself imply that they ought to receive financial support, nor does the fact that 
someone has committed homicide entail that they ought to be punished. 
A negative inference is possible, however. The logic of the concept of justice as remedying 
injustice allows us to infer that the response, Y, is only just if that to which it is a response, 
X, is the case. In other words, if we break down a claim of justice into two parts, an 
injustice X and a remedy Y, and it turns out that X is not the case in the situation, then Y 
is not a remedy in the situation. Consider the following example: Someone claims that it 
is just to deny women the right to vote. Why, we ask him? Because women are less 
intelligent than men, he claims. If this were a true fact, his claim of justice would be 
plausible; denying women the right to vote (Y) remedies the potential injustice (and unjust 
harm) of giving power to less intelligent decision-makers (X). Now, since we can show 
that it is not the case that women are less intelligent than men (if need be, we could find 
research to corroborate this matter of fact), we can determine that the claim of justice is 
false. Denying women the right to vote does not remedy an injustice and cannot therefore 
be called just. The ‘ought-claim’, Y, thus presupposes the truth of the ‘is-claim’, X. We 
might call this “The Negative Hume’s Law”: ‘is-not’ implies ‘ought-not’. 
Note that the ‘ought-not’ does not here apply to the act itself, but to the normative meaning 
that it is accorded. If an act is supposed to remedy an injustice that does not exist, we 
cannot understand the act as serving a just function in this way. There may, however, be 
other sufficient reasons for the justice of doing the same act. For instance, if a person has 
not committed a crime, incarcerating her cannot remedy the injustice of her crime. But it 
may still be just to incarcerate her, for example, in cases in which she poses an imminent 
risk to herself or others. If there are no plausible ways in which the act can be seen to 
remedy an injustice, then we can conclude that the act does not achieve justice, which 
means that the act is either itself unjust or neither just nor unjust.32 
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Note also that “The Negative Hume’s Law” applies to the concept of justice, and not 
necessarily to other moral claims. One might, for instance, hold that there ‘is-not’ a 
relevant difference between two beggars, but we cannot therefore infer that one ‘ought-
not’ give money to one without giving money to the other.33 As a matter of justice it is 
different, however, for example, when the state offers financial assistance to the poor. We 
can then infer that if there ‘is-not’ a relevant difference between the two beggars, the state 
‘ought-not’ reserve financial help for one without offering the same to the other. 
The reason why we can infer this comparative criterion for justice – what I shall call 
horizontal justice – is because irrelevant distinctions cannot be just. Put positively: 
Distinctions between acts, between persons, and between states of affairs are only just if 
making them remedies an injustice. If two groups can be distinguished from one another 
by the criterion that doing Y will remedy an injustice X for one group but not the other, 
then making that distinction can be just.  
We may, for instance, assert that punishment (Y) remedies an injustice for criminal 
offenders but not for non-offenders, because punishment remedies criminal wrongs (X), 
which non-offenders have not committed. In this case, there is a relevant distinction 
between the groups, entailing that it may plausibly be just to distribute punishment 
according to the criterion of committing a crime. If there were no relevant distinction 
between the groups, making the distinction could not plausibly achieve justice. It could 
not, for instance, plausibly be just to reserve punishment for offenders who are born on a 
                                                        
p” implies “It is just to do p because it remedies q or z or n and so forth”. E.g. “It is just to punish because 
it restores respect for mutual freedom, or because it creates a material balance, or because it cancels the 
offender’s ill-gotten gains and so forth”. The facts that make up the injustice are thus baked into the claim 
of justice (my concept of justice is thus a thick concept), so that if the facts can be denied, the particular 
claim of justice can also be denied. We are therefore not, strictly speaking, inferring an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ 
or an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’ when we make a claim of justice; we are postulating an ‘ought’ which includes 
an ‘is’. “The Negative Hume’s Law” nevertheless has a critical advantage over Hume’s law in the following 
way: A critic who applies Hume’s Law could say to the person who wants to deny women the right to vote: 
“You cannot infer the ‘ought-claim’ that women should be denied the right to vote from the ‘is-claim’ that 
women are less intelligent”. This would merely amount to a meta-ethical critique, however. The person 
who is criticized would likely shrug it off as irrelevant, since we make such claims in practice all the time. 
Applying “The Negative Hume’s Law”, a critic would be making normative, not meta-ethical critique: She 
would be claiming that what the person claims to be just is actually not just, considering the facts of the 
matter. 
33 Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is relevant here, for the latter entails that the duty 
to care for the beggar can be overridden by other imperfect duties, such as the duty to care for another 




Tuesday, since it is all but inconceivable that doing so would remedy an injustice for that 
group, but not for other offenders. 
Another way of putting this is to say that the default situation, “prior” to justice and 
injustice, is one of equality. Equality is neither just nor unjust; it is the baseline from which 
claims of justice proceed. When we understand justice as remedying injustice, it means 
that prior to or without an injustice, there is no justice, and vice versa. One cannot, in other 
words, claim that treating one group one way and another group another way is just if 
making such a distinction does not in some way remedy an injustice that is already present. 
Hence, prior to injustice, there are no just or unjust distinctions. And when there are no 
distinctions, everything is identical, i.e. equal, like the night in which all cows are black, 
as Hegel put it.34 Equality is thus the default from which claims of justice and injustice can 
be made. 
I will discuss this issue in more detail in the concluding chapter, considering among other 
things its implications for where the burden of proof in matters of justice falls, and how 
we ought to consider exceptions to just rules. 
1.3.2 Three criteria for critique 
In some cases, as we have seen, there is no plausible wrong that a proposed action might 
be said to remedy. More often, however, there are several plausible ways of understanding 
what is wrong in a situation, and these may or may not require different remedies. Such is 
the situation with criminal wrongs, as we shall see in Part I. How, then, can we know which 
of these is the one that we ought to address? I suggest three criteria that enable a critical 
evaluation of the theories that we will be considering.  
The first criterion is salience. As with all interpretations of events in the world, we may 
inquire of a theory of justice whether the meaning it confers upon the event accounts for 
the salient aspects of the facts of the matter. Specifically, does it pick out those features of 
the wrongdoing that stand out as the most important ones? Or are there other, more 
conspicuous or prominent aspects of the issue, and do these require different remedies? 
Formulated negatively, an injustice is salient when it cannot be ignored without onlookers 
                                                        




recognizing that the injustice lingers, i.e., that justice has not been sufficiently done. The 
opposite holds for an injustice that is not salient: Onlookers will tend not to recognize the 
injustice that the claim of justice picks out and will not react if nothing is done about it. 
The emotional reaction that we tend to have toward injustice is thus an important 
mechanism for identifying whether a claim to justice fits the facts of the matter.  
This criterion yields a critical potential in the same way as “The Negative Hume’s Law”, 
although usually as a matter of degree: Failure to recognize a certain feature of a situation 
as an important wrong tells us that remedying that wrong is not important either. If there 
are several wrongs, it will be more important, all things equal, to remedy the wrongs that 
are most salient. The right wrong to remedy is thus the worst wrong, i.e., the wrong that 
we perceive as entailing the greatest injustice if left unremedied. When there are competing 
claims of justice, a decision must be made about which action will remedy the worst 
wrong, and hence, be most just. This problem will be especially evident in Part II, in which 
we see that treating like crimes alike may conflict with the claim that we ought to take into 
account the life situation of severely socially deprived offenders, by reducing or abstaining 
from punishment in such cases. 
Determining the right wrong is not just a matter of considering the salience of a wrong in 
isolated situations. When our aim is to consider whether a theory is applicable generally, 
as a normative basis for our criminal justice practices, we can ask how the theory applies 
generally. Specifically, we can inquire whether the wrong that the theory picks out is 
salient not just in some instances, but for all relevant types of acts, e.g. all acts that ought 
to be considered crimes. Scope is thus a second criterion. Scope can also be considered for 
the punishment scale that a theory implies. We can ask whether the relative severity of 
punishments implied by the theory accords with actual punishment scales and with how 
we tend to view the severity of different crimes. Take the example of the freeloader theory 
again. It implies that the amount of punishment should depend on the size of the burden of 
self-restraint that the criminal has relieved herself of by committing the criminal act. 
However, much of what we normally understand as crime does not really involve a burden 
of self-restraint for most people. While many people will have to muster their will-power 
not to cheat on their taxes if they think that they can get away with it, most people do not 




presumably agree that the latter acts deserve more punishment than tax fraud, all things 
equal. In this case, the discrepancy of scope between theory and practice clearly speaks 
against the theory.  
According to a third criterion, consistency, a conception of justice ought to fit with the 
overall purpose of the practice or institution to which it applies. This criterion has a 
practical dimension: If the subsystems within a larger system seek diverging purposes, 
they may defeat each other. John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit give examples of this 
phenomenon within the criminal justice system and argue that a comprehensive theory of 
criminal justice is therefore requisite.35 A more philosophical reason for this criterion 
stems from Aristotle, who insisted that the just distribution of something can only be 
determined by considering the telos of the practice to which the distribution applies.36 In 
our case, it means that we can only determine which acts should be punished, how much 
they should be punished, and which constraints there ought to be on punishing, if we can 
first determine why we ought to punish at all. The latter question opens further questions 
of why we ought to have criminal law, and why we ought to have law in general, and why 
and how the state may exert legitimate power over citizens. Needless to say, it would take 
the entire thesis and more to answer these questions satisfactorily. I shall therefore be 
content to assert that I assume that a proper theory of retributive justice in this context 
must be consistent with the values of a democratic state under the rule of law: a so-called 
Rechtsstaat.37 We shall see several examples throughout the thesis of theories that to 
varying degrees fail to meet this criterion, for instance when they would entail punishment 
that is inconsistent with human dignity, that is paternalistic, that is insensitive to the degree 
of culpability of the offender, that subordinates the rights of the individual to the common 
good, and so on. 
                                                        
35 John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 12-25. An example of subsystems compensating for measures taken by other 
subsystems, can be seen, they claim, when measures are taken to limit the discretion of judges, which tends 
to increase the discretionary power exercised by police and prosecutors. 
36 This point is often shown by reference to the flute example in Aristotle, Politics, trans. B. Jowett, vol. 2, 
The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984). By which criterion should we distribute 
the best flutes? Aristotle asks. “[T]he superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior 
artist”, he answers. (1282b35). Why? Because that is the distribution that will best serve the purpose of 
flutes, namely the creation of beautiful music. 
37 See Jørn R. T. Jacobsen, Fragment til forståing av den rettsstatlege strafferetten (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 





This concludes my introduction to the main topics of the thesis and to the method that I 
will employ. It is time now to start to apply my negative approach to the question of crime 
and punishment. Most of the theories that I will be discussing fail along one or more of the 
mentioned criteria, some worse than others. This does not mean that these theories are 
entirely without merit, however. All of the theories that I will be discussing do describe a 
way of sanctioning crime that is plausibly just. They have a high degree of internal 
coherence. They are intuitively appealing, at least to some people sometimes. They pick 
out aspects of the wrongness in crimes that are salient under certain conditions. They are, 
in fact, the kinds of arguments that one will hear from ordinary people who are asked about 
the justice of punishment and alternative sanctions. All of these theories are thus part of 
the totality of reasons that the citizens of democratic states will give for maintaining and 
funding a criminal justice system wherein criminal offenders are punished. As such, they 
form part of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, when legitimacy is understood 
descriptively, as the citizens’ actual beliefs in the prestige and justice of the institution.38 
It is another matter, of course, whether the theories also form part of the normative 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Only if punishing offenders remedies their 
wrongs can the practice of state punishment be morally justified, and hence, normatively 
legitimate. This is the question that I will now consider in Part I: “The Justice of 
Punishing”. 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
Part I starts with an introduction to the topic of retributive justice (Chapter 2), which 
explains the need for a theory of why punishment is just, and not merely useful. The 
chapter also contains a section on the theory of retributivism, which I will argue has not 
been properly defined in criminal law theory. Chapter 3 discusses the wrongness of the 
material imbalance between offender and victim that a crime may cause. Chapter 4 
discusses the wrongness of the harm to the victim and how punishment might go some 
way toward remedying that harm. Chapter 5 deals with the undeserved profit that may 
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result from crime. Chapter 6 considers whether breaking the law is wrong in itself, leading 
into Chapter 7, which considers the wrongness of undermining the mutual benefits of law. 
Chapter 8 discusses the wrongness in freeloading on the mutual benefits created by law-
abiding citizens. Chapter 9 discusses the wrong in crime as an infringement upon mutual 
freedom. This is the longest chapter and goes into some detail on the penal theories of Kant 
and Hegel, as well as so-called ‘expressivist’ accounts of punishment. This ‘freedom 
perspective’ on crime and punishment, I argue, is best suited to account for the justice of 
punishing criminal offenders in a modern, democratic state. I therefore take this 
perspective as the basis for the further discussion in Part II. 
Part II discusses the possible injustice of punishing severely socially deprived offenders. 
After an introductory chapter (Chapter 10), I discuss in Chapter 11 the unfairness of the 
disproportionate likelihood of punishment that socially deprived offenders face. Chapter 
12 discusses the conditions under which the state may lack moral standing to punish 
severely socially deprived offenders. Chapter 13 deals with the disproportionate difficulty 
of law-abidance facing this group. Chapter 14 discusses mitigation and the diminished 
need for punishment when the offender is severely downtrodden. Chapter 15 considers 
restorative justice processes as alternative ways of doing justice after criminal wrongs. 
Finally, my concluding remarks deal with the justice of making exceptions, a meta-issue 














2. Retributive Justice 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this part is to articulate the underlying conceptions of justice used, implicitly 
or explicitly, to justify criminal punishment in modern democratic states.39 In addition to 
explicating different notions of just punishment, I aim to critically examine these 
conceptions and consider whether they truly do justify punishing criminal offenders. My 
task is thus partly descriptive and partly normative. Or rather, partly interpretive, partly 
evaluative. I will describe different conceptions of the justice of punishment and attempt 
to make sense of how these theories might claim that punishment remedies injustice. 
However, in doing so, i.e., in making sense of retributive theories, I will also point out 
which parts of the theories that do not work, in other words, when the theories make a 
claim about justice that, upon careful consideration, is not just, or entails a further injustice. 
Herein lies the critical, or normative, aspect of my approach.  
When assessing the different conceptions of what is wrong in crime and the way 
punishment supposedly remedies these wrongs, I will be referring both to moral and 
political philosophical arguments and theories, as well as to common intuitions, of which 
there is abundance on the topic of crime and punishment. I will also be drawing on actual 
penal practices, determining whether the different theories can account for common and 
cherished aspects of modern criminal law. Can, for instance, a given theory provide a 
punishment scale that approximates current scales and common perceptions about the 
seriousness of different crimes? Can the theory account for different degrees of 
blameworthiness and its influence on the just amount of punishment? Failing in these 
regards suggests that the theory is unsuitable as a stand-alone justification of current 
practices. It does not mean, however, that the theory cannot serve to explain aspects of our 
practices and our intuitions. It is also not given at the outset that current practices can be 
defended. A broad approach, which examines all of the most plausible theories of the 
justice of punishment, is therefore required.  
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paradigmatic examples, I am not asserting that criminal justice systems of other states are necessarily 
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I leave aside questions about the investigation and prosecution of crimes, as well as 
procedural issues pertaining to criminal trials and the execution of punishment, even 
though all of these issues may potentially influence the justice of punishment. I do not, for 
instance, discuss the rights of inmates and the standards that must be upheld if a prison 
sentence is to be executed justly. Nor do I discuss the merits of different types of 
punishment. The question here is more fundamental: Whether any punishment is just. A 
purely utilitarian approach to punishment denies the relevance of this question, but as we 
shall see, the justification of modern criminal law rests on an affirmative answer. 
I will start by clarifying a few key concepts and issues: What is punishment? What are the 
main strategies for justifying it? After showing the inadequacy of a purely utilitarian 
strategy, I will account for the way that so-called ‘mixed theories’ respond to these 
problems by combining utilitarianism with elements of retributivism. Since the 
justification of punishment thus depends on the correctness of an aspect of retributivism, 
and since, as we shall see, there is much confusion about what exactly the theory of 
retributivism entails, I shall afford quite a bit of space to a discussion of the essence of 
retributivism. After that, the majority of this part will be afforded a detailed discussion of 
different conceptions of the wrong in crime and the justice of remedying these wrongs 
with punishment. 
2.1.1 What is punishment? 
If punishment is understood broadly, for instance, as “negative sanctions for behavior 
deemed undesirable by the person punishing”, most of us can be said to receive and inflict 
punishment on a daily basis. We send our kids to their room for bad behavior; we ignore 
an annoying colleague; we uninvite a rude neighbor from a dinner party. However, such a 
broad definition is insufficient for the discussion I am undertaking here. My interest is in 
the ways in which a state-administered system of punishment is conceived of as just, and 
not (primarily) the ways in which we discipline each other in inter-personal relationships. 




by the state upon a criminal offender, in response to a criminal offense, and intended to be 
experienced as painful or burdensome.”40 
A few remarks on the choice of definition: Although the definition clearly distinguishes 
legal punishment from the informal types of punishment mentioned, much of the following 
discussion will be relevant beyond legal punishment. Indeed, someone wanting to justify 
to herself why she snubbed her disloyal friend or demoted her lazy employee will find 
much ammunition for her post hoc-rationalizations in this thesis. Although I will limit the 
discussion to the defined type of punishment, I acknowledge, as H. L. A. Hart did, that 
there are sub-standard types of punishment that share some of the features of the standard 
type.41 Instances of the broad definition mentioned may be so conceived. The point of this 
acknowledgment is to avoid what Hart called the “definitional stop”, which is the 
unfruitful strategy of settling substantial disagreements about justification by definition. 
For this reason, I have left out from the definition any reference to the expressive function 
of punishment, although some consider it an essential part of what punishment is, and 
exactly that which distinguishes punishment from, say, tax collection.42 Since not all 
justifying theories of punishment take this view, I designate the issue to the substantial 
discussion below. 
Finally, although informal punishments are sub-standard forms of punishment, this should 
not be taken to include sanctions that are informal but non-punitive, such as sanctions 
agreed upon through restorative justice processes. The last clause of the definition is meant 
to rule out such sanctions, as they are not intended to be painful or burdensome, although 
of course they may in fact be so. 
                                                        
40 This definition is close to being a one-sentence summary of H. L. A. Hart’s five step definition of 
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42 See for instance Joel Feinberg, "The Expressive Function of Punishment", The Monist 49, no. 3 (1965), 
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2.1.2 Justifying punishment: Two strategies 
The last clause of the definition also makes obvious the need for a justification of the 
practice of punishment. Many social practices involve infliction of pain or burdens, such 
as school homework or medical operations. However, punishment is the only social 
practice in which the pain involved is intended to be painful. The penal system is the only 
public institution that is created with the purpose of causing pain and suffering.43 Clearly, 
suffering is in itself bad. Punishment, if considered in isolation, is therefore an evil, as for 
instance Jeremy Bentham describes it.44 A justification is needed in order to say why the 
state ought to impose upon criminal offenders that which is, on its face, wrong and evil.  
There are essentially two ways that this can be done: Either by outweighing the badness 
of the pain of punishment with some other good that may result from it, or by denying that 
the pain of punishment really is bad. The latter strategy does not entail denying that pain 
and suffering is usually bad, but it denies that it is bad in the context of punishment. This 
is the strategy of retributivism. The former approach to justifying punishment is utilitarian. 
It acknowledges that causing criminal offenders to suffer is in itself bad, but claims that 
this isolated badness can be outweighed by the good consequences of punishment, so that 
the practice as a whole, including its repercussions for crime prevention, social cohesion 
and more, is good.45 
Of these two strategies I will only discuss the retributivist approach in this thesis. There 
are several reasons for this: First, as noted above, my task is descriptive in that I aim to 
articulate the underlying conceptions of justice giving legitimacy to the existing penal 
systems of modern democratic states. As I will argue shortly, a purely utilitarian theory of 
punishment does not and cannot supply the basis for such legitimacy. Utilitarian theories 
can at most play a supplementary role in addition to a theory explaining why punishment 
is just in itself. The latter notion, that punishment creates justice, is, as I will argue, 
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44 Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Prometheus Books, 1988), 170.  
45 Note that justification literally means “making just”, which, according to our definition, means remedying 
injustice. Justification of punishment thus involves theoretically making it just by remedying the injustice 
(or evil) of deliberately causing pain. And there are, as explained in the main text, two main theoretical 




essential for the legitimacy of current penal systems and, in my opinion, any morally 
acceptable penal system, either because it is seen as sufficient for the legitimacy of the 
penal system, or because it is seen as necessary, in addition to a utilitarian rationale for the 
penal system.  
Second, I limit my discussion to the notion of punishment as creating justice because that 
is where I believe we can locate its proper meaning as a social practice. Put negatively, if 
we conceptualize punishment as a purely instrumental means toward a separate goal such 
as crime prevention (as a utilitarian approach necessarily does), then we misconstrue the 
meaning that we usually accord punishment, notably the meanings of blame, repentance, 
symbolic leveling, respecting autonomy, cancelling ill-gotten profits and other meanings 
of punishment that I will address in this chapter. 
Third, since a utilitarian theory presupposes a detachment of punishment from the goals of 
punishment, its applicability depends on the empirical claim that punishment in fact attains 
its goals. Punishment then serves a purely instrumental function, unlike the function I 
propose where the goal of punishment is intrinsic to its practice. I do not deny that 
punishment may possibly serve such an instrumental function in addition to its function in 
remedying injustice, but since that is an empirical question I will leave it to be settled by 
empirical research. I will stick to that issue where philosophy only receives competition 
from other disciplines to the extent that they are playing the philosopher’s game: The issue 
of what justice is. Empirical research is only capable of mapping the opinions of justice 
that people hold. It cannot explain their meanings and critically examine their 
appropriateness. That is the game of philosophy, and since justice, unlike the instrumental 
function of punishment, is a necessary, and for some a sufficient, condition for the 
legitimacy of our penal system, a tall order is put to philosophers to deliver a theory of the 
justice of punishment. As we shall see, many have tried, with varying success. 
2.1.3 The problems of a utilitarian justification of punishment 
Before I delve into the issue of retributive justice, I will briefly explain why a utilitarian 
theory of punishment does not and cannot by itself provide the normative basis of penal 




Utilitarian penal theories justify punishment by its supposed positive effects on the 
happiness or pleasure of all members of society. The goal, which is net social gain, or “the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number”, is detached from the means, in this case 
punishment, so that the justification of punishment rests on its instrumental function in 
bringing about the goal. There are several theories of how punishment may serve this 
function, most notably through deterrence, reform and incapacitation. Deterrence is either 
aimed at the public at large (general deterrence) or the criminal (special deterrence). Other 
supposed beneficial effects of punishment are the satisfaction of victims and others from 
seeing the offender punished, and related to this, the oppression of vigilantism. The latter 
effect was most eloquently described by the Victorian judge James Fitzjames Stephen: 
“The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage 
to the sexual appetite.”46 
Either separately or as a whole, these mechanisms of punishment may supposedly have 
the effect of reducing crime so much as to offset the negative impact of punishment.47 
Although perhaps intuitively appealing, and certainly among the most popular theories of 
punishment, both among lay people, lawyers and penal theorists, these theories are faced 
with criticisms so devastating as to cancel the appeal of implementing a penal system in 
accordance with them. They cannot therefore provide the normative basis of current penal 
systems. 
The first among these criticisms is the commonplace claim that utilitarian penal theories 
might approve a system in which innocent people could be intentionally convicted of 
crimes. It is conceivable that under certain conditions more utility would be gained from 
punishing an innocent defendant than from acquitting her. It might also be useful not only 
to punish offenders but also their children and other family members, since such a policy 
would likely have a considerable deterrent effect.48 
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Second, a criminal law based on a utilitarian justification might prescribe draconian 
sentences for relatively minor crimes and mild sentences for serious crimes depending on 
the likelihood of the deterrent effect of punishment on that type of crime. Under Draco’s 
laws in ancient Athens even minor offenses qualified for the death penalty. So too, a 
utilitarian criminal law might justify the death penalty for, say, certain traffic violations, 
confident that more deaths would be prevented by such draconian sentences. Conversely, 
punishment may have little or no deterrent effect on crimes committed in affect. A 
utilitarian justification could thus provide an argument in favor of reducing or abolishing 
punishment in such cases. Of course, other utilitarian considerations may counter these 
considerations, for instance the concern of vigilantism. Nevertheless, the examples 
demonstrate that this way of reasoning about how to administer punishment is arbitrary, 
sometimes in accordance with our current punishment scales and sometimes not. 
Moreover, when these theories do get the answer right, they seem to do so for the wrong 
reasons. Specifically, they do not, unlike actual punishment scales, accord importance to 
just proportionality between crime and punishment. 
Third, reform may require long prison sentences for some offenders and a short or no 
prison sentences for others, which, again, results in an arbitrary amount of punishment 
relative to the seriousness of the crime.49 
Fourth, incapacitation may also justify a prison sentence that is arbitrary relative to the 
seriousness of the crime, such as when a person deemed dangerous is detained 
disproportionately longer than her crime justifies. If applied beyond a relatively small 
group of clearly dangerous offenders, such a justification of punishment would be more in 
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that the reason for punishing an infringement of a state monopoly of transport is to reform the offender ibid., 
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line with the penal systems of totalitarian regimes than democratic states under the rule of 
law. 
Fifth, a utilitarian justification of punishment cannot in principle account for the rules of 
excuse that all modern criminal laws contain, such as excuses due to insanity, infancy, 
involuntary intoxication, mistake of law, mistake of fact, duress etc. Bentham attempted 
to provide a utilitarian basis for excuses by claiming that punishment would not have the 
intended effect of deterrence on these classes of people, and therefore could not be 
justified. However, as Hart famously put it, Bentham’s argument is a “spectacular non 
sequitur”50. For even though the threat of punishment may not deter the insane, the young, 
the ignorant etc., punishing them may nevertheless deter others from following their 
examples. It may be perfectly consistent with utilitarianism to abolish the subjective 
criteria for criminal liability, making strict liability sufficient for all crimes. However, 
whether a utilitarian should in fact endorse such a policy constitutes, as always, an 
empirical matter. 
Sixth, a purely utilitarian justification of punishment is inconsistent with the respect for 
the autonomy of citizens that is essential to the modern democratic Rechtsstaat. The 
legitimacy of the rule of law depends on the citizens’ autonomous capacity to subject 
themselves to laws they could, hypothetically, have taken part in creating. The legitimacy 
of criminal liability under the rule of law thus presupposes respect for the autonomy of the 
offender. As the five preceding points have demonstrated, utilitarianism does not ensure 
such respect. If, for instance, a drunk driver is punished disproportionately harshly in order 
to achieve a general deterrent effect, then she is used as a means, and therefore treated 
without proper respect for her autonomy. To utilize punishment as a threat with the purpose 
of manipulating people into abiding by the law is incompatible with Kant’s categorical 
imperative, and can be likened, in Hegel’s famous phrase, “to the act of a man who lifts 
his stick to a dog.”51  
These six criticisms make it clear that if a purely utilitarian penal theory were to function 
as a normative basis for a penal system – if the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
were to be the guiding principle for the design of criminal law policy – then the resulting 
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penal system would look very different from the ones that we find in modern democratic 
states. Not only does that mean that we have to look elsewhere to find the normative basis 
of existing criminal law policy. It also means, I believe, that the theory is so at odds with 
commonly held notions of what the function of punishment ought to be that a purely 
utilitarian penal system, although it may conceivably be an ideal, serves most appropriately 
as a dystopia.  
2.1.4 Mixed theories 
Although a purely utilitarian justification of punishment is seriously flawed, it does not 
mean that utilitarian concerns are necessarily irrelevant to the justification of punishment. 
Many of us share the intuition that punishment should serve some good, for instance, that 
it should prevent greater harm than it creates. The question is whether we can satisfy this 
intuition and at the same time avoid the criticisms of a pure utilitarian theory. This is 
precisely what mixed theories attempt.  
This position was first introduced by John Rawls in his essay “Two Concepts of Rules” 
(1955) and developed by H. L. A. Hart in “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment” 
(1959). “What is needed is the realization that different principles (each of which may in 
a sense be called ‘justification’) are relevant at different points in any morally acceptable 
account of punishment”, Hart writes.52 For both Hart and Rawls, the general justifying aim 
of punishment – the reason why we ought to have a penal system – is its beneficial 
consequences. The reason why individual criminal offenders should be punished – the 
answer to the questions of who should be punished and how much, what Hart calls the 
question of distribution – is that they deserve it. In other words, utilitarian and retributive 
theories answer different questions. As Rawls puts it, “the judge and the legislator stand 
in different positions and look in different directions: one to the past, the other to the future. 
The justification of what the judge does, qua judge, sounds like the retributive view; the 
justification of what the (ideal) legislator does, qua legislator, sounds like the utilitarian 
view.”53 This view is also held, with some variation, by Andrew von Hirsh and Nils 
Jareborg, who were influential in the formation of the Swedish criminal law of 1989, which 
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explicitly states that the overall aim of the penal system is general deterrence, while 
limiting the considerations in the application of the law exclusively to matters of desert.54 
By including desert as a limiting condition for punishment, the first of the criticisms of a 
pure utilitarian theory (justifying punishment of innocent offenders) is avoided. However, 
whether a mixed theory can defend itself against the five other criticisms I have mentioned 
depends on how the theory understands the notion of ‘desert’. We may distinguish between 
what I will call ‘minimal desert’ and ‘moral desert’. By minimal desert, I mean the desert 
that follows simply from breaking a specific law. Granted that the law and the 
consequences for breaching it have been publicized in advance, a person who breaks the 
law can be said to have been warned and “given a fair opportunity to choose between 
keeping the law […] or paying the penalty”55. Desert then simply means eligibility for 
punishment.56 By including minimal desert as a side-constraint, a mixed theory can avoid 
potentially justifying punishment of the innocent. Minimal desert will not, however, 
suffice to ward off the other criticisms. If, say, a statute sets the death penalty for drunk 
driving, or declares that offenders will be held imprisoned until deemed reformed or no 
longer dangerous, a person committing drunk driving will then have achieved minimal 
desert of punishment. She would still be used as a means for a greater good, however, and 
the penal system so justified would appear very different from current systems in 
democratic states. 
A mixed theory, if it is to avoid the other five criticisms of a utilitarian theory, must operate 
with a more substantial notion of desert. The required moral desert, I will argue shortly, 
must entail a notion that something morally good or positive comes from giving a person 
whatever it is that she deserves. If we believe that a person morally deserves punishment, 
she is not only legally qualified for punishment; we believe that it would be intrinsically 
good that she be punished. We believe, in other words, that a value is realized in and 
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through the practice of punishing the guilty. Without this requirement, there would be no 
reason not to implement the most efficient penal system possible, and the result might look 
more like the dystopia sketched above than our current practices.  
There are, then, two main theories that justify state-administered punishment for criminal 
offenses: Retributivism, which views moral desert as necessary and sufficient to justify 
punishment, and mixed theories in which moral desert and social benefit are taken as 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient to justify punishment. The difference between 
retributivism and mixed theories is thus only the extent to which they view the notion of 
moral desert as providing the grounds for justifying punishment.57 Michael S. Moore was 
correct to state that mixed theorists are “closet retributivists”, for they accept the main 
premise of retributivism: that criminals deserve to be punished.58 
It is not yet clear, however, how we ought to understand this main premise of retributivism. 
What does it mean to deserve punishment? We have so far distinguished moral desert from 
minimal desert by the moral value that punishment supposedly realizes. But what is this 
value, and how does it justify punishment? As the following discussion reveals, there is 
much confusion, also in retributivist literature, about what exactly retributivism is and 
which claims are essential to it. Only after we have settled these questions can we hope to 
bring the discussion closer to an answer about whether retributivism or mixed theories can 
supply the normative basis for state punishment.  
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2.2 What is retributivism? 
 
We are justified in punishing because and only 
because offenders deserve it. 
Michael S. Moore59 
The quick assumption that the state is entitled to 
punish offenders who “deserve” it is one of the 
unfortunate banalities of criminal law in our time. 
George Fletcher60 
 
Retributivism is a theory that aims to justify punishment. Beyond this undisputed fact, not 
much can be determined about retributivism without argument. It is hard to find agreement 
even on what the basic claims of retributivism are, and much less on the question of 
whether retributivism is capable of attaining its goal of justifying punishment. I will here 
consider some common conceptions of retributivism. The problem with these conceptions 
is not, as I see it, that their claims are incorrect, but rather that they do not make clear how 
retributivism could justify punishment. The definition of retributivism that I propose will 
make explicit the link between desert and remedying the wrong in crime, thereby 
suggesting how we might overcome the much-discussed logical gap between desert and 
punishment.  
2.2.1 The paradox of retribution 
The terms “retributivism”, “retributive” and “retribution” are notoriously “imprecise and 
multivocal”, John Cottingham claimed in his 1979 article “Varieties of Retribution”. He 
proved his point by showing nine different ways in which the terms are commonly 
understood.61 Twenty years later, Nigel Walker followed up with “Even More Varieties of 
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Retribution”.62 John Mackie, too, reviewed different notions of retribution, identifying 4-
5 proper retributive theories, which he claimed were based on ideas that are “deeply 
ingrained”, revealing that people are “firmly wedded to retributivist ways of thinking”. 
However, upon closer scrutiny, Mackie argued, “all these attempts to make sense of the 
principle of positive retribution, as an independent principle with immediate moral 
authority, have signally failed.”63 We find ourselves in the situation in which our moral 
intuitions inform us that retribution is right, but these intuitions, Mackie believed, cannot 
be rationally justified. This is what he called “the paradox of retribution”. “The paradox is 
that, on the one hand, a retributive principle of punishment cannot be explained or 
developed within a reasonable system of moral thought, while, on the other hand, such a 
principle cannot be eliminated from our moral thinking.”64   
If Mackie is correct about this, the relevance of retributivism is seriously undermined. The 
theory is meant to justify punishment, not merely describe our intuitions. Punishment is, 
we remember, the only institution through which the state not only inflicts pain but does 
so with the intention of causing pain or a burden. The need to justify such an institution 
should be obvious. By most standards, simply pointing to the fact that we have intuitions 
about the legitimacy of punishing does not suffice to justify the practice.  
In fact, a common criticism of retributivism follows along the same lines as Mackie’s 
paradox: Retributivism is not criticized for lack of intuitive appeal; it is criticized for not 
offering an independent justification of punishment that could serve to validate our 
intuitions. S. I. Benn formulated this critique early on: “[W]hat pass for retributivist 
justifications of punishment in general, can be shown to be either denials of the need to 
justify it, or mere reiterations of the principle to be justified, or disguised utilitarianism.”65 
The same critique is evident in Hart’s claim that retributivism is “a mysterious piece of 
moral alchemy, in which the two evils of moral wickedness and suffering are transmuted 
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into good.”66 While Fletcher in the above quote laments the quick assumptions of 
retributivism as “one of the unfortunate banalities of criminal law in our time”. 
As the following review of common ways of understanding retributivism will demonstrate, 
this criticism is well founded. The concepts of retributivism used by retributivists and 
critics alike are correctly criticized for not making clear why we ought to seek the goals 
that punishment supposedly achieves.  
2.2.2 Retribution as payback 
The first clue to determining what retributivism is can be found in the etymology of the 
word: Retributivism is derived from retribution, which in Latin literally means payback.67 
Several theorists take the notion that punishment is a ‘backward-oriented’ payback for a 
past crime as a defining feature of retributivism. R.A. Duff, for instance, says of 
retributivist theories that “they all find the sense and the justification of punishment in its 
relation to a past offense”68. Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, likewise, speak of “the 
backward-looking, retributivist account”69, and Don E. Scheid claims “retributivism is the 
view that whether a person may be punished and, if so, to what extent are questions to be 
decided by reference to one’s past legal offence”.70 This characteristic of retributivism is 
useful in contrasting it to consequentialist theories, which are often termed “forward-
looking” because they take some future benefit, such as crime prevention, as that which 
justifies punishment. However, although the backward-orientation may constitute a 
defining feature of retributivism, it does nothing to justify punishment, unless it can be 
shown that backward-orientation is somehow good or right. The same, of course, goes for 
any other characteristic of retributivism. If that characteristic is to function in a justification 
of punishment, it must be viewed as something worth attaining or something we ought to 
do.  
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2.2.3 Retribution as intrinsically good 
Some, like Moore, locate the characteristic feature of retributivism in the claim that 
“punishing the morally culpable is intrinsically good.”71 Duff similarly attributes to 
retributivism the view that “[p]unishment is, once a crime has occurred, a good; and it is a 
good which the law must secure.”72 However, if punishment is justified by the value that 
it achieves, then it is unclear why this view is any more backward-looking than 
consequentialism. Indeed, several philosophers have noted that this intrinsic-good claim 
has the potential to collapse into consequentialism. As David Dolinko points out, even if 
a retributivist takes punishment of the morally culpable as an intrinsic good, she would 
likely not take it as the only intrinsic good there is. The latter view would entail the absurd 
claim that it would be better if a murderer were punished than if the murder never 
happened.73 Accepting that there are other intrinsic goods, then, the retributivist would 
have to consider how punishment would contribute to all of these goods. In short, she 
would have to conduct the kind of weighing of consequences that characterizes 
consequentialism. Benn’s criticism of retributivism as “utilitarianism in disguise” would 
largely have been confirmed.  
However, although this view of retributivism could be accepted, and it may be especially 
appealing to a mixed theorist, most retributivists do not accept that their theory is merely 
a species of consequentialism. An important difference, it has been argued, lies in the 
relation between punishment and the good that it achieves. While the good is only 
contingently related to punishment on a consequentialist theory, it is logically related on a 
retributivist theory. A retributivist thus views the good of punishment as intrinsic to its 
practice – the goal is achieved in and through punishment. The practice is autotelic, to use 
Aristotelian terms. For a consequentialist, on the other hand, the good is extrinsic, entailing 
that it may or may not be achieved by punishment. Punishment is then a heterotelic 
practice. 
This distinction will not, however, by itself suffice to avoid collapsing retributivism into 
consequentialism. The fact that something is an autotelic practice does not justify it, unless 
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one begs the question by defining autotelic or intrinsic good as that which is justified. A 
consequentialist could easily concede that something has an intrinsic value, yet insist that 
there are other, more important extrinsic values that perhaps outweigh the intrinsic value. 
For retributivism to be different from consequentialism, then, it must, in addition to 
showing that punishment is an autotelic practice, demonstrate that the goal that it achieves 
is sufficient to justify punishment in spite of countervailing extrinsic consequences. In 
short, it must show that it can be right to punish, regardless of whether it is also 
extrinsically good. 
Before I turn to the most common claim about what the intrinsic good is that supposedly 
justifies punishment, I should emphasize that the discussion about whether retributivism 
reduces to consequentialism is inessential to the possibility of justifying the penal systems 
of modern democratic states. As argued in the section on mixed theories, what is essential 
is the notion that it is intrinsically good that criminal offenders be punished (that they 
morally deserve it), and not the question of whether this intrinsic good is sufficient or 
merely necessary to justify punishment. 
2.2.4 Retribution as deserved punishment 
What is the intrinsic good of punishment? The standard retributivist answer is that it is 
intrinsically good that criminals be punished according to their desert. “The good that 
punishment achieves is that someone who deserves it gets it”, Moore writes. 
“[R]etributivism is the view that we ought to punish offenders because and only because 
they deserve to be punished.”74 C. L. Ten likewise holds that “contemporary retributivists 
treat the notion of desert as central to the retributivist theory, punishment being justified 
in terms of the desert of the offender.”75 Mitchell Berman too acknowledges that a 
consensus has developed among retributivists that there is a “core retributivist contention” 
which he terms “the desert claim: punishment is justified by the offender’s ill-desert”.76 
However, the desert claim, if given no further explanation, clearly qualifies for Benn’s 
criticism that retributive theories are either denials of the need to justify it, or mere 
reiterations of the principle to be justified. The claim does not by itself explain why it is 
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that desert justifies punishment. “There is a logical gap”, Duff states, “between the claim 
that wrongdoers deserve to suffer – that it is good that they should suffer – and the claim 
that it is for us, or for the state, to ensure that they suffer.”77 It is, in the words of T. M. 
Scanlon, not obvious why punishment of criminals would be “justified simply on the 
ground that this brings their fate more nearly in line with moral desert.”78 Or as Dolinko 
says: “After all, the government, state, or ‘society’ does not automatically take it upon 
itself to give people what they deserve in other respects. […] Why single out precisely this 
one category of persons and insist that the state must give them what they deserve?”79 
The challenge for retributivism, then, is to explain, and not merely state, the link between 
desert and the justification of punishment. I will now consider the strategy for moving 
from desert to justification proposed by Michael S. Moore, probably the most prominent 
contemporary retributivist. As will become clear, I accept Moore’s definition of 
retributivism as the theory whereby an offender’s desert of punishment is necessary and 
sufficient to justify punishment. But I do not believe that his retributivist theory is capable 
of bridging the logical gap between desert and justification.  
2.2.5 An evaluation of Moore’s retributivist theory 
Moore’s theory is motivated by what he regards as the failure of other retributive theories 
in deducing the justification of punishment from a more fundamental principle: “The 
battleground of theory known as the philosophy of punishment is littered with the corpses 
of supposed general principles from which the retributive principle is supposed to 
follow.”80 He adopts instead a coherence view of justification, taking the retributive 
principle – which Moore defines as the principle “that offenders should be punished 
because and only because they have culpably done wrong” – as “first principle”, which 
means that it is so basic that it cannot be an instance of a yet more general principle. He 
states, “[r]ather, first principles are to be justified as abductive inferences from more 
particular principles and judgments.”81 Moore’s strategy is in other words to review our 
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moral judgments about particular instances of crime and punishment, and then determine 
what is the best explanation of these judgments. 
Moore asks us to reflect upon some examples of crimes: He mentions the story from The 
Brothers Karamazov of a nobleman who sets his dogs to tear apart a young boy in front of 
his mother – an act so gruesome that even the mild Alyosha Karamazov, when asked what 
the nobleman deserves, responds: “To be shot”. Other examples are of equally heinous, 
but actual, crimes: A young man who hammers his girlfriend to death; a man who finds a 
woman with a flat tire, who rapes and murders her and drowns her three small children. 
We could also add, from recent history in Norway: A man who for political reasons kills 
69 youths at a summer camp. Most of us, I believe, would probably agree with Alyosha, 
if not in method of punishment, at least in the judgment that the nobleman and those like 
him deserve to be punished. But a critic could respond: How can we know that these 
intuitions are about desert and not about the good consequences of punishing such 
offenders? Moore asks us to imagine a situation in which there are no non-retributive 
reasons for punishing in these or similar cases. He mentions Kant’s famous example of an 
island where the inhabitants have decided to leave and dissolve the society82 – in other 
words a situation where no future benefits would occur if the murderers in the prison were 
executed prior to departure. C. L. Ten similarly asks us to imagine a Nazi war criminal 
who escapes to an uninhabited island where 30 years later he is found leading an idyllic 
life. Under such circumstances – Moore aptly calls the thought experiment an 
“Eichmann/Kant combination” – would we not still think it correct to punish? Again, I 
believe many share Moore’s intuitions. 
Since Moore’s coherentist approach relies on the possibility of arriving at an abductive 
conclusion from our particular judgments, it is decisive for his method that our intuitions 
are reliable and that they are relevant to the types of cases for which the retributive 
principle applies. A critic could challenge the relevancy of the intuitions that Moore fleshes 
out by questioning the representativeness of his examples. We may have such intuitions in 
these and other extreme cases, the critic could say, but what about in more normal cases, 
such as tax fraud or carrying a firearm without a license? Dolinko made this critique and 
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concluded: “No such intuition would likely arise from contemplating, say, an Englishman 
visiting Los Angeles who, in the dead of night, with no other vehicles around, forgets for 
several minutes which side of the road he is required to drive on.”83 Further, a critic could 
contest the reliability of basing abductive conclusions on our intuitions by challenging the 
emotional basis of these intuitions. The intuitions could after all be caused by contemptible 
sentiments on which it would be dubious to base policy. Moore devotes a considerable 
amount of space to what he calls the objection to the emotional base of retributivism, which 
he mainly derives from Nietzsche. According to Nietzsche, the common urge to punish 
offenders stems from ressentiment, which is basically a cocktail of the emotions of envy, 
sadism, fear, cowardice, despair, self-righteousness and others. Punishment, upon the 
Nietzschean view, is essentially motivated by the wish to feel strong by projecting one’s 
own weakness upon others. “Mistrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful. They 
are people of a low sort and stock” – thus spake Nietzsche through Zarathustra84  
Although such an emotional basis for our intuitions would not itself amount to an argument 
against the truth of our intuitions, it seems reasonable to be wary of moral judgments based 
on contemptible, rather than laudable emotions. However, the virtue of the emotional basis 
of retributivism is inconclusive. Nietzsche himself noted that a lack of urge to punish could 
also stem from weakness; the courageous and strong thing to do could actually be to react 
forcefully against wrongdoing. Further, Moore identifies two virtuous emotions that 
motivate retributive judgments: outrage at the suffering of others and guilt when one has 
done wrong. The latter implies, according to Moore, that one perceives the justice of being 
punished.  
Whether retributivism is motivated mainly by virtuous emotions or mainly by 
contemptible emotions is difficult to determine, of course. It seems reasonable, anyhow, 
to conclude with Moore that the urge to punish may conceivably stem from virtuous 
emotions, and the fact that it may sometimes be owed to ressentiment does not exclude the 
possibility that our particular judgments usually have a sound basis. 
Moore’s approach faces a more serious obstacle, however. The way that Moore constructs 
the coherence approach, it cannot supply the explanation needed to bridge the logical gap 
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between desert and the justification for punishment. He does not supply an explanation of 
why it is that desert should justify punishment. For if the retributive principle is a first 
principle, as Moore suggests, this means that it is so basic that it cannot be derived from a 
more basic principle and must instead be abductively inferred from retributive intuitions. 
But what if someone doubts that these intuitions are morally correct? That person might 
acknowledge that the retributive intuitions are widespread, yet she might, like Mackie, 
attribute them to an evolutionary function, which she might take to undermine the 
normative relevance of the intuitions.85 In addition, the person may not share the intuitions. 
A utilitarian who sees no point in punishing unless it achieves some further good will 
hardly be convinced by the fact that many other people have retributive intuitions. 
Moreover, as Dolinko’s example of the Englishman in LA shows, there are cases in which 
it is likely that the retributive principle does not intuitively apply. When Moore infers the 
justifiability of punishment from widespread intuitions, he simply perpetuates Mackie’s 
paradox of retribution. The problem, then, is not that Moore is necessarily incorrect about 
the intuitions, but that his method of justification essentially gives up explaining why these 
intuitions are right.  
It is not clear, however, why we ought to take the retributive principle as a first principle, 
when doing so means accepting without argument intuitions that are challenged by many 
theorists who have given the issue much thought. A coherentist approach might instead 
argue that the retributive principle is a secondary principle, derived from a more general 
moral principle that we have reason to accept.86 Moore briefly examines this possibility 
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and points to a general notion of desert that applies not only to punishment, but also to 
property allocations and corrective justice. It is, for instance, common to make judgments 
about desert related to work, saying that someone deserves the fruits of her labor. Likewise, 
if damage has been done, we often assert that whoever caused the damage deserves to 
assume the expense of repairing it. A retributivist might thus show, Moore claims, “how 
there is an odd lacuna in our moral judgments about desert if the retributive principle is 
not accepted”87.  
This second approach is more promising than Moore’s first approach, since it, unlike the 
first, can conceivably yield a proper justification for the retributive principle. The question 
that we must pose is whether there is a common meaning to the concept of ‘desert’ that 
may: (a) illuminate what is meant by the claim that a criminal offender deserves 
punishment; and (b) show how we might determine whether desert of punishment justifies 
punishment. Before offering my own understanding of the concept of desert, I shall briefly 
say why Moore’s own statements about the general principle of desert do not help to 
answer (a) and (b). 
Moore explains the general principle of desert as arising from ‘secondary’ moral rights 
and duties. We have primary duties not to break promises, not to injure or kill, and primary 
rights to most of the fruits of our labor. However, we also have secondary duties and rights 
that arise when primary duties and rights are violated. For instance, if I break a promise, I 
have a secondary duty to keep my promise, even belatedly, or to otherwise ensure that the 
person to whom I have given the promise does not incur a loss due to my breach.88  It is 
breach of these secondary duties that warrants the judgment that I ought to be made to 
comply with my duties and others ought to be made to comply with my rights. “We 
idiomatically make this ought judgment using the word ‘desert’”, Moore states.89 It is not 
obvious, however, how the notion that a criminal offender deserves punishment fits into 
this general principle of desert. Moore’s answer is unsatisfactory: “We all have primary 
duties not to do the sorts of acts that malum in se criminal statutes prohibit. We also have 
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secondary duties to allow ourselves to be made to suffer if we have violated these primary 
duties.”90 But why is this a secondary duty? Why is it our duty in such cases not just to 
compensate and repair the harm done, but also to allow ourselves to be made to suffer? 
Moore does not offer a justification for this supposed secondary duty, beyond the claim 
that feelings of guilt might include the wish to be punished.  
Moore proposes another way of linking the desert claim of retributivism to the other desert 
claims mentioned: “The unity of the principle of desert is to be found in the common 
conditions of culpability and of wrongdoing (or in their praiseworthy analogues, of 
‘meritability’ and of ‘right doing’).”91 He also states that “‘desert’ means culpable 
wrongdoing”.92 Indeed, there is a sense in which the desert of a person who intentionally 
works in order to enjoy the fruits of her labor is analogous to the desert of a person who 
intentionally (culpably) breaches a criminal statute. However, the concept of desert is also 
commonly applied to situations in which there is no culpable wrongdoing (or meritable 
right-doing), such as when one judges of a downtrodden person that “She deserves a 
break”, or of a disabled person that “She deserves help to achieve decent living 
conditions”. Moore’s equation of desert with culpable wrongdoing excludes such 
conceptions of desert, yet without offering a reason for their exclusion. Further, even if 
Moore was correct in claiming that culpability and wrongdoing were conditions for desert, 
this would still not explain why punishment is conceivably justified as a response to 
culpable wrongdoing. When Moore states that desert means culpable wrongdoing, he is 
committing the error of confusing possible antecedent conditions for desert with the 
meaning of the concept. His theory thereby fails to acknowledge and address the logical 
gap between these conditions for desert and what we shall call the ‘desert object’, in this 
case punishment. 
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2.2.6 The meaning of desert 
The concept of ‘desert’ always points out a ‘desert object’. The verb to deserve is 
transitive, and thus it must take an object. It is part of the logic of desert that something is 
deserved, as in the sentence “She deserves a raise” or “She deserves a reprimand”. 
Specifically, a retributive theory must be able to justify that this something for a criminal 
offender is a certain amount of punishment.  
How, then, can we understand the concept of desert so that it can be applied not only to 
desert of punishment, but to the other mentioned forms of desert? The answer, I believe, 
is to view desert as shorthand for justice. To assert “She deserves X” is the same as saying 
“It would be just if she received X”. Hence, if someone deserves payment for a job, it is 
just if she receives payment. If someone deserves to pick up the bill after an accident, it is 
just if she picks up the bill. If someone deserves to be punished, it is just if she is punished. 
It is justice, then, that is the common value of desert claims – “the broader principle of 
desert” in Moore’s words – to which the retributive principle relates. It is justice that is the 
intrinsic good that punishment is taken to accomplish, the value that is realized when 
someone gets what she deserves. Infliction of deserved punishment, then, achieves 
retributive justice, or simply retribution, according the definition in Chapter 1. 
Presumably, this is a way of understanding desert that retributivists can agree on, as is also 
suggested by the common combination of the terms in the notion of ‘just deserts’. The 
question, then, is how this definition of desert can help us understand and assess the theory 
of retributivism? Specifically, how does it help us bridge the logical gap between desert 
and justification of punishment? Some might think that I have simply substituted one 
vague concept (justice) for another vague concept (desert). This is not so, for the concept 
of justice relates, as we have seen, to the concept of injustice, and it is this relation that 
bridges the logical gap between a person’s desert and the desert object. Let me explain. 
I have defined justice in the following way: Justice is remedying injustice. Applied to the 
current question, this means that an offender can be said to deserve punishment for her 
crime if we take punishment to somehow remedy the wrong of the crime. In other words, 
justice would be done if punishment of the offender remedies the injustice of her crime. 




justice is not done. The latter entails that, unless justice can be done in a non-retributive 
way in the given case, the wrong of the crime remains unremedied, which, of course, is 
unjust. Construed in this way, the logical gap between desert and punishment appears less 
mystical. For as argued in the introductory chapter, implicit in an experience of wrong is 
a desire that the wrong be remedied. By acknowledging something as an injustice we 
thereby acknowledge an imperative to justice.93 By acknowledging the wrong in crime, we 
thereby accept that justice would be achieved if the wrong was remedied. Hence, if 
punishment of an offender remedies the wrong of her crime, she deserves punishment (all 
things equal). 
Mackie made a similar claim about wrong action giving rise to a situation in which it is 
“somehow generally unsatisfactory if the wrong action gets by without any proportional 
reaction.”94 This, he claimed, is entailed in the concept of wrongness itself: “The central 
moral concept of the wrongness of an action includes […] the synthetic judgment that what 
is harmful generally and intrinsically forbidden calls for a hostile response.”95 Therefore, 
“the concept of wrongness […] itself includes the principle of retributivism.”96 As we saw, 
Mackie went on to deny that this could be justified rationally: We experience retributive 
emotions, i.e., emotions about the justice of punishment, but we cannot provide a theory 
to justify these emotions. 
The extent to which Mackie was right about this remains to be seen. He was clearly at least 
half right, in the sense that we cannot justify rationally the imperative to do justice; we 
cannot prove that something is a wrong to which we ought to respond. In this sense, a “leap 
of faith” is always required. Indeed, we cannot prove that there is value in the world, and 
hence wrong. However, if we grant as much – and we all do in practice: value certainly 
has a practical reality for human beings – then there is no logical gap between 
acknowledging a wrong and the imperative to remedy it. It follows from the very idea of 
the value of justice that a negation of justice (wrong) ought somehow to be negated. 
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The problem of retributivism, then, is not so much the supposed logical gap of the 
imperative to respond to wrong – this pertains to any theory of justice. It is rather the extent 
to which the imperative supplies a reason for the state to administer punishment. 
Retributivism is the theory that accepts the imperative to do justice as sufficient for 
justifying state-administered punishment. Reformulated:  
Retributivism is the theory that takes retributive justice as a necessary and sufficient 
reason for state punishment.97 
Mixed theories, on the other hand, take retributive justice as a necessary, but not a 
sufficient reason for state punishment. Both theories thus rely on the notion that 
punishment can function as a way of making wrong right. This must then be our next task: 
To examine the concept of retributive justice and determine whether it can, contra Mackie, 
be rationally justified. Only after such an inquiry can we hope to arrive at an answer to the 
question of whether retributive justice is to be regarded as necessary or also sufficient to 
justify state punishment. 
2.3 Outline of the following chapters 
Does punishment remedy injustice? As argued above, the legitimacy of our current penal 
system requires an affirmative answer to this question. A simple “yes”, however, is 
insufficient. The seriousness of the matter – state-administered infliction of pain – 
necessitates a convincing account of how punishment serves a just function. I will in the 
following chapters consider possible candidates for such a theory. I will do so by applying 
the negative method, via negativa, laid out in the Introduction, by which justice is 
understood in relation to its negative, injustice, for which justice is a remedy. Hence, 
answering the question of whether punishment is just means identifying conceptions of 
what it is about crime that is wrong, and explaining, for each conception of wrong, how 
punishment can be seen as addressing and correcting that wrong.  
The following discussion will take as its starting point different conceptions of the wrong 
of crime that I have reconstructed on the basis of retributive theories and common-sense 
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perceptions of the justice of punishment. The conceptions can be divided into two main 
categories, according to where they locate the wrong of the crime: in the material 
consequences of the criminal act or in relation to the norm that the act breaches. This 
distinction corresponds with Kant’s distinction between material and formal wrong, which 
I will return to later. It also corresponds to a distinction between retributive theories that 
view the just function of punishment as non-symbolic and those that view it as symbolic. 
Theories of the first kind emphasize the direct (or material) effects of the crime, i.e. the 
harm (or pleasure) it causes. Correspondingly, these theories emphasize the actual pain (or 
pleasure) that punishment causes. Theories of the second kind emphasize the message 
conveyed by the crime, for instance the superiority of the offender compared to others, or 
the lack of recognition of the victim. Correspondingly, these theories emphasize the 
message conveyed by punishment – its symbolic effect – such as the re-establishment of 
the victim’s recognition or diminishment of the offender. The material effect of 
punishment, its pain, is then relevant to justice only as the medium by which the symbolic 
message is conveyed. We will return to the contested issue of whether this particular 
medium is necessary, sufficient or neither. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 address material wrongs of crime and corresponding theories of 
punishment. Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 deal with formal wrongs and their corresponding 
theories of punishment. The list of aspects of wrong is not meant to be exhaustive. I have, 
for instance, left out all religious theories of wrongdoing. Although many people believe 
that some crimes constitute offenses against the will of a divine power, such theories are, 
for well-known reasons, irrelevant to the justification of punishment in a modern state. 
I have limited my discussion to what I take to be plausible theories of the wrong of crime 
and the justice of punishment in the context of a modern democratic state. Each of the 
conceptions of wrong that I discuss refers in my opinion to a significant aspect of what it 
is that is wrong about crime. In other words, each conception identifies a genuine wrong 
in (some) crimes. Further, I believe that punishment can potentially be understood as 
remedying these wrongs. Each theory is therefore, prima facie, a plausible theory 
justifying punishment, and cannot therefore be disregarded offhand. My aim is indeed to 
reconstruct each theory so as to make it as plausible as possible, showing, to the extent 




freedom perspective outlined there represents the most suitable framing of criminal wrongs 
and their just sanctions within the context of a modern, democratic state. The other theories 
are still important, however, because they identify aspects of wrong that are sometimes 
salient, and which, if not remedied, will cause injustice in the eyes of many people. This 
may sometimes speak to the justice of other sanctions, or for instance, paying damages in 
addition to punishment. By considering a wide range of perspectives on the wrongness of 
crimes, it enables us to also see the limitations of the paradigmatic response to crime: 
punishment. However, an advantage of the freedom perspective, when properly 
understood, is that it can incorporate some of these other perspectives. The material 
consequences of crime are important, for instance, because they affect the possibility of 
equal freedom. Let us start, then, by considering one material aspect of crime: The 




3. Material imbalance 
I start with the simplest, and also perhaps the most common, of reasons given for punishing 
someone. It is the answer you might hear when you ask a child, (or an adult for that matter), 
“Why did you hit him?” – “Because he hit me first!” We might doubt, of course, whether 
this is even a proper reason. But since many seem to believe so, let us examine how it 
might be considered one. Implied in the statement “Because he hit me first!” is a judgment 
about the wrongness of the initial act. This implied wrongness is the only way the 
statement could be considered a reason for him to hit back. The wrongness motivated the 
response. But was it a just response? Any response will not do, obviously. As I have 
argued, a just response must be taken to remedy the wrongdoing. How could that be in this 
case? 
If a person hits someone, he causes him physical pain and perhaps also embarrassment and 
psychological pain in the form of stress, fear etc. We might say that the victim’s wellbeing 
has been reduced from a baseline prior to the hitting, his status quo ante culpam. There is 
now an inequality between the parties because the hitter presumably retains his wellbeing 
at the baseline (I will consider in Chapter 5 the notion that the hitter gains from his act). 
By hitting back, the inequality is erased. The injustice that the unfair inequality constitutes 
is thus remedied. The parties now share the same, albeit lower level of wellbeing compared 
to ante culpam. I will call this the ‘balancing theory’, i.e. the theory of just punishment as 
canceling an unjust material imbalance. 
This logic is often applied to crimes in general. A criminal deserves to “have the same 
thing done to him as he has done to others”, thereby restoring equality. This principle, 
often called Lex Talionis, is likely the oldest principle of punishment known. We find it 
expressed in the close to 4000 year old Code of Hammurabi, which states: “If a man put 
out the eye of another man, his eye shall be put out (§ 196). If he break another man’s 
bone, his bone shall be broken (§ 197) […] If a man knock out the teeth of his equal, his 
teeth shall be knocked out (§ 200).”98 
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Strictly speaking, however, the Lex Talionis is a sentencing principle, determining how 
(and how much) a person should be punished. It does not specify for what reason the 
criminal should have the same done to him. One can therefore subscribe to the Lex Talionis 
without endorsing the notion that the just function of punishment is to re-establish equality 
of wellbeing between victim and offender. When Kant, as we shall see, adopts the Lex 
Talionis as sentencing principle, the just function it serves is to hold the criminal to the 
logical consequences of his own maxim, not to create an equal loss as that of his victim. 
Neither is Lex Talionis a necessary sentencing principle for a theory of retributive justice. 
Only if one subscribes to the particular theory that justice is done when the offender suffers 
the same harm he has caused, is Lex Talionis necessary as sentencing principle.  
The reason why only the latter theory entails Lex Talionis is that punishment’s just 
function upon this theory is its non-symbolic function of creating harm. Justice here means 
ensuring equal harm, quite literally, and Lex Talionis prescribes exactly that. As briefly 
noted, and as we shall see in detail later, other retributive theories view the function of 
punishment as conveying a message, for instance of the equal worth of offender and 
victim. Since there are several potential ways of conveying such a message, no exact 
sentencing principle is entailed by such a theory. 
As a consequence of the fact that the balancing theory is wedded to Lex Talionis as 
sentencing principle, common criticisms of Lex Talionis will also affect the applicability 
of the balancing theory. I do not, however, count among proper criticisms the often heard 
and rather banal assertion that the theory amounts to condoning revenge. How can two 
wrongs make a right, some ask? They thereby beg their own question. The point is exactly 
that there aren’t two wrongs; punishment is right, not a second wrong, when taken as a 
theory of retributive justice. The features of punishment that make it possible to view it as 
right, and that distinguish it from revenge, are among other things a) the notion that it 
serves a function in remedying the wrong created by the crime, in this case the imbalance 
of wellbeing between the parties, and b) its universal applicability.99 Someone seeking 
revenge would not necessarily accept this. “I am revenging my brother, I don’t care 
whether somebody else does or does not revenge their brother.”  
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Actually, as a matter of historical fact, Lex Talionis, ought to be understood not as a 
justification for revenge, but as an attempt to curtail revenge. In times and places where 
blood feuds ravaged, the notion of an eye for an eye functioned as a limiting principle: 
only an eye for an eye. Or, only one brother for one brother. Not the entire male population 
of the rivaling clan. Lex Talionis achieves this limiting effect by locating the wrong in the 
act itself, and not, for instance, in the symbolic affront it represents to the aggrieved party’s 
status, or to the dignity of her family or clan. As a consequence, Lex Talionis promotes an 
egalitarian ideal of justice: an eye is an eye, no matter who’s eye it is. Whether the offender 
is rich or poor, or whether the victim has high or low status – by focusing on the act itself, 
status differences become irrelevant. With Lex Talionis justice is blind. 
However, blindness is also the source of problems for the theory. What if a rich man steals 
$ 100 from a poor man, should he in turn be robbed of $ 100? Such a sum means nothing 
to him, yet it means a lot to the poor man. And what if the eye-poker is one-eyed? An eye 
for an eye would cause a greater harm to him than he has caused, making him completely 
blind, as opposed to only half blind. The problem then, if justice is blind to such individual 
differences, is that injustice follows.  
Perhaps this can be avoided by amending the theory slightly: It is not an eye for an eye per 
se, but the harm of an eye for the harm of an eye. Kant uses this understanding of the Lex 
Talionis to argue that someone of high standing who causes “verbal injury” to someone of 
lower class, ought not merely to pay a fine, but should be compelled to apologize publicly 
and kiss the hand of the man of lower class, for this would cause a similar “hurt done to 
his pride”.100 Likewise, if he commits violence against someone socially inferior to him, 
solitary confinement involving hardship is required, because “in addition to the discomfort 
he undergoes, the offender’s vanity would be painfully affected.”101 
This understanding of the principle would allow for a degree of sensitivity to the specific 
context, avoiding some of the most conspicuous instances of accompanying injustice. 
There is, however, a disadvantage of abandoning the simple principle of equivalence of 
act for a principle of equivalence of harm. The former equivalence is easy to determine, 
whereas the latter raises the problem of commensurability between the harms of crime and 
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the harms of punishment. How might we compare, for instance, the harm of being sexually 
harassed and the harm of serving time in prison? 
Alan H. Goldman suggests a solution: “Equivalence here is to be measured in terms of 
some average or normal preference scale, much like the one used by the utilitarian when 
comparing and equating utilities and disutilities.”102 “One right or set of rights is equivalent 
to another for these purposes when an average preference scale registers indifference 
between the loss of either the one or the other.”103 Applied to equivalence of harm 
(equivalence of rights being the topic of a later chapter): The harm of punishment is 
equivalent to the harm of crime when the average person is indifferent to which he suffers. 
We might, for instance, conduct surveys to find out how much punishment is required to 
reach the point at which the average person would rather prefer to be the victim of a crime 
than to be the receiver of punishment. Needless to say, there are great epistemic problems 
with this scheme. How could we expect people to have anywhere near a realistic 
understanding of the pain resulting from a type of crime they have never experienced? And 
are we able to realistically imagine what it is like to serve time in prison? Presumably one’s 
experience would depend on why one is imprisoned (both in terms of one’s status among 
the prisoners – sexual offenders, for instance, are often placed lowest in the pecking order 
– and in terms of one’s own struggles with guilt and psychological trauma), what terms 
and material conditions one is serving under, and what one is confined from (presumably, 
serving time might be experienced quite differently for a parent of five than for somebody 
without dependents on the outside). Determining the average pain of these experiences is 
difficult, to say the least. 
We might grant, however, that balancing harm is roughly conceivable on this preference-
balancing scheme. There is a greater problem connected with the theory, however. The 
sole emphasis on balancing harm excludes from taking into account an aspect of 
wrongdoing of undeniable significance in the context of modern criminal law. That aspect 
is the subjective element of wrongdoing, the offender’s mens rea, literally his “guilty 
mind”. “An eye for an eye” obscures the important difference there is between a case where 
a person meticulously plots and executes a plan to cut out somebody’s eye, and another 
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case where the same harm is done, but caused by accidentally slipping on a banana peel 
with a pair of scissors in hand. To treat these two cases as if they were equally deserving 
of punishment not only goes against the most common views on moral responsibility and 
precludes us from noticing the symbolic aspects of crime and punishment. It also renders 
this conception of retributive justice unsuitable as a theory justifying current penal 
practices, as it would not be able to account for the ubiquitous distinctions made by the 
subjective element of wrongdoing in defining crimes and their associated punishment 
levels.104 A criminal law based solely on strict liability, as this theory would entail, is 
conceivable, of course, although hardly desirable. A sense of precariousness would likely 
spread among citizens knowing that the intent to abide by the law is insufficient, and that 
any unlucky circumstance could render them liable for punishment.105 
Even though this conception of the wrong in crime is clearly deficient, it does not mean 
that it is entirely irrelevant. It picks out, I believe, one aspect of the wrongness of crime 
that, whenever present, cannot justly be ignored; namely, the imbalance that crime often 
creates. Crime is not wrong merely because the victim is harmed or because the offender 
gains from it; crime is also wrong because it creates an inequality between the parties, an 
inequality that is unjust in itself. Lowering the offender by the same amount as the victim 
thus remedies at least one aspect of the wrong in crime. As Nietzsche put it: “Shared 
injustice is half justice.”106 Let us now turn to other theories in search of the remaining 
half. 
 
                                                        
104 It will not suffice either to merely add the subjective element to the objective harm and propose that 
justice means balancing [harm of punishment] with [harm + subjective guilt of crime]. The 
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4. Harm to the victim 
If we grant the point made in the last paragraph, that crime may create a material imbalance 
that is unjust in itself, the question nevertheless remains whether this injustice is significant 
enough to prioritize lowering the offender down to the level of the victim. The person 
whose wellbeing is brought down by the crime would, it seems, have a greater interest in 
being restored to her own status quo ante culpam rather than in creating a new equality at 
a lower level.107 She would, in other words, be less concerned with the horizontal 
imbalance relative to the offender than with her own vertical imbalance, that is, the 
discrepancy relative to her own starting point due to the loss caused by the crime.108 If the 
harm can be repaired, or if compensation would help to alleviate the injury, then 
presumably that would be the victim’s priority. This, however, speaks to the justice of civil 
damages for harm. Is it also a reason for punishment?  
The latter would require that the wellbeing/harm-relation between victim and offender be 
a zero-sum game, where one party’s suffering harm relieves or protects the other from 
harm. In such a situation the harm to the offender could be justified by the comparative 
fairness of her harm to that of the victim. If harm is inevitable, then surely it is fairer that 
the person responsible for creating the harm be the one to suffer it, rather than an innocent 
person. Put negatively: The injustice would be greater if harm was distributed arbitrarily 
rather than according to fault. Joel Feinberg calls this “weak retributivism”. “The principle 
simply asserts the moral priority, ceteris paribus, of the innocent party. Put most pithily, 
it is the principle that fault forfeits first, if forfeit there must be.”109 
Again, the relevance for civil damages is clear. But how might we conceive the usual kinds 
of punishment, such as imprisonment, as offsetting the loss for the victim? Take the 
situation where an offender is deemed dangerous to another person or to society in general. 
Here we could say that loss is ‘inevitable’, either in the form of the offender’s loss of 
freedom or a future victim’s harm. The principle of weak retributivism would then justify 
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the dangerous person’s imprisonment, as it would be fairer that she, rather than the 
innocent party, suffer the consequences of the fact that she poses a risk to others.  
However, it is notoriously difficult to assess the risk somebody poses to others. If a person 
deemed dangerous turns out not to be dangerous, then loss would not be inevitable, and 
the justification for incapacitation fails. A common critique of incapacitation is thus that it 
entails a risk of generating false positives.110 The more broadly the theory is applied, the 
more likely it is that some of the people who are assumed dangerous and therefore 
incapacitated would not have offended if not incapacitated. On the other hand, one could 
argue from the principle of weak retributivism itself that the uncertainty related to risk 
assessment should not count against the innocent parties. Here, as elsewhere, they get the 
benefit of the doubt. A person who has committed numerous or especially serious crimes, 
one could argue, has forfeited the benefit of doubt with regard to his disposition to do such 
acts. 
Note that this is not a utilitarian justification for incapacitation. The point is not that the 
pain of future crimes outweighs the pain of imprisonment. The point is that the person at 
fault deserves the pain more than the innocent party. Weak retributivism is thus a theory 
of distributive justice. Granted that harm is indeed inevitable, such a theory can provide a 
sufficient reason for imprisonment. The theory may thus be able to provide a rationale for 
some standard sentencing practices, such as the recidivist premium.111 However, most 
offenders are not dangerous in the required sense, where harm to others is all but inevitable 
if they are not imprisoned. The theory is therefore irrelevant to the vast majority of crimes. 
And not only is the theory thus not inclusive enough; it is also too inclusive. The rationale 
for incapacitation would apply even when a dangerous person had not already committed 
a crime. The principle of weak retributivism is therefore not so much a justification for 
punishment as a justification for incapacitation of any dangerous person, including, for 
instance, those suffering from certain mental diseases. Punishment, we remember, is per 
definition a response to an offense. Just punishment is a remedy for (an aspect of) the 
wrong of the offense. Looking closer, we see that incapacitation is no such remedy; in fact, 
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the wrong of the offense is irrelevant to this theory – only inevitable future harm counts in 
a weak retributivist justification for imprisonment. 
How, then, are we to conceive of a theory where punishment serves to alleviate the harm 
caused by the offense, not potential harm? Such a theory, in order to be a genuine 
retributive theory, must also be distinguishable from a theory of compensatory or 
corrective justice. It is not enough, then, that the burden inflicted on the offender should 
alleviate the victim’s loss. The burden must also be “intended to be experienced as painful 
or burdensome”, as the definition of punishment states. In a retributive theory, the intended 
suffering of the offender is thus a necessary condition for justice. In a compensatory theory 
the suffering is merely contingent. If, say, the victim suffers a loss of $ 100, a compensation 
of $ 100 would cancel her loss. To have to pay $ 100 might be a burden to the offender, 
but it could also be the case that her parents or an unknown admirer decided to take the 
loss for her. Compensatory justice would still be done, regardless of whether the offender 
experienced it as painful.  
For retributive justice, the offender’s suffering punishment plays an essential role in 
remedying wrong. I will here concentrate on a straightforward, non-symbolic way in which 
the offender’s suffering can be understood as remedying the victim’s harm. The victim 
may simply take pleasure in seeing the offender punished. Regardless of why this pleasure 
occurs, it may be conceived as serving a just function in alleviating (some of) the harm 
suffered by the victim. Punishment might, upon this view, give the victim satisfaction 
equivalent to the grievance caused by the crime, thereby restoring him back to status quo 
ante culpam.  
Note again that this is not utilitarianism in disguise. The kind of “satisfaction theory”112 
here discussed must be distinguished from the similar utilitarian theory whereupon the 
pain of punishment would be justified if it were outweighed by the pleasure it gave victims 
and others, much like the suffering of gladiators might cause so much joy to the audience 
that the total amount of happiness might be positive. The retributive satisfaction theory 
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does not argue that the total amount of happiness will be positive, but merely that the 
satisfaction experienced by the victim remedies the harm she has unjustly suffered. 
It is highly dubious, of course, whether the amount of satisfaction gained from seeing the 
offender punished comes even close to alleviating the harm of most crimes. To establish 
that it could, we would need a way to determine when satisfaction outweighed the harm 
of the crime. Goldman’s average preference scales could in theory provide the method. 
However, the exclusive focus on pleasure over pain seems even more out of place here. 
Imagine the indifference level being reached when a person reasons, “I experience such 
an intense satisfaction from seeing my rapist suffer that I now feel that I break even, 
pleasure-wise.” Not only does this grievance-satisfaction frame clearly fail to grasp an 
essential part of what constitutes the wrong of rape. Even if we did accept this ‘economic’ 
framework, we would have to conclude that the cost of the benefit is high. Presumably, if 
there is a direct link between the amount of punishment suffered and the amount of 
satisfaction of the victim (itself a highly dubious presumption), the punishment for rape 
would have to be harsh in order to outweigh the large pain it causes – too harsh, one could 
argue. Or so does Bentham, although within his utilitarian framework. “Vindictive 
satisfaction”, as he calls the pleasure that injured parties take in the punishment of their 
wrongdoers, can never amount to much compared to the cost of producing it. “No such 
pleasure is ever produced by punishment as can be equivalent to the pain.”113 Bentham is 
talking about the pain of punishment, and not as we are here, the pain of crime. 
Nevertheless, his warning that the effect upon the victim is little compared to its cost is 
relevant to the question of whether grievance-satisfaction ought to be a matter of 
retributive justice. 
A related question regarding the morality of alleviating harm through punishment concerns 
the virtue or vice of vindictive satisfaction. Is the desired satisfaction also desirable? Recall 
the discussion above, in relation to Nietzsche and Moore, about the virtue of retributive 
emotions. If, as Nietzsche claimed, the urge to punish stems from ressentiment, one might 
conclude not only that satisfaction of the desire is morally unworthy of our pursuit. We 
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might also speculate that its short-term beneficial consequences in the form of vindictive 
satisfaction might be outweighed by its long-term harmful consequences for our character 
and peace of mind. If so, we will have undermined the premise of the satisfaction theory, 
that vindictive satisfaction constitutes a good for the victim. 
This line of reasoning is often invoked as an argument for the virtue of forgiveness. 
Forgiveness, understood as the forswearing of resentment or similar negative emotions 
toward a wrongdoer, is usually perceived in the philosophical literature and elsewhere as 
a good for both giver and receiver.114 For wrongdoers it may facilitate the overcoming of 
destructive attitudes such as self-loathing and excessive feelings of guilt. For victims, 
carrying feelings of hatred, resentment, vindictiveness and the like over a long time may 
be detrimental to their wellbeing. That such emotions may be bad for us sometimes, does 
not, however, mean that they are always bad. Resentment, Murphy argues, constitutes an 
emotional defense of our self-respect:  
[A] too ready tendency to forgive may properly be regarded as a vice 
because it may be a sign that one lacks respect for oneself. Not to have what 
Peter Strawson calls the “reactive attitude” of resentment when our rights 
are violated is to convey – emotionally – either that we do not think we have 
rights or that we do not take our rights very seriously.115  
Sometimes, then, it may not only be understandable to retain one’s resentment toward a 
wrongdoer; it may be appropriate. Presumably, if resentment can be good, then vindictive 
satisfaction when retributive justice is done may also be good. Murphy argues: “If it is 
morally permissible intentionally to do X (under a certain description), then it is surely 
permissible to desire to do X (under the same description).”116 Put differently, if 
punishment is desirable, then the desire to punish is also desirable. If this desirable desire 
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is fulfilled, that constitutes a good for the victim who holds this desire. The victim’s loss 
is thus alleviated by the satisfaction she receives from having her desire for punishment 
met. 
To take this as a justification for the retributive satisfaction theory would, however, amount 
to a circular argument. Punishment would be just because it satisfies a desirable desire; the 
desire would be desirable because punishment is just. In sum, desire would be desirable 
because desired. To escape from this vicious circle, we would need an independent 
argument for either the justice of punishment or for the desirability of vindictive 
satisfaction. The retributive satisfaction theory cannot, therefore, stand on its own. If it can 
be shown independently that punishment is (sometimes) just, then Murphy’s point that we 
might appropriately take pleasure in seeing justice done, seems valid. The satisfaction 
theory might then be taken as a supplement to another retributive theory. As such, the 
theory would account for an additional just function of punishment.  
The theory expounded in this chapter may thus only play a limited role. But we may 
nevertheless acknowledge that it emphasizes an important aspect of crime. Part of the 
wrong of crime is the dissatisfaction it creates for victims in the form of harm. Creating 
victim satisfaction is a remedy for this aspect of the crime and ought therefore not to be 
ignored when determining a just response to crime. Of course, there may be other and 
better ways than punishment to achieve and sustain victim satisfaction. In Chapter 15 on 
restorative justice, we will see that some surveys show victim satisfaction to be higher 
after restorative processes compared with criminal procedures. Following the logic of the 
satisfaction theory here expounded, empirical findings of this sort must count in favor of 
the comparatively greater justice of restorative processes. Nevertheless, satisfaction theory 
cannot stand alone as a justification for restorative justice either. 
Another reason why the scope of the theory of this chapter ought to be limited is the simple 
fact that not all crimes have victims. One might, of course, reason that dumping garbage 
in a river or trading on inside information affects society at large – we are all, therefore, 
victims. And even when a crime does have a direct victim, we could all be said to be 
indirect victims due to the undermining effect crime has on the norms of society. It seems 
far-fetched, however, to reason that punishment somehow offsets the loss we as indirect 




be difficult. In cases where a direct victim is lacking, therefore, the victim satisfaction 
theory seems largely inapplicable.  
Though some crimes lack victims, no crimes lack offenders – all criminal offenses are by 
definition perpetrated by somebody. The potential for a comprehensive theory of crime 
and punishment might therefore be greater if we shift our attention from the satisfaction of 
the victim to the satisfaction of the offender. That is, from the loss of the victim to the 
illegitimate gain of the offender. The following chapter will consider whether 




5. Undeserved profit 
Picture a drug lord on his yacht, enjoying the sunset off the French Riviera. Or think of a 
corrupt judge, raking in money for his fraudulent verdicts. Or a bank robber settling back 
to daily life, the money safely hidden away in his garden. What is wrong in all these 
scenarios? For one thing, crime has paid off. The bad guy has gotten away with it. The 
criminal has profited, if not literally in all the cases, then metaphorically. “By the profit of 
the offence is to be understood, not merely the pecuniary profit, but the pleasure or 
advantage […] which a man reaps, or expects to reap, from the gratification of the desire 
which prompted him to engage in the offence”, Jeremy Bentham says.117 “The value of the 
punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the 
profit of the offence.”118 As is well known, his was a utilitarian penal theory, emphasizing 
the need for punishment to function as a counter-motive to the profit of the offense.119 
Subsequent deterrence theories share this premise. There is a sense, however, in which the 
notion of outweighing the profit of the offence can be interpreted not (primarily) as 
providing a motive for law-abidance, but as remedy for the wrong in crime. 
Upon this interpretation, crime and punishment form a kind of price system, where each 
crime has a fair price attached to it. As H. L. A. Hart put it, “The pains of punishment will 
for each individual represent the price of some satisfaction obtained from breach of 
law”120. Though this may sound like an abstract theory concocted by a philosopher, it is 
actually an analogy that is common in our every-day language; a conceptual metaphor that 
structures our understanding of the concepts of crime and punishment.121 The way we 
normally speak about punishment shows that we conceive it metaphorically as a way of 
creating an economic balance, where justice is a form of accounting. The aim of 
punishment is accordingly to “balance the books”, to “settle accounts”, to “make the 
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offender pay his debt to society”. Such economic metaphors are so common that we hardly 
recognize them as metaphors at all. Consider the word “Schuld” in German, no longer a 
metaphor, now literally meaning both “debt” and “guilt”. 
In this version of retributive justice punishment has precisely such an economic purpose 
of accounting: Inflicting punishment on a criminal offender is a way of cancelling the 
undeserved benefits rendered by the crime, thereby re-establishing her pleasure-level at 
the baseline, status quo ante culpam. If a criminal were to avoid punishment she would 
receive a profit to which she was not entitled. In more popular terms: “she’d get away with 
it”, yet another common metaphor that speaks to the popularity of this conception of 
punishment. 
The notion of justice as accounting presupposes a theory of why exactly this form of 
accounting is just, in other words, a justification for the price system of crime and 
punishment. The system itself cannot supply the grounds for why the profit of crime is 
illegitimate, and hence, why removing it through punishment is legitimate. We will later 
look at a theory attempting to supply such a reason, the so-called freeloader theory, which 
is similar to the profit theory here discussed, though with a horizontal concept of balancing, 
comparing the burdens of all members of society. The profit theory, on the other hand, 
entails what we might call a vertical balancing of the offender’s pleasure and pain, 
correcting her illegitimately high pleasure level back to status quo ante culpam. Profiting 
from crime is thus not wrong merely because it yields an advantage vis-à-vis law-abiding 
citizens but because the ill-gotten gains of crime are wrong in themselves. This latter claim 
presupposes the notion that the benefit of crime does not legitimately belong to the 
criminal. It is gained at the expense of another person’s pleasure. The pleasure of crime is 
stolen from the victim. All crime is in this sense theft.122 The profit of crime is therefore 
undeserved, or unpaid for if you will, and hence comes with the price of punishment. But 
how does an act entail “theft” of another person’s pleasure? If, say, two people compete at 
a game, we could say that pleasure is transferred from the loser to the winner, but this 
could hardly be called theft, and cannot as a consequence justify punishment of the winner. 
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A theory of legitimate criminalization is required, and the notion of crime as theft cannot 
supply such a theory, but rather presupposes it.  
The same can be said of all three theories of the wrong in crime discussed so far. None of 
them establish the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate harm, but presuppose it 
when determining the just reaction to illegitimate harm. If they were supplemented by an 
external principle of criminalization, for instance Mill’s harm principle, they could 
potentially account for the justice of punishing acts that are thereby defined as crimes. The 
claim of the profit theory could thus be formulated conditionally: If acts that typically are 
criminalized in a modern democratic state are perceived as wrong, it is because they entail 
an illegitimate theft of pleasure from another person, and this is the reason why punishment 
serves a just function. 
In order to evaluate this claim, we must consider whether typical crimes do yield the 
undeserved profits supposed. For some types of crime, the undeserved profit is a salient 
feature, as we saw in the examples at the start of the chapter. But the profit theory seems 
ill suited to account for the wrongfulness of many types of crime. Where is the profit in 
killing somebody in a bar fight? Does a violent father really benefit from beating his kids? 
Does a recalcitrant youth gain from showing contempt of court?123 
Further, there is the issue of crimes that involve a lower degree of subjective guilt: Can 
you be said to have profited if you, due to criminal negligence, back your car over your 
neighbor’s foot? There seems to be a difference here from a case where you intentionally 
hurt your neighbor. In the latter case you would at least get the satisfaction of fulfilling 
your desire. Perhaps in the non-intentional case you could be said to have benefitted by 
absolving yourself of the duty to exact proper care when backing your car. But then the 
profit would occur regardless of whether your neighbor is present or not, in other words, 
regardless of there being a crime or not. Hence the profit cannot be said to be “stolen” 
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from the victim. Another explanation of the illegitimacy of the profit would thus be 
required in order to justify punishment as cancelling profit.124 
Relatedly, the profit theory is incapable of accounting for the practice of differentiating 
between degrees of subjective guilt when determining the appropriate amount of 
punishment. If the profit were the same for an intended act as for an unintended act, as 
well might happen, the same punishment would be required in order to cancel the profit. 
This point alone is enough to write off the theory as a justification for current penal 
practices. A similar divergence from current practices would occur with regard to the 
objective aspect of crime. Crimes that are commonly deemed more serious, such as assault, 
might conceivably yield less pleasure than, say, insurance fraud, and would thus require 
less punishment. 
Add to this the problem of determining how much punishment is required in order to cancel 
the profit of the crime. This problem, however, might conceivably be solved using a 
version of Goldman’s average preference scales. Punishment would then be seen as severe 
enough to cancel the profit of crime when the average person would be indifferent to her 
pleasure level ante culpam and her pleasure level after experiencing the pleasure of crime 
minus the displeasure of punishment. However, even if we disregard the obvious problem 
of the temporal sequence – experiencing pleasure followed by pain cannot 
unproblematically be assumed to “break even” – the solution is anyhow insufficient. The 
amount justified by this method would be too little to constitute punishment. Take the 
example of a person who steels $ 1,000. Confiscating $ 1,000 from her would bring her 
back to status quo ante culpam financially. To say that this constitutes punishment would 
be misleading. The offender would not have suffered a loss. She would merely have been 
prevented from committing a successful crime, just like a bank robber who is caught on 
her way out the door. Punishment requires more than prevention of success. But since this 
theory does not justify anything beyond removing profit, it seems to require that we leave 
the criminal be after re-establishing her situation ante culpam.  
In response to this problem a profit theorist might argue that there is more to the profit of 
theft than mere financial gain. There is the exhilaration of committing the crime. There is 
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the pleasure in doing as one pleases, a gratifying sense of freedom from societal 
constraints. This profit too requires an equivalent displeasure, in addition to the removal 
of the financial gain. Presumably, though, this would merely amount to an endpoint at 
which the criminal is slightly worse off than before the crime, hardly sufficient to 
constitute what is normally meant by just desert.  
I suggest another solution for the profit theorist: She might argue that crime is like an 
investment; it yields a potential for a profit that you can walk away with, that is, a potential 
for an unpunished gain. The statistical likelihood of getting a return on the investment is 
normally quite big, since most crimes go unpunished. This potential gain must also be paid 
for; otherwise crime would yield an undeserved profit in the long run. The investment, like 
all investments, must have a price. If, say, there is a 20 % chance of being punished for a 
crime, one might on average commit four crimes for every time one is punished. The gain 
of these four crimes would render the set of five crimes profitable if punishment for the 
fifth crime was only sufficient to cancel its profit. In order to ensure that a rational criminal 
could not outsmart the system and get away with long term profit we would have to 
multiply the punishment required to cancel each specific crime by the sum total of the ratio 
of offences to convictions for that type of crime, in this case by five. Crime would be 
unprofitable when a rational person would not bet against the law, that is, when pleasure 
ante culpam is greater than the pleasure of crime divided by the likelihood of conviction 
minus punishment (e.g. Crime Type X yields pleasure = 2, divided by 20 %, = 10, which 
is cancelled by a punishment of 10 units of displeasure). Thus, I suggest, incorporating the 
price of prospective gains solves the profit theory’s problem of justifying punishment 
beyond that which is required to establish the offender’s status quo ante culpam. 
Of course, applying the theory still presupposes the possibility of determining the profits 
of different types of crime. Average preference scales could theoretically be helpful for 
this task, though one would have to assume that people are able to imagine what the 
pleasure of vandalism and rape is like and compare that to the displeasure of the loneliness 
and shame of a prison sentence. Anything beyond an approximation cannot realistically be 
expected. Nevertheless, the economic framing of crime and punishment does have the 
advantage of rendering the values on each side of the equation commensurable to each 




experience of it, and assigning it a value in an economic calculation of pleasure, we achieve 
a simple equation for justice: Justice after wrongdoing = undeserved pleasure minus 
equivalent amount of pleasure. 
The high abstraction level makes the theory applicable in a wide variety of cases, which 
can perhaps partly account for the widespread diffusion of the theory. We might also point 
out that there is a close affinity between the profit theory of punishment and the tendency 
today of applying market logic beyond the market sphere. The economic framing of non-
economic issues seems to be characteristic of today’s Zeitgeist and is displayed in many 
areas of society.125 Whatever the reason, this much is clear: The theory points out an aspect 
of crime that most people recognize as wrong whenever present. Witnessing a wrongdoer 
resume his daily life as if nothing has happened, having enjoyed the fruits of his deeds 
while somebody else bears the cost, will trigger a sense of injustice in most people. 
Punishment serves the function of remedying this injustice. 
However, the abstraction of crime and punishment into tokens of pleasure and pain, while 
necessary for the notion of justice as cancelling undeserved profit, is also the cause of 
problems for the theory. Seeing crime primarily as a source of pleasure suppresses other 
meanings we attribute to crimes. Symptomatically, the theory cannot properly account for 
the importance of subjective guilt for understanding the wrong in crimes. Nor can it 
account for the fact that many crimes do not seem to be characterized by profit at all. 
Indeed, even when crimes do render an economic or hedonistic profit we can question 
whether they also render a more profound or “existential” profit. Going back to Plato and 
Aristotle, we find the notion that crime does not really pay off. Plato argued that “a man 
who is unjust, is thoroughly miserable”126, while the same can be implied from Aristotle’s 
definition of happiness as the “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue”127. Morality 
is thus a resource for one’s happiness, a habit that one is lucky to have been taught from 
an early age. To be a well-functioning, law-abiding member of one’s community is thus 
the truly profitable and enviable position to be in. As we shall see in Part II when looking 
at statistics on the group of society that commits most crime, Plato and Aristotle’s views 
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do seem to fit with the overall picture of this group. The criminal group generally shows 
few signs of profiting in any substantial sense from their crimes. Criminal activity is 
correlated with low social status, poverty, adverse childhood experiences, chronic illness 
and other signs of scarcity and deprivation rather than profit. Thus, even when a particular 
crime has rendered a profit, the overall impression of an offender may be that punishing 
him is more like kicking somebody who is lying down than like cancelling his undeserved 
profit.  
To conclude, the profit theory is deeply ingrained in our deliberations on justice and is 
relevant whenever somebody truly has gained from crime. But the theory does not account 
for salient aspects of many types of crime, and it does not fit well in situations where the 
offender is generally characterized by a deficit rather than by profit. The theory can 
therefore at best account for one aspect of why punishment is just and cannot function as 
a general justification of the practice of punishment in a modern, democratic state. 
* 
We have so far looked at three ways in which the material consequences of crime make it 
wrong; first, due to the imbalance it creates between victim and offender, second, due to 
the harm it causes for the victim, and third, due to the pleasure it creates for the offender. 
We have thus concentrated on the effects of crime upon the parties directly involved in the 
act. The wrong in crime has been located in the dyadic relationship of victim and offender. 
We have not yet considered how crime affects third parties, that is, society at large. Crime 
is also a breach of a norm, and the norm applies to all, and has consequences for all. A full 
understanding of the wrong in crime must therefore consider its effect on the entire triadic 
relationship of victim-offender-society. Let us start by looking at the idea that breaking the 




6. Breaking the law 
Does the law prohibit acts that are wrong, or are acts wrong because they are prohibited 
by law?128 Clearly, the first alternative, that law prohibits wrong acts, is correct. The 
theories we have discussed so far show but a few ways in which an act can be wrong 
irrespective of its status as crime. Some criminal acts, however, are not wrong in 
themselves, mala in se. There is nothing inherently wrong in driving on the right in 
England; it is wrong only because the law says drive on the left. There are, then, some acts 
that are wrong simply because they are illegal – hence, the second alternative is also 
correct. But in what sense are these mala prohibita crimes wrong? Does the fact that an 
act is prohibited make it not only legally wrong, but also morally wrong?  
If we answer this question affirmatively we will by implication be claiming that there is a 
(prima facie at least) duty to obey the law.129 Though this is likely a common assumption 
among most people, it is philosophically controversial. “Citizens have no moral obligation 
to obey a law just because it is law”, Moore claims.130 M. B. E. Smith similarly asserts, 
“although those subject to a government often have a prima facie obligation to obey 
particular laws (e.g. when disobedience has seriously untoward consequences or involves 
an act that is mala in se), they have no prima facie obligation to obey all its laws”.131 Smith 
asks us to consider the following situation: 
[L]et us assume that while driving home at two o’clock in the morning I run 
a stop sign. There is no danger, for I can see clearly that there was no one 
approaching the intersection, nor is there any impressionable youth nearby 
to be inspired to a life of crime by my flouting of the traffic code. Finally, 
we may assume that I nevertheless had no specific prima facie obligation to 
run the stop sign. If, then, my prima facie obligation to obey the law is of 
substantial moral weight, my action must have been a fairly serious instance 
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of wrongdoing. But clearly it was not. If it was wrong at all – and to me this 
seems dubious – it was at most a mere peccadillo.132 
The example shows an act that has no serious untoward consequences nor is mala in se. In 
such a situation, Smith claims, it can hardly be called wrong to break the law. If the same 
violation is committed on a busy street, however, it would clearly be different. The act 
would then put people in great danger, which is wrong regardless of whether it is 
prohibited. As Moore says: “The moral wrong is thus not so much created by the 
legislation as it is a result of there being an antecedent moral obligation of all of us to solve 
co-ordination problems that if unsolved risk harm to all.”133 Driving on the right in England 
is thus wrong because, given the existing, albeit arbitrary, practice of driving on the left, it 
would risk harm to many. Upon this view, then, even mala prohibita acts can be explained 
under the first alternative above, as constituting independent wrongs that law prohibits. In 
Moore’s words, “the passage of a law prohibiting certain conduct adds nothing to our 
antecedent moral obligations with respect to that conduct”.134 
Yet, when considering punishment for a particular act, the fact that the act is prohibited 
certainly adds something with respect to the justice of the punishment. Even when an act 
flouts a serious moral obligation of the kind Moore refers to, it is insufficient in a particular 
case to warrant punishment. An “extra wrong” is required, namely breach of law. H. L. A. 
Hart brings out this point by considering cases where there are no antecedent moral 
obligations not to perform certain illegal acts:  
[E]ven where the laws themselves are hideously immoral as in Nazi 
Germany, e.g., forbidding activities (helping the sick or destitute of some 
racial group) which might be thought morally obligatory, the absence of the 
principle restricting punishment to the offender would be a further special 
iniquity; whereas admission of this principle would represent some residual 
respect for justice though in the administration of morally bad laws.135 
 
Though the person hiding Jews from the Gestapo fares morally better than the law-abiding 
citizen of the Nazi Germany, it would nevertheless constitute an extra injustice if the latter, 
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rather than the former, were punished for hiding Jews. The reason, according to Hart, is 
that “[r]etribution in the Distribution of punishment has a value quite independent of 
Retribution as Justifying Aim”.136 In other words, restricting punishment to those who 
deserve it according to pre-announced criteria laid down in the law has a value irrespective 
of whatever other value that punishment may realize. The value at stake here is justice, of 
course. Punishing only the guilty is just independently of other just functions that 
punishment may serve, such as cancelling the offender’s ill-gotten gains etc. Hence, (again 
applying the negative approach to justice), there is an additional injustice to punishing 
those who have not broken the law.  
What may this added injustice consist of, for which the “residual respect for justice” is a 
remedy? Only those punished according to law can be said to have been duly warned. Only 
then does punishment appear as “a price justly extracted because the criminal had a fair 
opportunity beforehand to avoid liability to pay”.137 The added injustice of punishing a 
person who has not broken a law consists of the fact that she, as opposed to the guilty 
person, was not given the choice to avoid punishment. The possibility of making a choice 
is a morally relevant difference between them. If this difference were ignored, at the very 
least, a comparative iniquity between lawbreakers and compliers would occur. A 
horizontal injustice would arise, because those who have been warned and have chosen to 
breach the law deserve punishment more than those who have not made such a choice. 
This desert of punishment that stems solely from the breach of a criminal prohibition is 
what I earlier called “minimal desert”. Minimal desert is a basic requirement of the rule of 
law, as expressed in the legal principle nullum crimen sine culpa, nulla poena sine lege. 
Through this requirement, the rule of law protects, in T. M. Scanlon’s words, “the value 
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of having a fair opportunity to avoid falling afoul of the law”.138 One of the purposes of 
law is thus understood as safeguarding against the injustice of punishing people who are 
not given the freedom to choose not to be punished. Indeed, one might argue that this 
function is so fundamental to the concept of a legal system that without it there would not 
be a legal system.139 
This requirement of minimal desert is sometimes applied as a justification for punishment, 
and then goes by the name “minimalism”, “rule theory” or “negative retributivism”.140 
However, as several have remarked, minimalism cannot possibly function on its own as a 
justification for punishment, nor is minimal desert sufficient in combination with a 
utilitarian theory. As I noted above, minimal desert is insufficient to avoid five out of the 
six mentioned criticisms against a utilitarian penal theory. Unless we are willing to accept 
potentially wide-ranging changes to current penal practices, such as draconian punishment 
levels whenever they yield a net social gain, we have to presuppose a richer notion of 
desert. Desert cannot simply mean qualified or eligible according to a rule. We must 
presume what I called “moral desert”, where something morally good (i.e. justice) is 
realized when the guilty are punished. 
The following example by Richard W. Burgh will illustrate this point: 
Suppose a group of people are taken hostage by terrorists. Each person is 
told that if he attempts to escape, he will be beaten. Suppose further that no 
hostages are made any better off than any other hostage. Insofar as the 
terrorists restrict the beatings to those who attempt an escape, they act fairly 
with regard to whom they beat. Conversely it would be true to say that each 
hostage was given a fair opportunity to avoid being beaten. Contrast this 
with a situation in which the terrorists impose a system of strict liability. 
Each hostage is told that if he attempts to escape, some other hostage will 
be beaten. Now, it is, I think clear that the former situation is morally 
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preferable to the latter. Yet it is false that in the former situation the beatings 
are justly extracted.141 
If, as in the example, punishment does not serve a just function, the fair distribution of it 
will not make it just. If we presume at the outset that suffering is bad, it will not become 
good by bestowing it according to a predetermined rule. As Burgh says: “If people have 
the right not to be made to suffer, they do not lose this right by being given a fair 
opportunity to avoid suffering.”142 Hart was right that fair distribution does exhibit a 
residual respect for justice. But it is a horizontal justice, distinguishing between morally 
relevant qualities of those partaking in a practice and those who do not. The practice itself 
is logically prior to the principle of fair distribution that applies to it and cannot therefore 
be grounded on that principle. 
Breaking the law is therefore at most a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the 
justice of punishment. Put differently: If punishment does not remedy injustice beyond the 
potential horizontal injustice that would occur by indiscriminate use of punishment, then 
punishing a lawbreaker is like beating a rule-breaking hostage. Saint Augustine of the 21st 
century would probably have put it this way: What are states without justice but terrorist 
groups enlarged? 
The examples above, like that of running a stop sign on an empty street at night, show that 
there are instances when breaking the law is hardly wrong at all. And we can go further: 
There are instances, even in a well-functioning democracy, where breaking the law is not 
simply innocuous, but laudable, at least when done in the open, as a protest against an 
unjust law or ruling. Civil disobedience, many will agree, can under certain circumstances 
be not only not-wrong, but morally right.143  
Does this mean that breaking the law is not in itself wrong? Perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly, the concept of civil disobedience suggests otherwise. Consider the following: 
We do not always view civil disobedience as right; it is not justifiable whenever a law is 
unjust or whenever a more just result could be achieved by breaking the law. Suppose you 
believe homelessness is an injustice. Presumably, you could do more to remedy this 
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injustice by giving money directly to homeless people or by helping to fund affordable 
housing for them, than by paying the same amount in taxes. Would you be justified in 
making such a choice? Or suppose you think the law prohibiting use of marihuana is 
wrong, because using it does not interfere with the freedom of anybody else. Would you 
be right to flout this, in your (reasonable) opinion, unjust law? 
Arguably not. One reason is provided by what we may call the epistemological objection: 
You may be mistaken about the injustice of a particular law or about the effect you may 
achieve by breaching it. Part of the reason for adopting majority rule is to minimize the 
chance of making mistakes. You can’t fool all the people all the time, as they say. By 
ourselves, however, each one of us is susceptible to a number of biases, of being swayed 
by undue sympathies, of falling under the spell of a clever demagogue. A certain humility 
regarding one’s ability to determine what is just is therefore called for.  
But let’s assume that you are quite sure that a particular law is unjust and that your opinion 
is well-founded. Should you then breach an unjust law? Again, the answer may be no. In 
Rawls’ words: “The injustice of a law is not, in general, a sufficient reason for not adhering 
to it any more than the legal validity of legislation (as defined by the existing constitution) 
is a sufficient reason for going along with it.”144 
Why is it that the injustice of a law is not a sufficient reason for breaching it, even when 
doing so promotes a more just alternative? The answer must be that abiding by the law 
sometimes does have an independent value, and that respecting that value overrides the 
reasons we have for always maximizing justice in each particular case. The fact that there 
are certain necessary criteria for the justice of civil disobedience (a discussion of which I 
will conduct below) goes to show that civil disobedience, in quite a literal sense, is the 
exception that confirms the rule; or rather, confirms the legitimacy of having rules. Rawls 
makes the same point, I believe, when he says, “[t]he problem of civil disobedience […] 
arises only within a more or less just democratic state for those citizens who recognize and 
accept the legitimacy of the constitution. The difficulty is one of a conflict of duties”.145 
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Those of us who acknowledge that civil disobedience is sometimes right and sometimes 
wrong, even when the result of abiding by a law is unjust, implicitly recognize that the law 
itself can be a source of value, and that breaking the law may thus constitute a malum in 
se.  
Why it is so – in other words, from where the rightness of law-abidance and the wrongness 




7. Undermining the mutual benefits of law 
This chapter considers the idea that crime is wrong because it undermines the mutual 
benefits that are realized through law. The issue is comprehensive, encompassing a range 
of questions that I will deal with in three sections. In the first section I elaborate some of 
the valuable social functions that law serves. I have organized these under the headings, 
security, flourishing, solidarity and freedom. The topic is much discussed in legal 
philosophy and sociology, and, needless to say, I can only briefly consider some of the 
most important theories on the issue. The discussion of the first section will nevertheless 
suffice to make clear some of the ways that law attains value, and this enables us to return 
in the second section to the question I left unanswered above: What is wrong about 
breaking the law? The answer to that question is partly developed through a discussion of 
civil disobedience, where the wrong in undermining legal authority becomes evident. 
Finally, the third section, “Punishing for the Common Good”, considers the function of 
punishment in light of the mutual benefits that are undermined by crime. Specifically, 
punishment upon this view creates assurance that law will be upheld and ensures moral 
education of offenders. I end the chapter by discussing a challenge facing these two 
retributive functions, namely how to avoid collapsing into utilitarianism. Though both 
functions can avoid utilitarianism, they nevertheless assume an instrumental function of 
punishment, which means that they cannot provide grounds for considering punishment 
just in itself. 
7.1 The mutual benefits of law 
What would life be like without law? Would humans live free, as noble savages 
uncorrupted by civil society?146 Or would we live in a constant aggressive state, homo 
homini lupus, where life was “nasty, brutish, and short”?147 There is a long tradition of 
                                                        
146 The term “noble savage” has come to denote the ideal type of a primitive, yet good and happy human 
being. It first appeared in John Dryden’s play “The Conquest of Granada” in 1672: 
I am as free as nature first made man, 
Ere the base laws of servitude began, 
When wild in woods the noble savage ran. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau did not use the term (bon sauvage), though his view of man in the state of nature is 
associated with this idealized character. 





philosophical speculation on this subject, of trying to imagine life in a state of nature, prior 
to the establishment of a legal order; thought experiments and myths meant to illicit, via 
negativa, the functions of law by imagining their absence. A more empirical approach is 
also taken: historical research aimed at uncovering the driving forces behind the early 
development of law, thus displaying the functions of law. A standard historical model of 
this development, the so-called self-help model148, describes the stages of development as 
a gradual curtailment of vengeance and vendettas, culminating in what Max Weber 
famously coined the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. A motivating 
factor behind the emergence of the legal order is thus the insecurity and destruction caused 
by blood feuds and spiraling private vengeance.149 Incidentally, the same narrative 
underlies the well-known myth of the establishment of the Athenian homicide courts, as 
portrayed in Aeschylus’ Oresteia: Athena tamed the vengeful Furies, transforming them 
into the kindly Eumenides presiding over criminal trials. Thus, the state tamed the unruly 
aggression of the state of nature, transforming vengeance into retribution.  
7.1.1 Security 
Law, accordingly, serves the function of curtailing violence and providing security. But is 
law necessary for security? Historical sources cannot answer this question for us but can 
merely show that law provided security under the given historical circumstances. Could 
we imagine humans living in peace and security without law, if not in a pre-legal society, 
then perhaps in a post-legal society? If the answer is yes, then we have yet to find an 
answer to what is inherently valuable in law.  
One possible reply comes from considering certain basic facts about human life. We might 
argue, as H. L. A. Hart did with his “minimum content of natural law”150, that given the 
way we happen to be constituted as humans, law is necessary for our survival. These basic 
facts are: 
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i) Human vulnerability (we are easily injured) 
ii) Approximate equality (even powerful people are defenseless when they 
sleep)151 
iii) Limited altruism (making a system of mutual forbearance necessary and 
possible) 
iv) Limited resources (requiring the protection of property) 
v) Limited understanding of strength and will (requiring sanctions) 
If we were like shrimp, armored by exoskeletons, laws against battery would perhaps be 
unnecessary. If we were like plants, capable of self-nurture through thin air, perhaps we 
would not need property laws. But since we are not like that, and until we eventually evolve 
such capacities, a legal order with certain minimal features is necessary to ensure our 
security and future survival. Law is thus inherently valuable for us as we happen to be – 
geworfen, as we are, into this particular world. 
Even if for no other reason, law thus has value because it is necessary for security. When 
Rawls says that all constitutional arrangements “would determine social conditions that I 
judge to be better than anarchy”152, he is likely right at least in this regard. Even hideous 
regimes, such as Nazi Germany, provide a minimum of security, say, against being 
murdered in your sleep by a burglar. But this example also reveals that security is hardly 
exhaustive of the value of law. What Nazi Germany did not achieve, but which a legal 
order may contribute to, is our flourishing as human beings. 
7.1.2 Flourishing 
This understanding of the purpose of law goes back at least to the ancient Greeks. Aristotle 
claimed that the state may have originated “in the bare needs of life”, but that its continuing 
existence is “for the sake of a good life”.153 The aim toward which the laws ought to be 
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directed is “justice, in other words, the common interest”.154 Similar statements on the link 
between law and the good of society are offered by legal philosophers today.155 
If the purpose of law is our flourishing, how might law achieve that aim? According to 
Aristotle, the good for man is a life of virtue. Might the purpose of the law thus be to instill 
virtue in the people? Although some legal moralists will find this notion attractive, there 
is quite a bit to be said against it, and it is anyhow a view that cannot be attributed to 
Aristotle without qualification. First, there is the empirical question of whether and to what 
degree the law may successfully inculcate virtue. Aristotle himself was skeptical. “We 
should probably be content”, he says, if we by all the external influences that are supposed 
to make us good are able to attain a “tincture of excellence”.156 Some scholars, among 
them Johs Andenæs, have advocated the so-called positive general prevention theory, 
according to which the criminal law has a general preventive effect not only through 
deterrence, but by supporting and strengthening moral judgments. However, as Andenæs 
himself concluded, the empirical basis of this theory is dubious, partly because the 
vagueness of the theory impedes its assessment157, and partly due to negative results.158 A 
review of the research by Karl F. Schumann concludes, “the criminal law’s influence on 
common morality is widely exaggerated”.159 
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Second, even if the law did significantly influence our moral judgments, the question 
remains whether these judgments are correct, and thus conducive to our virtuous living. 
Andenæs does not presume that they are, and notes that the law may indeed instill immoral 
values in people, for instance in racist regimes such as that of South Africa during 
apartheid.160 Merely acting in accordance with values promoted by law does not suffice, 
then. The ability to reflect upon the morality of one’s actions, what Aristotle calls the 
intellectual virtue of phronesis, is necessary for virtuous living, especially when external 
influences such as law get it wrong.  
Yet, for Aristotle, the aim of law is the common good. How might that be achieved if not 
by making each one of us good? Though skeptical of the effectiveness of using law to 
mold good men, he did see a proper function of law in molding good citizens. A distinction 
is thereby made between private virtue and civic virtue, the latter pertaining to one’s role 
as a citizen of the polity. “Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity 
possess the excellence which makes a good man.”161. To be a good citizen, the only thing 
that matters is one’s relationship with the community, i.e. with others. Private virtues, such 
as one’s temperance, pride, good temper and so on, though essential to a good man, are 
not required for being a good citizen. 
Another way of putting this is to say that as a citizen one’s virtue is that of justice: “justice 
is the only virtue that is regarded as someone else’s good”.162 Injustice, accordingly, is a 
failure to exhibit proper concern for others. To be more precise, injustice is taking more 
than one’s share, i.e. to prioritize oneself at the expense of others, a kind of greed (what 
the Greeks called pleonexia).163 Oppositely, civic virtue can be defined as placing the good 
of the community before one’s private needs by displaying a “willingness to respect and 
support the civic rights and duties that are critical to the continued project of living together 
as equals”164. Abiding by law, especially when it would be in one’s best interest to defy it, 
is thus integral to civic virtue.165 
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To the extent that the state ought to concern itself with the virtue of its citizens, the primary 
concern, according to Aristotle, should be civic virtue. “[J]ustice is the bond of men in 
states.”166 Relations among citizens should be regulated by that which is relevant for the 
well-functioning of the polity, for instance when distributing offices:   
[I]t is evident that there is good reason why in politics men do not ground 
their claim to office on every sort of inequality […] rival claims of 
candidates for office can only be based on the possession of elements which 
enter into the composition of the state.167 
Every sort of inequality, and, hence, every sort of virtue, is not relevant in political 
relations; only “bonds of justice” between citizens are.168 Civic virtue is appropriately the 
state’s business because it concerns others; it is a prerequisite for the very existence of the 
state. Without civic virtue – i.e. the ability to put the concern for others ahead of one’s own 
needs – society would be impossible. And without society, nobody would flourish either 
as men or citizens. The telos of the state – mutual flourishing of its members – thus 
necessitates civic virtue and makes it a proper concern in state matters. 
But how does civic virtue enable a flourishing society, and how does law enable civic 
virtue? We have yet to see a detailed answer beyond these rather vague claims about 
appropriately giving others their due. I will now turn to Emile Durkheim’s theory of social 
solidarity, which has some important features in common with the Aristotelian notion of 
civic virtue, and which may be useful in this regard.  
7.1.3 Solidarity 
For Durkheim, as for Aristotle, society is made possible by social bonds between its 
members. Durkheim calls these bonds solidarity. “Doubtless society cannot exist if its 
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parts are not solidly bound to one another, but solidarity is only one of the conditions for 
its existence.”169 Solidarity, in turn, is for Durkheim equivalent to morality: “Man is only 
a moral being because he lives in society, since morality consists in solidarity with the 
group, and varies according to that solidarity.”170 We see here an affinity between this 
general notion of solidarity as morality and Aristotle’s civic virtue of justice (which he 
says is complete virtue).171  
We may say that what is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, 
everything that forces man to take account of other people, to regulate his 
actions by something other than the promptings of his own egoism, and the 
more numerous and strong these ties are, the more solid is the morality.172 
Like Aristotle, Durkheim thus emphasizes as a condition for human society the capacity 
to look beyond one’s private needs and take account of other people. Durkheim further 
nuances the concept of solidarity according to its sources in the social conditions of 
society. More specifically, he distinguishes between two types of social solidarity 
according to the ways in which labor is divided in society. 
Societies in which there is little division of labor, where members tend to have the same 
occupations and are largely self-sufficient, are characterized by what Durkheim calls 
mechanical solidarity. Members feel solidarity with each other based primarily on the fact 
that they share many of the same social conditions and beliefs. It is a form of solidarity 
that stems from the collective consciousness of the members.173 As we shall see, Durkheim 
views the function of punishment as upholding this type of solidarity, and therefore claims 
for punishment a necessary function in preserving society. 
When there is much division of labor, social solidarity stems not from the collective 
consciousness – not, in other words, from the common perception that members are alike 
in the most important respects – but rather from the interdependence which arises due to 
one’s differences. Durkheim calls this organic solidarity, for it is a form of solidarity that 
results from each member’s dependence on the well-functioning of the whole social 
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organism. A blacksmith, for instance, is not self-sufficient, but depends on farmers, 
doctors, insurance agents and so on for her survival and flourishing. She depends more on 
others than does a hunter-gatherer who provides most or all of life’s necessities for herself 
and her family. Ironically, the freedom to choose one’s way of life comes at the price of 
greater dependence upon others. 
As societies become more advanced, i.e. with a higher degree of division of labor, the 
solidarity which binds its members together takes a more organic form, though no society 
manifests either form of solidarity completely.174 Even in highly diverse modern societies 
there is, when these are well-functioning, a sense of solidarity due to the perception of 
similarities rather than difference: a collective consciousness which manifests itself in 
traditions, historical knowledge and rituals such as national holidays, ceremonies – and 
trials and punishment. Criminal law is a manifestation of this mechanical solidarity, as it 
demarcates that which is opposed to our shared norms, thereby providing, via negativa, an 
elucidation of these norms. Crime defines the outside, so to speak, which is necessary for 
the existence of an “inside” of society. Hence, Durkheim famously claimed, crime is an 
inevitable feature of any healthy society.175 
However, when a society is bound together organically, through differences rather than 
similarities, law also manifests and supports this form of solidarity.176 Contract, tort law, 
property rights etc. create the conditions for people to pursue their individual projects in 
ways that contribute to the social organism on which all depend. Take a few examples: 
Without a legal regulation of copyright, composers, writers and inventors could not make 
a living from the reproduction of their works. Without legal enforcement of contracts, most 
business transactions would be risky, if not impossible. Without a system of licensing, 
dentists would not retain the exclusive right to perform dentistry. Law thus regulates the 
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division of labor, thereby sustaining the interdependence on which organic solidarity is 
based. 
While Aristotle’s distinction between private and civic virtue serves to mark an 
autonomous sphere beyond the reach of law, it is with Durkheim’s organic solidarity that 
we now observe the positive function that law must have in creating the conditions for 
individual freedom. We see, then, that there are essentially two ways in which law 
promotes freedom: By enabling interdependence and by enabling independence. The first 
by creating the conditions for mutual cooperation necessary for each individual to realize 
her projects; the second by creating an autonomous sphere beyond intrusion by others. 
7.1.4 Freedom 
How are we to understand this latter form of freedom? At the start of this section I noted 
the indispensable role of law in protecting our security, without which life would be nasty, 
brutish and short. “Liberty”, Hobbes wrote, is “the absence of externall Impediments”177. 
With this understanding of freedom, which has become the hallmark of the liberal tradition 
in political philosophy, it is easy to see that law, by protecting our security, protects our 
freedom from external impediments. On the other hand, if freedom simply means non-
interference, law must also limit our freedom. Criminalizing a certain conduct creates an 
external impediment to our choice of that conduct. Law thus diminishes the sphere in 
which we retain an absence of external impediments. This point is illustrated by Hobbes 
in the following passage: 
There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this 
day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular 
man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth 
there, than in Constantinople. Whether a Commonwealth be Monarchicall, 
or Popular, the Freedome is still the same.178 
Hobbes is right that freedom is still the same if freedom means non-interference, for laws 
interfere with our choices in a democratic republic as well as in an absolute monarchy. But 
                                                        
177 Hobbes, Leviathan, 189. 




on a different understanding of freedom, there is a significant difference between the laws 
of a tyranny and the laws of a republic. 
Specifically, the republican theory sees freedom not as absence of interference, but as 
absence of dominion. The concept of dominion hails back to the theory’s roots in the 
Roman republic and the distinction between dominus (master) and servus (slave).179 In 
contrast to a slave, a free citizen, a liber, was a man over whom nobody held dominion, 
meaning power to treat as one’s own property and to interfere with at will. A free citizen 
might experience many external impediments to the pursuit of his projects. Conversely, a 
slave, if she was lucky, might have a benevolent master who let her pursue her projects 
without interference. The distinction between liber and servus could therefore not be made 
by reference to the actual absence or presence of interferences in their choices. Like a horse 
that is given free rein and can go wherever it wants, a slave may happen to enjoy non-
interference from her master. But just like the rider can pull the reins at any time and steer 
the horse at his pleasure, so the master can rein in his slave if he has a change of mind.180 
It is this possibility that makes even the lucky slave unfree.  
Freedom, upon the republican view, requires that nobody holds dominating power over 
you, regardless of whether that power is actually exercised or not. And this is where law 
comes in. Only if protected by law can the citizen be assured of her freedom as non-
domination. In his book Republicanism, Philip Pettit quotes Hobbes’ contemporary James 
Harrington, who in his reply to the quoted passage in the Leviathan makes just this point: 
For to say that a Lucchese hath no more liberty or immunity from the laws 
of Lucca than a Turk hath from those of Constantinople, and to say that a 
Luchese hath no more liberty or immunity by the laws of Lucca than a Turk 
hath by those of Constantinople, are pretty different speeches.181 
Freedom by law means that law protects from arbitrary power. Arbitrary power may come 
in the form of one person’s dominium over another, as we have just seen. And arbitrary 
power can also be wielded by the state over its citizens, in which case it is termed 
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imperium. Guarding against imperium means on the one hand granting freedom from law, 
by according each a personal sphere beyond public reach. And on the other hand, it means 
that power over citizens must be exercised in a non-arbitrary way, that is, by law. As the 
republican slogan demands: There must be an empire of laws, not of men.  
This ideal, in turn, puts constraints on the creation and application of laws, as well as on 
their content. The division of power is an essential tenet of republicanism, precisely to 
avoid the arbitrary empire of men. Popular contestation of state power is another essential 
feature of republicanism, again because arbitrary power must be curtailed. Finally, 
regarding the content of laws, the ideal of freedom as non-domination is more demanding 
in terms of social justice than the liberal ideal of non-interference. Non-domination 
requires that there be a public “safety net” preventing poverty, exploitation on the labor 
market, lack of health care, gender inequality, etc., all of which would otherwise result in 
dependence on the arbitrary goodwill of others. Freedom is thus a “gateway good”, 
opening the door, so to speak, to other social goods.182 “Justice is freedom, freedom 
justice”183, Pettit argues – a claim that will find resonance in my discussion of the 
philosophies of Kant and Hegel in Chapter 9. 
7.2 The wrong in undermining law 
We have now seen some of the ways that law serves a valuable social function. Let us 
return, then, to the question of whether breaking the law is morally, and not merely legally 
wrong in itself. Presumably, if law is valuable for at least one of the reasons outlined above, 
each of us ought, all things equal, to uphold law. And if we ought to uphold law, as a 
consequence, breaking the law is prima facie wrong. Yet, as we have seen, several 
philosophers deny this, and have offered some rather convincing examples to support their 
views. Why is it wrong, they ask, to run a stop sign in the dead of night with nobody in 
sight? Why is it wrong to smoke home-grown marihuana if nobody knows and nobody is 
harmed? One answer might be that you can never be one hundred percent sure that you 
have assessed the situation correctly. Perhaps there is a pedestrian hidden in the dark, ready 
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to step into the road in front of your car. We ought to follow the law for the simple reason 
that much harm would be avoided if people did not take it upon themselves to assess the 
risks and benefits of each situation anew. Valid as this point may be, it still seems 
somewhat exaggerated to say of someone that she committed a wrong if she ran a stop sign 
on a deserted street without causing any harm. 
But let us suppose now that she was caught on surveillance camera and then fined for her 
violation. Though we are hard pressed to say what was wrong about running the stop sign, 
it would anyhow be wrong of her to refuse to pay the fine. The reason is that the latter 
wrong clearly undermines the authority of law itself, and thus challenges more directly the 
above-mentioned values stemming from law. 
Edmundson brings out this point by distinguishing between background and foreground 
(in)justice. Individual conflicts of justice usually occur against a background of pre-
determined legal rights and pre-established procedures for adjudicating conflicts. “What 
is mine and what is thine are sometimes natural facts, but are more usually institutional 
ones.”184 Stealing a car, for instance, presupposes the institution of property and its 
application to cars (accordingly, you cannot steal somebody’s air, since, under normal 
circumstances, ownership does not apply to air). The legitimacy of foreground justice (i.e. 
the justice of individual cases) usually depends on the legitimacy or justice of its 
background justice.185 What grounds the legitimacy or background justice of the legal 
order is obviously much debated. I will be content, for now, to say that the values obtained 
by the legal order (such as the ones mentioned in the section above), and certain constraints 
upon the achievement of these values (such as the universal and equal application of law) 
form the background justice of the legal order. While individual conflicts are usually about 
foreground (in)justice, some acts challenge directly the background justice of the legal 
order itself. 
There is an almost palpable difference between ignoring a traffic law or 
traffic sign, on the one hand, and ignoring a traffic ticket or traffic cop, on 
the other. What is called in question in the latter instances is not, what was 
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it safe to do in the circumstances, but the very legitimacy of a system 
assigning a special moral role to officials.186 
Running a stop sign with nobody around does not create foreground injustice (at most a 
mere peccadillo). Refusing to pay the fine, however, is wrong because it negates the 
background justice pertaining to law enforcement in general and traffic law in particular. 
Viewed in isolation, then, the offense does not merit punishment, but refusing punishment 
may nevertheless be unjust.  
Socrates famously reasoned accordingly when Crito visited him in prison and tried to 
convince him to escape before his execution. Though Socrates believed that he had been 
wrongly convicted, he nevertheless claimed it would be wrong to undermine the authority 
of the legal system by escaping. In a memorable use of the rhetorical figure prosopopeia, 
Plato lets the laws make the point for themselves: 
Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you not by this action 
you are attempting intend to destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, 
as far as you are concerned? Or do you think it possible for a city not to be 
destroyed if the verdicts of its courts have no force but are nullified and set 
at naught by private individuals?187 
Even though it was “the laws” that perpetrated the injustice against Socrates, it would 
nevertheless constitute a bigger injustice if those same laws lost their force. Recall Rawls’ 
point that having any constitution is better than anarchy, because, he says, “[u]p to a certain 
point it is better that the law and its interpretation be settled than that it be settled 
rightly”.188 Put differently: The fallibility of law in creating foreground justice in a 
particular case does not negate the background justice of the legal system. 
But what if law fails systematically in creating foreground justice in certain cases, for 
instance by showing insufficient regard for the interests of racial minorities or future 
generations and their environment? Would a refusal to comply with such law be unjust? 
Not necessarily. In such cases, civil disobedience may be justified. By distinguishing 
between justified civil disobedience and ordinary crime, it shall become clearer why and 
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when it is wrong to break the law.  
7.2.1 Civil disobedience 
Civil disobedience is, according to Rawls’ widely accepted definition, “a public, 
nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of 
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government”.189 If civil disobedience 
is to be legitimate, certain criteria must be met, pertaining both to the injustice toward 
which it is a response, and to the way in which it is conducted. There must be a “substantial 
and clear injustice” against which civil disobedience is a last resort, meaning that lawful 
ways of overturning policy have been exhausted.190  
On the one hand, this criterion specifies that civil disobedience must address an injustice; 
it does not suffice that the protested law has bad consequences.191 On the other hand, the 
injustice must be “substantial and clear”. An unjust tax system does not normally justify a 
refusal to pay taxes. If, however, the tax code is unduly biased against a permanent 
minority, such a systematic injustice might conceivably be substantial and clear enough to 
justify disobedience.192 All authority is fallible; injustice is therefore inevitable. However, 
we owe a duty to uphold the authority of law only if “in the long run the burden of injustice 
should be more or less evenly distributed over different groups in society, and the hardship 
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of unjust policies should not weigh too heavily in any particular case”.193  
Applying the concepts of background and foreground justice, we might say that long-term, 
systematic discrimination implies not only a failure to create foreground justice, but a 
failure to provide background justice. As such, it is a failure of the legal order to fulfill the 
functions that give it legitimacy. Protesting this failure by civil disobedience is a way of 
holding law to the standard on which its legitimacy rests. Civil disobedience thus 
“expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law, although it is at the 
outer edge thereof”.194 
Certain constraints upon the way in which civil disobedience is conducted must be met if 
it is to express loyalty to background justice.195 Many hold that non-violence is a necessary 
feature of civil disobedience, thereby expressing one’s loyalty to peaceful conflict 
resolution and the state’s monopoly on violence. Publicity is another requirement. Thus, 
Gandhi proclaimed when he was brought before a British judge in Ahmedabad in 1922: “I 
am here […] to invite and cheerfully submit to the highest penalty that can be inflicted 
upon me for what in law is a deliberate crime and what appears to me to be the highest 
duty of a citizen.”196 Finally, conscientiousness is a necessary feature of legitimate civil 
disobedience, as is also conveyed in Gandhi’s quote. The dissenter must be motivated by 
and express a sincere concern about the injustice of the practice she is protesting. She must 
be driven not by self-interest, but by earnest moral conviction. 
The latter requirement is likely the most striking feature distinguishing a civil disobedient 
from a typical criminal. The conscientious objector responds to what she considers an 
injustice; the criminal, on the other hand, exempts herself from the demands of justice. As 
we shall see in more detail in Chapter 9, the notion of exemption from what applies 
universally is a defining feature of crime according to Kant and Hegel. Crime, Hegel says, 
is a negation of the universal, an opposition between the particular will and abstract 
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right.197 Civil disobedience, on the other hand, does not merit being called a negation of 
the universal. On the contrary, the motive behind legitimate civil disobedience is for law 
to properly exhibit its universality by refraining from arbitrary discrimination. When Rosa 
Parks took a seat at the front of the bus it was not merely for her own convenience; it was 
an appeal for law to apply universally, that is, equally for all, regardless of skin-color. 
In his discussion of the Greek tragedies in his lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel indirectly 
supports this distinction between crime and civil disobedience. What characterizes the 
tragedy, he says, is that the characters hold opposing claims that collide, but where both 
claims are justified.198 The best example of this, Hegel says, is in Sophocles’ Antigone, 
where “the public law of the state is set in conflict over against inner family love and duty 
to a brother; the woman, Antigone, has the family interest as her 'pathos', Creon, the man, 
has the welfare of the community as his”.199 Antigone, in what is essentially an act of civil 
disobedience, buries her brother Polynices in defiance of the order of Creon, king of 
Thebes, who considered Polynices an enemy of the state. Hegel’s point is that both the 
right to honor one’s dead and the right to protect the state are justified. But taken by 
themselves they are one-sided, representing only parts of justice. The tragedy of the 
situation is that one side of justice cannot persist without negating the other, that is, without 
creating injustice.200 
In civil disobedience, too, we might say that there are two opposing, but justified claims. 
A dissenter may rightly be challenging a legal injustice. But by doing so, she undermines 
the authority of law and, in democracies, undermines majority rule. In societies where laws 
legitimately command authority, civil disobedience thereby creates injustice as well.201 
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This is the tragedy of civil disobedience. One side cannot triumph without creating 
injustice. If the dissenter is acquitted, the justice of majority rule is negated. If she is 
punished, it is without having committed a wrong, in the sense that there is no opposition 
between her particular will and the universality of law. Punishing her thus wrongly justifies 
the lack of universality of law by treating the act as if it were a mere expression of her 
particular will. 
Having thus distinguished between civil disobedience and regular crime, I conclude that 
breaking the law can be wrong in itself. This means that even when an act does not violate 
any independent moral norms – e.g. it does not cause harm and does not put anybody at 
risk – it may violate the moral norm that commands obedience to reasonably just laws. 
Hegel’s theory, which I shall discuss in more detail in Chapter 9, makes explicit when it is 
that breaking the law is morally wrong in itself: It is wrong when there is an opposition 
between the lawbreaker’s particular will and the universality of legitimate legal 
authority.202 That is not always the case with civil disobedience, as the examples of Gandhi 
and Rosa Parks showed. The hard cases are the ones where the background justice of the 
legal system commands obedience, but where the foreground injustice of a matter is grave 
enough to imply that law is not universally valid in the case. I will return to this issue in 
Chapter 12, where I shall claim that similar hard cases arise in states that are so socially 
unjust that they do not retain the moral standing to punish some offenders, even when the 
offender does not, unlike the civil disobedient, reveal morally laudable motives. 
7.3 Punishing for the common good 
I have so far in this chapter discussed the mutual benefits of law and the injustice of 
undermining the legal authority that provides these benefits. The question now is whether 
punishment can serve to remedy this injustice.  
“[T]he community as a collective concept, is entitled to take such steps as are necessary to 
ensure its own continued existence and development”, Lacey states. Although the criminal 
law only represents a “small part of such a strategy”, she says, it is “logically entailed by 
a commitment to the value of community”.203 The implication is that punishment is not 
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merely a response to individual wrongs (foreground injustice if you will). Punishment is 
an answer to threats against collective interests. “[I]t is the attack upon society that is 
repressed by punishment”, Durkheim says. “[S]ociety […] is harmed even when the harm 
done is to individuals.”204 How, then, can punishment defend and uphold these collective 
interests? How does punishment serve the common good? I will consider two main answers 
to this question. 
The first and most obvious way that punishment serves a socially beneficial function is by 
providing assurance to all that breach of law will be sanctioned. Punishment thereby 
creates trust in mutual adherence to law. And without trust in the compliance of others, 
contract and other forms of cooperation would be all but impossible. The notion is familiar 
from the game of “Prisoner’s Dilemma”: Each person is (presumably) better off by 
breaking the law, but all benefit more if all comply, hence the need for mechanisms to 
ensure compliance.  
The second and more controversial social function of punishment that I will consider is 
achieved by inculcating the proper moral and legal norms in the offender. Proponents of 
the so-called moral education theory assume that punishment may have the effect of 
‘teaching a lesson’ to the criminal. Jean Hampton supported such a theory, which she 
explained with the following analogy: 
Punishments are like electric fences. At the very least they teach a person, 
via pain, that there is a ‘barrier’ to the action she wants to do, and so, at the 
very least, they aim to deter. But because punishment ‘fences’ are moral 
boundaries, the pain which these ‘fences’ administer (or threaten to 
administer) conveys a larger message to beings who are able to reflect on 
the reasons for these barriers’ existence: they convey that there is a barrier 
to these actions because they are morally wrong.205 
Moral education, then, is not (just) a matter of deterrence. It sees punishment as a way of 
communicating to the criminal the wrongness of her act and hopefully bringing her to want 
to do what is right. Robert Nozick describes it as an attempt to “re-link” the criminal with 
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correct values. A criminal, he says, is someone who has chosen not to let value have causal 
effect upon her choices; she has flouted the values which she ought to have respected. 
“Correct values are without causal powers. Criminals choose not to give them effect. 
Therefore others must give them effect on him through punishment.”206 His theory, he 
says, rests on three simple premises: 1) the existence of values 2) that they can be linked 
with, and 3) that it is valuable to link with them. The latter premise can also be taken to 
mean that it is valuable for the person who is punished. This notion goes back at least to 
Plato, who suggested that the criminal harms herself by committing injustices, leaving 
scars on her soul. Since doing wrong is bad for the wrongdoer, learning a moral lesson that 
would prevent her from doing wrong is by implication good for her.207 As Herbert Morris 
put it, “remorse implies comprehension of evil caused. A person’s blindness about such 
matters […] is that person’s loss”.208 Moral education through punishment accordingly 
means opening the eyes of the criminal to the wrong she has done and letting her see how 
she ought to behave in the future.  
Of course, not all share the implicit Socratic faith in the causal relationship between right 
knowledge and right action. Recidivism rates well above 50 % in most countries certainly 
do not give reason for optimism in this regard. Many have pointed out that prisons tend to 
be more like crime schools than penitentiaries, in the literal sense of the word. As Oscar 
Wilde wrote: 
The vilest deeds like poison weeds 
Bloom well in prison-air. 
It is only what is good in Man 
That wastes and withers there.209 
A further critique can be raised against the moral education theory for implicitly focusing 
on the criminal’s character, in opposition to liberal dogma, whereby the state’s legitimate 
interest is limited to external action. The difference is one of fitting punishment to the 
criminal’s need of reform versus fitting punishment to criminal deeds. The same criticism 
can be brought against the function of creating assurance. In general, when the purpose of 
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punishment is to protect the common good that stems from mutual adherence to law, 
criminals are easily viewed in terms of their dangerousness from which they ought to be 
cured or against which we ought to be protected.  
The premise is the following: Criminals display in their willingness to commit crimes an 
anti-social disposition. Society has a legitimate interest in this disposition because it is this 
disposition that puts society at risk of being harmed again. Put differently: If you accept 
as the purpose of punishment the protection of the mutual benefits of law, it makes sense 
to distribute punishment according to how it may attain that purpose. Since character traits 
reveal (at least to some degree) one’s likelihood of committing a crime, punishment ought 
to be distributed according to how it may either morally educate or protect against people 
with these character traits.210 
Some features of modern criminal law seem to fit particularly well with this notion that 
punishment ultimately serves to protect the common good. Indeed, the theory can better 
explain some common practices than rivaling retributive theories whereby punishment 
serves to remedy isolated criminal deeds. This applies, for instance, to the practice of the 
so-called retributivist premium.211 Why should the tenth robbery be considered worse than 
the first? From the perspective of protecting mutual benefits of law, the recidivist can be 
said to have displayed a deeper commitment to undermining law. “The recidivist 
demonstrates greater disdain for the project of law itself”, Yankah writes. “[R]epeatedly 
ignoring the law or, worse yet, unjustified attempts to undermine the law where it in fact 
pursues the common good, represents hostility to our joined civic project and its more 
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forceful repudiation is warranted.”212 In Nozick’s terms, the recidivist has not only 
displayed a disposition to flout correct values repeatedly; she has flouted the value of 
punishment itself, that is, the value of re-linking with value, which therefore calls for 
greater efforts to give value a causal force in the recidivist’s life.213 
Another example is increased punishment for hate crimes compared to similar acts with 
different motives.214 Why should it matter whether somebody attacks another because the 
person is Jewish or simply because she does not like him? Why is it a hate crime if it is 
done because the victim is Muslim, but not because he is, say, a chess player or a computer 
scientist? Again, the difference can be explained in terms of the criminal’s disposition to 
undermine collective values protected by law. While hate crimes against ethnic and 
religious minorities is a real threat to the possibility of living peacefully together as equals, 
there is to my knowledge no society in which the equal status and protection of chess 
players or computer scientists are threatened. One person’s hate of the latter groups is not 
relevantly different from another person’s hate of his neighbor or colleague. Hate against 
minorities is different, however, when viewed from the perspective of society as a whole. 
Such hate reveals a threat to the flourishing of all in this society today, because 
discrimination against these minorities do actually occur. That does not mean, of course, 
that we can exclude the possibility of a future society in which it is computer scientists 
who are in special need of the protection of law. 
Though the examples show that the theory of punishing for the common good may provide 
a good explanation of some common criminal law practices, a more fundamental criticism 
can be raised about its implications for moral responsibility: If punishment is determined 
not only on the basis of the deeds a person has committed, but on the extent to which the 
deeds display an anti-social character, the person is partly punished for who he is rather 
than what he has done. This could ultimately suggest that this retributive theory will have 
trouble accounting for the act requirement of criminal liability. For if we take crime as 
proof of criminal passions (i.e. what he is), then we could imagine a situation where we do 
not need more proof: We already know that the person has a criminal disposition, so why 
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not incarcerate him before he commits any crimes? 
One reply might take as its starting point the mentioned distinction between private and 
civic virtue. For on a republican view, the state takes a legitimate interest in civic virtue 
only, that is, virtue that concern others. You may, in other words, think whatever and be 
as immoral as you wish; your virtuous or vicious character is only relevant to others if it 
results in action. Hence, only if you actually commit a crime do you display the relevant 
lack of virtue. A similar answer might be made from a moral education standpoint. In 
Nozick’s terms, punishing is re-linking with value, which presupposes, he says, that a 
person is anti-linked with value, and not merely unlinked.215 We are all unlinked with value 
every time we sleep, Nozick remarks. But only if we act so as to flout value are we anti-
linked, and only then can punishment re-link us with value. In short, only if we have 
committed a moral wrong is there a moral lesson to be taught by punishment. 
However, even if the theory can thereby succeed in properly accounting for the act 
requirement, there still remains the troubling notion that it entails that a criminal offender 
is held responsible for who she happens to be. What if she has become who she is because 
of an earlier character defect? For instance, she turned to criminal activities when she made 
the choice to drop out of school, which in turn was a result of her lack of work ethic, which 
in turn came from not experiencing the rewards of mastering her schoolwork early on, and 
so on ad infinitum. Is she then responsible for how she became?  
Yes, Nozick says, because even if she is not responsible for the chain of character defects 
that resulted in her current character, she is nevertheless responsible for letting the 
character defect persist.216 This way of reasoning goes back to Aristotle, who likewise 
claimed that virtuous and vicious actions reflect one’s virtuous or vicious character, and 
one’s character, in turn, is the result of habits one has acquired through previous actions. 
But these actions are the result of choice, meaning that they are not merely voluntary in 
the sense that they are not forced or due to ignorance; they are the result of deliberation. 
In order to become virtuous, it is not sufficient that we develop virtuous habits merely 
voluntarily; we must deliberate upon our choices, thereby developing the earlier-
mentioned intellectual virtue of phronesis or prudence. A vicious person is one who has 
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failed to develop a virtuous character by failing to make deliberate choices that gradually 
become good habits. Every time she has chosen to satisfy her immediate desires instead of 
doing what is right, she has ever so slightly contributed to her own poor character. 
Therefore, says Aristotle, “they are themselves by their slack lives responsible for 
becoming men of that kind”.217  
7.3.1 The instrumental function of punishment: Promoting justice or 
utility? 
However, even if the theory can account for moral responsibility for one’s criminal 
tendencies, a further criticism can be raised against the theory: If we punish in order to 
maintain the mutual benefits of law, does that not mean that the theory I have so far 
considered as a theory of retributive justice is merely utilitarianism in disguise? Is there 
any difference between providing assurance and preventing crime through general 
deterrence? Is there any difference between moral education and preventing crime through 
reform? 
The questions are pertinent, because clearly these theories could be construed in such a 
way as to erase the distinctions between them, in effect collapsing all into utilitarianism. 
And without rehearsing once again the problems of utilitarian penal theories, suffice it to 
say that a consequence of a collapse into utilitarianism could be punishment that is unjust, 
for instance by ignoring the act requirement when doing so serves social utility. There are, 
however, ways of construing these theories that distinguish them from utilitarianism, as 
we shall now see.  
Non-utilitarian assurance 
In the article “Political Theory and the Criminal Law”, Matt Matravers employs Rawls’ 
concept of ‘the original position’ to argue for the justice of punishment.218 The question 
Matravers poses is: Would we opt for a system of punishment if we found ourselves in the 
original position, behind a veil of ignorance, knowing not who we were and our own 
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criminal dispositions, i.e. our own risk of “falling foul of the law”?219 Yes, he answers, it 
is in everyone’s blind self-interest to have a system of punishment if one assumes, as both 
Rawls and Matravers do and as I have accounted for above, that punishment is necessary 
in order to secure a stable constitutional arrangement. “The function of the system of 
punishment would be to address an assurance problem”.220  
But assuming that one’s character and social environment greatly effect one’s chances of 
being punished: Could someone punished not rightly claim, as above, that she is punished 
for her bad luck? And if the answer she gets is simply that doing so is necessary for 
ensuring the mutual benefits of law, how is that any different from utilitarianism? 
This is where the Rawlsian twist comes. The function of ‘the original position’ in Rawls’ 
theory is to effectively sever the tie between justice and moral worth. Justice is determined 
irrespective of talents, intelligence, work ethic etc. – you do not know about the 
distribution of these from behind the veil of ignorance. From the perspective of justice, all 
one’s abilities and dispositions may just as well be due to pure luck – whether this is true 
or not is irrelevant to justice. Such “natural facts”, Rawls says, are “neither just nor unjust 
[…] What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts”.221  
On the Rawlsian scheme, Matravers points out, “there is no justification for allowing 
inequalities in natural facts (or social luck) to be reflected in the principles of justice”.222 
However, once a just system is established, natural facts will legitimately influence one’s 
outcome. Talented persons will do better and receive bigger shares of goods than 
untalented persons, ceteris paribus. But the person who does well does not deserve (as a 
matter of justice) to reap these benefits; he is merely entitled to them. Applying this to 
criminal law, Matravers says 
[I]nert natural facts ought not to dictate the shape of the principles of 
(retributive) justice. However, once these principles are in place, such facts 
may well play a role in where, within the scheme, a given person ends up. 
Just as the talented (and socially lucky) will tend towards the better-off 
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groups – not because justice requires rewarding the talented, but because 
rewarding the talented maximally benefits the least well off – those who are 
disposed to break the criminal law (for whatever reason) will tend towards 
the group who are punished, but again not because justice requires 
principles that punish those who act on such a disposition, but because only 
by punishing them will the system provide the assurance needed to be 
stable.223 
Upon Matravers’ Rawlsian theory, then, it does not matter for the justice of punishment 
whether criminals are punished due to bad luck in their social circumstances and their 
dispositions, or if they truly had the capacity to do otherwise. Be that as it may. A person 
is punished solely as a matter of entitlement. The institution of punishment is just, 
however, not because it maximizes social utility, but because “free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept [it] in an initial position of 
equality”224. In this way the assurance theory of punishment can avoid collapsing into 
utilitarianism.225 
Non-utilitarian moral education 
Upon one interpretation, moral education theory is indistinguishable from utilitarianism. 
Punishment serves to teach the criminal a moral lesson with the aim of bringing her back 
on the narrow path, thus contributing to crime prevention. However, as Nozick 
emphasizes, this teleological version of the theory can be distinguished from a non-
teleological version such as his own. The first seeks an effect ‘in the wrongdoer’, while 
the second seeks an effect ‘on the wrongdoer’. Upon his theory the aim is not that the 
criminal should repent and change her ways, but merely that she should experience the 
causal power of correct values. The ‘lesson’ taught by punishment, in Nozick’s words, is 
that correct values can have force, thus “making it impossible to remain as pleased with 
one’s previous anti-linkage [with value]”.226 
Antony Duff has similarly proposed a theory whereby punishment is meant to 
communicate to the offender the wrongness of her act in the hope that she should accept 
its moral lesson and decide to undertake penance for her wrong. However, the justice of 
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punishment does not depend on whether the criminal repents or not. Repentance must be 
voluntary; a criminal trial cannot force the offender to undertake penance. It can merely 
communicate to the offender that she ought to do so. The trial must respect the autonomy 
and rationality of the defendant, inviting her to be a participant in, and not merely the 
object of, moral judgment. Like Nozick, Duff finds the use of prepositions helpful in 
eliciting this distinction: [W]hereas a judicial or psychiatric inquiry may be held on a 
person, a criminal trial […] is conducted with the defendant […] verdict is passed not just 
on the defendant but to him.227 
This emphasis on the communicative function of punishment makes it possible to separate 
two aspects of the goal of punishment: One is the aim that the offender genuinely accepts 
the wrongness of her act and voluntarily communicates through penance that she has 
learned a moral lesson. In this sense, Duff’s theory is teleological. The other is the aim of 
publicly communicating that the crime was wrong. “If the offender remains unrepentant, 
his punishment has thus failed in one of its aims: but it can still succeed as a 
communication with him.”228 In this sense, Duff’s theory is non-teleological; the 
communication itself is justified, whether or not the offender accepts the message 
conveyed. 
I will discuss in more detail other communicative or expressive theories of punishment in 
Chapter 9. I will here consider only Emile Durkheim’s theory, as it too displays both a 
teleological and a non-teleological aspect. The recipient of the ‘lesson’ of punishment upon 
Durkheim’s theory is society at large: “[W]ithout being paradoxical, we may state that 
punishment is above all intended to have its effect upon honest people.”229 The reason is 
that both crime and punishment concern the collective consciousness of society. Crime, 
we recall from above, is for Durkheim an attack upon society and its shared norms: “ [A]n 
act is criminal when it offends the strong, well-defined states of the collective 
consciousness.”230 Indeed, he says, “we should not say that an act offends the common 
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consciousness because it is criminal, but that it is criminal because it offends that 
consciousness”.231 When a society holds any norm as collectively valuable, no matter what 
that norm may be, it will necessarily thereby define something as conflicting with that 
norm to the degree of being a crime. A positive norm can only be posited if there is a 
negative contrast. And since no society can exist without collectively held norms, crime, 
by implication, is an inevitable part of any society. 
Thus crime is necessary. It is linked to the basic conditions of social life, but 
on this very account useful, for the conditions to which it is bound are 
themselves indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law.232 
Crime nevertheless requires a reaction that denies that the attack upon society will succeed. 
Punishment’s “real functions”, Durkheim says, “is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of 
society by sustaining the common consciousness in all its vigour”.233 Drawing on 
Durkheim’s later work in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, we could say that 
punishment functions as a ‘ritual’ which marks that which is ‘sacred’ in the collective 
consciousness – in this case, our shared moral beliefs.234 As such, punishment, like crime, 
is useful for the existence and flourishing of society. 
Does that mean that Durkheim’s theory is ultimately utilitarian, justifying punishment by 
its social benefit? His answer is that the dichotomy of utility and justice is false, that utility 
is served by justice and vice versa: 
[…] the one sees in punishment an expiation, the other conceives it as a 
weapon for the defence of society. Certainly it does fulfill the function of 
protecting society, but this is because of its expiatory nature. Moreover, if it 
must be expiatory, this is not because suffering redeems error by virtue of 
some mystic strength or another, but because it cannot produce its socially 
useful effect save on this one condition.235  
What are we to make of this for the justice of punishment? Since Durkheim’s theory is 
descriptive (at least upon one interpretation of it), the question of justification does not 
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arise.236 However, for our purposes, the takeaway from his theory is that we can conceive 
of the expressive function of punishment as not directly linked to utility in each instance 
(as a deterrence theory or a reform theory would). Instead, like Nozick and Duff and other 
non-utilitarian moral education or expressive theorists, Durkheim emphasizes the intrinsic 
value of denouncing clear violations of our shared moral norms. Society is inconceivable 
without such condemnation. Censuring crime is therefore both right and useful. 
* 
We see, then, that the charge of utilitarianism can be avoided, and we can conclude that 
the theory of this chapter is a proper theory of retributive justice. It still remains a 
consequentialist theory of retributive justice, however. Punishment serves a purely 
instrumental function, promoting the goal of maintaining a just social order, whereby the 
security, flourishing, solidarity, cooperation and freedom of society and of citizens are 
ensured. More specifically: Punishment is the means by which assurance and moral 
education or censure is achieved, which, as we have seen, serves to negate efforts to 
undermine the mutual benefits of law.  
However, even if assurance and moral education serve a just function upon this theory, we 
have not thereby showed that punishment is necessary for providing assurance and moral 
censure. If assurance and moral censure can be achieved by other means, punishment may 
be redundant and even unjustified, all things considered. A reply to this could be that surely 
the empirical realities are such that assurance and moral censure cannot be properly 
achieved without punishment. Be that as it may (I will return to these questions in Chapter 
9). Punishment serves an instrumental function nevertheless. We have, in other words, yet 
to argue that punishment itself is just, and not merely that its possible effects are just. 
This will be the topic of the next two chapters, both of which relate in different ways to 
the main idea argued in this chapter, that law is valuable. The first takes as its premise that 
law is socially beneficial and proposes that as a matter of distributive justice punishment 
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is fair for those who receive the benefits of law without contributing to its maintenance. 
The second expounds Kant and Hegel’s theories, whereby punishment is seen as an 





To explain this theory, I will start with an example from the housing cooperative where I 
live. There are 60 houses gathered together around a common area. At one end there is a 
parking lot where all residents are required to park. If you are transporting a heavy load, 
the rules of the coop allow you to drive on the pathways all the way to your house to 
unload, before returning to the parking lot with the car – a distance of up to a hundred 
meters. The benefit to all is obvious: peace and quiet around the houses, children playing 
safely in a traffic-free environment. However, a few neighbors do not respect the parking 
rules and often park their cars in front of their houses instead of at the common parking 
lot. Other neighbors find this irritating, myself included. But why? Only a few people break 
the rules, so the tranquility of the neighborhood is practically unaffected. The rule-breakers 
do drive carefully, so we cannot claim any real risk to the children in the neighborhood. 
For all practical purposes the benefits of the parking rules remain. What is it, then, that 
causes our vexation? What constitutes the wrong in the actions of the rule-breakers? 
The answer, according to a theory proposed by Hart, and later advocated by Rawls, Morris 
and others, is that the rule-breakers do not contribute their fair share to the good from 
which they benefit. Hart says that, “when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise 
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these 
restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have 
benefited by their submission”.237 Rawls develops this into what he first calls the ‘principle 
of fair play’ and later ‘the principle of fairness’, according to which it is unfair to “gain 
from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share”.238 By enjoying without 
sacrificing, rule-breakers create an unfair discrepancy between themselves and those who 
comply with the rules. In the example, the rule-breaking neighbors get the benefit of the 
car-free neighborhood, but they do not undertake the efforts that others do in order to 
produce the benefit. They enjoy the peace and quiet, but they do not make those dreadful 
walks through rain and sleet. They are, in short, freeloaders. 
The notion of freeloading is not unfamiliar in a criminal context. As mentioned above in 
                                                        
237 H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?", The Philosophical Review 64, no. 2 (1955), 185. 




the chapter on the profit theory, we often speak metaphorically of punishment as a way of 
“balancing the books” by making the offender “pay his debt to society”. The notion of debt 
implies that the criminal has gained something for which he hasn’t paid; he is “a parasite 
or freerider on a mutually beneficial scheme of social cooperation”.239 These common 
sentiments received a rational defense in Herbert Morris’ article “Persons and Punishment” 
in 1968240, where Morris developed Hart and Rawls’ theories into a penal theory. The 
theory became, according to David Dolinko in 1991, “what is probably the most influential 
contemporary defense of retributivism”.241 
The argument goes as follows: Everybody benefits from the protection of law (as we also 
saw in the preceding chapter). The benefit only occurs, however, as a result of individuals 
respecting the law. 
Making possible this mutual benefit is the assumption by individuals of a 
burden. The burden consists in the exercise of self-restraint by individuals 
over inclinations that would, if satisfied, directly interfere or create a 
substantial risk of interference with others in proscribed ways. If a person 
fails to exercise self-restraint even though he might have and gives in to 
such inclinations, he renounces a burden which others have voluntarily 
assumed and thus gains an advantage which others, who have restrained 
themselves, do not possess.242  
Punishment remedies this injustice by cancelling the unfair advantage that the criminal has 
required vis-á-vis law-abiding citizens. The theory is thus quite similar to the profit theory, 
but the difference is that the wrong of the crime is here a horizontal injustice. That is, it is 
the unfairness of the distribution of burdens and benefits that is remedied through 
punishment (and not each criminal’s benefits relative to her baseline ante culpam). 
A person who violates the rules has something others have—the benefits of 
the system—but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of 
self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage. Matters are not even until 
this advantage is in some way erased. Another way of putting it is that he 
owes something to others, for he has something that does not rightfully 
belong to him. Justice—that is punishing such individuals—restores the 
equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he 
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owes, that is, exacting the debt.243 
Before considering the details of this argument, which benefits are gained and how 
punishment is supposed to cancel them, we ought first to pause at the question of whether 
the freeloader theory can appropriately be applied to a criminal law context.  
It is not obvious that the criminal setting resembles sufficiently that of a joint venture like 
a housing cooperative to make the terms of fair cooperation that apply to the latter also 
apply to the former. Rawls argued originally that the theory did apply to a legal context: 
“My thesis is that the moral obligation to obey the law is a special case of the prima facie 
duty of fair play.”244 However, in A Theory of Justice, he had abandoned the view, now 
saying that obedience to law is required by the ‘natural duty of justice’. ‘The principle of 
fairness’, on the other hand, only applies when two conditions are met: (1) the institution 
to which it applies is just, and (2) “one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the 
arrangement”.245 
If some friends have decided to share a taxi home after a night out, one may reasonably 
say that they have voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement and so are obligated 
under the principle of fairness to pay their share of the fare. How about the rule breaking 
neighbors? Since they did not live in the housing cooperative when it was established they 
have never explicitly consented to the parking rules that were adopted at the outset. 
Nevertheless, they were aware of the rules when they bought their houses. By becoming 
part of the cooperative, they might be said to have given their tacit consent to the rules that 
apply there. For Rawls this would probably be sufficient to assume obligations under the 
principle of fairness, since he holds that the criterion of voluntariness is met “if one has 
accepted the benefits of its working and intends to continue doing so”.246 
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick offers several counterexamples to the notion that 
one can assume obligations simply by enjoying the benefits of a cooperative venture. 
Suppose, he says, that a group of neighbors decide to institute a system of entertainment 
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for the neighborhood where each day a neighbor is required to take a turn reading or 
playing records over a loud speaker system. If after 138 days it is finally your day, are you 
obligated to take your turn? “You have benefitted from it”, Nozick writes, “occasionally 
opening your window to listen, enjoying some music or chuckling at someone’s funny 
story. The other people have put themselves out. But must you answer the call when it is 
your turn to do so? As it stands, surely not”.247 I agree with Nozick’s conclusion, and even 
more so for some of his other examples: “One cannot, whatever one’s purposes, just act 
so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment”, such as by giving 
somebody a book (which she might enjoy) and then grabbing money for it. However, the 
examples all seem to point out situations where there really is no consent at all, in other 
words, where it is unreasonable to impute tacit consent to the person receiving the benefit. 
That such situations exist does not mean that there are no other situations where tacit 
consent is reasonable to assume. In determining whether there is tacit consent, we might 
consider, for instance, whether the recipient of the benefit had ever protested the 
arrangement or otherwise expressed disapproval. And we might consider the extent to 
which the person actively has sought the benefits and the time she has remained in the 
arrangement without leaving. I assume, like Rawls, that sometimes one’s consent is clear 
enough even though it was never explicitly stated. 
How does this apply to a legal context? Can we say that somebody who has benefitted 
from the legal order has thereby acquired an obligation to obey the law? Yes, according to 
Socrates, who did not let himself be convinced by Crito to escape from prison before his 
execution. Again, Plato let ‘The Laws’ speak for themselves, making the point that 
Socrates owed allegiance to the city that had been so good to him. 
Socrates, we have convincing proofs that we and the city were congenial to 
you. You would not have dwelt here most consistently of all the Athenians 
if the city had not been exceedingly pleasing to you. You have never left the 
city, even to see a festival […] So decisively did you choose us and agree 
to be a citizen under us.248 
This is likely the first example of the idea of a social contract being invoked to ground the 
obligation to obey the laws. As Kymlicka notes, when the social contract theory started 
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gaining ground during the Enlightenment, it was based on this notion of consent or 
promise.249 The problem with this approach was that it only pushed the question of 
obligation one step back: If you claim that we should obey the laws because we should 
keep our word, you would still, as Hume put it, “find yourself embarrassed when it is 
asked, Why we are bound to keep our word?”250 The existence of a promise is insufficient 
to ground obligation unless there is an obligation to keep promises, which in turn would 
require a promise to keep promises, and a promise to keep promises to keep promises, ad 
infinitum.  
The conundrum is equivalent to Wittgenstein’s famous rule-following paradox: If the 
meaning of a word were determined by the correct application of a rule, this would require 
another rule for determining correct application, which in turn would require another rule 
ad infinitum. Indeed, the solution that the principle of fairness provides for cooperative 
endeavors is also reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s answer to the rule-following paradox: 
“’Following a rule’ is a practice”, Wittgenstein says.251 In other words, meaning is 
determined by use. Equivalently for cooperation: We obligate ourselves to doing our fair 
share not by promising to keep a promise to do so (and so on), but by partaking in a practice 
wherein our obligation is implicit.  
As I said above, there are indeed practices where such obligation seems to be implicit. But 
can this solution save the social contract theory? That would require that living under a set 
of laws is such a practice from which it is reasonable to assume consent. “You have had 
seventy years during which you could have gone away if you did not like us”, ‘The Laws’ 
say to Socrates.252 And true enough; there is often an element of choice to where you live. 
But hardly for all, and hardly a choice so clear as to constitute tacit consent. Hume said it 
best: 
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Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave 
his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives, from 
day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert 
that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the 
master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the 
ocean and perish, the moment he leaves her.253 
Socrates’ arguments are thus effectively countered, and the conclusion ought to be, I 
believe, that it is futile to try to apply the freeloader theory as a theory grounding the 
obligation to abide by law. As noted above, Rawls abandoned the theory for a theory of 
the ‘natural duty of justice’. He thus moved closer to Kant’s social contract theory, as we 
shall see in the next chapter.254 Before turning to Kant, however, it is still worth 
considering whether the freeloader theory can account for (an aspect of) how justice is 
served by punishment. For even though the freeloader theory cannot function as a 
comprehensive theory justifying law in general or criminal law specifically, it could 
perhaps function as part of a mixed theory where the general justifying aim is supplied by 
another theory, for instance utilitarianism. That is, it might function as a theory of 
retributive justice, even though it cannot by itself justify retributivism. Unfortunately for 
the theory, even this more modest function is wrought with problems. 
In order to assess the function of punishment in restoring a fair equilibrium, we must 
consider what is meant by ‘the unfair benefit’ that the criminal supposedly gains from 
crime. Richard W. Burgh offers four different interpretations of the benefit Morris’ theory 
might be referring to, of which I will discuss the two most plausible: (1) the benefit consist 
of “not bearing the burden of self-restraint, hence having a bit more freedom than others”; 
(2) the benefit is “the sphere of non-interference which results from general obedience to 
the particular law violated, e.g. each person benefits from property laws insofar as he is 
free from interference with his property”.255 The latter assumes that the benefit is gained 
from law, and shared by all citizens; the former assumes the benefit is gained by the 
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criminal, as something extra vis-á-vis the benefits that all enjoy. Both interpretations seem 
to find support in Morris’ text. On the one hand, he speaks of (1) “renounce[ing] a burden 
which others have voluntarily assumed and thus gains an advantage”. On the other hand, 
he speaks of (2) “the benefits of the system” and the criminal as having “something that 
does not rightfully belong to him”. 
Each interpretation yields a different conception of how punishment serves justice. If we 
take number (1) as the benefit, justice is served by inflicting a burden so as to cancel the 
relief of the burden of self-restraint, thus restoring to status quo ante culpam the equal 
amount of benefits and burdens. If we take number (2) as the benefit, justice is served by 
removing the benefit that law ensures by protecting a sphere of non-interference, thus 
restoring to status quo ante culpam the fair relationship between benefits received and the 
price paid.  
A problem with number (1) is that we would have to assume that abiding by law does 
require a burden of self-restraint. In some cases, that seems reasonable. Many of us would 
probably indulge in a little theft or a little voyeurism if we were wearing The Ring of 
Gyges. Self-restraint may be the only thing stopping us sometimes. However, it requires 
no self-restraint from most people to stop them from murdering somebody, or torturing 
them, or molesting them. They simply do not want to do such things. A system of 
punishment that assumes that people shoulder a burden when they refrain from pimping 
or assaulting or raping is, as Murphy put it, “too creepy to be right”.256 And further, since 
there is obviously little correlation between the seriousness of a crime and the burden of 
self-restraint required to avoid it, a punishment scale based on this theory would diverge 
widely from current scales. Most people probably feel a stronger inclination to cheat on 
their taxes or to commit insurance fraud than they do to rape or kill someone. More 
punishment would thus be required in the former instances than in the latter in order to 
counter-balance the larger relief of these crimes. 
A problem with number (2) is that we would have to assume for each just punishment that 
the criminal has received a benefit, not from the crime itself, but from the law that she 
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broke. This prompts Burgh to ask the question: “Are there criminal laws that do not 
provide a sphere of noninterference for all persons?” His answer is yes, and he mentions 
rape laws and laws against embezzlement.257 The first example is poor. Men, too, get 
raped, and hence the idea that only women benefit from the protection of rape laws is 
wrong. However, we could modify the example slightly to make the point: Child 
molestation laws are to the benefit of children, whereas adults are by definition not 
protected by them. The example of embezzlement is meant to show that such laws protect 
only people who are in a position where they can become victims of embezzlement. 
Presumably, poor people have nothing to gain from such laws, a point reminiscent of 
Anatole France’s famous quote: “In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor 
alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread.” If there are laws 
which do not benefit some, those people could not have the benefit erased in order to 
restore a fair equilibrium. 
But perhaps Morris’ theory can be salvaged if we apply it at a higher abstraction level: The 
criminal may not have benefitted from the particular law she broke, but she will have 
benefitted from law in general. The problem with this framing is that there would be no 
way of distinguishing more serious crimes from less serious crimes. They would all entail 
that the criminal no longer should benefit from the protection of law, period – a truly 
Draconian system, in the historical sense of the word, meaning same punishment for all 
crimes.  
Another, more plausible, solution would identify the type of right that the particular law 
protects, e.g. embezzlement laws protect the right to noninterference of property, rape laws 
protect the right to noninterference of physical and sexual autonomy, homicide laws 
protect the right to life. Since the benefits of these spheres of noninterference are taken to 
be increasingly valuable, punishments would be proportional when, ceteris paribus, 
murder is punished more severely than rape, and rape more severely than embezzlement. 
As we shall see, this solution is reminiscent of Kant’s penal theory, by which the criminal 
act is understood as a unilateral withdrawal from the universal protection of the specific 
right breached. Indeed, Murphy argued at one point that Kant’s theory could be rationally 
                                                        




reconstructed as a freeloader theory. He abandoned this view, however, noting that there 
really is no reason to impute to Kant the principle of fairness that underlies the freeloader 
theory. For Kant, punishment is a matter of respect for human freedom and rationality; it 
is not a matter of cancelling undeserved benefits. Kant thereby avoids a problem that the 
freeloader theory faces: Why require state punishment? Why not simply withdraw the 
benefit of the protection of law, thereby in effect licensing everyone to treat the offender 
in whatever way he or she wishes with impunity? Morris’ theory, Dolinko 
concludes, “amounts to a kind of outlawry – declaring the criminal fair game for anyone 
who wishes to harm him or his interests – far different from the forms of criminal 
punishment we actually employ and which Morris’ approach was intended to justify 
morally”.258 
To conclude, the freeloader theory, though intuitively plausible for some cooperative 
endeavors, and also in accordance with some common ways of framing punishment in 
daily life, is nevertheless ill suited to account for the justice of state punishment.  
Some institutions and practices are such that partaking in them entails a form of consent 
from which an obligation to do one’s fair share can be deduced. The same form of consent 
cannot reasonably be imputed to people who merely live their lives under a legal order. 
And without consent, no obligation. 
Further, even if we assume that the problem of obligation could be resolved by combining 
the freeloader theory with another theory, the framing of punishment as a way of restoring 
a just distribution of burdens and benefits clearly misconstrues its function in cases of 
serious harm to others. It is hard to understand why we should primarily view a murder or 
a rape as a relief for the offender. In short, the freeloader theory does not pick out the most 
salient aspect of the wrong in crime, except perhaps for some economic crimes where 
benefit is due to cooperation. I turn now to Kant and Hegel, whose framing of crime as an 
infringement of autonomy has much greater potential to yield a comprehensive theory of 
criminal law and punishment. 
 
                                                        




9. Infringing upon freedom  
I will in this final and longest chapter of Part I discuss what I call the freedom perspective 
on crime and punishment. This perspective identifies the wrong in crime as an 
infringement of the freedom of the victim and of everybody’s equal right to freedom. It 
sees in punishment a way of negating this infringement. My starting point is Kant and 
Hegel’s theories of punishment, but I expand the theoretical input in the latter part of the 
chapter. I will there discuss expressive theories that supplement Kant and Hegel’s theories, 
while remaining within the Kantian-Hegelian framework. 
Discussing these theories together as versions of an overarching freedom perspective risks 
downplaying important differences between them. This worry is less relevant here, 
however, than when the aim is exegeses of Kant and Hegel’s theories for their own sake. 
Kant and Hegel agree sufficiently in the way of framing the problems related to crime and 
punishment that it is proper, I believe, to talk of a common Kantian-Hegelian framework 
or a freedom perspective when discussing these issues. 
However, as we shall see, there are some differences between Kant and Hegel’s theories 
that are important for our discussion. Most notably, their conceptions of freedom, and 
therefore of right, are only partly overlapping. Axel Honneth thus notes, 
Hegel means something far more comprehensive by “right” than other 
philosophers of his time: unlike Kant or Fichte, to whom “right” meant 
human coexistence regulated by the laws of the state and who relied most 
of all on the coercive power of the state, he understands that term to cover 
all those social conditions that can be proved to be necessary for the 
realization of the “free will” of every subject.259 
 
That means, more specifically, that Hegel sees institutions other than the legal system, and 
forms of recognition other than legal rights, as indispensable aspects of freedom. The 
relevance of this wider concept of freedom shall become especially clear in Part II where 
I discuss the links between social (in)justice and criminal justice. However, once again the 
importance of the differences between Kant and Hegel should not be exaggerated. If we 
adopt, as I do, a Republican reading of Kant’s legal and political philosophy, Kant too 
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must be understood as recognizing a link between legal and social justice.260  
9.1 Right as mutual autonomy 
To understand Kant and Hegel’s penal theories it is necessary to place them within the 
broader framework of their legal philosophies.261 The function that Kant and Hegel ascribe 
to punishment can only be understood, and no less defended, in light of the purpose that 
they ascribe to law and the legal order generally. The purpose is freedom. “The idea of 
right is freedom”, Hegel writes.262 More specifically, and with Kant’s words: “Right is 
therefore the sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the 
freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law.”263 
This “Universal Principle of Right” entails that an action is right as long as it can coexist 
with the equivalent freedom of everybody else. We can say for short that it is a principle 
of mutual freedom. An action’s legality depends solely on its being externally compatible 
with everybody’s mutual freedom – in contrast to an action’s morality, which for Kant 
entails that the universal law of freedom is also the internal motivation for the action. 264 
My legal freedom thus extends to where your sphere of freedom begins. Freedom can only 
legitimately be constrained by freedom. This means, ultimately, that the right to freedom 
is also a right to coerce. Put negatively: If I do not have a right to prevent a wrongful 
hindrance of my freedom, then I have no freedom. Freedom and coercion are thus 
inseparable aspects of right. In the same way that minus minus is plus, the right of 
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“hindering of a hindrance to freedom” 265 is the right of freedom. “Right and authorization 
to use coercion therefore mean one and the same thing.”266 
Most fundamentally, the right to coerce is a right to prevent violations of one’s physical 
integrity. Freedom, understood as “independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice” 267, is for Kant an innate right; a pre-legal right that humans have as a consequence 
of being human. Even outside a legal order, in a state of nature, one would have the right 
to protect oneself against violations of one’s body and one’s immediate sphere of 
movement. An equivalent right of self-defense pertains to things over which one has 
physical control – Kant’s example is an apple that one holds in one’s hand. This right does 
not extend to external things over which one does not have direct physical control, 
however. It makes no sense to claim that one has the right to protect such objects against 
violations by others in a state of nature. To be able to claim such a right, for instance over 
an apple tree standing in the forest, there has to be a legal order that makes possible 
acquisition of and respect for property.268 
Without a legal order, my freedom will be limited. I cannot cultivate the land, I cannot 
build a house, I cannot enter contracts etc. without others being able to reap the fruits of 
my projects with equal right. For this reason, Kant says, we would “do wrong in the highest 
degree by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful, that is, in which 
no one is assured of what is his against violence”.269 One’s possibility for exercising one’s 
freedom increases dramatically when one can set aims outside one’s immediate vicinity 
with protection against interference from others. The rightful condition, i.e. a state 
governed under the rule of law, is thus necessary for remedying the lack of freedom that 
follows from the dependence on the will of others in the state of nature. The state does so 
by (1) ensuring rules that everyone can make valid for themselves, (2) by ensuring an 
impartial adjudication process, and (3) by guaranteeing that the law is upheld. The 
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legislative, the judiciary and the executive branches of government can thus be considered 
remedies against different sources of lack of freedom in the state of nature. 270 With the 
establishment of the rule of law comes a system for the protection of everybody’s freedom 
of choice to the extent compatible with the equivalent freedom of choice of others. Wrong 
is then understood as infringements of mutual freedom, and this is the basis for 
criminalizing certain actions in a rightful legal order. 
9.1.1 Consenting to being punished 
What is the right reaction when an infringement of mutual freedom occurs? Since right is 
defined as mutual freedom, the right reaction to legal offences must obviously be 
consistent with mutual freedom. The reaction must, in other words, respect the freedom of 
choice of the offender to the extent compatible with the freedom of choice of everybody 
else. Since punishment is per definition painful, most criminal offenders will likely not 
actually choose to be punished. Without such consent to punishment, how can it be claimed 
to be consistent with the offender’s freedom of choice? First of all, it is not the punishment 
itself that the offender would have to consent to: “No one suffers punishment because he 
has willed it but because he has willed a punishable action”271. It is thus the criminal law, 
not the concrete punishment, that has to be such that the offender could have chosen to 
make it valid for himself and others. Secondly, it is not empirical consent Kant is 
concerned with. The criminal is ascribed an ideal, that is, pure reason, and it is from this 
pure reason that the consent must be deduced.  
Consequently, when I draw up a penal law against myself as a criminal, it is 
pure reason in me (homo noumenon), legislating with regard to rights, which 
subjects me, as someone capable of crime and so as another person (homo 
phenomenon), to the penal law, together with all others in a civil union.272 
 
This is not to be understood as a denial of the empirical circumstances that motivate and 
influence criminals in real life. There is nobody, criminal or not, who manifests pure 
practical reason completely. We are nevertheless assumed to have the possibility to 
transcend our empirically given needs and wishes. We are assumed capable of making 
rational choices, even if we do not always do so in practice. The criminal offender is 
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viewed from the perspective of freedom, knowing well that this perspective does give a 
full picture of him or her. 
Whether we are justified in making such assumptions is a controversial philosophical 
question, as is well-known.273 It is worth noting, however, that for Kant our freedom is not 
a fact that can be verified or falsified, but something we simply must presuppose that we 
have. We cannot theoretically prove that we are free; freedom, in the Kantian system, is 
not a phenomenon that can be subsumed under categories. In the very moment that we 
were to capture and comprehend freedom, freedom would vanish, like a bubble of soap 
that bursts when we catch it. But we must presume the practical reality of freedom. We 
cannot rationally deny that we are free without thereby denying that the denial is rational. 
Our judgment would then amount to a performative inconsistency274: If we did not presume 
that we have an autonomous rationality we would not retain the possibility of making 
judgments about anything, including the possibility of rendering a negative judgment on 
our own freedom. 
Law must be omnilateral if it is to be consistent with the freedom of those who are 
subjected to it, not unilateral, as that would entail that one was under the choice of another. 
What does it mean that law is omnilateral? Kant defines omnilateral as “derived from the 
particular wills of each”275. Law must be such that each and every one could have rationally 
willed that it be valid for herself and everybody else. Only then does law entail legitimate 
constraints upon our freedom, that is, constraints that are consistent with mutual freedom. 
This is clearly expressed in a formulation of the Universal Principle of Right that Kant 
gives in Toward Perpetual Peace: “My external (rightful) freedom is […] to be defined as 
follows: it is the warrant to obey no other external laws than those to which I could have 
given my consent.”276  
If we interpret this antithetically, it means that we do not have the right to disobey laws 
that we could have given our consent to. We have all, in light of our pure practical reason, 
subjected ourselves to the criminal law, if it is consistent with the Universal Principle of 
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Right. The use of coercion against criminals is legitimate, then, because coercion is a 
hindering of a hindrance to freedom, and therefore a manifestation of freedom. Kant 
thereby establishes that the right of the polity to punish follows from the idea of right as 
mutual freedom. If one accepts the premise that right is mutual freedom, then it follows 
that coercion can rightfully be applied in order to assure mutual freedom. Freedom and 
coercion are two faces of the same coin. Formulated negatively: Nobody can claim a right 
not to be punished if she denies through her actions the validity of right. The criminal gives 
up her legal protection against coercion by denying the law’s protection against coercion.  
A critic might reply: “If Sarah steals Peter’s bicycle, she denies Peter’s right to own the 
bicycle, but she has no intention of denying the law’s protection against coercion 
generally”. Kant could then reply by referring to his distinction between material and 
formal wrong.277 The theft of the bicycle entails a material wrong against Peter. This was 
the empirical intention of Sarah’s action. But if we consider Sarah’s deed as an act of a 
free and rational person, the theft of the bicycle also entails a formal wrong against the 
legal order. 
9.1.2 The function of punishment according to Kant  
The argument goes as follows: To the extent that the offender’s action is a serious 
expression of her rationality, in other words, to the extent that she has freely chosen to 
commit the action, it must be rational for all other free and rational persons; it must be 
omnilaterally valid. The only way that Sarah’s appropriation of the bicycle could be 
omnilaterally valid was if the right to property was invalid. But Sarah cannot annul the 
right to property for all – that would entail a unilateral imposition of her own will on others. 
Her act can only be rational if it is exclusively self-imposing: She does not deny property 
rights generally, but only for herself. 
This is how we can make sense of Kant’s enigmatic claim that “whatever undeserved evil 
you inflict upon another within the people, that you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, 
you insult yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you 
strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself”.278 The function of punishment is to turn 
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the crime against the criminal – to “bring his misdeed back upon himself”279 – by taking 
his message of denial of law seriously as a rational maxim. It is rational, and hence 
consistent with mutual freedom, to refrain from a right, but not to force others to refrain 
from their rights. 
Many have interpreted the above quotes as expressions of a primitive form of retribution: 
The objective harm of the crime is to be balanced with an equivalent harm in the form of 
punishment. Such an interpretation does find some support in other passages in Kant. He 
says, for instance, in the same place: “But only the law of retribution (ius talionis) […] 
can specify definitely the quality and the quantity of punishment.”280 Kant likely did not 
mean a material equality between crime and punishment, however. He says, for instance, 
that the punishment for someone of high standing who strikes an innocent person should 
be solitary confinement involving hardship, because that would affect the vanity of the 
offender, ”so that through his shame like would be fittingly repaid with like”. 281 The 
punishment for theft ought also to be forced labor, because, as described above, the thief 
relinquishes his right to protection of property, which means that the state must provide 
for him, and he ought to pay for it through his forced labor.  
The critique that some have made against Kant’s penal theory claiming that it entails 
torturing the torturer or raping the rapist, interprets the law of retribution too literally.282 
Such punishment would not be consistent with the humanity of the offender, since it is 
degrading and therefore not something to which the offender could rationally consent. 
Allen W. Wood, for one, claims that Kant’s theory of punishment is inconsistent with 
Kantian ethics because it cannot be rational to universalize such actions as rape in this 
way. As Wood says, it cannot be the case that “someone (presumably, the state’s executive 
authority) is entitled to act toward the criminal in a manner that accords with what his 
maxim would imply if it were universalizable (which it necessarily is not)”.283 But this 
misconstrues the way in which the criminal’s act is taken to be universalizable. Abstaining 
from one’s rights is universalizable, unilaterally changing other’s rights is not. The latter 
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constitutes a (formal) wrong; the former constitutes consent to punishment (or more 
precisely consent to abstaining from the right not to be punished). The act of “bringing his 
misdeed back upon himself” is thus a way of treating the criminal as rational while 
upholding the rational legal order; a way of respecting the pure rationality entailed by the 
criminal deed while hindering that the offender’s hindrance to freedom is left standing, as 
if it were omnilaterally valid.  
We see, then, that it is the crime against the legal order itself (i.e. against mutual freedom) 
that justifies coercion against the coercion that violates freedom. Kant’s theory ought 
therefore to be understood as legal retributivist, as opposed to the material theories I have 
discussed. The retributive function of punishment is “legal” in the sense that it is the 
violation of law that motivates punishment and that is sought re-established through 
punishment.284   
Herein lies a potential for a critique of Kant’s theory. If it is the violation of law that 
justifies punishment, a central party is left out of the theory: the victim. The person who 
has been most significantly affected by the crime, who has suffered its consequences, is 
absent from the justification of the sanction. Punishment finds its justification solely in the 
relation between the actions of the offender and the rational principle of the legal order. Its 
function is to hold the offender responsible, but the responsibility is in one sense 
solipsistic: It is a responsibility not toward the victim, but toward the offender’s own 
rationality. Punishment ensures that the offender is treated consistently with his own 
maxims.285 One might wonder, of course, whether this function is sufficiently important 
to justify the resources that we as a society spend on punishing offenders. Is it the job of 
the community to ensure that everybody lives through the logical consequences of one’s 
actions? Presumably, punishment must serve a function beyond this if society is to have 
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not only a right to punish, which Kant’s theory in my opinion succeeds in establishing, but 
also a sufficient reason for exercising the right. 
I turn now to Hegel, whose penal theory builds on Kant, but who also sees crime and 
punishment in relation to the victim and therefore, in my opinion, better succeeds in 
establishing a sufficient reason for punishing. 
9.2 Right as recognition  
For Hegel, as for Kant, freedom is the purpose of law. Hegel accepts the Universal 
Principle of Right, but he gives it a new formulation: “Be a person and respect others as 
persons.”286 This formulation is consistent with Kant’s formulation, but in light of Hegel’s 
broader philosophy it reveals a difference in the way Kant and Hegel view the relationship 
between right and freedom. While Kant postulates our innate freedom from which right is 
inferred, Hegel views right and freedom as mutually constitutive. Put differently: 
According to Kant, we possess pre-legal freedom; for Hegel right is necessary for freedom 
and vice versa.  
This will become clearer if we look closer at Hegel’s understanding of right as being and 
respecting persons. What is a person? Hegel answers: “The other, as an abstract and pure 
I, has itself as its end and object, and is therefore a person.”287 The first part, that the person 
is an abstract I, fits well with an ordinary understanding of the word. That is evident also 
from the etymology of the word: The Latin word “persona” referred to the mask that actors 
wore, and is possibly derived from per sonare, “to sound through” (the mask).288 To be a 
person means, metaphorically, to wear a mask: One’s idiosyncrasies are hidden; the 
individual is abstracted from its concrete circumstances and peculiarities. And precisely 
because right entails such an abstraction (this part of the Philosophy of Right is indeed 
called “Abstract Right”) it is for Hegel a one-sided realization of freedom. As we shall see, 
Hegel thereby opens a room for critique of a purely juridical understanding of crime and 
its sanctions.289 But Hegel emphasizes that abstract right is nevertheless a necessary aspect 
                                                        
286 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 36. 
287 Ibid., § 35 Note. 
288 Online Etymology Dictionary, etymonline.com 





of freedom. “Negative freedom […] is one-sided, yet as this one-sidedness contains an 
essential feature, it is not to be discarded.”290 
The second part of Hegel’s definition of a person is more difficult to grasp immediately. 
What does it mean that the I has itself as its end and object? Hegel’s answer can be found 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit, in the famous chapter on self-consciousness. To have 
oneself as one’s object means to be self-conscious: the object of consciousness is oneself. 
“Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for 
another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”291 Hegel’s point, briefly explained, 
is that self-consciousness is achieved through interaction with other persons who are self-
conscious. Hegel shows the way this happens and the different aspects of self-
consciousness in the famous Master-Slave dialectic, which also has been interpreted as 
Hegel’s version of the allegory of the state of nature.292 While Kant postulates our freedom 
in the state of nature, Hegel claims that the Kantian innate freedom, denoting separate and 
self-sufficient individuals, cannot be more than a moment in full self-consciousness. In 
itself consciousness of oneself is merely negative, as separate from everything else. “I am 
not the other”. This is the consciousness of the Master: The world is the other that the I 
can consume, as if everything else were things to be used for the I’s own desire. To 
transcend this self-sufficient self-consciousness, it is necessary to experience that 
something among other things is the Other. In other words, that I experience another as 
self-conscious, like the Slave experiences the dominating Master as self-conscious. Only 
then can I recognize my own, equivalent self-consciousness. When I then experience 
myself as separate from this other self-consciousness, so that I am for the Other like the 
Other is for me – thereby transcending the consciousness of the Slave – I achieve 
(universal) self-consciousness. That is when I have consciousness of myself as something 
– as a man, as a philosopher, as a violinist, as anything at all. 
This short summary is sufficient for our purpose here. We can now see that it is only with 
the recognition of and from the other person that one becomes a person. It is only when 
                                                        
view of criminal motivation, which I will discuss at some length in Chapter 13. It is also relevant for the 
discussion of restorative justice as a sanction for crime that potentially addresses other forms of recognition 
than the abstract form, see Chapter 15. 
290 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 5 Addition 
291 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 111. 




one acknowledges that there are limits to what one can do to others – that others are not 
things but are persons with the capacity for having rights – that one can become conscious 
of oneself as a person with the capacity for having rights. In other words: Freedom occurs 
with right and is not prior to it. In yet other words: Right is mutual recognition. 
9.2.1 Hegel’s concept of wrong 
Let us now look at what this means for Hegel’s concept of wrong. While Kant simply 
views wrong as violation of mutual freedom, Hegel distinguishes between three types of 
wrong. The first is civil wrong or “unpremeditated wrong”, which might occur, for 
instance, in a property conflict. Such wrong entails a violation of a person’s concrete or 
particular right: One makes the claim that the person does not own something that he or 
she actually owns. It does not constitute a negation of right as such, however. The right of 
property is recognized, there is simply disagreement about who has it. “This is a purely 
negative judgment, in which the predicate “mine” negates only the particular.”293 The 
second type of wrong is fraud. It entails a semblance of respect for particular right, but 
universal right is not respected – in other words, opposite of civil wrong.294 The third type 
of wrong is crime, where both particular right and universal right is negated. 
Crime is the negative-infinite judgment in its complete sense. It negates not 
only the particular object of my will, but also the universal or infinite which is 
involved in the predicate ‘mine’, the very capacity for possessing rights.295 
The distinction between civil wrong and crime is thus that the former entails, in Hegel’s 
terminology, a negative judgment, while the latter entails a negative-infinite judgment. 
Hegel explains these terms in his Logic: A negative judgment is expressed in a statement 
of the kind “the rose is not red”. Such a judgment “still leaves the connection of the subject 
with the predicate subsisting”.296 The subject is thus still something. The rose is not red, 
so it must be yellow, white, or another color. A negative-infinite judgment on the other 
hand, is expressed in statements such as “the mind is no elephant” and “the lion is no table” 
(Hegel’s examples). From these statements nothing can be inferred. It makes no sense to 
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reason that if the lion is not a table, it must be a sofa or some other piece of furniture. There 
is no connection between subject and predicate at all. 
Applied to the domain of right: To have rights means that there is a positive connection 
between subject and predicate. Hegel says about property rights, for instance: “The object 
taken into my possession receives the predicate ‘mine’”.297 A civil dispute about property 
would entail a negative judgment, a denial of the particular connection between the subject 
and the predicate; a denial that the thing is “mine”. Theft, on the other hand, would entail 
a negative-infinite judgment, that is, a denial of any connection between subject and 
predicate. It is a denial that anything has the predicate “mine”; a denial of my capacity for 
having rights at all. The crime thus entails a denial of the victim’s status as person, because 
“[p]ersonality implies, in general, a capacity to possess rights”.298 
Another way of explaining this is through a description of ownership. For Hegel acquiring 
property, for instance by purchasing a bicycle, means that you manifest your will in that 
thing. You make it yours, and you thereby negate the thing’s independence: “the will is 
related to it positively. Yet in this identity the object is established as something 
negative”.299 You deny that the thing has a positive, independent will, so to speak. It is the 
exact same that happens in a crime. The offender negates the victim’s will by making it 
his own. The victim is for the offender like a thing he can use, instead of an independent 
person with a positive will. The criminal’s consciousness is thus like that of the Master. 
For the Master, his surroundings consist of things that he can consume in order to satisfy 
his desire. He does not recognize the Slave as a self-conscious Other, just like the criminal 
offender does not recognize the freedom of the victim. But that is why the Master does not 
achieve self-consciousness. Without mutual recognition one cannot become a free and 
self-conscious person. The analogy is the following: Just like the Master’s use of the Slave 
is destructive for his own freedom, so is the crime destructive for the freedom of the 
offender. For this reason, punishment, as we shall see, serves a function for the offender’s 
own freedom. 
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9.2.2 The function of punishment according to Hegel 
Wrong is the negation of right. As we have seen, Hegel distinguishes between three ways 
that wrong can negate right – by negating a particular right, by negating universal right, 
and by negating both. Depending on which type of wrong it is, a legal reaction is required 
so that “right by negating this negation of itself restores itself”.300 If it is a civil wrong, for 
instance if I unknowingly back my car over my neighbor’s bicycle, then the wrong against 
the particular right of the neighbor can be negated by compensating her for her loss.301 If, 
on the other hand, I damage my neighbor’s bicycle purposefully, it will be different. That 
would be a crime, and hence a violation of my neighbor as a person, and not merely of her 
property. Punishment is then required in order negate the wrong, according to Hegel: “The 
doing away with crime is retribution, in so far as retribution is in its conception injury of 
an injury”.302 
The different functions that Hegel accords punishment and compensatory damages in 
negating wrong can be explained by the distinction we saw in Kant between formal and 
material wrong. The function of damages is to negate material wrong. The function of 
punishment is to negate formal wrong. Hegel, like Kant, is therefore a legal retributivist. 
The form of a criminal action is incompatible with universally valid law. It is this formal 
wrong that constitutes the extra dimension of wrong that separates crime from civil wrong. 
Punishment is thus aimed at the negation of right itself.  
This is reflected in Hegel’s claim that “[a]n injury done to right as right is a positive 
external fact; yet it is a nullity. This nullity is exposed in the actual negation of the injury 
and in the realization of right”.303 The crime has a positive existence in the sense that it has 
material consequences, that is, as material wrong. Or as Hegel says: “By crime something 
is altered, and exists as so altered.”304 But crime is “nothing” in a different sense, before it 
is negated by punishment and thereby exposed as a nullity. What might Hegel mean by 
this? 
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One reasonable interpretation is that the action as a legal offense, i.e. as formal wrong, 
does not exist before it is declared (or “exposed”) as an offense. An action might, for 
instance cause the death of somebody, but it does not exist as a homicide until there is a 
conviction. Only then is it a negation of right.305 But, then, if the action is classified as 
homicide, it does exist as something, namely as homicide. What might Hegel mean when 
he says that it is exposed as a nullity? 
The action is a nullity in the sense that it is bound to fail as a negation of right. The offender 
cannot possibly make it so that right is invalid and his particular right is given existence 
as right. “But right, as absolute, is precisely what refuses to be set aside.”306 Again, this is 
fairly intuitive: No matter how many homicides occur, the law against homicide will not 
become invalid. We recognize the same argument from Kant: The offender, as a rational 
person, cannot unilaterally force a change in the rights of everybody. The project is bound 
to fail, because right per definition is omnilaterally given. With Hegel this takes on an 
intersubjective dimension, as described above: The freedom of the offender is dependent 
on recognition by and of other, free persons. If mutual freedom is negated, so is the 
offender’s own freedom, and hence the basis for right.  
The function of punishment is to display this impossibility; to manifest that the action of 
the offender cannot be left standing. Punishment is thus a denial of the validity of the denial 
of the freedom of others and the freedom of the offender. Hegel thus famously claimed 
that punishment of an offender “expresses his own inherent will, is a visible proof of his 
freedom and is his right […] a right of the criminal himself”.307. The right to be punished 
is a right to have rights, that is, a right to be a person with the capacity for possessing rights 
and not merely a thing. Punishment serves the symbolic function of reinstating the criminal 
as a mutually recognized person. 
But if the primary function of punishment is a kind of restoration of the offender’s status 
as person, the same critique can be made against this theory as against Kant’s theory. The 
critique of Kant was that the victim’s role is underemphasized. Punishment is justified by 
its function of negating the formal wrong against the legal order, and not the material 
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wrong suffered by the victim. This critique does not apply to Hegel’s theory, however. 
With Hegel we see that the formal wrong that punishment negates is also a wrong against 
a specific victim. The victim does not merely suffer material wrong, but also a formal 
wrong by the negation of her capacity for having rights. When the state uses resources in 
order to negate this formal wrong, it is not merely to ensure that the offender experiences 
the rational implications of her own actions, but to deny the denial of the victim’s freedom. 
The punishment serves a symbolic function as recognition of a concrete person. And by 
acknowledging the victim’s equal right to freedom, so is everyone else’s equal right to 
freedom recognized. Thus, the message conveyed by the crime is denied; it is manifested 
as false, as a nullity. 
9.3 Supplementing Kant and Hegel’s Theory 
This reconstruction of Hegel’s penal theory has made clear what he takes to be the proper 
aim of punishment: the re-actualization of mutual recognition, which has been negated 
through crime. The details of how punishment may achieve this aim are not as clear, 
however. By supplementing Kant and Hegel’s theory with the insights of the so-called 
expressive or communicative penal theories, I believe we can fill in some of these details, 
while rendering the Kantian-Hegelian framework all the more convincing.308 
As legal retributivists, both Kant and Hegel subscribed to the notion that punishment 
negates the formal wrong of crime. Formal wrong, understood as a negation of right, is 
necessarily symbolic. It has no positive existence; as we saw, only the material aspect of 
crime has positive existence. Material wrong is remedied by compensation, not 
punishment. Punishment is exclusively directed against a wrong that is symbolic and 
whose negation must therefore also be symbolic. 
What does this mean? Very rudimentarily, it simply means that crime and punishment 
carry meaning. They entail certain messages. Put negatively, if an event does not have 
meaning – if it does not involve communication – it is not a crime, and hence, cannot be 
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symbolically negated. An earthquake, for instance, does not communicate anything. It is 
therefore neither just nor unjust. Human action, on the other hand, can be meaningful, and 
hence potentially right or wrong. 
To this someone might object that many peoples have viewed earthquakes and the like as 
punishments from God. We even find a curious example of the opposite, a human 
punishing nature for its crimes, in the story of the Persian king Xerxes who whipped the 
sea for its failure to obey him. These are not counterexamples, however. They merely show 
that people have attributed meaning to nature and to the Cosmos at large, thus including 
them within the realm of justice and injustice. Indeed, the very notion of justice was 
originally inseparable from nature, as is evident, for instance, in the oldest remaining text 
on justice in Greek philosophy. In Anaximander’s Fragment, the life-giving and 
destructive changes in nature are said to “give justice and make reparation to one another 
for their injustice, according to the arrangement of Time”. Another example from ancient 
Greece is the notion of hubris. Anybody who displayed hubris by going beyond his rightful 
place within the cosmic order might rightfully meet an unhappy fortune. His downfall, i.e. 
his nemesis, would put him back into his place. Today we might call this poetic justice: 
the notion that eventually, through the workings of the universe, vice will be “punished” 
with misfortune. Again, this merely shows that when we apply to nature or to random 
events such terms as justice and punishment, it is because we read them as if they had 
meaning – as if they were poetry. 
The first to coin the term ‘the expressive function of punishment’ was Joel Feinberg, in 
the article by the same name. He there outlines a few ways that punishment communicates 
to the public at large. First, it can communicate authoritative disavowal. If, for instance, a 
corrupt police officer is punished, the state effectively communicates that what the police 
officer did, he did not do ‘in our name’, that is, as a representative of the state. Somewhat 
linked to this, is absolution of others. If the policeman is convicted and punished it 
communicates that it was he, and not somebody else, who was responsible for the crime. 
Likewise, there may be situations in which “the absolution of an accuser hangs as much in 
the balance at a criminal trial as the inculpation of the accused. ”309 If, for instance, a 
person is convicted of rape, the conviction communicates that the person accusing him is 
                                                        




not guilty of perjury. 
Punishment can also express what Feinberg calls symbolic non-acquiescence, 
communicating that the criminal act committed is not something society will condone. 
Feinberg offers a contrasting example, the so-called ‘paramour killings’ under The Texas 
Penal Code (Art. 1220), which states: “Homicide is justifiable when committed by the 
husband upon one taken in the act of adultery with the wife, provided the killing takes 
place before the parties to the act have separated.” By not punishing such killings, Feinberg 
says, “the law expresses the judgment of the 'people of Texas’ in whose name it speaks, 
that the vindictive satisfaction in the mind of a cuckolded husband is a thing of greater 
value than the very life of his wife's lover”.310 I might add that a premise of this judgment 
is the belief that husbands have the right to control the sexuality of their wives; that the 
wives are in this way the property of the husbands. The same premise underlies the practice 
in many countries whereby inter-marital rape is legal. Conversely, punishing such acts 
communicates the opposite, that husbands do not have property rights to wives, that both 
retain their sexual autonomy in marriage. 
Failure to ‘symbolically non-acquiesce’ can also result from leniency in sentencing. If a 
sentence is conspicuously low, the courts may thereby signal that they do not emphatically 
condemn the crime. A good example is the case of now infamous William Zantzinger, a 
wealthy, white tobacco heir convicted of killing Hattie Carroll, an African-American 
barmaid and mother of ten. The sentence: six months in jail, conveniently deferred until 
after Zantzinger’s tobacco harvest. The story of the case was made immortal by Bob 
Dylan’s 1964 song “The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll”, which conveys the outrage 
many felt at the court’s acquiescence. 
In the courtroom of honor, the judge pounded his gavel 
To show that all's equal and that the courts are on the level 
[…] 
And handed out strongly, for penalty and repentance 
William Zantzinger with a six-month sentence 
It is precisely the irony of the notion that “all’s equal” before the law in the Jim Crow south 
that is effectively revealed in the “strong” sentence of six months.  
                                                        




Feinberg argues that it is the idea of symbolic non-acquiescence that really underlies 
Kant’s famous example of an island community that is about to be dissolved. Kant writes,  
[…] the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be executed, 
so that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does 
not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for 
otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation 
of justice. 
Kant has drawn much critique for the reference to ‘blood guilt’ (rightly, of course). 
However, in light of Feinberg’s ‘symbolic non-acquiescence’ a charitable interpretation of 
this otherwise extreme claim is possible: The failure to punish reflects on society at large. 
We are all in some sense collaborators to injustice if we do not act to remedy the injustice. 
If we let fellow citizens go hungry for lack of money; if we return asylum seekers to an all 
but certain death; if we fail to punish offenders against minorities as we normally would – 
in all these cases we would fail in our duty to uphold justice and would thus be guilty of 
an injustice. Indeed, as we shall see shortly, these are all examples of injustice according 
to the Kantian Universal Principle of Right. 
The fourth and final way that punishment serves an expressive function according to 
Feinberg is by vindication of law. Again, it is easiest to illustrate with negative examples. 
Sometimes, Feinberg says, the criminal law may be clear enough in its condemnation of 
certain conduct, but “official evasion and unreliable enforcement, gives rise to doubts that 
the law really means what it says”.311 If, for instance, prohibition of marihuana use or 
drinking in public parks is not enforced, as is the case in many jurisdictions, the lack of 
enforcement communicates to the public that the prohibition is not to be taken seriously. 
Conversely, if the prohibition is enforced, law is vindicated. As with symbolic non-
acquiescence, vindication of law is an expressive function of punishment that fits nicely 
with the Kantian-Hegelian framework outlined above, especially if by law we mean not 
merely positive law as it happens to be, but law as it ought to be, that is, in accordance 
with mutual freedom.  
Feinberg has thus shown that punishment serves an important expressive function in (at 
least) these four ways. He then raises the following challenge: Could not the same 
                                                        




expressive function be achieved by other means? And would that not mean that the 
expressive function could not justify the necessity of punishment? 
One can imagine an elaborate public ritual, exploiting the trustiest devices 
of religion and mystery, music and drama, to express in the most solemn 
way the community's condemnation of a criminal for his dastardly deed. 
[…] Such a device would preserve the condemnatory function of 
punishment while dispensing with its usual physical forms – incarceration 
and corporal mistreatment.312 
If we wanted to communicate, say, that all have a right to sexual autonomy, could we not 
instead of punishing a rapist hold a parade in honor of the victim, with banners and 
speeches denouncing the crime and expressing to the victim her equal worth?313 In fact, 
could we not do without any ritual at all, perhaps beyond a simple statement conveying 
the wrongness of the crime? Feinberg’s answer: “Perhaps, but when [the state] speaks by 
punishing, its message is loud and sure of getting across.”314 His point is that as things are, 
punishment is the most effective way of communicating condemnation.  
[C]ertain forms of hard treatment have become the conventional symbols of 
public reprobation. This is neither more nor less paradoxical than to say that 
certain words have become conventional vehicles in our language for the 
expression of certain attitudes, or that champagne is the alcoholic beverage 
traditionally used in celebration of great events, or that black is the color of 
mourning.315 
We might compare it to the custom of giving gifts: If a person does you a favor you can 
certainly express your gratitude with a simple “Thank you”. But the message will get 
across better if you also give a bouquet of flowers or a bottle of whisky. Feinberg’s answer 
to his own challenge is thus that punishment is necessary for the achievement of the 
mentioned expressive functions, not because there is anything inherent in the act of 
punishment making it indispensable to this aim, but as a matter of convention. 
Durkheim’s answer to this challenge is slightly different, but with a similar conclusion. As 
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we saw above, Durkheim too held that punishment serves a communicative function: “it 
is a sign indicating that the sentiments of the collectivity are still unchanged”316 And the 
ultimate purpose of giving this ‘sign’ through punishment is “to maintain inviolate the 
cohesion of society by sustaining the common consciousness in all its vigour”.317 Why 
could not this purpose be achieved without punishment? Why not, for instance, simply 
have the courts make a statement about the crime’s failure to change the collective 
consciousness? 
The answer has to do with the nature of the collective consciousness. Durkheim defines it 
as: “The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of society.”318 
From these shared beliefs and sentiments arises the mechanical form of social solidarity, 
the fellow feeling which is due to the sense of being alike (or in more colloquial terms: the 
feeling of being in the same boat). Precisely because social solidarity has an emotional 
basis in our shared sentiments it will not suffice to counter attacks against it with a mere 
statement. Rituals, Durkheim stresses, play a vital role in maintaining the collective 
consciousness. But why the ritual of punishment, why not an elaborate public ritual such 
as the one Feinberg sketches above? Because crime speaks to us emotionally, an emotional 
reaction is required, and punishment, which “constitutes an emotional reaction”319 is 
particularly apt to “react vigorously against the cause of what threatens such a lowering of 
the consciousness”, Durkheim says.320 
A mere re-establishment of the order that has been disturbed cannot suffice. 
We need a more violent form of satisfaction. The force that the crime has 
come up against is too intense for it to react with so much moderation. 
Indeed it could not do so without becoming weakened, for it is thanks to the 
intensity of its reaction that it recovers, maintaining the same level of 
vitality.321 
Violent emotions such as anger are resources, Durkheim says, for mobilizing a defense of 
our shared convictions. “[F]ar from shaking our convictions, [it] has the effect on us of 
strengthening them even more.”322 Much like a fight against a common enemy will bring 
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people together, crime can unite people in the response against it, reinforcing social 
solidarity at a deeper level. Recall from above Durkheim’s remarkable conclusion: Crime 
serves a useful function in any healthy society. 
Joshua Kleinfeld, who has recently defended a Durkheim-inspired penal theory, stresses 
the importance of the emotional aspect of punishment: 
Having these emotions is thus part and parcel of being bonded to one 
another, and acting on them by punishing is what helps keep us bonded to 
each other. Indeed, punishment must be emotional if it is to have solidaristic 
effect; nothing wholly cerebral could produce the feelings of attachment that 
are one of punishment’s objects.323 
 
We see, then, that both on this Durkheimian ‘emotional theory’ and on Feinberg’s 
‘conventional theory’, punishment serves an important expressive function. On both 
theories, however, the medium (punishment) is contingently bound to its goal (expressing 
condemnation, reinforcing social solidarity). It is conceivable, in other words, that the goal 
could be achieved by other means than punishment. Both Durkheim and Feinberg argue 
for what we might call the ‘empirical necessity’ of punishment: As the world happens to 
be, punishment is necessary for achieving the expressive function accounted for, either 
because it is the (most effective) conventional way of expressing condemnation, or because 
it is the (most forceful) emotional response to attacks upon our shared convictions. Both 
these claims may be true as it is, but things may change so that they are no longer. We 
might develop other conventions whereby we express condemnations. We might find other 
responses that are as emotionally potent; or perhaps the need for an emotional response 
will diminish as society develops.324  
Because we might achieve the goals by other means, we must justify that we ought to use 
punishment instead of other medias of communication. Feinberg concludes, correctly I 
believe, that “[t]he problem of justifying punishment, when it takes this form, may really 
be that of justifying our particular symbols of infamy”.325 Since punishment involves the 
intentional infliction of pain, the cards are stacked against it at the outset. Only if it can be 
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shown that punishment is so much more effective in achieving the desired goals that the 
‘price’ of causing pain is worth it, will punishment be justified. However, we then have a 
consequentialist justification, which requires that we must show not only that the chosen 
means are the most effective, but that the goal attained is so valuable as to justify the 
means. Most would agree that condemning crimes is valuable, but for what reasons? Is 
absolution of others, authoritative disavowal, symbolic non-acquiescence and vindication 
of law so valuable as to justify the method that achieves it best, regardless of other negative 
effects of the method? Feinberg indicates that in addition, the expressive function might 
have a crime preventive effect.326 Durkheim’s ultimate goal for the expressive function is 
strengthening social solidarity, which in turn is a prerequisite for human flourishing within 
a society. It seems this version of the expressive theory is very close to collapsing into 
utilitarianism, notwithstanding Durkheim’s own claim to be transcending the dichotomy 
of justice and utility. 
In any case, we are far from providing an expressive account of punishment that fits the 
Kantian-Hegelian justification of punishment. The latter would require a theory of how 
punishment inherently expresses mutual respect for freedom, because punishment itself 
entails this meaning, and not because it is a conventional instrument for conveying such 
meaning. Jean Hampton’s expressive theory may here be helpful.  
9.3.1 The natural meaning of crime and punishment 
Hampton applies a Gricean theory of meaning to show different ways in which a criminal 
act can convey meaning. H. P. Grice distinguished between what he called natural meaning 
and non-natural meaning.327 The latter would include the kind of meaning by convention 
that Feinberg attributes to punishment: In the same way that giving a gift or saying “Thank 
you” are conventions for expressing the attitude of gratefulness, punishment is the 
conventional way that the state expresses condemnation. Hampton acknowledges that 
punishment may convey meaning in this and other non-natural senses, but asserts in 
addition that punishment is meaningful in Grice’s natural sense. Natural meaning can be 
understood as something akin to “evidence of” or “shows”. We say, for instance, “dark 
clouds mean rain is coming” or “a higher mortgage means we will have less money to 
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spend”. We are clearly not talking about the linguistic meaning of the words uttered, but 
rather about an actual or epistemic connection between the two phenomena referred to on 
each side of the word “mean(s)”. Human actions can also be meaningful in this natural 
sense. Hampton’s example is of an art expert who slits the canvas of a painting, an act that 
means that she thinks the painting worthless.328 Why can we infer this meaning? Because, 
Hampton says, to consider an artistic object valuable means “to preclude many kinds of 
treatment with respect to this object”. She discusses as an example the Book of Kells. If 
somebody spray-painted over its pages we would be furious. “[I]ts value generates certain 
entitlements. For as long as the Book of Kells has that value, it has these entitlements, 
which include being preserved, treated with care, and so forth.”329 
In the same way, Hampton holds, a criminal act means that the offender demeans the worth 
of the victim. ”By victimizing me, the wrongdoer has declared himself elevated with 
respect to me, acting as a superior who is permitted to use me for his purposes.”330 The 
implicit message the offender is sending: “I can do with you whatever I want. I can 
dominate you.” This false claim is the target of punishment. Punishment “negates the 
evidence of superiority”.331 ”The retributive punisher uses the infliction of suffering to 
symbolize the subjugation of the subjugator, the domination of the one who dominated the 
victim.”332 Or as Hampton says in a clear reference to Hegel: “The lord must be humbled 
to show that he isn’t the lord of the victim.”333 
The wrong in crime is thus the offender’s elevation of herself by demeaning the victim. 
As Hampton observes, many crime victims feel degraded. Their sense of self-worth is 
threatened by the crime. They feel low, and some come to think that they deserve their low 
status; that the offender did not cause them to be degraded, but rather that their prior worth 
was undeserved and that the offender merely put them in their right place. Many victims, 
for instance after sexual abuse, feel this sort of shame and self-loathing. Indeed, these 
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emotions can be seen as psychological self-defense mechanisms.334 
Though such acceptance of being demeaned may be a natural self-defense mechanism, it 
is nonetheless undeserved, and the recovery and justice of the victim requires that the claim 
be denied. Remedying this wrong means elevating the victim through negating the 
offender’s claim to superiority. Implicit in this aim is a distributive principle for the amount 
of punishment required: “The more severe the punishment, the more he is being brought 
low; and how low we want to bring a criminal depends on the extent to which his actions 
symbolize his superiority and lordship over the one he hurt.”335 This also means there is 
an upper limit to how low it is appropriate to bring the offender. The aim is to negate the 
evidence of superiority, not to elevate the victim above the offender, creating a new 
inequality. If punishment is so harsh as to demean the offender it may actually be counter-
productive to elevating the victim.  
Applying a Hegel-inspired theory of recognition, Hampton shows the futility of re-
establishing one’s self-esteem (i.e. one’s perception of having worth) at the expense of 
another’s worth. If trying, for instance, to bolster one’s image of oneself as a superior 
tennis player, it will not suffice to win over poor tennis players, say, one’s seven-year-old 
child. Only if one respects the worth of one’s opponent (in this case as a tennis player), 
can one possibly take winning over her as evidence of one’s own ability. Or take 
Hampton’s example: A philosophy professor who only surrounds himself with students 
who look up to him will not successfully convince himself that he is well-respected among 
his peers. This ‘superstar recognition-strategy’, as Hampton calls it, is bound to fail 
because recognition is a two-way street. If the professor does not recognize his students as 
his peers, their recognition will not suffice. This is, essentially, the problem of the Master 
in Hegel’s dialectic. 
Hampton also shows that hatred is a self-defeating emotional strategy for elevating oneself 
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after having been brought low. Many crime victims experience hate of whoever has 
demeaned them, sometimes in combination with self-loathing, as mentioned above. 
Whether the hatred is malicious, taking pleasure in the other’s lowness relative to oneself, 
or spiteful, taking pleasure at having “company at the bottom”, i.e. not being alone in being 
worthless, one will not thereby achieve the sense of objective worth that one seeks. Rather 
one confirms one’s own lowness through hating. Hampton quotes John Donne, who put 
this point succinctly: 
Lest my being nothing lessen thee  
If thou hate me, take heed of hating me.336   
Hampton thus warns against punishment that is cruel and based on hatred. The aim cannot 
be to ‘bring the offender low’. His lowness is not a goal in itself – such a hateful purpose 
would be self-defeating for elevating the victim. ‘Bringing low’ or ‘humbling the lord’ 
must be understood as ‘negating the evidence of superiority’. ‘Bringing low’ thus has 
merely instrumental value; it is just to the extent that it establishes equality. 
However, even this instrumental function of ‘bringing low’ may be problematic. It seems 
to rest on the assumption that the offender actually succeeds in elevating himself and 
lowering the victim. Punishment, by “domination of the one who dominated the victim” 
then re-establishes their equal worth. But does that not mean that the ability to dominate 
bears on one’s worth? Interpreting Hampton in this way, Gert et al. conclude that she 
proposes an “offensive equation of power with value”.337 Dolinko makes the same point 
when he asks why somebody should take a crime against her as evidence of her inferiority. 
“If you find your home burglarized, you may experience anger, or a sense of defilement, 
or fear that it will happen again, or all of these - but will you feel that the burglar has 
demonstrated that his moral value is greater than yours? Surely not!”338 
Hampton objects, of course, to an interpretation of her theory that equates moral value 
with strength, as we shall shortly see. It is worth noticing, however, that if the theory was 
about power, it could still make sense as a retributive theory. In other words, if we saw 
crime as wrong because the offender’s power over the victim makes her superior, this 
                                                        
336 Hampton, "Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred", 73. 
337 Gert, Radzik, and Hand, "Hampton on the Expressive Power of Punishment", 87. 




wrong would be remedied by applying punishment as a counter-power. In societies in 
which moral worth is equated with power, this interpretation of Hampton’s theory would 
likely accord with common opinions on the justice of punishment. However, Hampton 
points out that if you accept an inegalitarian theory of worth then you will not, as a 
consequence, accept the principle of proportionality of crime and punishment. An 
inferior’s crime against a superior will require a more severe punishment to restore the 
“correct” balance than a superior’s crime against someone who is already inferior – simply 
due to the inequality of the status quo ante culpam. And indeed, historically, the rich and 
powerful have been punished less severely than the poor and powerless for similar crimes, 
and this practice persists to some extent in modern societies. The difference is that now 
such practices are viewed as unjust. Most of us react to the injustice of cases like that of 
William Zantzinger. Part of what we find offensive is precisely that his low punishment 
makes sense only against a background where his worth at the outset is superior to that of 
Hattie Carroll. This premise is unacceptable, but if it were acceptable, the theory that Gert 
et al. and Dolinko attribute to Hampton would still function as a theory of retributive 
justice. In other words, we have here an instance of a retributive theory that is internally 
coherent, but where the premise that it rests on is unacceptable. 
We need, then, an alternative account of the wrong in crime – it cannot be that power over 
another makes that person morally inferior. One possibility is to drop the notion of 
superiority and inferiority entirely, focusing instead on the wrongness of the power 
imbalance itself: It is unjust that one person should hold power over another; this wrong is 
remedied by applying punishment as a counter-power. Notice that this version addresses 
only the material aspect of power. It is not, therefore, an expressive account of punishment. 
And for the same reason it is insufficient as a comprehensive theory of punishment – it 
could not, for example, account for a wrong committed against a more powerful person, 
where the crime has not made the offender superior to the victim in terms of power. Neither 
can it account for the injustice of punishment when a person does hold power over another, 
but has not committed a crime. However, as I have stressed before: The fact that the theory 
is not comprehensive does not mean that it does not sometimes account for an aspect of 
what makes punishment just. Crimes do sometimes create an unjust power imbalance that 




Hampton’s answer is different, however, preserving the expressive element of punishment. 
Crimes do not actually cause the victim to be inferior to the offender. Their real value is 
unchanged by the crime. Crime is merely an appearance of degradation. Hence, Hampton 
says, “the retributive motive for inflicting suffering is to annul or counter the appearance 
of the wrongdoer’s superiority and thus affirm the victim’s real value”.339 
What is the victim’s real value? The answer: Her value is infinite. She is, as Kant put it, 
“raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent [and hence] has a dignity”.340 
Compare this to Hobbes’ claim that “The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, 
his Price”.341 Hampton, as most others today, adopts the Kantian view of persons as ends-
in-themselves and rejects the Hobbesian instrumental view of human worth. That means 
that for Hampton, human value is inalienable. A victim cannot lose value, and an offender 
cannot have more value. The Kantian view is precisely that human value is beyond more 
and less, i.e. raised above all price.  
How are we then to interpret the meaning of crime? Crime creates an appearance of 
degradation (as opposed to a real degradation). Punishment, in turn, negates the evidence, 
exposing the appearance as just an appearance. But Hampton has not thereby showed how 
crime and punishment create and negate these appearances. Her position is therefore 
vulnerable to the kind of critique that Dolinko makes: “But why should we care about 
nullifying precisely those claims?” 342 Why should we care about something we know to 
be merely an appearance? All kinds of false moral claims are made every day; should it be 
the state’s responsibility to negate these claims? Take the example of Randy Newman who 
had a huge hit singing: “Short people got no reason to live” – should he have been punished 
in order to show the claim to be merely an appearance of the value of short people?343 
Further, unless the theory specifies how crime and punishment create and negate the 
appearance of degradation, it will not be able to answer Feinberg’s challenge from above. 
It cannot provide a reason why punishment is not merely a conventional instrument 
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whereby condemnation is expressed. And it cannot, then, avoid the problems I associated 
with Feinberg’s and Durkheim’s theories, namely that punishment would have to be given 
a consequentialist justification, which it is uncertain that the expressive theory could 
provide.  
Hampton’s own views on this issue are not entirely clear. She held at one point that 
punishment is “uniquely suited to the vindication of the victim’s relative worth”.344 Later, 
however, she claimed that even turning the other cheek could serve the same “retributive” 
function as punishment. She quotes St. Paul to this effect: "[I]f your enemy is hungry, feed 
him; if he is thirsty, give him drink; for by so doing, you will heap burning coals upon his 
head.”345 Presumably, such “kind” acts may evoke feelings of humiliation and shame in 
the offender, thereby “humbling” her. Likewise, throwing a parade for the victim or giving 
a sincere apology may, according to Hampton, serve the retributive function “to nullify 
the wrongdoer’s message of superiority”. But defining “retribution” so widely as to include 
such non-punitive acts does not answer the above challenges. We still only have an account 
of the conventional meaning of punishment. The problem merely shifts to which among 
the different means of conveying this conventional meaning, if any, is justified. 
 
I will now try to answer these challenges by giving an account of the Gricean natural 
meaning of crime. The aim is to show the inherent connection between the natural meaning 
of crime and the retributive function of punishment, thereby providing an understanding 
of the expressive function of punishment that accords with the Kantian-Hegelian theory of 
punishment. My proposal is based on H. L. A. Hart’s account of rights and a similar insight 
provided by Hampton’s example of the art critic who slits the canvass of a painting. The 
art critic’s act means that for her the painting is worthless. The reason the act has this 
natural meaning is because it is entailed by the meaning of artistic value. ‘An object having 
artistic value’ means ‘certain treatment of it is precluded’. As Hampton put it, the object 
has entitlements as long as it is viewed as valuable. Vandalizing the object means 
disrespect of these entitlements, and hence disrespect of its value. 
Hart’s theory of rights, as he lays it out in “Are There Any Natural Rights?” similarly 
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asserts a necessary connection between valuing the autonomy of the individual and 
according her moral rights. One’s value as a free and equal person is entailed by the 
concept of rights and vice versa. “There is no place for a moral right unless the moral value 
of individual freedom is recognized.”346 Hart does not argue that this natural right to 
freedom is part of an eternal natural law; he is making the conditional assertion that “if 
there are any moral rights then there must be this one natural right”.347 The moral codes of 
ancient Greece, for instance, did not include the concept of a right, Hart argues. The 
concept of rights arose during the Enlightenment with the explicit value placed on 
individual autonomy. When Kant distinguished between the morality and the legality of 
an act, Hart claims, it was precisely to isolate a sphere within morality where the individual 
could not be coerced even if doing so would contribute to the overall Good. “His point is, 
I think, that we must distinguish from the rest of morality those principles regulating the 
proper distribution of human freedom which alone make it morally legitimate for one 
human being to determine by his choice how another should act”348 With the concept of a 
right one could thereby distinguish that which is good and/or just from that which it is 
within one’s right to enforce. Something might then be good, but beyond limits. I might 
think, for instance, that it would be good to take away my nephew’s iPhone, since he seems 
to be enslaved by it; however, it is not my right to do so. Likewise, it would be good if 
people gave more to charity, but we all have a right not to be forced to do so. 
How, then, is the natural right to freedom entailed by the concept of moral rights? Hart 
distinguishes between special rights and general rights, which are mirror images of each 
other. Special rights arise out of transactions or special relationships and accord the right 
to something that would otherwise be within another person’s sphere of autonomy. “[T]he 
claimant has some special justification for interference with another’s freedom which other 
persons do not have (‘I have a right to be paid what you promised for my services’).”349 
General rights apply to all and accord the right not be interfered with unless somebody has 
a special right to do so. “[G]eneral rights […] are asserted defensively, when some 
unjustified interference is anticipated or threatened, in order to point out that the 
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interference is unjustified. ‘I have the right to say what I think.’ ‘I have a right worship as 
I please.’”350  
Hart’s point is that both special rights and general rights can only be understood against a 
background where all have a natural right to be free. It does not make sense to claim a 
special right to interfere unless persons by default have the general right not to be interfered 
with, that is, unless we are by default free. To claim, for instance, “I have a right to your 
services according to our contract” only makes sense if but for the contract you were 
rightfully free not to render the services. Further, the very possibility of according me 
special rights presupposes your autonomy. “For we are in fact saying in the case of 
promises and consents or authorizations that this claim to interfere with another’s freedom 
is justified because he has, in exercise of his equal right to be free, freely chosen to create 
this claim.”351 Both types of right thus presuppose the autonomy of the individual: 1) for 
transferring rights to another, and 2) as the negative against which a positive right to 
interfere is conceivable. 
Robert Nozick objects to this argument, and attempts to show its flawed logic by turning 
it on its head:  
If there were cogency to Hart’s claim that only against a background of 
required nonforcing can we understand the point of special rights, then there 
would seem to be equal cogency to the claim that only against a background 
of permitted forcing can we understand the point of general rights.352 
        
Nozick’s point is the following: If I say that we all have a general right to take a walk or 
to eat dinner or to speak our minds, it only makes sense, applying Hart’s logic, if but for 
this general right, others could legitimately force us not to do so. In conclusion: Only if 
we do not have a natural right to be free can we understand our general rights to do such 
things as taking a walk or eating dinner. 
Nozick’s argument does not work, however, for he has missed the fact that general rights 
are negative. We do not have general rights to do anything in particular; we have general 
rights to not be interfered with when others do not have special rights to do so. Admittedly, 
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Hart could have been clearer about this. His examples of general rights are “I have a right 
to say what I think” and “I have a right to worship as I please”. However, he does say that 
these sentences are asserted defensively, when an unjustified interference is anticipated. 
The general right is not really ‘the right to speak your mind’, but ‘the right not to be 
hindered in speaking your mind, save for justifiable reasons’. Likewise, the general right 
is really ‘to not be hindered in worshipping’.  
Turning this on its head is implausible and in conflict with the way we normally conceive 
rights. We do not normally think we are prohibited to do everything except that which we 
have a right to do. That would require an infinite amount of positive general rights – for 
instance, the general right to climb a tree on a Wednesday, which we would otherwise be 
prohibited in doing because we are by default unfree. And how could we even conceive 
the notion of special rights as overriding general rights without confirming Hart’s point? 
If you have a general right to climb trees on Wednesdays unless I have a special right to 
force you not to, then you are in fact free. Nothing has then changed from Hart’s theory 
except that the name of general rights is misleadingly assigned to ‘the right to climb trees 
on Wednesdays’ instead of ‘the right not to be hindered in climbing trees on Wednesdays’. 
Instead of an infinite amount of positive general rights, we have one negative general right 
to freedom, and many positive special rights. The latter make exceptions to the general 
right to non-interference, but, importantly, exceptions that confirm the rule, i.e. our natural 
right to freedom (by presupposing our autonomy in creating special rights). This is 
essentially the same claim that Kant makes when he says that we have one innate right to 
freedom from which all positive rights stem. Under the Universal Principle of Right, we 
have a general right to unrestricted freedom to the extent compatible with everyone else’s 
equal freedom. Special rights may override the general right not to be interfered with, but 
these rights must be compatible with mutual freedom in order not to be illegitimate 
restrictions on our freedom. 
Another way of putting this is to say, as Kant did, that we can only have rights against 
beings that have rights as well as duties. We cannot have rights against beings that have 
neither rights nor duties, nor beings that have only duties but no rights.353 The three main 
                                                        





types of (special) rights that Kant distinguishes thus have in common that upholding them 
respects the rights of the person against whom the right is held.354 If I consent to your use 
of my bicycle, your interference in my property respects my rights. This is the principle of 
volenti non fit injuria. Without consent, however, your use of my bicycle would be wrong. 
It would not be a case of a special right overriding the general right to non-interference, 
because one cannot have a special right without respecting rights. In other words, one 
cannot have rights against someone who is treated as a being with neither rights nor duties 
– like a thing – or as a being with only duties but no rights – like a slave. 
Thus, because respecting rights means respecting that person’s equal right to freedom, 
disrespecting rights means disrespecting her freedom. We have identified, then, a natural 
meaning of crime. Of course, not all will recognize this meaning. Hart’s point is valid: If 
you do not have a concept of rights, you will not have a concept of a natural right to 
freedom, and neither will you then conceive crimes as entailing a denial of this concept. 
This does not mean, however, that we have here merely a conventional meaning of crime. 
If a man in, say, ancient Egypt raped his wife, the act would mean a denial of her freedom, 
even though he and others at the time would not conceive it as such. 
In modern societies, where we are accustomed to think in terms of rights and hence to 
value individual freedom, this natural meaning of crime as denial of equal freedom is much 
closer to an established meaning of crime, though as the preceding chapters have shown, 
we often do accord other meanings to crimes as well. What this chapter has shown, 
however, is that if we accept the concept of rights, we thereby accept the value of individual 
freedom, and we cannot then fail to accept that a denial of a person’s rights means a denial 
of equal freedom. Unlike the other aspects of the wrong in crime identified in the preceding 
chapters this meaning of crime is not optional once we accept the value of freedom. We 
could, of course deny the value of freedom, but at the cost of giving up the notion of rights, 
and hence, the democratic Rechtsstaat itself. The freedom perspective on crime is thus not 
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only intuitively appealing because we value freedom highly in our culture – it is also 
implied by something else we do and ought to value highly: The rule of law. With the risk 
of sounding very Hegelian, I would suggest that to give up the value of freedom once it 
has been acknowledged would constitute an unwanted (and perhaps impossible) 
regression. 
Accepting, then, that the denial of mutual freedom constitutes a natural meaning of crime, 
does this answer the challenge posed by Feinberg regarding the expressive function of 
punishment? In other words, is punishment more than merely a conventional instrument 
for condemning crimes? The Kantian-Hegelian theory of punishment permits an 
affirmative answer, seeing punishment as inherently expressing respect for mutual 
freedom. With Kant, we saw that punishment means treating the criminal as a free and 
rational agent. The justice of turning the crime against the criminal is entailed by mutual 
freedom, for it is the only way the crime can be taken as an expression of the criminal’s 
rationality. With Hegel, we saw that crime is also a specific denial of the victim’s 
personhood, and since one’s own personhood depends on the recognition of other equals, 
treating the criminal as an equal (as shown by the Kantian theory of punishment) means 
restoring mutual recognition for both victim and offender. Treating the offender as an 
equal means denying the appearance of her superiority over the victim and others, to put 
it in Hampton’s terms. Thus, in the same way that the natural meaning of crime is a denial 
of equal freedom due to the meaning of the concept of rights, so the natural meaning of 
punishment is a negation of unequal rights and hence an affirmation of mutual freedom. 
9.4 Conclusion: The duty of justice 
This brings us to the conclusion to this chapter and the part on the justice of punishment. 
After having reviewed all the plausible theories of the wrong in crime and the function of 
punishment in remedying these wrongs, I conclude that the best theory of retributive 
justice is one built on Kant and Hegel’s fundamental insight of the wrong in infringing 
upon the equal right to freedom. This is not to say that other aspects of wrong are 
unimportant and ought not to be remedied. But the Kantian-Hegelian theory has some 
advantages over the others.  




of crime, while the previously discussed wrongs – freeloading, undeserved profiting, 
undermining the common good etc. – are salient in some types of crimes, but absent in 
others, and therefore unsuitable as comprehensive theories of the wrong in crime. Indeed, 
some crimes can hardly be understood without seeing them as infringements of autonomy. 
There is no obvious harm in sexually touching a sleeping person who never finds out about 
it. But it is clearly a denial of her rights, treating her as if she were an object to be used for 
one’s own ends.  
Note that the republican theory of Pettit and Braithwaite that identifies wrong as 
domination has the same scope, and is at first sight indistinguishable from the Kantian-
Hegelian wrong as infringement of autonomy.355 The subtle difference is that the latter is 
a non-consequentialist theory, while the former is consequentialist with freedom as non-
domination as the goal to be promoted.356 This brings us to the second advantage of a 
retributive theory based on Kant and Hegel: Punishment, upon this theory, instantiates the 
value it seeks to achieve. It is not merely a conventional instrument for attaining a goal 
outside of itself. Thus, the answer to Feinberg’s challenge is not that punishment is more 
effective than other means and “worth the price”. Rather, punishment is just in itself once 
we accept as wrong the infringement upon mutual freedom. 
There is an important caveat here, however. The fact that punishment is sufficient for re-
establishing recognition of mutual freedom does not mean that there cannot be other ways 
of achieving the same. There may be other sanctions that achieve justice by remedying the 
same injustice. As a practical matter, then, there may be little difference between the 
consequentialist and the non-consequentialist version of wrong as domination: On either 
theory one ought presumably to take into account the downsides of the specific sanctions 
if more than one can achieve the same goal. 
There is nonetheless an important difference: Whereas a consequentialist might conclude 
that no sanctions are worth it in a given case, i.e. that the overall good of freedom as non-
domination is best served by doing nothing about a particular wrong, a non-
consequentialist will insist upon the duty to do justice regardless of the overall effects. The 
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Kantian-Hegelian non-consequentialist theory I propose, unlike the consequentialist 
version, will say the following: 
If, in a given case, other ways of restoring mutual freedom is impossible, punishment, since 
it is sufficient for restoring mutual freedom, is necessary for achieving justice. 
This claim has two important consequences for the version of the Kantian-Hegelian theory 
I am adopting: First, it rejects Kant and Hegel’s own retributivist views, but accepts their 
theories of retributive justice. Second, it accepts the duty to do justice that Kant and Hegel 
insisted upon. 
The duty to do justice implied for Kant and Hegel the duty to punish. They held, in other 
words, the retributivist position that punishment is necessary and sufficient for justice. 
“The law of punishment is a categorical imperative”357, Kant says, and Hegel notes “the 
necessary connection between crime and punishment”358. If, however, there are other ways 
of restoring recognition of mutual freedom, and if these other ways have additional 
benefits, there is no reason to accept this Kantian-Hegelian duty to punish. There is a 
conditional here, and it will therefore be of importance for my theory to determine whether 
there are in fact other ways of restoring mutual freedom and when, if ever, they are 
practically feasible. I will later discuss restorative justice as one potential way of restoring 
mutual recognition. 
Even if we abandon Kant and Hegel’s duty to punish, we cannot abandon their duty to do 
justice without abandoning their theories all together. As Kant famously put it: “For if 
justice goes, there is no longer any value in human being’s living on the earth.”359 In other 
words, the duty of justice is inherent to the fundamental value of human life: Freedom. In 
yet other words, the duty to right wrongs is built into the very system of mutual freedom 
under universal law.360  
How so? As we saw, even in a hypothetical state of nature, the innate right to freedom 
                                                        
357 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:331. 
358 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M.  Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), § 101 Remark. 
I refer here to Knox’ translation instead of Dyde’s because the former is clearer at this point. 
359 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:332. 
360 See for instance ibid., 6:362: “The mere idea of a civil constitution among human beings carries with it 





entails the right to hinder a hindrance to freedom. From the outset, freedom and coercion 
are two faces of the same coin. Likewise, for acquired rights, to property for instance: Such 
rights are entirely vacuous unless there is assurance that they will be respected. “No one 
is bound to refrain from encroaching on what another possesses if the other gives him no 
equal assurance that we will observe the same restraint toward him”, Kant says.361 The 
problem is that outside of a legal order, such assurance is impossible. I might promise you 
to refrain from picking apples from a tree you have planted if you promise to leave the 
strawberries I have planted alone. But if I one day change my mind and I am physically 
capable of enforcing my will, your “right” to the apples is effectively nonexistent. In the 
same way that a slave who depends on the goodwill of his master is still dominated, so a 
person is unfree outside of a legal order, for one does not have rights if these depend on 
the unilateral will of other persons. 
Now, a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone with 
regard to possession that is external and therefore contingent, since that 
would infringe upon freedom in accordance with universal laws. So it is 
only a will putting everyone under obligation, hence only a collective 
general (common) and powerful will, that can provide everyone this 
assurance.362  
Hence, it is built into the very concept of mutual freedom under universal law that it is a 
collective responsibility to protect the right to freedom. That, in turn, means that a legal 
order is only legitimate if it fulfills its duty to protect the equal freedom of all. Otherwise 
the legal order itself is in conflict with the Universal Principle of Right. 
From this duty to secure everyone’s equal freedom flows several substantial duties of the 
state. One such duty is the duty to “maintain those members of the society who are unable 
to maintain themselves”.363 If the state does not provide for the poor, people without 
property will be dependent on the goodwill of other people for their survival. While in a 
state of nature everyone would be free to hunt and gather anything they came across, the 
establishment of property rights excludes all but the right-holder from enjoying the specific 
good. As Ripstein explains it: “If all land is privately held, then any person who does not 
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own land would only be entitled to be anywhere at all with the permission of the person 
who did own the land.”364 Such a situation is not consistent with everyone’s equal freedom. 
Hence, if property rights are to be legitimate at all, they are so only within a legal order 
that ensures everyone property enough not to depend on anyone.365 A similar argument 
can be made for the right to seek asylum: The division of the world into separate states is 
only legitimate if everyone is ensured citizenship of a country where they can exercise 
their freedom. If a person is persecuted in her own country, she has the right to protection 
in another country, for without this right the very system of states “owning” land would 
afford her no place to be, and hence, would not be consistent with mutual freedom.366 The 
same logic accounts for the necessity of public spaces and public roads, and the police 
power to ensure that these are not appropriated for private purposes. One can, for instance, 
legitimately be fined for emptying sewage in a public area. Indeed, public infrastructure, 
such as a sewage system, is required in order to assure everyone’s access to the public 
domain. Other duties of the state include providing public health care and education, 
without which it would be impossible to uphold the lawful order.367 
We see here that the Kantian ideal of mutual freedom functions at least to an extent as the 
sort of “gateway good” that Pettit attributes to this understanding of freedom. The reason 
why the ideal is demanding, inviting substantial duties on a legitimate state, is because 
freedom as non-domination requires that everyone realistically has access to freedom, and 
not merely potentially. That is, others must not be allowed to potentially dominate you; it 
does not suffice that they actually do not. Hence, we cannot rightly turn away an asylum 
seeker if doing so poses a realistic chance that she will lose her freedom or die, even though 
there is a chance that she will survive. Likewise, we cannot deny a poor person aid even 
though she could potentially catch fish with her bare hands and thereby survive. If her 
access to equal freedom is not assured without aid, aid is owed to her as a duty. Or take 
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the example of emptying sewage on the street. Sewage will not physically hinder people 
from enjoying a stroll on the sidewalk, but realistically one’s access to a public good will 
thus be restricted, and hence it must be prohibited.368 
In the same way, sanctioning crime is also a matter of assuring realistic access to equal 
freedom. If crime were not sanctioned, we would only have our unilateral self-defense to 
ensure our rights, which would effectively make our rights void. That is, we would still 
retain our rights normatively, but they would not have effect in space and time, i.e. 
empirically or realistically. Recall Hegel’s equivalent distinction for crime: “An injury 
done to right as right is a positive external fact; yet it is a nullity.”369 In other words: One’s 
rights cannot be damaged by crime. Crime is a nullity in the normative realm. Empirically, 
however, crime does damage. 
But what sort of damage? I have, with Kant, distinguished between material and formal 
wrong. Clearly, many crimes cause material wrong, physical injury, damage to property 
etc. However, crime can do real damage not only materially, but also formally. It does so 
by denying the actual access to equal freedom. The formal right to freedom is effectively 
denied when one’s faith in its empirical reality is undermined or it is otherwise made 
realistically inaccessible.  
If crime is rampant, people will feel unsafe. The right, for instance, to walk home at night 
will still be valid, but realistically one’s choice to do so will be constrained. Similarly, for 
crime victims: As Hampton stressed, one cannot actually be degraded by crime when one 
accepts a Kantian concept of moral worth. Crime is normatively inconsequential; hence, 
the lowering of the victim’s value is merely an appearance. But sometimes the crime 
“damages the realization of her value” by effecting “a state of affairs in which the victim 
is unable to secure that to which his value entitles him – where that can include his 
                                                        
368 Naturally, there will be some disagreement as to exactly what is required in order to meet the demand of 
realistic access to mutual freedom. The Kantian framework, which, remember, is a metaphysics of morals, 
leaves much room for political considerations, i.e. considerations about the matter as opposed to the form 
of law. However, as we see above, the form itself, mutual freedom under universal law, gives rise to non-
optional substantial demands upon legislation, and these demands are indisputable at least in core cases. 
That is, one might disagree about how comprehensive public health care provision must be, or how much 
aid must be provided for the poor, but very little or no health care and very little or no aid for the poor is 
clearly insufficient. 





autonomy, his bodily integrity, the possession of property, and even his life”.370 This may 
be straightforward, as when somebody is crippled by a crime: The damage is not merely 
material (e.g. the pain of having your legs cut off). The crime also damages that person’s 
ability to realize her choices, for example precluding her from holding her previous 
occupation. Other times, the damage could be effected psychologically, for instance by 
causing a disabling fear that prevents the person from going out, from having normal, 
trusting relationships etc. As mentioned above, Hampton also points to the all too common 
phenomenon where the victim starts to believe the degrading message of the crime, 
effectively preventing her from claiming her rights. This may also have social 
repercussions, where “[t]he misrepresentation of value […] threatens to reinforce belief in 
the wrong theory of value by the community”371, thereby encouraging similar acts by other 
people. Hate crimes thus threaten to damage minority groups’ realization of freedom. 
This emphasis on the actual harm to mutual freedom caused by crime implies an equivalent 
emphasis in the aim of sanctioning crime: The purpose of sanctioning crime is not only to 
assert the correct norm and to display the falsehood of the meaning entailed by crime. The 
purpose is also to ensure the empirical reality of our equal right to freedom. As Ripstein 
states the same aim: “Punishment upholds the supremacy of law in space and time.”372 
This, in turn, means that there is both a prospective and a retrospective dimension to 
sanctioning crime. The latter requires that re-establishing mutual freedom must instantiate 
mutual freedom. As I have shown above, Kant explains this in terms of turning the crime 
against the criminal, thereby respecting her rationality. The former is more controversial 
and seems at first sight to collide with Kant’s warning against the criminal theorist who 
“crawls under the windings of eudaimonism”, i.e. who attempts to justify punishment by 
its benefits.373 If punishment is justified by a prospective gain, it usually entails treating 
the criminal as a mere means, cf. the common critique of deterrence theories. Upon the 
Kantian theory, however, crime prevention is not an independent goal, but is inseparably 
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linked to the retrospective dimension of respecting the criminal’s autonomy.  
To see why this is so, imagine a society where there is no crime. In such a society there 
would be no need to use punishment to deter criminals, as there would be none. If crime 
prevention is an independent goal, the empirical circumstances will thus determine 
whether and how much punishment is required to reach the goal. Upon a Kantian theory, 
however, the threat of a sanction is necessary “however well disposed and right-loving 
human beings might be”, i.e. independently of empirical circumstances.374 The reason is 
the same as for why aid for the poor must be available regardless of whether there currently 
are any poor: It is necessary to safeguard against the domination of others. Regardless of 
whether my rights are currently respected, there must be a guarantee that they will continue 
to be respected in the future. Hence it does not matter whether people are well disposed at 
the moment, or whether anybody is actually poor: Freedom requires assurance against the 
potential domination of others. This prospective function is thus achieved to the extent that 
law is upheld, in other words, through the retrospective function of sanctioning crime. To 
sanction crime is to assert retrospectively that an interference of mutual freedom has been 
committed, and prospectively that this and other interferences will not stand. In other 
words, that wrongs will be made right, that law is supreme in space and time.  
* 
Thus, according to the Kantian-Hegelian framework, justice after wrongdoing is achieved 
if a sanction both instantiates respect for mutual freedom and realizes mutual freedom. Of 
these two dimensions, the former has traditionally been associated with Kant and Hegel’s 
theories of punishment. Many have therefore seen these theories as overly focused on 
“punishment for punishment’s sake”. Indeed, some theorists limit their discussion of these 
theories to a cursory reference to Kant’s infamous island-example, intending thereby to 
show just how categorical and even bloodthirsty Kant’s defense of punishment was. 
Others, who see in these theories something of value in the respect they display for the 
dignity and freedom of the individual, nevertheless see them as too lofty and detached 
from the realities of modern society. Thus, Karl Marx concluded:  
[T]here is only one theory of punishment which recognizes human dignity 
                                                        




in the abstract, and that is the theory of Kant, especially in the more rigid 
formula given to it by Hegel […] Looking, however, more closely into the 
matter, we discover that German idealism here, as in most other instances, 
has but given a transcendental sanction to the rules of existing society.375 
To the extent that Kant and Hegel’s theories are used to justify penal practices in severely 
unjust societies today, Marx’ point is valid. The resurgence of retributivism from the 
1970’s and onwards has similarly been associated by some with an uncritical acceptance 
of individual just desert at the expense of addressing structural injustices and causes of 
crime. It seems, however, that Marx and others have underestimated the critical potential 
of the Kantian-Hegelian framework. The second dimension of justice, the realization of 
mutual freedom, requires more than a superficial regard for the autonomy of the criminal. 
The just sanction must also address the empirical conditions for freedom, including the 
“damages to the realization of freedom” caused by the crime. Once we abandon the 
retributivism of Kant and Hegel, their theories can be applied to evaluate different 
sanctions along these two dimensions. As we shall see later, Hegel’s other forms of 
recognition, which have not been dealt with here, give us additional analytical tools that 
may further contribute to the critical potential of the Kantian-Hegelian framework. The 
following chapters will consider some of the social issues that may influence the justice of 
punishment, some of which may indeed suggest that Kant and Hegel cannot readily be 




                                                        













10. Introduction to Part II 
Punishment, we have seen, is just when it remedies the wrong in crime and thereby re-
establishes status quo ante culpam. But what if the status quo is itself unjust? Is justice 
served if it restores an unjust situation prior to the crime? And what if the status quo is 
itself a contributing factor to the crime? I will argue in this part that such a situation may 
undermine the justice of punishing. And the same follows if there are alternative ways of 
remedying the wrong in crime that avoid some of the problems of punishment. The 
following five chapters present four negative arguments – arguments for why punishment 
may not under certain conditions serve the just function it purports to serve or do so with 
a lower amount than is normally required – and one positive argument for an alternative 
way of remedying the wrong in crime, restorative justice processes. I take as my starting 
point the Kantian-Hegelian framework laid out in Chapter 9. The justice of not punishing 
will thus be considered against a background where the just purpose of punishment is to 
re-establish mutual freedom.  
The Kantian-Hegelian framework distinguishes between the material and the formal (or 
symbolic) aspects of crime and punishment – or, in more colloquial terms, between the 
medium and the message. The framework thus opens for the possibility that a different 
medium might achieve an equivalent message. In this case, the question is whether the 
symbolic function of restoring mutual recognition may be served by alternatives to 
punishment. I will argue this point in Chapter 15, contra Kant and Hegel’s own 
retributivist views. I thereby supply a positive argument for the justice of not punishing.  
Let us start, however, with the negative arguments of the first four chapters. The arguments 
take as their starting point the familiar notion that there are sometimes exceptions to a rule 
which undermine its application in a given case. This notion is itself uncontroversial. Even 
retributivists, who hold the principle that punishment is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for justice after crimes, will recognize that there are circumstances under which 
this principle does not apply, notably when an offense can be justified or excused, or when 
there is reason for mitigation, or a bar to trial applies to the case. The following four 




of punishing, but I will concentrate on one particular reason for making these exceptions: 
The deprived social background of the offender.  
Does the social situation of the offender have implications for the justice of punishing her? 
Is, in other words, social justice relevant to retributive justice? If so, how? As we shall see, 
scholars greatly disagree about the reason for and the extent to which the offender’s social 
background should be relevant to the justice of punishment. Legal practice also differs. In 
some jurisdictions, severely disadvantaged social conditions may to some extent be taken 
into account in sentencing.376 In other jurisdictions, such considerations are barred. The 
United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for instance, explicitly state that “socio-
economic status” and “[l]ack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating 
a disadvantaged upbringing” are both “not relevant in the determination of a sentence”.377  
While the standard justifications, excuses, bars and mitigating factors are easily considered 
exceptions which do not undermine the justice of punishment since they do not apply to 
the vast majority of offenders, a much larger portion of offenders have deprived social 
backgrounds. Rather than being exceptions, socially deprived offenders are closer to the 
norm, which means that the reasons against punishment proposed in the following chapters 
potentially apply to a large portion of those who are actually punished today. The potential 
impact of these arguments may indeed be one of the reasons why these arguments are 
controversial. In all societies, the prison population is exceedingly recruited from the least 
privileged classes. This fact applies in inegalitarian societies such as the United States, as 
well as in more egalitarian societies such as Norway. “The prison is the magnifying mirror 
which reflects and enlarges the unresolved social problems of the society which it serves”, 
Vivien Stern asserts.378 Jeffrey Reiman and Paul Leighton similarly state that “[a] criminal 
justice system is a mirror in which a whole society can see the darker outlines of its 
face”.379 Or as Nils Christie puts it: “If the ideals of equality had been maintained, they 
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would have been reflected in our prison population. The composition of the prisons gives 
a bleak picture of fundamental inequalities in our society.”380 A look at the statistics of the 
prison population lends support to these assessments.381  
In the United States, the median annual income of incarcerated men prior to their 
incarceration is 48 % of the median annual income of non-incarcerated men of similar 
ages.382 The least educated are greatly overrepresented in prisons and jails.  
In 1980, around 10 percent of young African American men who dropped 
out of high school were in prison or jail. By 2008, this incarceration rate had 
climbed to 37 percent, an astonishing level of institutionalization given that 
the average incarceration rate in the general population was 0.76 of 1 
percent. Even among young white dropouts, the incarceration rate had 
grown remarkably, with around one in eight behind bars by 2008.383 
 
Becky Pettit and Bruce Western conclude: “The significant growth of incarceration rates 
among the least educated reflects increasing class inequality in incarceration through the 
period of the prison boom.”384 Further, there are glaring racial and ethnic disparities in 
incarceration rates. While blacks make up 13 % of the general population in the United 
States, they constitute 40 % of the prison and jail populations. The equivalent percentages 
for whites are 64 and 39.385 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, among the 
general population, “[n]early 3% of non-Hispanic black males and 1% of Hispanic males 
were serving sentences of at least 1 year in prison at yearend 2014 compared to less than 
0.5% of non-Hispanic white males”.386 The compounding disparities of race, class, gender 
and age have normalized ”incarceration as a new stage in the life course of young low-
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skill black men” according to Pettit & Western.387 Their research determines the lifetime 
chance of imprisonment for an African American high school dropout at 64 %.388 
If we look at the prison population in Norway, we see a similar overrepresentation of the 
socioeconomically least privileged members of society. According to a 2015 study, only 
36 % of inmates were employed at the time of incarceration, compared to 82 % in the 
general population reference group.389 Only 34 % of inmates had an education beyond 10 
years primary school, while 75 % of the reference group had completed high school or 
college.390 27 % of inmates had an income above 300,000 NOK (approximately 35,000 
USD), while 72 % of the reference group had a higher income. 27 % of inmates had an 
income below 100,000 NOK, and 14 % under 50,000 NOK.391 When asked to rate their 
own social status in society on a scale from 0 to 10, 41 % of inmates put themselves at 
levels 3 or below, while only 4 % of the reference group rated their own status equally 
low.392 
In addition to socioeconomic deprivation, the prison population has disproportionate 
psychosocial challenges and health problems. In Norwegian prisons, 55 % say they suffer 
from a chronic health condition, compared to 37 % in the reference group. For instance, 
51 % of inmates have suffered from insomnia during the last three months, versus 12 % in 
the reference group. 39 % have felt depressed, versus 8 % in the reference group.393 56 % 
of inmates have used drugs during the last year, compared to 7 % in the reference group.394 
81 % of inmates have had one or more adverse childhood experiences (ACE’s), such as 
abuse, neglect, witnessing domestic violence, mental illness in the home, substance abuse 
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in the home, suicide attempts in the home, parental separation or divorce and incarcerated 
household member.395 
Looking beyond the Norwegian context, studies on ACE have shown “a graded dose-
response relationship between ACE’s and negative health and well-being outcomes across 
the life course”, for instance related to alcoholism, drug use, depression, suicide attempts, 
adolescent pregnancy, homelessness and more.396 Ports et al. found that as ACE scores 
increased, so did the risk of sexual victimization in adulthood, and the strongest predictor 
was childhood sexual abuse.397 Whitfield et al. found that childhood physical or sexual 
abuse or growing up with a battered mother increased the risk of perpetrating intimate 
partner violence two-fold, and if all three ACE’s were present, 3.8-fold.398 Being the victim 
of crimes or witnessing crimes in the home as a child thus substantially increases the 
likelihood of perpetrating crimes as an adult and of being victimized. And not only do 
crimes in one generation increase the chance of crimes in the next; punishment of parents 
and family members causes adverse experiences in children, thereby “transmitting the 
penalties of a prison record from one generation to the next”.399 
Social marginality is deepened by the inequalities produced by 
incarceration. Workers with prison records experience significant declines 
in earnings and employment. Parents in prison are likely to divorce or 
separate, and through the contagious effects of the institution, their children 
are in some degree “prisonized,” exposed to the routines of prison life 
through visitation and the parole supervision of their parents. […] As adults, 
these children will be at greater risk of diminished life chances and criminal 
involvement, and at greater risk of incarceration as a result.400 
Thus, we see from this brief survey of empirical research on the prison population that 
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socioeconomically disadvantaged persons and persons who have had a difficult upbringing 
are overrepresented among the punished. The question then, is what relevance these 
findings have for the justice of punishment. Before I begin to answer this question in the 
following chapters, two points should be noted in order to establish the potential relevance 
of social deprivation to retributive justice. 
1) Presumably, it will not be the mere fact that these groups are overrepresented that makes 
belonging to these groups potentially relevant to one’s punishment. Approximately 90 % 
of inmates are men, but few would argue that because men are overrepresented this should 
somehow influence the justice of their punishment. If, however, a considerable share of 
those belonging to a group end up in prison, it seems safe to say that this increases the 
potential relevance of belonging to that group. While most inmates are men, most men are 
not inmates. On the other hand, most African American high school dropouts are indeed 
inmates at some time during their lives. We might take this as an indication that there are 
social structures that influence the chance of going to prison to a greater degree in the 
latter group, and that this degree of influence from social structures is a fact of potential 
relevance to the justice of punishment. 
2) Belonging to a relevant group may to a greater or lesser degree be a matter of choice. 
Take poverty as an example. Students are often poor. But their poverty is usually self-
imposed and temporary. The same cannot be said of those who are born into poverty and 
who have few realistic ways of escaping it. The former have to a greater extent chosen to 
be (temporarily) poor and have therefore ultimately chosen the disadvantages and troubles 
that follow.401 The latter have not to the same degree chosen the disadvantages and troubles 
that they suffer, including their disproportionate risk of being punished. They are victims 
of social injustice. Only where there is social injustice, I hold, is deprivation potentially 
relevant to the question of retributive justice.  
A problem with injustice as a necessary criterion for relevance is its vagueness. 
Determining the extent to which poverty is due to choice is a notoriously contentious 
political question. Further, there is well-known theoretical disagreement in political 
philosophy about the injustice that has befallen the poor. While a luck egalitarian might 
                                                        




consider much poverty unjust, a right-libertarian like Robert Nozick would deny that the 
poor have suffered any injustice, unless, of course, they are poor due to direct denial of 
their property rights. Hence, normative pluralism in the field of social justice may have a 
spillover effect on criminal justice. Depending on the theory of social justice one accepts, 
the socioeconomic conditions of a certain group may or may not be deemed relevant. 
William C. Heffernan argues that this pluralism may enrich scholarly debate, but that it 
undermines the possibility of judges taking social justice into account, because “no 
criterion exists that can enable judges to arbitrate between the different versions of the 
term”.402 There is, I believe, a way of circumventing this problem. 
Both 1) and 2) suggest that the potential relevance of belonging to a socially deprived 
group will be greater the narrower we define the group. Simply put: 1) Among those who 
are severely socioeconomically disadvantaged and among those who have a severely 
adverse upbringing, a bigger share will end up in prison, compared to those who are 
merely slightly disadvantaged or have had fewer and less serious adverse childhood 
experiences. 2) Though there is ample disagreement about the social injustice pertaining 
to slightly disadvantaged groups, one can hardly deny that the most deprived members of 
society are victims of injustice, whether due to socioeconomic structures or due to neglect 
and abuse during childhood.403 
For these reasons, I will limit the following discussion to clear instances of social 
deprivation, for which I will use the term severe social deprivation (henceforth, SSD). I 
take this to cover core instances of socioeconomic disadvantage as well as core instances 
of adverse upbringing. In this way, I will circumvent the difficult question of how socially 
deprived one must be for it to have relevance to one’s punishment, and instead focus on 
the question of whether social deprivation is relevant at all. The latter question is, of course, 
logically prior to the former. And the best way to answer the latter is by looking at the 
most severe cases of social deprivation. If relevance cannot be established there, it cannot 
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be established at all. 
For current purposes, then, we simply have to be able to invoke core instances of SSD. 
Stuart Green, in his discussion of “Just Deserts in Unjust Societies”, gives the following 
“clear and uncontroversial examples of disadvantage”404: 1) Denial of property rights as a 
result of social caste, 2) Denial of political rights for the same reason, and 3) Denial of 
right to basic state protections. It is easy to see that these criteria would include, among 
others, oppressed minority groups in seriously unjust societies, such as Jews in Nazi 
Germany and people of color in apartheid-South Africa. More controversially, Jeffrey 
Howard reaches the same conclusion about a group closer to home: “Whether the policy 
regime that prevails in many of the West’s urban ghettos is the result of injustice is not, to 
my mind, subject to reasonable disagreement.”405 Victor Tadros applies a less specific 
criterion, arguing that it is sufficient that there are people who are “worse off than they 
ought to be, and that this is criminogenic”406. Duff is even less specific, saying about his 
arguments that “there are contexts in which each of these explanations would be 
plausible”.407 
I suspect most readers can easily supplement the broad categories mentioned by Green and 
others with personal knowledge of individuals whom most would agree are severely 
socially deprived. Perhaps a person who has had a truly ‘rotten social background’, to use 
a term that is often applied in the debate on social and retributive justice.408 Perhaps an 
individual who has suffered abuse and neglect, and who has, to little surprise to his 
surroundings, followed along an increasingly destructive path of drinking and doing drugs, 
dropping out of school, hanging with the wrong crowd, committing petty crimes, and 
eventually ending up in prison. The more we sense that the outcome was predetermined 
by the person’s social circumstances, the stronger we sense the unfairness of our different 
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starting points in life. In the words of William Blake: 
Every night and every morn, 
Some to misery are born. 
Every morn and every night, 
Some are born to sweet delight 
Some are born to sweet delight 
Some are born to endless night.409 
If we recognize the truth of these lines – as I suspect most of us will when we consider 
core cases – what are the normative implications for punishment? Should we punish those 
who are born to endless night as much as those who are born to sweet delight? Should we 
punish them at all? 
I have divided the answers to these questions into four chapters, where each chapter 
discusses one way in which SSD may potentially have implications for retributive justice. 
Thereafter follows the chapter on restorative justice. 
Chapter 11: Disproportionate likelihood of punishment: This chapter discusses the 
unfairness that stems from the fact that low-class offenders tend to be punished more and 
more often than high-class offenders. This tendency holds both when low-class and high-
class offenders have committed the same type of crimes, and when they commit different 
types of crime. If we compare the harm caused by different types of crime, high-class 
offenders are punished more leniently than low-class offender for equivalently harmful 
acts. 
Chapter 12: Justification and lack of standing to punish: This chapter discusses whether 
SSD can under certain circumstances provide a justification for acts that would otherwise 
be unlawful. The discussion is linked to a related debate about the conditions of the state’s 
moral standing to punish. 
Chapter 13: Disproportionate difficulty of law-abidance: This chapter assesses different 
reasons why severely socially deprived offenders tend to face greater difficulties in abiding 
by law. These reasons make it plausible that SSD may qualify as an excuse, though I do 
not discuss how SSD might be implemented as an excusing condition in criminal doctrine.    
                                                        




Chapter 14: Diminished need for punishment: This chapter considers whether SSD ought 
to be a mitigating factor in sentencing. It does so by discussing reasons why less than 
normal amount of punishment may be required in order to remedy the wrong in crimes 
perpetrated by severely socially deprived offenders. 
Chapter 15: The justice of restorative justice: This chapter asks whether restorative 
processes can potentially remedy the wrong in crime upon a Kantian-Hegelian theory of 
criminal justice. The chapter does not relate especially to the issue of SSD, but asks instead 
whether and under which conditions restorative justice can be a general alternative to 






11.  Disproportionate likelihood of punishment 
As we saw in the previous part on the justice of punishment, some conceptions of justice 
remedy what I have called horizontal injustice, injustice that is due to an unfair imbalance 
between relevant parties. Other conceptions of justice remedy injustice that pertains to a 
situation as viewed in isolation from other cases. Examples of the first kind were 
freeloading and material imbalance between victim and offender, and examples of the 
latter were undeserved profit and causing suffering to victims. In this part, too, I will 
identify both kinds of injustice, but this time relating to punishing when there is SSD. I 
will start with a horizontal injustice that is due to the increased risk of punishment of those 
who belong to the lowest socioeconomic class. 
The claim is the following: Persons from the lowest socioeconomic class are 
disproportionately likely to be punished, all things being equal. This holds irrespective of 
any discrepancy that might stem from an increased tendency to commit more or worse 
crimes. There is, thus, a structural injustice built into the criminal justice system. 
Criminologists have shown this element of “class justice” to be reinforced at several levels 
in the criminal justice system. A well-known model is “Christie’s crooked pyramid”, 
showing that offenders from the lower classes are increasingly overrepresented at each 
stage in the criminal process.410 
                                                        





There are several reasons why the pyramid is crooked, of which I will mention three. 
11.1 Low class persons are more often targets of 
investigation 
First, members of the lowest classes are to greater extent targets of investigation for some 
types of crime. Dorothy Roberts notes that domestic crimes in poor families are 
disproportionately investigated because poor families are more often in public housing and 
in contact with welfare services that gain access to their homes. “Because poor parents are 
in closer contact with government agencies than wealthier families, their neglect is more 
likely to be detected and reported.”411 Robert Hampton notes that “[s]everal studies have 
found that children from poor and minority families are more likely to be labeled ‘abused’ 
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than children from more affluent and majority homes with comparable injuries”.412 For 
typical street crimes, such as drug crimes, carrying illegal firearms, burglary etc., 
disproportionate investigation of lower class offenders result from profiling, “stop and 
frisk”-policies, and enhanced policing in poor neighborhoods. Ironically, the statistics 
showing that people with SSD are overrepresented among criminal offenders make it 
rational to target such individuals for preventive reasons, thereby feeding a self-fulfilling 
feedback mechanism.413 
11.2 Low status crimes are more easily investigated and 
convicted 
Second, the types of crime mostly committed by members of the lower classes are easier 
to investigate and convict than the types of crimes mostly committed by members of the 
upper- and middle classes. As Christie states: “Low status crime is an individualized crime. 
High status crime will to a larger extent take place within and by complex 
organizations.”414 White-collar crime is difficult and costly to investigate and convict, both 
because it is typically intricate, with several actors and numerous opaque transactions, and 
because offenders typically can muster a stronger defense, even contriving complexity into 
the case so that the investigation will be prolonged, not least because offenders know that 
“justice delayed is profits retained”.415  Blue-collar crime, on the other hand, is typically 
less complex, for immediate gain, by fewer actors with less opaque roles and less power 
to delay and defend against conviction. 
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Braithwaite concludes that members of the lower classes are overrepresented in all types 
of crimes, “apart from those for which opportunities are systematically less available to 
the poor (i.e. white-collar crime)”.416 Conversely, some crimes are systematically less 
attractive to members of the upper- and middle classes. Recall from above the classic quote 
from Anatole France: “In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep 
under bridges, beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread.” Obviously, only the poor have 
incentive to do such things. W. Byron Groves and Nancy Frank argue that as a matter of 
rational economic choice, poor people have greater reasons for seeking immediate cash 
gains, characteristic of street crimes, rather than larger, but deferred and not easily 
disposable sums resulting from white-collar crimes. 
[T]he increased marginal value of the dollar makes attractive to lower class 
persons those forms of criminality which yield the cash form of money (e.g. 
robbery, burglary, larceny), and these crimes are more easily discovered and 
more severely punished than are crimes of the powerful.417 
 
11.3 Criminal law disproportionately targets the poor 
Third, while the crimes of the lower classes are punished, the transgressions of the rich are 
more often sanctioned in other ways or punished less. This is partly due to discrimination 
in the application of law.  
Studies of criminal justice processing through 
arrest/prosecution/bail/sentencing stages consistently show that discretion 
is exercised on behalf of the white, the educated, the employed, and the 
conventional, and against the black, the poor, the disturbed, and the 
unconventional.418 
A study of 77,236 federal offenders in the U.S. concluded that “blacks, males, and 
offenders with low levels of education and income receive substantially longer sentences” 
and are also “less likely to get no prison term when that option is available; less likely to 
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receive downward departures; and more likely to receive upward adjustments and, 
conditioned on having a downward departure, receive smaller reductions than whites and 
females”.419 Another study found that “African Americans have 20 % longer sentences 
than whites, on average, holding constant age, gender, and recommended sentence 
length from the guidelines”.420 Contributing to this discrimination are perceptions of 
blameworthiness and dangerousness that are stereotypically associated with socially 
deprived groups. For instance, Anna L. Tsing found among women charged with perinatal 
endangerment that courts made distinctions according to race and class, treating young 
college women leniently because they were viewed as innocently immature, as opposed to 
poor white women and colored women who were viewed as obstinate and cunning.421 
Likewise, stereotypical assumptions about unemployment may figure in explanations of 
an offender’s criminal dispositions and blameworthy motives, which in turn increase the 
perceived need to protect society from him or her. An employed offender, on the other 
hand, is more likely to be viewed as someone who has temporarily swayed from his path, 
and who will return to a law-abiding life if spared a long sentence.422 
In addition to discrimination in application of law, disparity in punishment stems in part 
from a “division of labor” between criminal law and other forms of sanctions. The types 
of harmful and wrongful behavior committed mainly by the upper- and middle classes are 
to a much larger extent regulated by tort law, inspections, amnesties, warnings etc. Richard 
Posner says it in no unclear terms: “[T]he criminal law is designed primarily for the non-
affluent; the affluent are kept in line, for the most part, by tort law.”423 Hudson similarly 
concludes: 
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The wrongdoings of the affluent are paid for mainly by money. Their 
characteristic transgressions – income tax evasion, corporate fraud, neglect 
of health and safety regulations, industrial pollution, and so on – are dealt 
with largely by financial penalties.424 
The criminal law, on the other hand, is primarily aimed at the poor, while “uphold[ing] the 
rights of the affluent (property rights rather than a right to shelter, for example)”.425 
But what does it mean, precisely, that criminal law disproportionately targets the poor? I 
will now look closer at two possible interpretations of this claim and the implications for 
the question of horizontal injustice between rich and poor. The claim can be taken to mean 
either 1) that criminal law is designed to target the non-affluent, or 2) that criminal law is 
designed to target acts that are disproportionately committed by the non-affluent. The first 
claim has been argued by critical theorists who have emphasized the social and economic 
function of punishment in modern capitalist societies. This function is revealed, they claim, 
if we look at the historical development of different forms of punishment. Georg Rusche 
and Otto Kirchheimer’s Punishment and Social Structure (1939), a seminal work in 
Marxist criminology, traced the development of different forms of punishment to the 
economic basis of the historical epoch.426 There was a surplus of labor in Europe in the 
early modern age, permitting the permanent exclusion of criminals from the labor force by 
the use of corporal punishment such as mutilation and the death penalty. In the mercantilist 
period, there was shortage of labor due to wars and famine, and the forced labor of 
criminals became a valuable economic asset in the first and labor-intensive factories. Then, 
as machines started to replace human labor and populations grew during The Industrial 
Revolution, forced labor became increasingly unprofitable, and the modern prison system 
was born, in which offenders merely served time. Though serving time is itself 
unproductive, the prison system as a whole served the dual function of providing a worse 
alternative for disgruntled factory workers and for mitigating the problem of mass 
unemployment.427  
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Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish expands on the notion that the forms of 
punishment are determined by the economic and ideological conditions of the historical 
epoch. In particular, the modern prison system satisfied an increasing demand for control 
of the citizens in the new industrial economy. Mass production, mass education, 
bureaucracy and industrial warfare all required systematic knowledge of and power over 
the individuals within these systems. The prison system, especially exemplified in 
Bentham’s Panopticon prison, which was designed to facilitate the surveillance and 
control of prisoners, produced but one form of discipline that gradually also permeated 
classrooms, the military, factories, and daily life in an increasingly ‘panoptic’ society. 
“Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline 
increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same 
forces (in political terms of obedience)”, Foucault writes.428 Jeffrey Reiman and Paul 
Leighton make a similar claim, inviting us to 
look at the American criminal justice system as if it were aimed, not at 
protecting us against crime, but at keeping before our eyes – in our courts 
and in our prisons, in our newspapers, and on our TVs – a large criminal 
population consisting primarily of poor people. This serves the interests of 
the rich and powerful by broadcasting the message that the real danger to 
most Americans comes from people below them on the economic ladder 
rather than from above.429 
These two highly influential theories, the labor market theory of Rusche and Kirscheimer 
and Foucault’s discipline theory, thus explain why it would serve a useful socioeconomic 
function to target the economically marginalized. Of course, the rich, too, are targets of 
discipline when they transgress. But they can more easily be disciplined with financial 
sanctions. The poor cannot provide monetary payment for their transgressions and must 
therefore be made to “pay” by other means.430 The most valuable economic asset of the 
lower classes in a capitalist economy is their time. Time is money in a capitalist economy. 
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The two are merely different currencies of the same thing, economic value, making it 
possible to exchange one for the other, as when workers are paid for their hours. Viewed 
in this light, criminal law stands to tort law as the dollar to the euro. They are just two 
different forms of payment. Criminal law exacts payment in the form of time from those 
who cannot pay with money.  
To the extent that this framing is appropriate, then, the first claim is correct: Criminal law 
is designed to target the non-affluent. But there is one obvious objection that shows this 
claim to be overly reductionist: When affluent people commit murder or robbery, they too 
are punished. True, they have more resources to avoid punishment, but in clear cases, even 
these resources are insufficient and they become targets of criminal prosecution. The 
reason why more poor people are punished is not because they are targeted, but simply 
because they commit more crimes. Hence, criminal law is designed for the non-affluent in 
the sense that it is designed to target acts that are disproportionately committed by the non-
affluent. 
This, however, is not obviously unjust, unlike the first claim. If crimes deserve punishment 
in a way that torts do not, those who commit crimes are justly punished, while those who 
commit torts are justly not punished, regardless of their socioeconomic status. It is only if 
criminalization does not track desert of punishment that there is a potential horizontal 
injustice between the targets of criminal law and tort law. If, for instance, some types of 
torts are more harmful and more wrongful than some types of crimes, those who commit 
the latter will, according to these criteria, be punished unfairly compared to those who 
commit the former. The question, then, is whether crimes that are typically committed by 
the poor are indeed more harmful and wrongful and deserve punishment more than non-
criminal acts typically committed by the rich. 
“What is a picklock to a bank share? What is the robbing of a bank to the founding of a 
bank?” With these questions, posed in the final scene of The Threepenny Opera, Bertolt 
Brecht expressed a sentiment that has found resonance among Marxists, anarchists, and 
critical theorists more broadly: The rules of capitalist society are themselves more harmful 
than their breaches. The oppression resulting from free trade and accumulation of private 
property – sweatshops, mass unemployment, poverty – is worse than simple theft of 




are branded criminals in this society are not the real criminals. Capitalists do more damage 
and deserve punishment more than the typical criminals from the lower classes. 
Nonetheless, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison, as the title of Reiman and 
Leighton’s book states. And this constitutes a horizontal injustice. 
We are blind to this injustice because we are accustomed to define crime on the basis of 
the social norms of our society. Recall Durkheim’s claim from above: “[W]e should not 
say that an act offends the common consciousness because it is criminal, but that it is 
criminal because it offends that consciousness.”431 In a capitalist society, the norms that 
support private ownership and accumulation of wealth makes shoplifting a crime, while 
high interest rates on mortgages is perfectly legal, even when the latter results in 
foreclosures and families evicted from their homes. But if our collective consciousness 
were different, so would our definitions of crime be. Brecht’s questions thus remind us of 
the arbitrariness of our definitions of crime when measured against alternative criteria, 
such as the tendency of an act to cause suffering and oppression.  
Of course, the premise of the “Brechtian” claim is highly controversial. Do capitalists 
cause harm, or do they create jobs and wealth that benefit society as a whole? Are banks 
primarily oppressive, or do they facilitate investments and “grow the pie”, so that even the 
least well off increase their share? Clearly, people have diverging views on the extent to 
which each of these claims are true. But even if we take the view that capitalism and its 
legal institutions (e.g. protection of property) on the whole are both good and right, we 
might still recognize that some legal acts cause more harm and infringe more upon the 
autonomy of others than some of the crimes of those who are incarcerated. In which case 
the horizontal injustice alluded to by Brecht arises. 
Now consider acts that are in fact illegal and offensive to our collective norms. Are those 
committed in and by businesses less harmful and wrongful than the typical crimes of the 
lower classes? While robbery and rape are strongly condemned, triggering the kind of 
visceral response to injustice described in the introductory chapter, business offences are 
often talked of in terms of “cutting corners”, a euphemism that suggests that such acts are 
indeed less offensive to the collective consciousness in capitalist societies. Perhaps people 
                                                        




can more easily empathize with someone who “bends the rules” in order to get ahead, 
something most of us likely have done to some extent in our lives. Physically attacking 
someone, on the other hand, is inconceivable and inexcusable for most of us. Because 
street crimes like assault cause victims and others to feel unsafe and to mistrust strangers, 
many hold that these crimes are more serious and more detrimental to society than the non-
physical economic crimes of the upper- and middle classes. James Q. Wilson, for instance, 
writes: 
[M]y conviction, which I believe is the conviction of most citizens, [is] that 
predatory street crime is far more serious than consumer fraud, antitrust 
violations […] because predatory crime makes difficult or impossible the 
maintenance of meaningful human communities.432  
However, if we look at the amount of harm that business offenses cause, the conclusion 
may well be the opposite. Braithwaite states: 
[I]f objective harm (property lost, numbers of persons seriously injured or 
killed) is a central determinant of desert, as most retributivists insist, I have 
shown that the evidence is overwhelming that business offenses cause much 
more objective harm than common crimes.433 
Not only are the financial costs of white-collar crime much higher than the financial costs 
of other crimes combined.434 So is the harm to life and health. 
[If] one counts up the lives lost through offenses against consumer product 
safety, occupational health and safety and environmental laws, even in a 
society with a homicide rate as extraordinary as the United States, it is the 
former which cost more lives.435 
                                                        
432 Quoted in Hudson, "Punishing the Poor", 200. 
433  Braithwaite, "Retributivism, Punishment and Privilege", 62. 
434 “Owing to the concealed nature of many frauds and the fact that few are reported even when discovered, 
their cost is impossible to estimate precisely, but in the United States it is thought to be at least 10 times the 
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fraud".  





Reiman and Leighton found that in the U.S. between 1992 and 2006 the average annual 
number of occupation-related deaths as a direct result of employer negligence was 55,325. 
The average annual number of homicides was around 14,000.436 The quantity of business 
related crimes and other economic crimes committed by the upper- and middle classes is 
also vastly higher than for other types of crime.437 A recent study of tax evasion in 
Scandinavia, utilizing data from the so-called “Swiss Leaks” and “Panama Papers”, found 
that tax evasion is common among the richest members of society, and increasingly so as 
wealth accumulates. “On average about 3% of personal taxes are evaded in Scandinavia, 
but this figure rises to about 30% in the top 0.01% of the wealth distribution, a group that 
includes households with more than $40 million in net wealth.”438 
The upshot of all this is the following: The lower classes, and particularly the severely 
socially deprived, are overrepresented in the prison population; the offenses of the upper- 
and middle classes are punished less and more often dealt with as tort cases or otherwise 
regulated by inspections, warnings etc. Yet, according to the research we have just cited, 
the offenses of the upper- and middle classes cause the most harm and are most 
widespread. This has lead Braithwaite to conclude that the following general theorem of 
criminal law holds: “Where desert is greatest, punishment will be least.”439 In other words: 
The criminal justice system creates a horizontal injustice between white-collar criminals 
of the upper- and middle classes and blue-collar criminals of the lower classes. 
11.4 Remedying this horizontal injustice 
How, then, can this horizontal injustice be remedied? There are only two possibilities: 
Either the crimes of the upper- and middle classes can be punished more, thereby 
establishing a fair balance at a high punitive level. Or the crimes of the lower classes can 
be punished less, thereby establishing a fair balance at a low punitive level. The problem 
with the first alternative is that it is both difficult to achieve and may cause more harm 
than it prevents. As noted, white-collar crime is often complex, requiring a lot of resources 
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from police, prosecutors and courts to investigate and convict. A significant increase in 
convictions would likely be very costly and, considering the enormous amount of white-
collar crime, would only affect a small portion of offenses.  
Braithwaite argues that the most effective way to ensure that businesses comply with law 
is to enlist their voluntary cooperation. If businesses take it to be in their best interest to 
openly acknowledge safety deficiencies etc., these will be much easier to expose and to 
remedy. Providing immunity from prosecution and giving warnings prior to fines are but 
a few policies that would encourage businesses to let safety inspectors freely talk to 
employees and otherwise disclose potential risks and near accidents. Air traffic is a good 
example of an industry where safety has been achieved in part due to a policy of voluntary 
disclosure of safety breaches. Conversely, if businesses try their best to hide their missteps, 
they will likely succeed to a large extent, and appropriate remedies will be difficult. A 
punitive approach, Braithwaite argues, will likely foster resistance and concealment, and 
therefore achieve less than government inspectors will achieve “by adopting a diagnostic 
and catalytic role”.440 
Dissipating the motivation of business to strive for compliance with the law 
is a disastrous consequence because the punitive law enforcement 
alternative can never fill the gaps left by the failure of persuasion and 
education as compliance strategies.441 
Hence, if we attempt to remedy the horizontal injustice of punishment between rich and 
poor by adopting more punitive measures for business offenses, we will likely cause more 
harm to the public and to worker’s safety. Braithwaite suggests instead that we remedy the 
horizontal injustice according to the second alternative above, i.e. by punishing low class 
criminals less. He acknowledges, however, that for some types of white-collar crime, 
increased punishment will not have a detrimental effect on compliance, and in some cases 
will increase compliance. Presumably, embezzlement and fraud are examples of such 
crimes. We might therefore adopt a dual strategy for remedying the horizontal injustice: 
Increasing punishment for some white-collar crimes, while keeping punishment as low as 
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possible for other types of white-collar crime and for blue-collar crime, without sacrificing 
compliance. 
However, if we adopt this strategy, it will exacerbate another horizontal injustice, the one 
between those who are punished and those who get away with the same crimes. Since 
conviction rates are low for embezzlement and fraud (and are bound to be so, for reasons 
explained above), there is already an unjust disparity between the relatively few offenders 
who are singled out for punishment, and the rest who are not. If we increase punishment 
for the convicted, this horizontal injustice will increase. Conversely, lowering punishment 
will contribute toward remedying this horizontal injustice. 
This is the argument that Braithwaite and Pettit make in their book Not Just Deserts: A 
Republican Theory of Criminal Justice: 
There are two states of complete criminal justice equality. One is where 
every guilty person is equally punished. The other is where every guilty 
person is granted mercy. The sociological and fiscal realities of criminal 
justice mean that every society is always closer to the latter state of equality 
(zero enforcement) than it is to the former (100 per cent punishment). If we 
lived in a world where 90 per cent of the guilty were punished, then the way 
to make the system more equitable would be to pursue the 10 per cent who 
were getting off. But the reality of societies we know is the opposite. We 
are lucky to punish 10 per cent of the guilty, leaving 90 per cent of crimes 
unpunished. It follows that the more of the currently punished 10 per cent 
that can be extended mercy, the more equitable the criminal justice system 
will become.442 
Hence, increasing punishment for some white-collar criminals may contribute to 
remedying the horizontal injustice between rich and poor offenders, but it will at the same 
time exacerbate the horizontal injustice between the few rich offenders who are punished 
and the rest who are not. From the perspective of horizontal injustice, then, we ought on 
the one hand to lower punishment for blue-collar crime without increasing punishment for 
white-collar crime. In fact, by the same logic, we ought to go further and abolish all 
punishment, thereby treating all offenders alike. However, we would thereby treat 
offenders and non-offenders alike, which, when we hold that the former and not the latter 
                                                        




deserve punishment, would create a new horizontal injustice. Thus, we ought, on the other 
hand, to pursue horizontal justice by punishing according to desert. 
We see, then, that if we were to take horizontal justice as the sole aim of criminal justice, 
it would leave us at an impasse, with no specific policy to pursue. Treating everybody alike 
according to a rule, giving each his due, suum cuique tribuere, is meaningless without a 
material principle for determining what each person is due. Thus, unless we ascribe to 
punishment an independent valuable function, there is no way of concluding that the state 
in which all offenders are punished according to desert is better than the state in which no 
offenders are punished. There is, in other words, no way of answering the question of how 
we ought to remedy the above-mentioned horizontal injustices if we merely consider the 
question in isolation, irrespective of the overall purpose of the criminal justice system. 
We are again reminded of Aristotle’s point that just distribution depends on the telos of 
the practice in which it takes place. Just distribution (horizontal justice) is not itself the 
telos of punishment, but is secondary to the telos. Put differently: We cannot justify 
punishing an offender solely by appeal to the fact that we punish other offenders, as if such 
fairness was the purpose of punishment. Recall the example in Chapter 6 of a terrorist 
group beating hostages fairly according to a predetermined rule. If horizontal justice was 
a sufficient condition for justice, even such practices would be just, which they are not. 
The upshot is that other concerns must necessarily be part of deliberations on justice, and 
it is not given that remedying horizontal injustice ought to take priority. We recognize this 
point intuitively when we disregard as a serious defense the claim that “I should not be 
punished for my offense unless others who have done the same are also punished”. 
Similarly, we do not merely accept that we should not punish as many as possible 
according to their deserts, even though we are bound to fail in giving everybody their due, 
and hence will inevitably create horizontal injustice. And for the same reason, it is not 
given that we ought to reduce punishment of low-class offenders below what their crimes 
deserve merely because high-class offenders do not get what they deserve. We might 
understandably hesitate to let a low-class person off the hook for his burglary simply 





To conclude, the systemic horizontal injustice between high-class and low-class offenders 
discussed in this chapter must be taken as one of potentially several relevant injustices to 
be remedied. Here, as elsewhere, justice requires that we deliberate and “negotiate” 
between competing concerns, remedying the most salient and pertinent injustices of the 
issue at hand. An example is Braithwaite and Pettit’s “negotiation” between what they take 
to be the telos of the criminal justice system – maximization of freedom as non-domination 
– and the horizontal injustice that stems from low conviction rates: We ought to remedy 
the latter by lowering punishment levels and applying alternatives to punishment. But 
doing so must not happen to a degree that undermines the overall purpose of criminal 
justice. Thus, we ought not to lower punishment beyond the point where it can be shown 
that doing so increases crime, and hence, decreases freedom as non-domination. We ought 
not, as I put it, to pursue a distribution that is counterproductive to the purpose of that 




12. Justification and lack of standing to punish  
This chapter discusses whether SSD may provide a justification for breaking the law and 
whether the state may lack legitimate authority to punish offenders with SSD. I apply a 
Kantian theory of legitimate authority to investigate the conditions under which a criminal 
prohibition lacks authority and the state’s right to punish an offender seizes to apply. Legal 
philosophers often discuss this topic as a matter of the state’s moral standing to blame, 
following work by Antony Duff. I will examine his theory, but will ultimately return to 
the Kantian framework, which has the advantage, I will argue, of connecting the state’s 
lack of standing to punish with the citizen’s lack of duty to abide by law (i.e. her 
justification). The Kantian framework thus allows us to analyze when the situation occurs 
in which the state loses its standing to punish. 
12.1 Justification 
If a person as a matter of self-defense kicks somebody, the act will be considered justified 
and the agent free of blame. Though kicking somebody is normally a blameworthy 
criminal offense, it is not in this particular case. The reason, as Jeremy Waldron explains 
the logic of justification, is that the particular instance is deemed outside the scope of the 
proper application of an otherwise valid rule. In other words, the rule is over-inclusive if 
applied to this instance.443 Why? Because the value that the rule protects – in Kantian 
terms, the mutual right to physical integrity – will not be served if the rule against assault 
is applied in this case. On the contrary: The act of self-defense serves the purpose of the 
rule, by hindering a hindrance to said purpose, to use Kant’s phrase. 
Can the crimes committed out of need by a severely socially deprived person be construed 
in the same way? The classic example is Jean Valjean who steals a loaf of bread to feed 
his sister’s starving children. Or in William C. Heffernan’s updated example: “Jeanne 
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Valjean”, an indigent single mother who commits Medicaid fraud to secure medical 
benefits for her one-year-old son with a heart condition.444 In both cases, the Valjeans 
acquire what does not rightfully belong to them, presumably reasoning that doing so 
amounts to a lesser of two evils. Such a necessity justification can successfully be made 
by someone who finds himself trapped in a storm while hiking in the mountains, and who 
breaks into a cabin in order to save his life. In such a case, however, the person will have 
to pay for the damages when he returns to safety. An indigent person who steals to survive 
cannot be expected to pay in retrospect. Hence, another person (or a corporation or the 
state) will have to bear the loss, in effect robbing that person (or corporation or state) of 
their property rights.445  
According to Waldron, examples like these show an important difference between 
justification from indigence and the self-defense justification. Only in the latter case can 
the justified action be understood as promoting the value that the law is meant to protect; 
i.e. only in the latter case does the justification merely challenge the scope of the 
application of the law. “By contrast, if indigence were accepted as a justification, it would 
tend to call into question not just the application but the general legitimacy of the rule that 
was broken (usually a rule of property).”446 In other words, by denying a person protection 
of her property against those who are in need of it, the very concept of property rights is 
undermined. Unlike acts of self-defense, the theft committed by the Valjeans or other 
indigent people in need is not a hindering of a hindrance to the purpose the law. It is rather 
a denial of the law and therefore not a proper justification, according to Waldron. He 
compares it to the case of rape: It is inconceivable that in order to avoid rape it would be 
legitimate to rape the rapist. The value that rape law protects – i.e. sexual autonomy – 
would not be promoted but would instead be undermined. Using Kantian terminology, we 
can say that the law against rape instantiates the value it protects, and we cannot therefore 
separate the adherence to the law and the promotion of its purpose.447 
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However, this example reveals, contrary to Waldron’s claim, a disanalogy between the 
cases. Unlike in the case of rape, it is conceivable that denying property rights could 
promote the purpose of property laws. If, say, I stole the keys to a bank robber’s getaway 
car while he was filling his bags with cash, my theft of his property would indeed be 
hindering a hindrance to the purpose of property laws. My action would thus be justified 
by precisely the same logic that Waldron ascribes to self-defense. Convicting me of theft 
would amount to an over-inclusive application of the law against theft. 
Can the same be said of theft from need by a severely socially deprived person? If we once 
again adopt a Kantian framework it will allow us to answer this question in the affirmative, 
under certain further specified conditions. Recall from Chapter 9 that according to the 
Kantian theory of right, the purpose of all law is to make effectual in space and time the 
Universal Principle of Right, i.e. mutual respect for freedom to the extent compatible with 
everyone else’s equal freedom. This means, as we saw, that a law, and more generally, a 
legal system, is only legitimate according to this framework if it does not itself amount to 
a hindering of mutual freedom.448 More specifically, it means that if laws of property are 
to be legitimate, there must be in place a system of public support for those who are not 
by themselves able to acquire property, and also a public domain where all have equal 
right to be. Otherwise, those who do not have money and who do not own land would be 
hindered in their self-preservation. There would be no place where they could freely go to 
hunt or to grow crops, for instance. They would depend entirely upon the goodwill of 
others who do hold property in order to survive. And such a situation is not, of course, 
compatible with mutual freedom. 
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The answer to the question of whether an offense can be justified when committed out of 
need by an indigent person requires thus that we look at the actual circumstances under 
which it takes place. If the offender has been effectively denied legal access to something 
which is necessary for his equal right to freedom, the laws which deny him such access 
are not compatible with his equal right to freedom.449 Imagine for instance that there were 
no public toilets and no public homeless shelters. A law that prohibits sleeping and 
defecating in public places would not be compatible with everybody’s equal right to 
freedom, because a homeless person would be denied legal ways of survival. Of course, in 
reality homeless people often have access to private shelters, and many compassionate 
restaurant owners let homeless people use their bathrooms. But that does not suffice. A 
law which makes people dependent on the goodwill of others for their survival is not 
compatible with the Universal Principle of Right. 
If under such conditions a homeless person were to break what is an illegitimate law, his 
justification would not merely challenge the scope of its application. It would, as Waldron 
pointed out, amount to “an indictment of the rules that have been broken”450. Similarly, if 
sufficient public help for the poor is not in place, an indigent person who steals in order to 
survive can be said to challenge the very legitimacy of the current legal order which 
grounds the allocation of property. His justification would be that a law is not compatible 
with his innate freedom if he is forced to break it in order to survive. The distinction 
Waldron makes between the self-defense justification and the justification from indigence 
is not, then, as clear as he suggests. In the first case, the act of self-defense is compatible 
with the purpose of the law against assault; it amounts to a hindering of a hindrance to the 
mutual right to physical integrity. But in the second case, the same logic applies, the only 
difference being that the law itself is here the hindrance to the mutual right to freedom. 
Here too, then, the crime is compatible with the ultimate purpose of a legitimate law, i.e. 
mutual freedom. 
This, in turn, means that Waldron’s analogy between theft and rape does not apply. The 
crime of rape can never be compatible with mutual freedom. It involves, per definition, a 
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negation of the freedom of the victim, who is treated as a mere object and not as an 
autonomous subject. Property rights and the right not be raped are different in this respect. 
While property rights for Kant are ‘acquired rights’ that can be legitimate, e.g. if the legal 
order of which they are part is compatible with the Universal Principle of Right, the right 
not to be raped follows directly from the innate and inalienable right to freedom (e.g. 
directly from the Universal Principle of Right), and is therefore valid without exception, 
even in a supposed state of nature.451  The same goes for other crimes that instantiate 
disrespect for innate freedom, such as torture.452 
Granted then that there are situations where property rights do not comply with the criteria 
of legitimacy because they form part of a legal order that does not sufficiently ensure the 
access to mutual freedom for all – what does this mean for the justice of punishing a person 
for theft under such circumstances? The most radical proposal would be that theft does not 
even exist in such a situation, in other words, that property laws ought to be considered 
invalid and everybody free to help themselves to whatever they want as long as it is not in 
the direct possession of another. A slightly less radical proposal would be that only those 
who have been denied access to mutual freedom under the current legal order are free to 
disregard property laws that have not been properly extended to them. A further narrowing 
is possible too, where the latter group might only justifiably help themselves to the bare 
minimum of what is required for their subsistence. 
At first glance, it seems that Kant would deny all of the above proposals. The fact that an 
actual legal order does not comply perfectly with the ideal of a rightful condition does not 
give subjects a right to resist and overturn the legal order. To disregard laws that are given 
by a state which fulfills the minimal criteria of a lawful condition, means unilaterally 
imposing one’s will against others.453 As we have seen, the use of force is only legitimate, 
according to Kant, if it is omnilaterally authorized. This means that for Kant, once a legal 
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order has been established, legality is a precondition for the moral authorization to use 
force.454 A ‘right’ to revolt against unjust laws would thus be self-contradictory: “For a 
people to be authorized to resist, there would have to be a public law permitting it to 
resist”455 And further: “For someone who is to limit the authority in a state must have even 
more power than he whom he limits […] In that case, however, the supreme commander 
in a state is not the supreme commander; instead, it is the one who can resist him, and this 
is self-contradictory.”456 An extralegal challenge of legal authority would thus have to 
presume the authority (and hence, the legality) of the challenge, which by definition is 
impossible when it is extralegal. Therefore, Kant concludes, “the sovereign has only rights 
against his subjects and no duties (that he can be coerced to fulfill)”457.  
Though this conclusion may seem extremely anti-democratic, the impression is at least 
partly due to the form of the Kantian argument rather than its content. For according to 
Kant, the sovereign, i.e. the state, has an internal duty of right to improve itself in 
accordance with the Universal Principle of Right. The notion of an internal duty of right 
simply means that the state is required, in order to be legitimate, to pursue as its end the 
establishment of a rightful condition. To the extent that it is defective in this regard, the 
state is required by a duty of right to remedy its defects in accordance with its regulative 
ideal, the Universal Principle of Right. Since every individual has the right to freedom in 
accordance with the Universal Principle of Right, and since the state has an internal duty 
to provide such conditions for its subjects, the state thus indirectly has a duty toward 
individuals. But individuals cannot demand their rights by force, but only by lawful means, 
i.e. “by complaints (gravamina) but not by resistance”458. For, as Ripstein explains, “[l]ike 
all duties of right, the state’s duty to improve its laws can only be carried out by using 
means consistent with the Universal Principle of Right”.459 Kant thus famously dismisses 
the right of a people to overthrow an unjust sovereign (though, as we shall see, these 
arguments against revolution are not as conservative as they may seem at first).  
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But what about the more specific right of a person in need to acquire enough goods to 
survive? Kant also denies such a right of necessity, for as he says, “there could be no 
necessity that would make what is wrong conform with law”.460 The argument against the 
right to necessity is somewhat similar to the argument against the right to revolt, in that 
both ‘rights’ would have required the legality of a unilateral imposition of one’s will. If an 
indigent person were to have the right to, say, take food from a grocery store or to occupy 
a vacant house on a cold winter night, this right would imply a correlative duty on behalf 
of the owner of the grocery store or house to give up ownership. But if such a duty could 
be imposed upon the owner without her consent, her right would be left vulnerable to the 
wishes of other people. This would not be consistent with right, according to Kant, because 
“[t]he concept of right […] does not signify the relation of one’s choice to the mere wish 
(hence also to the mere need) of the other […] but only a relation to the other’s choice”.461 
In other words, right concerns the coexistence of each person’s choice with everybody 
else’s choice. Hence, it concerns only the form of people’s choices, ensuring that each 
choice is consistent with an equivalent freedom of choice by another, regardless of the 
matter of choice, i.e. the concrete needs and wishes motivating the choices. As a matter of 
virtue, but not of right, the owner of the grocery store or the house has an imperfect duty 
of beneficence to help those in need.462 Duties of virtue are imperfect according to Kant, 
meaning that they are permissively limited by other duties, e.g. a duty of beneficence 
toward yet another person or the duty of self-perfection toward oneself.463 A particular 
imperfect duty cannot legitimately be enforced; only perfect duties of right can. Hence, 
neither the state nor a person in need has a right to force the owner to give up her property 
for the sake of the particular ends of another. 
However, even though Kant denies that there exists a right of necessity, he asserts (in a 
much-discussed example) that a person in a shipwreck who saves his own life by pushing 
another off a plank should not be punished. In such a case, he states, “a penal law […] 
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could not have the effect intended”464. In other words, it is impossible under such 
circumstances to uphold the supremacy of law in space and time. “There is no supremacy 
to uphold”, as Ripstein puts it, because a person in desperate need will not defer to a 
supreme law, but is rather “a law unto himself”.465 Since punishment cannot serve the 
function of upholding law in such cases, the act is unpunishable, Kant says, though not 
inculpable.466 
Here, then, is a fourth proposal about the justice of punishing an indigent person who steals 
from need. The proposal entails that the right to punish such an offender does not apply 
even though the offender does not have the right to steal (or otherwise break the law). 
12.2 Moral standing to blame 
A version of this latter claim has been argued by Antony Duff, but from a different 
theoretical vantage point than the Kantian theory I have proposed here. The state does not 
retain the necessary moral standing to communicate blame through punishment, Duff 
argues, when the same state has not previously fulfilled its responsibilities vis-à-vis the 
offender. 
Suppose that he has been excluded – politically, materially, and normatively 
– from an adequate share in the community’s goods; and that his exclusion 
has not been recognized as a wrong done to him. Could he not with justice 
say to the court that, whether or not he is bound by the criminal law, the 
court lacks the standing to call him to answer for his alleged crime?467 
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Communication of blame is an essential part of the just function of the criminal trial and 
subsequent punishment, Duff holds. If such communication is not possible, the trial cannot 
fulfill its just function. When the circumstances surrounding a case do not allow for a trial 
to fulfill its just function, there is a so-called ‘bar to trial’, the most common of which are 
due to the condition of the defendant (e.g. when mentally impaired or otherwise ‘unfit to 
plead’). But there are also other bars to trial that arise when the criteria for initiating a just 
trial are not fulfilled, for instance due to the court’s lack of jurisdiction, either territorially 
or temporally, because of a statute of limitations, because of double jeopardy, or, in other 
cases, due to misconduct toward the defendant by the state (coerced testimony, entrapment 
etc.). According to Duff, when the social injustice suffered by a defendant is sufficiently 
severe, this too ought to qualify as a bar to trial, because the circumstances preclude proper 
communication of blame. 
The argument is based on an analogy with non-legal ways of communicating blame. “The 
trial”, Duff argues, “can be seen as a formal, legal analogue of the informal, moral process 
of calling another to answer for an alleged wrong, and blaming her for it if she cannot offer 
a suitably exculpatory answer”.468 When criticized for doing wrong in our everyday lives, 
we are not usually prepared to answer to just anybody. If a person is meddling in our 
affairs, we might think a proper response to be, “That’s none of your business”. If that 
person is being hypocritical, or worse, if she is complicit in the same act that she criticizes, 
we might think it sufficient to respond, “Look who’s talking”.469 In such cases, the person 
blaming does not have the required moral standing to blame. Her criticism may be 
objectively correct (i.e. the criticized conduct really is blameworthy), but she is not in a 
position to call the other person to answer for that conduct.470 As G. A. Cohen explains,  
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Admonition may be sound, and in place, but some may be poorly placed to 
offer it. When a person replies to a critic by saying: “Where do you get off 
criticizing me for that?”, she is not denying (or, of course, affirming) the 
inherent soundness of the critic's criticism. She is denying her critic's right 
to make that criticism, in a posture of judgment.471 
 
Analogously, Duff claims, the state lacks moral standing to hold offenders who are victims 
of severe social injustice accountable through punishment. Let us look closer at the 
analogy to see if it holds. Of the three mentioned reasons for lack of moral standing, 
meddling is not relevant here, as we are concerned with criminal offenses, which are not 
simply ‘one’s own business’. There is more reason to claim that the state is guilty of 
hypocrisy and complicity when it holds severely socially deprived persons criminally 
liable. Victor Tadros argues to this effect in “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility”: “The 
state is complicit insofar as the economic injustice it perpetrates creates criminogenic 
conditions.”472 In other words, when the state is responsible for economic injustice, it is 
complicit in creating the conditions under which we know that more crime will occur. If it 
were not for the state’s role in economic injustice, then, some of the crime that is being 
committed would not have been committed. Hence, when the state calls a person to answer 
for crime that would not have occurred but for the economic conditions for which the state 
is partially responsible, it is complicit in the crime and therefore lacks standing to blame. 
Further, Tadros argues, the state is hypocritical:  
One reason not to perpetrate distributive injustice is that distributive 
injustice is criminogenic. In perpetrating distributive injustice, the state 
shows itself to have insufficient concern for the victims of crime. Hence, in 
holding the poor responsible for what they do, the state claims that the poor 
should be held responsible for violating their moral obligations while 
denying the entitlement of the poor to hold it responsible for failing to adhere 
to those very obligations.473 
If the state shows insufficient concern for victims of crime, it lacks standing, therefore, to 
hold others accountable for their insufficient concern for victims of crime. We might, 
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however, question just how relevant this analogy between the private, moral lack of 
standing to blame and the state’s lack of standing to blame is. For starters, it is not entirely 
obvious that what applies in the blaming-relations of two private individuals necessarily 
applies in the blaming-relations of the state and its citizens. One issue concerns who the 
state represents. Peter Chau has argued that the courts might be thought of as acting only 
on behalf of those who do retain the standing to blame. The courts might thus reply to a 
deprived offender: “You may not owe a duty to account for your crimes to the polity as a 
whole now, but you still owe a duty to account to the just citizens, and I am now calling 
you to account on behalf of them.”474 Against Chau’s view, however, Jeffrey Howard has 
argued that such a claim to act only on behalf of some citizens is illegitimate under normal 
circumstances: “State officials are morally permitted to see themselves as acting on behalf 
of a subset of the citizenry, I argue, only in circumstances of democratic crisis: 
circumstances in which a moral community can no longer be plausibly said to exist.”475 
Further, Matt Matravers points to the potential difference it makes that in a public setting, 
as opposed to a private setting, a person acts in the capacity of an official role. Hence, it is 
unclear whether the hypocrisy of the person filling the role is sufficient to cause the 
institution she is part of to lose moral standing. Does it, for instance, affect a university’s 
standing to hold students accountable for not upholding deadlines if a member of the 
disciplinary committee does not herself uphold deadlines? And what if the institution has 
failed to react against staff members who do not uphold deadlines – should that affect the 
institution’s standing to hold students responsible for, say, plagiarism? Presumably, loss 
of standing requires the institution to flout the same values that it would hold others 
accountable for, and in the case of plagiarism, the fact that the institution is tolerant with 
breaches of deadlines is therefore irrelevant. This is a general characteristic of hypocrisy. 
An adulterer has standing to criticize somebody for being stingy but not for being an 
adulterer – i.e. it is only in relation to the act of adultery that he would be hypocritical, not 
for all immoral acts. Likewise, a state that fails to provide economic safety for all will 
presumably retain its moral standing to hold somebody accountable for rape, but not, 
possibly, for theft. 
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It seems, then, that flouting the same value is necessary for loss of standing to blame – but 
is it also sufficient for loss of standing? Matravers offers the following example: Assuming 
that it is true that the UK Government lied about the facts that were provided as grounds 
for the Iraq War, does that mean that the UK Government lacks standing to hold a person 
accountable for lying to her insurance company about the goods stolen from her in a 
robbery?476 In both cases, the value of truthfulness in legal relations has been flouted, and 
the state is thus being hypocritical. Yet, intuitively, this fact does not seem to supply a 
sufficient reason for not holding the person committing insurance fraud accountable. 
The complicity-claim is stronger, as Tadros also says. But here, too, we can question 
whether the analogy is entirely fitting. Crime caused by economic injustice could be 
viewed as a “proportionate foreseen harm”477: We would hardly call the state complicit in 
a plane crash because it allows air traffic, even though few or no plane crashes would occur 
if air traffic were prohibited. In the same way, one might argue that the state is not 
complicit in crime caused by those who lose out in the free market simply because it allows 
a free market. Free-market proponents would likely argue that more poverty, and therefore 
more crime, would result if the market were restricted so as to prevent any poverty at all. 
Put differently: The state does not do wrong by allowing a free market, and if it does not 
do wrong, it cannot be complicit in wrong. 
For the analogy to work, then, one must argue that the state does do wrong toward the poor 
and is therefore complicit in their crimes. We need a theory of the state’s responsibility for 
poverty, in other words. There are, of course, several plausible theories of why a state that 
allows poverty does injustice toward the poor. The advantage of the Kantian approach 
developed above, is that it can provide a link between poverty, standing to punish and 
justification. For if the state creates a hindrance to mutual freedom by setting up a system 
of property rights that exclude some from access to property, a person so excluded might 
be understood as hindering a hindrance to her access to mutual freedom when breaking 
those laws. The state, we might say, is complicit in the offender’s need to break the law in 
such cases, because the law is a hindrance to her freedom. And for the same reason, the 
indigent person may be justified in breaking the law. This argument simply requires that 
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one accept the premise that law is legitimate only to the extent that it accords with the 
Universal Principle of Right – in other words, a premise that is inherent to the Kantian 
project of justifying legal authority.  
12.3 A state of barbarism 
Of course, for the Kantian theory as well, there arises the problem of how far from the 
regulative ideal of the Universal Principle of Right a legal order must stray before it loses 
its legitimacy. As we saw, Kant denied that the defects of an actual state would provide its 
citizens with the right to revolt against it. For all its failures, the state, by the mere existence 
of laws, provides some degree of omnilateral authority. Even where there is merely a 
formal respect for law, what Hart called “a residual respect for justice”, there is at least 
some claim to legitimate authority. A right to revolt, on the other hand, is conceptually 
impossible according to Kant, because it would require the legitimacy of a unilateral will 
to oppose (the imperfect expression of) the omnilateral will. 
As long as the state retains some legitimacy, then, it has standing to hold citizens 
accountable for breaches of law. Perhaps the reason why the example of the UK 
Government lying about the Iraq War undermines the intuition about the relevance of 
hypocrisy, is simply because the UK Government is otherwise perceived as sufficiently 
legitimate to have moral standing to blame. It would be no wonder, then, if Duff and 
Tadros’ theory is not intuitively applicable in situations where the state, but for some 
defects, is largely legitimate. The same conclusion would follow from Kant’s theory.  
Duff does not pursue the question of exactly how bad the situation in a state must be before 
the state loses standing to blame, but clearly the theory will be most relevant if we consider 
situations of grave, systematic injustice against specific groups of society. In such states, 
some groups are excluded from full membership in the polity, while at the same time they 
are being held accountable before the polity, and hence are only then included as members. 
Such an inconsistency is clearly unjust, and if we consider the examples of the Jews in 
Nazi Germany and people of color in Apartheid-South Africa, this injustice is extreme. 
These groups were systematically excluded from full membership in the polity, and as 





But was there not even in Nazi Germany “a residual respect for justice”, a sliver of formal 
respect for law sufficient to provide the state with some legitimacy? For the Jews, the 
answer is clearly no. They were so entirely excluded from the polity that their rights were 
not even minimally protected. There was, in other words, a situation of almost complete 
lawlessness for the Jews. And this is the reason, if we again adopt a Kantian perspective, 
why we might say that the courts had no legitimacy against the Jews. There was in reality 
no law that expressed the omnilateral will of the Jews, i.e. law that Jews rationally and 
consistent with their humanity could have given to themselves.478 Hence, there was no law 
before which the Jews could be morally required to answer. For non-Jews, on the other 
hand, the conclusion might conceivably be the opposite. Their property rights and some 
other rights were indeed protected to a large extent. Perhaps they might therefore be said 
to owe the polity respect for the rights of others, and thus would legitimately have to 
answer to the polity if they were charged with theft or other crimes. 
The lawlessness under which the Jews in Nazi Germany lived is consistent with what Kant 
defines as ‘barbarism’ in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Barbarism, Kant 
says, is when there is “Force without freedom and law”. This, in turn, is opposed to 
‘despotism’, which he defines as “Law and force without freedom”479. While the latter is 
a defective form of state, it retains at least some element of legality and hence has the 
potential to represent, in a minimal way, the omnilateral will of the people.480 Barbarism, 
on the other hand, exists where there is not even this minimum of legality. It is, in effect, 
like the state of nature, where all that exists is a multitude of unilateral wills. In such a 
situation, the argument against the right of revolt does not apply. There is no omnilateral 
will against which revolutionaries would unjustifiably exert their unilateral wills. On the 
contrary, if the revolutionaries attempt to put in place a state which does in fact express 
the omnilateral will, they act in accordance with right, for to “remain in a condition which 
is not rightful” is to “do wrong in the highest degree”.481 As mentioned, Kant’s denial of a 
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moral right to revolt is thus less conservative than one might at first think, for he too would 
acknowledge that there are some situations in which ‘all bets are off’ and nobody holds 
legitimate power.482 
Hence, we might conclude that for Jews living in Nazi Germany there was no state to 
which they owed allegiance. They could legitimately view themselves as being in a 
situation equivalent to a state of nature where no institutions or persons had the right to 
use force against them, except defensively. They had thus a moral right to revolt against 
the Nazi state. The argument could arguably be extended to everybody in the Reich, non-
Jews as well, if we grant that the situation was so far removed from the ideal of a legitimate 
state that it did not even fulfill the minimal criteria of a despotic regime. But we might also 
want to differentiate between these groups, claiming that for Jews and other clearly 
repressed minorities, the moral right to revolt applied tout court, but for others the moral 
right to break the law only applied if it amounted to a hindering of a hindrance to freedom. 
Hence, it would not be morally justified to steal food from one’s neighbor simply for one’s 
own satisfaction, but it would be justified to hide Jews or to work with the resistance 
movement.483 
12.4 Wrong against victims 
The last example points to an issue that I have briefly touched upon above in the example 
of the grocery store owner, and that constitutes a problem for any theory claiming that 
members of an oppressed group are unpunishable for breaches of other people’s rights. If 
a Jew in Nazi Germany stole food from his neighbor, the state would not retain the standing 
to hold him to account. But could one argue that the neighbor had nevertheless suffered a 
wrong? In other words, that the neighbor had rights vis-à-vis the state to have her property 
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protected, even though Jews in Nazi Germany did not have any obligations toward the 
state to uphold property rights? This discrepancy is increasingly plausible if we consider 
acts that infringe directly upon the neighbor’s innate right to freedom, such as rape or 
assault. Such acts would constitute a wrong for the victim even in a state of barbarism or 
where the law does not legitimately apply to the offender due to his near complete 
exclusion from the polity. There would not in such cases exist a legitimate way of holding 
the offender accountable, and the wrong against the victim would thus be left unremedied 
by the state. In effect, the state would not protect her innate right.  
A related issue regarding the wrong against victims comes up in cases closer to home. If 
the victim is herself socially deprived, as victims of crime excessively tend to be, the 
injustice she has suffered will be further exacerbated. The socially deprived are generally 
more insecure and less protected by law than other groups. As Tadros notes:  
First, poverty […] is almost certainly a cause of an increase in the crime 
rate, particularly in poor communities. Second, because the poor have less 
wealth than they ought to have, they have less money to spend on enhancing 
their security […] Therefore, failing to prosecute and convict the offender 
of a security based offence might compound the injustice done to others who 
are already victims of injustice.484 
There is, then, a potential irony in applying a theory that proposes to let social injustice 
toward an offender override the criminal justice of prosecuting her: The result may be even 
greater social injustice. Those who live under socially unjust conditions, whether in the 
banlieues of Paris or the favelas of Rio, might wish for the exact opposite of what this 
well-meaning theory proposes: More police, more prosecutions, harsher punishments of 
offenders – in short, a clearer manifestation of the supremacy of law in their community, 
ensuring people there the rightful access to freedom. Nevertheless, as we have seen, there 
are some situations where the exclusion of certain groups is so fundamental that holding 
members of these groups accountable before the polity from which they have been 
excluded would amount to an independent injustice.  We have then a tragic situation, 
where criminal justice cannot be done to victims without perpetrating injustice to 
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offenders, and vice versa. Tadros concludes in the same way: “In some cases, however, 
while failing to prosecute and convict the offender will cause some injustice to the victim 
or to other citizens, the injustice is insufficiently grave to outweigh the injustice of holding 
the offender responsible for what he has done.”485 
12.5 When does a tragic situation arise? 
The Kantian approach I have taken allows us to analyze when the tragic situation occurs: 
Only when the offender is beyond reproach from the state and the victim is in fact wronged 
is there potentially a tragic situation.486 I will now briefly consider how this applies to 
different types of crime, before concluding with a suggestion about how we may seek to 
mitigate the tragic situation when it occurs. 
As we saw above, the injustice done to the victim is clear when it infringes upon her innate 
right to freedom. Our duty to respect innate right does not follow upon the fulfillment of 
other criteria, unlike our duty to respect acquired rights, which, on a Kantian theory, 
depends upon the legitimacy of the legal order of which they are part. For Kant, then, there 
are some acts which are categorically wrong, meaning that there are no conceivable 
circumstances under which an institution can legitimately make them right. If a person 
who is beyond reproach from the state commits such a ‘natural’ wrong, the mentioned 
tragic situation will arise with necessity, for the wrong against the victim cannot then be 
publicly recognized through a legitimate criminal trial and punishment. The injustice is 
bound to remain unremedied.  
When a person who is beyond reproach from the state breaches ‘acquired rights’, such as 
property rights, the act will only be wrongful upon a Kantian theory if the right in question 
is provided by a legitimate legal order. In a state of nature such rights do not exists. Hence 
there is no such thing as theft. The ‘victim’ has no legitimate grievance. The same applies 
in a state of barbarism, devoid of legitimate law. Only in a state that shows at least the 
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potential of representing the omnilateral will of citizens do we have a ‘natural’ duty to 
support and comply with the state’s institutions and laws.487 
The difficult situation to consider, then, is when the state retains at least a minimum of 
legitimacy, but where some groups are excluded from equal access to freedom. I am 
thinking of a type of state that is tolerably unjust, to use Rawls’ term, meaning that the 
natural duty to comply with its laws is still valid.488 The difficult situation arises if in such 
a state there are some citizens that are excluded to the extent that the duty does not apply 
to them, at least for some types of offenses. The example mentioned at the outset is 
illustrative: A city that does not provide homeless shelters or public bathrooms excludes a 
homeless person from a life consistent with mutual freedom. Nevertheless, we could not 
say of that city that all its laws are void. We could likely not even say that the bylaw 
prohibiting sleeping and defecating in public places is void, but merely that it does not 
legitimately apply to a homeless person who has no legal alternatives. Now, if the 
homeless person were to sleep in somebody’s private garage without permission, we could 
say that the owner of the garage had been wronged, for property laws are valid in this 
tolerably unjust society. Similarly, if an indigent person with no legal means of acquiring 
food would steal food from a grocery store, the owner would have been wronged. Yet, 
since in both these cases the government did not supply sufficient assistance to assure them 
legal access to mutual freedom, the laws which prohibited these necessary actions created 
a hindrance to their freedom. 
Since the laws hindered the indigent person’s freedom, breaching these laws amounts to a 
hindering of a hindrance to his freedom. His actions are thus justified qua breaches of law, 
that is, vis-à-vis the state. But the very same law protects the freedom of the grocery store 
owner and the garage owner. Hence, we have a tragic situation. But we see more clearly 
now that it is a tragic situation for the state, and not for the parties, who both do right and 
not wrong. The state is the one that cannot avoid doing right and wrong at the same time. 
That is, it cannot avoid failing to protect the rights of either the victim or the offender. If 
the offender is punished, the state treats as wrong what is in fact a negation of the state’s 
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wrong. If the offender is not punished, the state treats as right the negation of the property 
rights of the owners (who have not done anything to lose their rights).489 
The state must then try to mitigate the situation, by reducing the severity of the injustice 
that it cannot avoid doing. I suggest that it do so in the following way: By not prosecuting 
the offender and compensating the victim. This way of mitigating the situation is also the 
one that is most compatible with the Kantian framework I have proposed here. For Kant, 
property rights, like all acquired rights, come with a price. The price is the cost of ensuring 
that the rights are consistent with the access to freedom for all. The price is usually paid 
ahead of time, through taxes that are redistributed to the poor, ensuring that they too can 
hold sufficient property. And here is the point: If the price has not been paid ahead of time, 
the property-holding citizens have unjustly benefitted from this illegitimate property 
scheme. They might thus be said to “owe a debt to society”, as the phrase goes. Hence, it 
would not be unjust to make them pay the price of property in retrospect, as compensation 
to those citizens who by poor luck were victimized and hence forced to provide the means 
for the survival of those who could not provide for themselves. The grocery store owner 
could thus be said to have paid the price of property on behalf of the polity and should 
therefore be reimbursed by the polity. 
Compensation is not equivalent to righting a wrong (recall that for Kant, the material 
aspect of wrong can be compensated, while the formal must be punished). Even with 
compensation, the property rights of the owners have been negated. That wrong has not 
been rectified simply by covering the owner’s losses. Nevertheless, in the kind of tragic 
situation outlined here, compensation and amnesty are likely the least unjust alternatives. 
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13. Disproportionate difficulty of law-abidance 
This chapter discusses the extent to which severe social deprivation makes compliance 
with law disproportionately difficult. A person’s SSD is not something for which she is 
responsible (cf. the stipulation above, that we consider only cases where the offender is a 
victim of social injustice). If breaches of law can (in part) be ascribed to the difficult 
conditions facing people with SSD, punishment will entail holding people responsible for 
circumstances beyond their control. If the difficulty is so considerable that we take it to 
negate the culpability of the offender, SSD should qualify as an excuse.490 If the difficulty 
of law-abidance is believed to lessen, though not negate, the culpability of the offender, 
SSD is grounds for mitigation of punishment. I will discuss mitigation in the next chapter, 
but the discussion there will build on the extensive discussion on the link between criminal 
behavior and SSD in this chapter. 
The aim here is to assess the reasons we have for believing that SSD makes compliance 
with law disproportionately difficult. Providing such reasons is necessary if SSD is to 
qualify as an excusing condition. Only if we can establish that SSD does actually tend to 
make law-abidance disproportionately difficult, can it plausibly be argued that SSD ought 
to be grounds for excuse.491 I will not, however, discuss the doctrinal implications of the 
disproportionate difficulty of law-abidance facing offenders with SSD. Put differently, I 
will not set out to determine the criteria for when SSD is sufficient to excuse an offender. 
Given the complexity of the matter, a theory of how to operationalize SSD as an excusing 
condition would require deliberations beyond what I can conduct in this context. My 
contribution to such a theory is here limited to an argument for its necessary premise: The 
difficulty persons with SSD face in abiding by law. Built into this premise is the notion 
that the difficulty can for some offenders be so severe as to negate their criminal 
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responsibility – hence, the need for further theoretical clarification of how to establish this 
threshold in legal doctrine. The threshold will in any case have to be set at an extreme 
degree of SSD (without here determining how extreme), in keeping with the criminal law’s 
overall purpose of respecting everybody’s equal freedom. Many offenders with SSD will 
therefore not reach the threshold for excuse upon any plausible doctrinal theory, but may 
be eligible for mitigation, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
Criminological research has long identified sources of criminal behavior connected with 
social deprivation. It is a well-established fact in criminology that “being at the bottom of 
the class structure”, as Braithwaite says, “increases rates of offending”.492 The Oxford 
Handbook of Criminological Theory similarly states that “the idea that structural 
inequality contributes to community-level variations in crime is uncontroversial”.493 
Before looking closer at more specific criminogenic mechanisms of social deprivation, it 
is worth to pause and note the implications of this supposedly uncontroversial claim. 
Crime, it says, happens partly because of social structures and social policy beyond the 
control of individuals.494 That means that if a community had had in place policies to 
combat social inequities, be it access to better schooling, a more progressive tax system, a 
higher minimum wage, we would have removed one of the causes of crime, increasing the 
possibility that some of the crime committed today would not have been committed. 
Maybe John’s house would not have been broken into; Charlie, a local teenager, would 
not have committed burglary. Maybe the 7-Eleven on the corner would not have been 
spray-painted; Jenny and Paul would not have committed vandalism. The claim can thus 
be formulated in more controversial terms: Society is partly to blame for the fact that 
Charlie, Jenny and Paul have become criminals. Framed in this way, it is increasingly 
plausible that there are normative implications for the justice of punishing them. 
The criminogenic conditions of SSD have interconnected material, cultural and 
psychological aspects. There are different views within the field of criminology on the 
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relative importance of these aspects.495 For our purposes, however, it matters less which 
of these factors are generally better predictors of crime, and more that they are of 
significance for at least some cases of SSD. The factors are anyhow intertwined and can 
therefore only crudely be isolated in the following.  
After having reviewed some commonly acknowledged criminogenic conditions pertaining 
to SSD in section 13.1, I will turn to the topic of crime and recognition in section 13.2. 
The theory of recognition, I will claim, can help explain aspects of criminal behavior and 
motivation that a materialist (economic) psychological theory (Section 13.1.3) cannot. 
These aspects are associated with SSD, and the recognition theory can thus serve to 
substantiate the claim that law-abidance is disproportionately difficult for those with SSD. 
The recognition perspective on criminal behavior overlaps with insights from other 
psychological theories (e.g. object-relations theory), but the recognition theory itself has 
received little attention within the literature on criminal behavior and social deprivation. 
An advantage of the recognition perspective is that it can be brought to bear on the 
discussion of how to remedy the wrong in crime within a Kantian-Hegelian framework for 
criminal justice. We shall see examples of this in the following chapters on mitigation and 
on restorative justice. For these reasons I will devote a relatively large amount of space to 
expounding such a perspective in this chapter.  
13.1 Criminogenic conditions of social deprivation 
13.1.1 Criminogenic material aspects of SSD 
Adverse childhood experiences, such as maltreatment or deprivation of affection, disrupts 
brain development, and, according to a recent review of evidence “has wide-ranging 
effects on neural, endocrine, immune, and metabolic physiology”.496 Another recent 
review shows “a growing body of evidence suggesting that exposure to adverse 
circumstances affects the developing brain in ways that increase risk for a myriad of 
problems”. Among these are cognitive problems, the authors summarize, such as “memory 
problems, learning difficulties, and cognitive delays, which are likely contributors to 
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disproportionately higher rates of academic difficulties and school adjustment issues”. In 
addition, “[a]ttention and behavior regulatory difficulties are also highly prevalent in 
children exposed to early adversity, likely underpinning risk for ADHD and associated 
behavioral problems”. Further, “atypical emotional development is also often observed in 
children reared in adverse contexts. Problems involve difficulties with stress, sensitivity to 
reward, and emotion and behavioral regulation, which lead to increased rates of psychiatric 
disorders, interpersonal problems, and engagement in high-risk antisocial activities”.497 
Research has also shown stunted physiological development associated with 
socioeconomic disadvantage (and not just as above, with adverse experiences). For 
instance, a comprehensive study in the United States found that “[p]arental socioeconomic 
disadvantage was […] associated with abnormal child neural development during the first 
7 years of life”, as well as “deficits in cognitive and emotional development”.498 In their 
book Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much, Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar 
Shafir set out to explain (among other things) why economic disadvantage may inhibit 
normal cognitive and emotional functioning. Scarcity of a resource, in this case money, 
has the mental effect of “taxing cognitive bandwidth”, i.e. reducing a person’s mental 
capacity, making it harder to concentrate on a given task. Experiments measured this effect 
to an average drop of 14 IQ points. A “tunneling effect” makes long-term goal attainment 
suffer at the expense of a narrow focus on the scarce object. In addition, scarcity weakens 
executive control, making sudden outbursts of anger etc. more likely when people are 
stressed due to scarcity. The scarcity thesis thus challenges the widespread, but simplistic 
view that poverty is primarily a result of failure (failure to graduate from high school, 
failure to hold a steady job, and so on). Rather, the reverse also holds: failure is a result of 
poverty. Without reduced cognitive and emotional functioning due to scarcity, failure 
might not occur, and the dialectic of poverty and failure may not get started. George 
Fletcher, when discussing the relevance of poverty to criminal justice, similarly notes that 
“[p]overty is a condition that disables people from functioning in the expected manner. It 
is a handicap relative to the society in which it occurs”. The disability can be fairly 
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obvious: “if you do not have enough to eat, you are sick all the time. If you cannot rest 
properly, then obviously you cannot work, either physically or mentally. Further, if you 
do not receive a proper education, you cannot function well.”499 
These are some examples of the debilitating material effects of both adverse childhood 
experiences and socioeconomic disadvantage. By impeding learning, concentration, 
deferred gratification, regulation of behavior, stress management, impulse control etc., 
SSD becomes a handicap, limiting a person’s capabilities. We can understand 
‘capabilities’ in accordance with ‘The Capability Approach’ advocated by Amartya Sen 
and others, as the real opportunities a person has to do and be what he or she has reason 
to value. As Sen puts it, “[t]he focus here is on the freedom that a person actually has to 
do this or be that – things that he or she may value doing or being”.500 A person’s ability 
to do this or be that – for instance, to graduate from high school or to be a steady employee 
– will be affected negatively by reduced cognitive, emotional, and in turn social 
functioning. In this material way, then, SSD inhibits a person’s freedom and, in ways to 
be explained, predisposes a person to commit crime. 
13.1.2 Criminogenic cultural aspects of SSD 
How might a reduced capability to do and be what one has reason to value bear on one’s 
capacity to conform to law? In his 1938 article “Social Structure and Anomie”, Robert 
Merton provided what became a highly influential explanation for this link between 
opportunity and criminal conduct, often known as ‘opportunity theory’ or ‘strain theory’ 
of crime. The idea is simple: To the extent that persons lack legal opportunities to achieve 
what they value, they will have a motive to try to achieve this illegally. In a society where 
a good is highly valued, but where parts of the population are deprived of the legal means 
to achieve it, the social structure will be criminogenic by strengthening the motive to 
achieve it illegally. “[A]ntisocial behavior is in a sense ‘called forth’ by certain 
conventional values of the culture and by the class structure involving differential access 
to the approved opportunities for legitimate, prestige-bearing pursuit of the culture 
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goals.”501 A society’s crime level will thus vary according to two parameters: How strong 
the shared cultural evaluation of a goal is, and how effective the blockage of this goal is 
for parts of the population. 
It is only when a system of cultural values extols, virtually above all else, 
certain common symbols of success for the population at large while its 
social structure rigorously restricts or completely eliminates access to 
approved modes of acquiring these symbols for a considerable part of the 
same population, that antisocial behavior ensues on a considerable scale.502 
As Merton notes, it is not poverty per se that is criminogenic. A feudal society or a caste 
society will often have more poverty and fewer possibilities of social mobility than a 
capitalist society, yet less crime. The important factor, Merton claims, is that in a capitalist 
society the lower classes will to a larger extent measure individual success by the same 
yardstick as the higher classes. Wealth becomes a good that is universally valued, and 
“monetary accumulation […] a symbol of success”.503 And because success by that 
yardstick is restricted, more people will see their legal opportunities of success frustrated. 
Put differently: If, as in pre-capitalist societies, one’s expectations and hopes are largely 
defined by one’s caste or class, attainment of these goals will likely be less restricted. For 
example, if your goal in life is to take over the farm or become a shoemaker like your 
father and his father and father’s father before you, your goal is likely within reach. You 
may still have few alternative opportunities. Poor people have, objectively speaking, fewer 
opportunities than wealthier people. But if what you want (or at least, expect) is among 
the opportunities that you have, you may nonetheless be content. 
The problem occurs when your goals are dissociated from your opportunities, i.e. when 
you want something you cannot have by legal means. Merton’s point is that the latter 
situation arises more often in capitalist societies. The lower classes are no longer taught to 
want what they have, so to speak. Tradition no longer offers a recipe for how to “find one’s 
                                                        
501 Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie", American Sociological Review 3, no. 5 (1938), 679. 
In 1960, Cloward and Ohlin amended the theory slightly, noting that it is insufficient that legal opportunity 
be blocked. Criminal opportunity must also be open. This helps to explain why lower-class people do not 
commit white collar crime, even though their legal opportunities for wealth are blocked. See John 
Braithwaite, "Poverty, Power, White-Collar Crime and the Paradoxes of Criminological Theory", 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 24, no. 1 (1991). 
502 Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie", 680. 





place” within realistic reach. Instead, under capitalism, the hegemonic culture exerts a 
pressure to desire what most people cannot have: The wealth and prestige of the higher 
classes.504 Merton’s opportunity theory thus emphasizes the side of opportunity 
unaccounted for by the material factors mentioned above: The “want”-side of opportunity. 
Our freedom, or capability, depends not only on our abilities to do this or be that, period. 
It depends on what we value doing or being, and whether this is within reach. What we 
value depends in part, as Merton and countless others have claimed, on the cultural values 
of one’s society.  
We can of course try to gain relief from the cultural pressures influencing our desires, thus 
exerting our freedom to determine what we value in our lives. As the Stoics and Buddhists 
have long understood, freedom can be attained by changing one’s desires. Put plainly: If 
you want nothing, then your opportunity to have it will definitely not be frustrated. But 
succeeding in exerting our freedom from cultural pressure requires the capability to reflect 
critically upon the cultural values that influence our desires. This capability must be 
nurtured through education, political participation, spiritual guidance etc., something the 
capability approach indeed emphasizes.505 Without assistance in cultivating this capability, 
as will likely disproportionately be the case for the severely socially deprived, it will be all 
the harder to free oneself from those culturally determined goals that one might attempt to 
pursue through crime. SSD is criminogenic, then, not just simply because it blocks one 
from legally attaining that which one desires, but also because it undermines one’s 
independence from culturally instilled desires.  
The normative significance of this kind of cultural pressure for punishment remains to be 
determined, of course. I might add here, however, that the notion of such legal significance 
of cultural pressure is less radical than perhaps one might assume, and was recognized 
even by Kant, who otherwise, of course, stressed the importance of addressing the criminal 
as a homo noumenon, retaining pure practical reason. “There are”, Kant writes, “two 
crimes deserving of death, with regard to which it still remains doubtful whether legislation 
is also authorized to impose the death penalty”. One is infanticide by the mother of a child 
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born outside wedlock. The other is murder by one soldier of another in a duel. “The feeling 
of honor leads to both”. The soldier who is insulted “sees himself constrained by the public 
opinion”, and likewise “no decree can remove the mother’s shame when it becomes known 
that she gave birth without being married”.506 Quaint as these examples may seem to us, it 
is clear that Kant recognizes that a strong cultural pressure may influence one’s capacity 
to conform to law. Since the citizen is torn between two incompatible social forces, the 
culture of honor and the criminal law, “public justice arising from the state becomes an 
injustice from the perspective of the justice arising from the people”.507 Whether or not 
this truly qualifies as a tragic situation parallel to that of Antigone, is another matter.508 In 
any case, the negative implication of the claim that public justice arising from the state is 
unjust, is that reduced punishment would go some way toward remedying this injustice, as 
we shall discuss later. 
13.1.3 Criminogenic psychological aspects of SSD 
We have so far seen that there are material and cultural conditions that disproportionately 
restrict the freedom of severely socially deprived persons. This group exceedingly lacks 
resources to do and be what they value doing and being. First, because they are affected 
by a strong cultural pressure to value what for most is realistically out of reach. Secondly, 
because they have, all things equal, less education, less ability to regulate behavior, less 
resourceful networks and so on – in short, less of the cognitive, emotional and social 
resources that provide options for success in a competitive society. We know also that 
having such deficits is correlated with a disproportionate tendency to commit crime. But 
we have yet to provide a satisfactory explanation for why a person with such deficits might 
be drawn toward crime. A proper explanation of criminal behavior requires not only that 
we identify general traits of those who are disproportionately disposed toward crime. It 
requires that we explain what a person might try to attain by her crime. In other words, we 
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must supplement a negative explanation, which says what criminals tend to lack compared 
to the rest of the population, with a positive explanation of what makes crime an attractive 
strategy for a person so disposed. Saying, for instance, that criminals tend to have less 
impulse control or less empathy, only explains why this group tends to have fewer 
inhibitions toward crime. It does not explain what it is that crime might provide for them. 
It is as such only ‘half’ of the explanation and must be supplemented by a plausible theory 
of what a person committing crime tries to achieve, consciously or subconsciously. 
Needless to say, any such theory will be somewhat speculative since we do not have direct 
access to the “inner workings” of criminals. Furthermore, there are probably great 
variations between criminals and between types of crime, such that one psychological 
theory may be suitable in one instance but not in another. This should not deter us from 
attempting to offer psychological explanations, however. The fact is that all theories of 
crime and punishment rely on some theory of what motivates criminal behavior. Declining 
to provide alternative theories merely leaves the field open to common-sense perceptions 
of criminal psychology. Such common-sense perceptions provide the premise for both 
deterrence theories and some retributive theories like the profit theory and the freeloader 
theory, and are, as we shall see, incomplete at best. Further, even though the topic invites 
answers that are tentative and short of being full-blown theories of “The psychology of 
crime”, we can still assess the plausibility of these answers by considering how well they 
explain well-established facts pertaining to criminal behavior. A good explanation requires 
that the two “halves” of the theory, the negative and the positive, be connected. The theory 
must explain the link between whatever a person lacks and what she might gain from 
crime, in other words, how crime (supposedly) remedies the deficit. A plausible 
psychological theory of crime must therefore fit the characteristics of the criminal 
population. If this group disproportionately lacks X, a good theory will explain how crime 
may be perceived as providing a remedy for the lack of X.509 Such a theory will then help 
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us determine whether this applies especially to those with SSD, thus intensifying their 
motive to commit crime. 
An economic view of criminal motivation 
Let us start, then, by looking at the psychological premise of the opportunity theory 
explained above. In its simplest form, the psychological premise is that people will try to 
gratify their desire for material wealth by the easiest and least costly method. Like water 
runs where resistance is least, so a person will be drawn toward crime if it provides the 
easiest way to get what she wants. The prospect of punishment might provide a counter-
motive, however, leading the person to change her course, just like a rock or a log can steer 
a stream from where it otherwise would go.  
Framed in this way, the premise of the opportunity theory corresponds with the common-
sense view of crime as motivated by personal gain (i.e. material wealth, or more generally, 
pleasure). I will call this view ‘the economic view’ for short. As we shall see, this 
represents but one interpretation of the psychological premise of the opportunity theory. 
The common-sense economic view is revealed, as I mentioned in the chapter on the profit 
theory, in the ways we talk about crime and punishment in everyday language. We often 
frame the issue using economic metaphors, saying for instance that a criminal tries to “get 
away with murder” or that he must “pay his debt to society”. More generally, this theory 
of criminal motivation accords with a view of humans as primarily utility-maximizing 
beings; the so-called homo economicus-model of human rationality. This model has come 
under sustained attack from behavioral economists and others in recent years, but 
continues nevertheless to serve as a psychological premise for much public policy.510 Like 
other public policy issues, crime is here framed as a function of an imbalance between 
incentives and disincentives in favor of the former. As Jeremy Bentham put it: 
When a man is prompted to engage in any mischievous act, […] the strength 
of the temptation depends upon the ratio between the force of the seducing 
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motives on the one hand, and such of the occasional tutelary ones, as the 
circumstances of the case call forth into action, on the other. The temptation, 
then, may be said to be strong, when the pleasure or advantage to be got 
from the crime is such as in the eyes of the offender must appear great in 
comparison of the trouble and danger that appear to him to accompany the 
enterprise.511 
If the price is right, so to speak, the criminal will take the risk of punishment, because the 
increased (or more immediate) pleasure from the crime outweighs the pain that might 
ensue from punishment. We see this notion expressed in Bentham’s principle that “the 
value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh 
that of the profit of the offence”.512 And we see it explicitly argued in political debates to 
justify increased punishment levels and policies promoted as being “tough on crime”. On 
the other hand, this economic (or materialist) framing of crime and punishment is also 
adopted by some on the Left who promote policies that are supposed to be “tough on the 
causes of crime”. While the Left tends to focus on the incentive side, claiming that material 
conditions induce the socioeconomically deprived to commit crime, the Right tends to 
focus on the disincentives, claiming that punishment levels are too low to dissuade 
potential criminals. The Left and the Right thus propose different policies based on the 
same psychological factor. This suggests that if we were to adopt an alternative 
psychological theory of crime, we could expect yet other policies to appear suitable. We 
shall see an example of this in chapter 15, where I will discuss the potential in restorative 
processes of addressing causes of criminal behavior found in conflict-ridden relationships 
and lack of recognition.  
How should we assess the economic view just outlined? One problem with this view is 
that it often seems inappropriate to talk of crime as if it were merely one of many ways of 
gratifying one’s desires. Most people have inhibitions against committing many types of 
crimes and would not under normal circumstances even consider these courses of action. 
This holds even when a clear benefit could be gained and there are no external 
disincentives. I could easily get away with stealing and selling my neighbor’s bike, but I 
would never do it. As we saw in the chapter on the freeloader theory, the notion that most 
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people would torture or rob someone unless they were dissuaded from doing so by external 
threats or internal efforts of willpower is “too creepy to be right”.513 
However, there are other types of crimes that do not to the same extent elicit empathy with 
the potential victim (e.g. theft from a corporation), as well as situations where our 
inhibitions are weakened (e.g. “he had it coming”-situations, or “better him than me”-
situations). These are, as Bentham put it, situations where our “standing tutelary motives”, 
in short, our social dispositions, have diminished strength.514 It seems reasonable to assume 
that in such situations, at least, the prospect of pleasure might motivate the commission of 
a crime if legal ways were blocked. At first sight, then, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the economic view can be more or less suitable depending on the type of crime at issue. 
But as we shall see, even purely economic crimes may be seen as filling other 
psychological needs than the need for material wealth. How much importance we ought to 
accord the economic-materialist view remains to be determined, then, and depends in part 
on how well it can explain the most central variables associated with criminal behavior. 
Criminological research has established that crime is disproportionately associated with 
the following variables: being male, aged 15-25, unmarried, living in large cities, with high 
residential mobility and relatively weak ties to school, work and family, and being at the 
bottom of the class structure.515 It is implausible that people with these traits are generally 
more utility-maximizing than other people, and that this could account for their increased 
tendency to seek pleasure through crime. On the other hand, it might be that the relative 
weight accorded to the incentives and disincentives to crime is somewhat abnormal for 
this group. As mentioned above, the increased marginal utility of the dollar may make 
some crimes more attractive to the poor. This may hold not only for purely economic 
crimes, but perhaps also for crimes that yield other types of pleasure for which the 
mentioned group may have fewer opportunities. E.g. stealing a car to go for a joy ride is 
more tempting for a person who cannot afford his own car. Further, it might be that the 
disincentive of punishment weighs somewhat less for people who are already 
downtrodden. The prospect of going to jail and being fed three meals a day may not be all 
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that frightening to a person living on the streets in mid-winter. When you ain’t got nothing, 
you ain’t got nothing to lose, as the song goes. 
On the other hand, the economic view cannot explain why men would be more tempted by 
the prospect of pleasure from crime than women. All things equal, women have fewer legal 
opportunities for material success than men, and ought therefore to have greater incentives 
to crime than men. Further, the theory offers no explanation for why being unmarried, 
having high residential mobility or having weak family ties would increase the likelihood 
of crime. Of the mentioned factors, the economic view seems able to properly account 
only for poverty and weak ties to school and work, and to some extent being young and 
living in cities. Looking beyond the mentioned characteristics of the criminal group, it is 
likely also that adverse childhood experience is strongly correlated with criminal 
behavior.516 The economic view cannot account for this variable either.  
We find a similar lack of support from the data if we compare the economic view to 
research on punishment’s deterrent effect. If we really were as sensitive to utilitarian 
incentives and disincentives as the economic view suggests we would expect that higher 
punishment levels would have a significant effect on the level of crime. But research on 
deterrence has not been able to establish such an effect from increased punishment. Put 
simply: The evidence does not support the idea that an increased disincentive – say, five 
years as opposed to three years in prison – will affect a person’s tendency to commit rape 
or robbery. The evidence does show a deterrent effect from the risk of exposure, though. 
The more likely you think it is that you will get caught, the more likely it is that you will 
abstain from crime.517 Johs. Andenæs suggested that the fear of exposure varies with the 
severity of the overall consequences of exposure for the offender, and not merely the 
consequences in terms of formal punishment. 
An accountant who embezzles, a priest who cheats on his taxes, a teacher 
who makes sexual advances toward minors, a public servant who takes 
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bribes – in these and many other instances the fear of exposure will be more 
the fear of shame and scandal, loss of employment, problems in the family, 
than fear of formal punishment […] For a previously punished habitual 
criminal, or for an unemployed youth from a drug-user environment, this 
may be different.518 
Fear of exposure is thus not merely fear of being caught and punished. It is fear of the 
social repercussions of being exposed as someone who has done the act in question. 
Andenæs’ point, then, is similar to the “nothing to lose”-point from above: If you are 
already known as a no-good criminal or junkie, the social repercussions of being caught 
yet another time may be exceedingly small. Not so for a well-esteemed citizen. 
How does this fit with the general characteristics of the most criminal group of society? 
The trait that unites this group, Braithwaite suggests, is weaker than normal social ties. 
Men are less bound to the family than women, all things equal. Youths are often ‘between 
families’, having loosened the bonds to their parents and having not yet married and 
established their own families. Those who have high residential mobility have looser bonds 
to their communities, all things equal, and the same goes for those who do not attend or do 
not fit in at school or in the workplace. It seems plausible that the social repercussions of 
being caught are less severe for this group, since this group is less intensely invested in 
social relationships, all things equal. The deterrent effect of the threat of exposure may 
thus be smaller for this group. The so-called primary control exercised by friends and 
family will be weaker, leaving more to the less effective secondary control of the criminal 
justice system. Where primary control is weak, crime will be up, as Christie, among others, 
has shown. Social distance, i.e. loose social interaction, is thus criminogenic.519  
We have, then, an explanation for why this group may have fewer inhibitions toward crime 
than normal. But what is the “positive” half of the explanation, i.e. the explanation for why 
this group is especially drawn to crime? The economic view can only supply such an 
explanation to the extent that crime is thought to remedy the specified deficits of this group 
– and as we saw, it can therefore explain properly only why low-class people and others 
with few legal opportunities for material wealth (e.g. high school dropouts) tend to 
disproportionately commit some types of crime. The economic view must be 
                                                        
518 Johs. Andenæs, Straffen som problem (Oslo: Exil, 1996), 53-54. Translated by me. 




supplemented by another theory, then, both because there are unexplained traits of the 
criminal group and because the economic framing is poorly suited for non-economic 
crimes such as rape and domestic abuse. I will turn now to a theory that I believe can 
supply such a supplement to the materialist-economic theory just outlined. 
13.2 Crime and recognition 
Hegel’s theory of recognition provides, I believe, a promising framework for 
understanding criminal behavior.520 The psychological premise of the theory is the 
following: Everybody needs recognition from others. Human beings have a drive to 
achieve recognition of one’s personality, an ineluctable hunger for acknowledgment that 
leads us to seek ever-evolving relationships and institutions to try to satisfy it. Why do we 
have this drive? Which necessary function does it serve? 
We saw in Chapter 9 that Hegel uses the Master-Slave parable in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit to illustrate how self-consciousness requires the presence of another and equal self-
consciousness, i.e. another person to enable consciousness of oneself as a person. The 
function of recognition is here the formation of self-consciousness, but many 
commentators on Hegel have attributed a broader function to recognition. Recognition 
serves the purpose of emancipating the individual; in short, it’s function is to enable 
freedom.521 In Axel Honneth’s reconstruction of Hegel’s theory, recognition is understood 
as a necessary condition for the formation of personal identity. Or in Honneth’s various 
formulations, the function of recognition is to enable the development of “the practical 
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"What is the Question for which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer?", European Journal of 
Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000), 155, where he defends the view that “[t]hat question is the question of the nature 





self”522, “successful ego-development”523, “identity-formation”524, “psychological 
integrity”525, “positive attitudes toward themselves”526, and “individual self-realization”527. 
Though the concept of recognition can thus be given different meanings, the importance 
of these differences should not be exaggerated. It seems rather that these meanings ought 
to be understood as highlighting different aspects of recognition that are essentially 
compatible with each other. Clearly there is an intimate connection between self-
consciousness, personal identity and freedom.528 Without self-consciousness, how could 
an individual be considered a free agent? To the extent that he could even be said to act 
upon the world, he would be merely like the Master who consumes in order to try to stem 
his desire, over which he has no conscious control.529 Likewise, the self-realization that 
Honneth talks about requires consciousness of and a degree of control over one’s own 
needs. Or as he puts it, a kind of positive freedom which is manifested in “a form of trust 
directed inward, which gives individuals basic confidence in both the articulation of their 
needs and the exercise of their abilities”.530 The connection between recognition, self-
realization and freedom is made clear in the following negative formulation:  
[U]nless one presupposes a certain degree of self-confidence, legally 
guaranteed autonomy, and sureness as to the value of one’s own abilities, it 
is impossible to imagine successful self-realization, if that is to be 
understood as a process of realizing, without coercion, one’s self-chosen life 
goals. With regard to such a process, ‘lack of coercion’ and ‘freedom’ 
cannot be understood simply as the absence of external force or influence, 
but must rather signify the lack of inner barriers as well as psychological 
inhibitions and fears.531 
Freedom, understood as self-realization, thus presupposes three things which, as I will 
explain shortly, arise only as a result of recognition: self-confidence, self-respect and self-
esteem.532 These three aspects of one’s self-image – or self-consciousness if you wish – 
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are developed through different forms of relations with other people, from familial 
relations of love and friendship, to legal relations, to ‘ethical’ relations in one’s 
community.  
Hegel’s three forms of recognition thus correspond to three different social spheres or 
practices: family, law, and ethical life (‘Sittlichkeit’). All three are necessary for the 
successful formation of the self, meaning that each by itself is insufficient or ‘one-sided’. 
Hegel thus explains the evolution of human practices and institutions: The drive to achieve 
recognition leads us to try to overcome the insufficiencies at each stage. The hunger for 
freedom, i.e. for self-realization and self-consciousness, is the motor of this dialectic 
process– the causa finalis “pulling” human development toward new forms of practices 
and institutions involving new types of relations and new forms of recognition.  
This explanation of development is supposed to apply both ontogenetically and 
phylogenetically, that is, both pertaining to each individual’s psychological development, 
and pertaining to the development of the human species and its practices and institutions. 
For Hegel, it is only natural that these two types of development should mirror each other, 
since individual freedom is possible only within the ethical life of a society, i.e. in the 
“lively unity” of “universal and individual freedom”.533 For the purposes of my discussion 
here, however, it is useful try to distinguish the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic aspect of 
Hegel’s theory, focusing on the former.534 Hegel’s framework allows us to theorize on the 
importance of intersubjectivity in the development of the individual personality and 
individual action, and it is this that bears most directly on the psychology of criminal 
behavior. 
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13.2.1 The three forms of recognition 
Before turning to the explanation of criminal behavior, we must first consider the three 
types of recognition that human beings seek and which motivates much of our behavior in 
general. The first is the recognition that we gain through relationships of love, in the family 
and among friends. It is with the experience of love, as Honneth explains Hegel, that we 
become more fully aware of our own needs and able to develop the necessary self-
confidence to trust the significance of these needs. The most fundamental such experience 
is the relationship of the newborn baby and the mother, which develops from a state of 
symbiosis toward a gradual self-assertion and self-awareness made possible by trust in the 
mother’s love. “During the first months of life, the child is incapable of differentiating 
between self and environment” Honneth remarks, drawing heavily in this section on 
psychoanalytic object relations theory. 
At six months, on average, the child begins to interpret acoustic and optical 
signals as clues to the future satisfaction of needs, so that the child is slowly 
able to endure the temporary absence of the ‘mother’. In thereby 
experiencing, for the first, the ‘mother’ as something in the world that is 
outside of his or her omnipotent control, the child simultaneously begins to 
become aware of his or her dependence.535 
Awareness of one’s dependence on each the other – the experience that ‘I need you, and 
you need me’ – is what characterizes love. “In the reciprocal experience of loving care, 
both subjects know themselves to be united in their neediness, in their dependence on each 
other.”536  
The family is the primary location of this unity of interdependence.537 But as the child 
matures, it gradually gains independence from this unity. There is thus a dialectic 
progression in the child’s development, from being completely immersed in the unity of 
the family toward more and more autonomy, that is, toward recognition of oneself and 
others as separate persons. In relationships of love each is recognized in his or her 
uniqueness, as a particular and irreplaceable individual: You are your daughter’s father, 
your brother’s brother, your friend’s friend and so on. And just like you cannot substitute 
anyone for your daughter, your brother, your friend, so you are unique to them. This form 
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of recognition is one-sided, however. The child gradually learns to see itself not merely as 
a unique other to a unique other (as son or daughter, brother or sister and so on), but as a 
‘generalized other’, that is, as equal to others, sharing general characteristics with others.538 
In this latter form of recognition, each is recognized as same rather than unique. But in 
order to be alike, one must abstract from the concrete idiosyncrasies of each individual. 
One must “put on the mask of the person”, as explained in Chapter 9.  
This recognition as a legal person is also one-sided, however. When we relate to other 
people, it is not merely as abstract, empty categories. We relate to each other as individuals 
with concrete qualities and skills: he is a baker, she is a lawyer, this guy is very funny, she 
has a great voice. To put it succinctly: We are someone to each other; we are not just 
anyone, like we are before the law. Yet this more concrete form of recognition does not 
amount to the recognition of love and friendship. Being someone in one’s community is 
not the same as being a uniquely loved someone. The baker may also be a beloved father, 
and as the latter, he is irreplaceable. As the former, however, he is someone in light of the 
role he fills. If he is sick one day, somebody else might fill in for him, but nobody can fill 
in for a loved one. The individual is thus socially recognized for the social function he fills 
through his role. Through his function, he contributes to the community. He is thus 
recognized for his contribution to the common good.  
The upshot of this, more fundamentally, is that one’s identity – who you are, how you 
understand yourself – is determined by the ethical values of your community, i.e. the 
‘Sittlichkeit’ in which you live. Hence, you are unique only via commonly shared (i.e. non-
unique) values – a kind of mediated uniqueness, we could say. In the Hegelian dialectic, 
this third form of recognition is thus a sublation of the two other forms of recognition – a 
transcendence of the dichotomies of uniqueness vs. sameness (love vs. equal respect), and 
of unity vs. separation (family vs. law). In ethical recognition you are individual-as-part-
of-a-whole, in Hegelian terms, identity-in-difference. Yet, even though the two previous 
and one-sided forms of recognition are transcended in the recognition of the ethical 
community, they are still necessary forms of recognition for human self-realization. 
Hegel’s fundamental insight is that we need all three forms of recognition. We need to feel 
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loved, to feel respected, and to feel appreciated – if we are lacking in either, we will be 
motivated to try to remedy this deficit.  
13.2.2 Lack of recognition 
As mentioned, this premise can be used to explain both historical development and 
individual psychological development. It functions as the premise of Hegel’s explanation 
of the development of Spirit throughout history. And less abstractly, it is the premise of 
Honneth’s explanation of social development as a “Struggle for Recognition”. My interest 
here, however, is whether this premise can also be used to explain individual criminal 
behavior. Although a narrower question, this too finds textual support in Hegel, and fits 
well with Honneth’s theory of social conflict. According to Honneth, “[…] Hegel traces 
the emergence of crime to conditions of incomplete recognition. The criminal’s inner 
motive then consists in the experience of not being recognized, at the established stage of 
mutual recognition, in a satisfactory way”.539 
To assess this claim, we require first a theory of how privation of recognition can become 
a motive for any action at all, and second and more specifically, how it can motivate crime. 
Honneth derives the first from John Dewey’s pragmatist psychology whereby emotions 
are understood as affective responses to actions. Positive emotions such as joy and pride 
arise with successful solutions to action problems. Negative emotions such as shame, guilt, 
anger, sorrow and indignation arise when one’s expectations for action are frustrated. The 
affective response to frustrated expectations, Dewey claims, shifts one’s attention toward 
these expectations, which may be either instrumental expectations or ‘moral expectations’, 
i.e. normative expectations of how one ought to behave or how one ought to be treated. 
The feeling of guilt is thus an emotional response of an actor to a violation of a norm she 
accepts as prohibiting her action. The same action may trigger indignation in another 
person. Shame is an emotional response of a person to an action, by herself or another, 
which she perceives as showing that she has a lower social value than she had previously 
assumed. Recall Hampton’s point that many crimes threaten the feeling of self-worth of 
victims, that is, cause them to feel shame. This may happen, she noted, either because they 
believe the crime has caused their degradation, or because they perceive it as evidence of 
                                                        




their true status (e.g. “I deserve to be raped”). Conversely, the criminal may feel shame by 
perceiving the crime as confirming to herself and others that she is a bad person, that she 
does not live up to the normal standard for how one ought to be (as opposed to guilt, which 
relates to the action, not to one’s personality). Emotions thus serve a cognitive function by 
making us aware of the discrepancy between our expectations and how we actually act or 
are acted upon. Emotions thereby help clarify to ourselves our normative beliefs.540 
Becoming emotionally (and cognitively) aware of the discrepancy between one’s current 
situation and one’s normative expectations, may trigger, as I see it, one of two responses 
to dispel the emotional tension. One can either lower one’s expectations or one can struggle 
to achieve one’s expectations – two different strategies for cancelling out the perceived 
discrepancy. The first strategy can be seen when feelings of shame lead to apathy and 
acceptance of one’s degradation, as Hampton described. Perhaps it is partly a matter of 
sour grapes: When you cannot get what you want, you can simply change your desires, in 
this case your expectations for how you ought to be treated.541 Or perhaps it is a more 
fundamental problem, best described as a vicious cycle of self-deprecation. Self-
confidence, self-respect and self-esteem are required, as we saw, for one’s self-
consciousness as a free agent, in other words, for one’s self-perception as one who should 
not accept degradation. However, one’s degradation is itself an impediment to the self-
confidence, self-respect and self-esteem needed to assert the injustice of one’s degradation. 
The other strategy to overcome the discrepancy is to act so as to bring one’s treatment in 
accordance with one’s normative expectations, i.e. to pursue recognition. As Honneth puts 
it,  
the experience of being disrespected can become the motivational impetus 
for a struggle for recognition. For it is only by regaining the possibility of 
active conduct that individuals can dispel the state of emotional tension into 
which they are forced as a result of humiliation.542 
The struggle for recognition can take the form of collective action when minority groups 
react to their exclusion from social recognition accorded to comparable groups. The 
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movements for women’s rights, racial equality and LGBT-rights are but a few examples. 
Participating in such political struggles can in and of itself help to remedy one’s lack of 
recognition. Being included in a group where one’s feelings of disrespect are articulated 
and shared provides recognition from one’s fellows in this group and can thus function as 
an “anticipation that a future communication-community will recognize them”.543 But lack 
of recognition does not always spur collective action: 
Empirically, whether the cognitive potential inherent in feeling hurt or 
ashamed becomes a moral-political conviction depends above all on how 
the affected subject’s cultural-political environment is constructed: only if 
the means of articulation of a social movement are available can the 
experience of disrespect become a source of motivation for acts of political 
resistance.544 
For many people, feelings of disrespect have no political outlet. They are alone, or at least 
feel alone, with their lack of recognition. A high-school dropout, a sexually humiliated 
husband, or a neglected teenager – for them and countless others who perceive that they 
are not respected, not esteemed, not loved, it is difficult to find a social movement that 
might articulate their lack of recognition as a collective problem. And when the problem 
is individualized, shame and apathy are all the more likely outcomes. But there are also 
individual remedies to lack of recognition. Some work hard to get rich. Some are happy to 
show off their pretty girlfriends. Some study like mad to prove to themselves and others 
their great intellectual capacity. And, as Hegel explains, some seek individual remedies to 
lack of recognition through crime.  
13.2.3 Recognition through crime 
We saw in the previous part that Hegel (like Kant) defines crime as the negation of 
universal right. By its very definition, then, crime is non-universal, that is, an expression 
of a particular will. In doing wrong, one “exhibits particularity”, Hegel states.545 One 
creates an “opposition of abstract right to the particular will”.546 Hegel goes further, 
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however, saying at one point that crime is motivated by the wish to be recognized as a 
particular individual: 
The inner (subjective) source of crime is the coercive force of the law […] 
his inner justification is this coercion, the reinstatement of his individual 
will to power, (his wish) to count for something, to be recognized. He wants 
to be something (like Herostratus), not necessarily to be famous but only to 
have his will prevail, in opposition to the universal will.547 
Herostratus was a young man who lit fire to the Temple of Artemis in order to achieve, 
well, herostratic fame. Crime, Hegel suggests, is like fame in that it might be motivated 
by the need to be someone in the eyes of others. The anonymous, abstract ‘sameness’ of 
legal recognition is insufficient. We all need to be someone, to be individual. In other 
words, we all need Hegel’s third form of recognition, where we are recognized for our 
particular qualities, for instance as a successful businessman, as a caring nurse, as the 
clown of the class, or as the high school beauty queen. Hegel’s insight is that if we lack 
such recognition, crime may be perceived as a way of achieving it. If we feel that our 
esteem is threatened in a particular situation, a particular crime may be perceived as a way 
of regaining esteem. In short, if we feel humiliated, a particular crime may be a way of 
demanding respect, i.e. demanding to be treated as someone to be reckoned with. “The 
consummated crime is the will that knows itself as individual”, Hegel says.548 Let us now 
apply this so-far rather theoretical and abstract claim to different types of crimes to see 
how the theory of recognition might explain the motivation of those who commit them. 
Needless to say, I cannot here discuss all types of crime, as space is limited. I will be 
content, therefore, to show the potential of the theory of recognition in explaining the 
motivations for two broad categories of crime, economic crime and violent crime.  
Economic crime 
I will start with the types of crime most easily explained by the economic view of criminal 
behavior: crimes where the offender stands to gain an (economic) advantage, i.e. theft, 
fraud, blackmail, drug trafficking etc. Can the theory of recognition contribute to an 
understanding of the motivation for such crimes? It seems clear that if these crimes are 
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committed in order to satisfy a basic material need, like Jean Valjean stealing a loaf of 
bread, the economic view is sufficient to explain their motivation. In many cases, “he 
needed the money”, should be considered a perfectly good explanation. However, much 
economic crime is not committed out of basic material need, but is rather committed out 
of greed, like when a business owner bribes a government official for a lucrative contract. 
The economic view would explain this motivation as simply wanting more of what one 
desires, e.g. more money on top of what one needs to get by. But although this explanation 
is clearly correct, it is insufficient. Greed is not just a desire for material goods per se. 
Material goods are means of communication, instruments for expressing to other people 
one’s identity, one’s individuality. In other words, wealth is more than a means for self-
sustenance; it is also a means for self-aggrandizement, for instance through conspicuous 
consumption aimed at showing off one’s status, and through the power over others that 
wealth yields. 
For the same reason, a purely materialist interpretation of the opportunity theory is 
insufficient. It is not merely lack of opportunity for material wealth per se that creates 
criminogenic conditions in a society. As we recall, Merton explicitly denied such a purely 
materialist interpretation, noting instead that in a capitalist society, an additional 
criminogenic factor stems from the social fact that material wealth is almost universally 
acknowledged as a yardstick of success. Hence, if you lack legal opportunity for wealth, 
you do not merely lack legal opportunity for material goods – you lack legal opportunity 
to achieve success by this yardstick. You lack, in other words, access to a source of 
recognition from others.  
On a macro-level, then, the social structure of a society may provide or block access to 
sources of recognition to varying degrees and for larger or smaller portions of the 
population. As Braithwaite put it, “[s]ome societies and institutions are structurally more 
humiliating than others”.549 The experience of humiliation, Braithwaite argues, may arise 
from many types of social structures, including economic structures: 
[I]negalitarian societies are structurally humiliating. When parents cannot 
supply the most basic needs of their children, while at the same time they 
are assailed by the ostentatious consumption of the affluent, this is 
structurally humiliating for the poor. Where inequality is great, the 
                                                        




rich humiliate the poor through conspicuous consumption and the poor are 
humiliated as failures for being poor.550 
Braithwaite mentions among other humiliating social structures, racism. “For a black, 
living in South Africa is structurally more humiliating than living in Tanzania.” A black 
person in Apartheid-South Africa was humiliated by the social structure that denied her 
recognition of the same political rights and esteem as white people. Similar forms of 
humiliation may result from other social structures, Braithwaite notes, such as a school 
system that rewards ‘dunces’ and delegates the academically challenged to an inferior 
position. Or such as an excessively retributive penal system, where inmates face degrading 
conditions and threats of violence, and where humiliation continues after they are released, 
through disenfranchisement and demeaning parole controls. In these and many other ways, 
material and cultural conditions of a society contribute to the first-person experience of 
humiliation by individuals in that society. If economic gains can counteract humiliation by 
raising one’s status in the eyes of others and oneself, this may provide a motive for 
economic crimes. 
Since wealth has both a material function and a status function, we cannot expect to 
separate one from the other and determine its specific motivational force. For the same 
reason, we cannot expect full awareness by the agent of how these aspects influence her 
actions. This applies more generally to all actions that might be seen as strategies for 
gaining recognition. Since recognition is achieved through actions that carry meaning 
independently of the recognition they provide, we might assume that the agent is not 
always aware of the multiple aims that her actions may serve. Indeed, the action may be 
overdetermined by the different functions it achieves.551 
As we shall shortly see, the picture is further complicated by the fact that an action may 
be perceived by the agent (more or less consciously) as a way of achieving recognition, 
yet it may fail to provide just that because it represents a self-defeating strategy for 
recognition. The fact that the action is doomed to failure is not necessarily known to the 
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agent, and the action may therefore make sense from a first-person perspective, even 
though it does not make sense from an informed third-person perspective. 
Violent crime 
Violent crime, like economic crime, is a broad category consisting of many distinct types 
of crime, which occur in a great variety of situations. When trying to answer the general 
question of why people commit violent crimes, we might start by distinguishing between 
these violent situations, to see whether some of the same motivations apply across 
situations and across types of crime. 
Based on interviews with violent criminals, Lonnie Athens has distinguished between four 
types of interpretations of violent situations.552 The first is “physically defensive”: an 
interpretation of the situation that is formed when an actor believes a physical attack is 
forthcoming or actually taking place. The second is “malefic”: an interpretation of the 
situation that is formed when an actor sees the other as having a malicious or extremely 
negative character. The third is “frustrative”, which is when the actor interprets resistance 
from another person to the actor’s line of action, or coercion from the other to pursue a 
line of action that the actor does not want to pursue. The fourth is “frustrative-malefic”, a 
combination of the two preceding types. Such an interpretation of a situation occurs when 
the actor sees the other as resisting her plans or coercing her, and then constructs an 
extremely negative object of the other and his behavior. 
In the first and the third type of situation, the motive for violence can be rather easily 
explained by the economic view of criminal behavior. In both situations, there is a clear 
benefit to be gained from committing the violent act: security for one’s physical health in 
the first, freedom to pursue one’s ends in the third. Poisoning a colleague in order to take 
her job could easily fit the third category, the colleague being “frustrative” of one’s career 
opportunities. This would suggest, in turn, that the act can at least partly be explained as 
motivated by a desire for material benefit.  
But much, if not most, violence does not lend itself to such an explanation. The 
paradigmatic example of violence is not the kind of premeditated, “rational” violence that 
                                                        




the example represents. Violence is often unplanned, occurring under exceptional 
circumstances, and often yields no external benefit. Homicide situations, Jack Katz found 
in his review of police records and ethnographic studies, are usually characterized by the 
“materially petty, ‘inconsequential’ nature of the conflicts”. Katz’ book Seductions of 
Crime attempts to reconstruct a first-person narrative of criminal motivation, “approaching 
crime from the inside” as he says, and concludes broadly that “the attraction that proves to 
be most fundamentally compelling is that of overcoming a personal challenge to moral – 
not to material – existence”.553 Similarly, David F. Luckenbill found in his review of 71 
homicides that, “[i]n all cases ending in murder the offender interpreted the victim’s 
previous move as personally offensive”.554 Roy F. Baumeister et al. likewise found a main 
source of violence to be “threatened egotism”.555 In short, violence is here understood as a 
reaction to humiliation. In Katz’ phrase, violent rage is “livid with humiliation”, and he 
describes how there is often cursing, threatening and pushing in the build-up to the violent 
act, which he interprets as attempts to silence the other’s disrespect and thereby save face. 
When this does not succeed, violence becomes “a last stand in defense of respectability”.556 
Luckenbill too found that “[t]ransactions resulting in murder involved the joint 
contribution of the offender and victim to the escalation of a ‘character contest,’ a 
confrontation in which at least one, but usually both, attempt to establish or save face at 
the other’s expense by standing steady in the face of adversity”.557 Such cases fit Athens’ 
category of “malefic” interpretations of the violent situation, wherein the other person is 
seen as an extremely negative object which threatens one’s standing. 
The view that violence is a response to humiliation is supported by the fact that in many 
cases the material side of the conflict is all but insignificant. When a fight breaks out over 
whose beer it is, it is not really the beer, but the offensive insinuation that the other person 
has the right to push him around that triggers the offender’s response. In many cases (41 % 
of homicides in Luckenbill’s data set, to be precise), the victim makes a verbal expression 
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which the offender interprets as offensive. Katz too recounts many cases where “the victim 
either teased or dared the killer to resolve the conflict”.558 Some of the examples he relates 
are instances of domestic violence following an experience by the husband of being 
sexually humiliated by the wife, either verbally or through flirtations or sexual relations 
with other men. Baumeister et al. refer to several studies where rapists describe among 
their motives for rape the wish to disabuse a woman of her sense of superiority: “The 
woman gave the man the impression she thought she was better than he was, and so he 
raped her as a way of proving her wrong.”559 
In many cases, the offender interprets the victim’s refusal to cooperate as offensive. Cases 
in which parents murder their children are usually of this sort. Luckenbill found that 
“[w]hen the parent’s request that the child eat dinner, stop screaming, or take a bath went 
unheeded, the parent subsequently interpreted the child’s activity as a challenge to rightful 
authority”.560 Again, it is not the eating or screaming or bathing in itself that is the issue. 
It is when these material facts are interpreted as moral challenges that rage builds. Such 
cases fit Athens’ category “frustrative-malefic”: the victim frustrates the offender’s plans, 
which in turn creates in the mind of the offender an image of the victim as a malicious 
threat to the offender’s respectability. 
The next question, then, is why a person who is humiliated would commit violence in 
response to the humiliation? What does the humiliated person try to achieve through 
violence? And why do so many people who are humiliated abstain from violence – in what 
way do they differ from violent criminals? In Katz’ interpretation of the homicide cases 
he reviews, he emphasizes the offender’s perceived lack of other ways to save face. As the 
conflict escalates and attempts to silence the other person’s disrespect by cursing and 
threatening fail, the offender perceives violence as the last alternative to an unbearable 
defeat. “After humiliation makes one painfully aware that what has just now happened 
cannot be reconciled with a respectable vision of oneself in any imaginable, concrete 
future, rage rises to block out concern for what will be”.561 But violence is not inevitable 
up to that point. There are exits all along the route from humiliation to violence. If the 
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other person backs off, the situation no longer calls for a last stand. A few words or a 
gesture might make one see a possible future where honor is restored. Or one might 
perceive that violence will not succeed, and therefore realize that it is better to stand down 
than to risk further humiliation. There are thus situational contingencies that separate those 
who are humiliated and who commit violence from those who are humiliated but remain 
non-violent.  
In addition, there are likely differences in character traits between those who end up 
committing violence and others who are humiliated but remain non-violent.562 A 
widespread view is that violence is disproportionately committed by people with low self-
esteem, and at first sight this view seems to harmonize with the Hegelian theory of 
recognition: Low self-esteem is a sign of (and a consequence of) lack of recognition, which 
in turn might trigger a motive for violence as a way of gaining recognition. However, 
according to Baumeister et al., this common view is wrong. On the contrary, they claim, 
“the major cause of violence is high self-esteem combined with an ego threat”.563 
Reviewing available studies on different types of violence, Baumeister et al. conclude that 
persons who have positive feelings about themselves are more likely than others to react 
with violent rage when humiliated. 
In this view, then, aggression emerges from a particular discrepancy 
between two views of self: a favorable self-appraisal and an external 
appraisal that is much less favorable. […] More to the point, it is mainly the 
people who refuse to lower their self-appraisals who become violent.564 
The tendency to commit violence, they claim, is correlated with feelings of self-worth, and 
not, as one might think, with feelings of worthlessness. It is the sense of superiority, and 
not the sense of inferiority, that triggers violence. If you feel superior to others, you will 
likely have weaker inhibitions against maltreating those over which you feel superior – 
their feelings mean less to you. And with a sense of superiority comes a sense of 
entitlement, which means there will be more acts that are potentially offensive to you. 
Especially, Baumeister et al. note, if your self-image is unrealistically positive.565 
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Many types of violence do indeed seem to display a perception by the offender of his 
superiority, implying an inherent asymmetry between the parties. Characteristic of 
misogynistic violence, for instance, is the belief it conveys in the woman’s status as lower 
than that of the man, entitling men to dominate women.566 Political violence and war 
displays confidence in the superiority of one group or nation over that of the (evil and 
inferior) enemy. And within the larger ‘in-group’ of the nation, we often find elite groups 
committing political violence on behalf of the state, for instance torturers and special 
forces. For these groups, we see a double tendency to portray themselves as superior, both 
vis-à-vis their compatriots and, of course, vis-à-vis the enemy.567 The same double sense 
of superiority is also characteristic of some political terrorists – Breivik is a prime example 
– seeing themselves as inherently better than their enemies (e.g. Muslims and “cultural 
Marxists”) and as saviors, capable of an exceptional sacrifice for their group (e.g. saving 
Europe from the Muslims).568  
While feelings of superiority and entitlement increase one’s sensitivity to disrespect, the 
converse holds for those with low self-esteem. Put differently: Only those who demand 
respect can be insulted. If you do not think yourself worthy of respect, you may easily 
come to interpret demeaning treatment as evidence of your true status. You may come to 
internalize disrespect as self-loathing and shame, as many crime victims do, thinking that 
they deserve to be raped or deserve to be put in place. Hence, lack of recognition does not 
necessarily make the individual attempt to gain recognition, for instance through violence. 
Nor does it necessarily lead to a political “struggle for recognition”, as discussed in 
connection with Honneth’s theory above. It might instead simply lead to nothing; to 
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apathy; to withdrawal. Humiliation will trigger a counter-reaction only when there is a 
discrepancy between one’s treatment and one’s normative expectations. The views of 
Baumeister et al. can thus help us refine our Hegelian theory of violent behavior: It is not 
lack of recognition per se, but denial of expected recognition that provides, all things equal, 
motives for violence. 
But there is something strange about this notion that perpetrators of violence supposedly 
have high self-esteem. Certainly at least some violent offenders convey an image that 
suggests the opposite – think for instance of a troubled youth, unsuccessful at school, 
unpopular among his peers etc. Recall also the study referred above, where 41 % of 
inmates in Norwegian prisons (as opposed to 4 % of the reference group) rated their own 
social status at levels 3 and below on a scale from 0 to 10.569 
More fundamentally, however, the notion that violent offenders have high self-esteem 
seems oxymoronic. If the offender truly had high self-esteem, he would not let himself be 
provoked. He would know that his status was undeniable, and could simply shrug off an 
insult as if it were a fly that had landed on his nose. There is an irony in defending yourself 
against offenses to your status: By accepting the other’s words and actions as offensive, 
you accept that you are not above and beyond the other. You are vulnerable to him. 
Responding with violence can thus be seen as a de facto recognition of the power that the 
other holds over you.  
This seeming contradiction – that self-esteem is necessary in order to take offense, and 
that taking offense implies lack of self-esteem – can be overcome if we add to the analysis 
the concept of self-certainty. Self-esteem means holding a favorable opinion of oneself. 
One believes, simply put, that one is “good enough” to deserve to be treated in accordance 
with a norm that applies to esteemed people. This belief comes in degrees of certainty, 
however, and can also be more or less stable over time. Those who are self-certain, i.e. 
certain of their self-esteem, can easily ignore what others may take offense from. They are 
“beyond resentment”, in Hampton’s phrase, meaning that “their belief in their standing is 
so strong that demeaning actions cannot call it into question”.570 On the other side of the 
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spectrum are those who are certain in their lack of self-esteem, “those who cannot resent”, 
i.e. who do not react with resentment to an offense because they believe they deserve such 
treatment. Between these extremes are those who have some, but not complete certainty 
in their own right to respect and esteem. Presumably, in reality we all fall into this third 
category. That is, even for those who are close to the extremes there are some actions that 
are so offensive that it will trigger their resentment.  
Upon Hampton’s phenomenological analysis, the experience of a degree of self-certainty 
is coupled with a fear that one might be wrong. One’s thoughts about one’s own rank and 
value might be inflated. The offender, by treating me as low, might have put me in my 
right place. Such fear, Hampton says, is a necessary component of resentment, which she 
analyzes into the following parts:  
1. A fear that the insulter has acted permissibly in according you treatment that 
would be appropriate only for one who is low in rank and value. Your fear 
can be analyzed as involving: 
a) some degree of belief that the insulter is right to treat you as low in rank 
and value (i.e., you neither fully believe it nor fully disbelieve it) 
b) a wish that the belief described in item 1a is not true, so that you are not 
low in rank and value (i.e., you wish to have no degree of belief that you 
are as low in rank and value as his action assumes you to be). 
2. An Act of Defiance: you “would have it” that the belief in item 1a is false 
(i.e. you would have it that you are high in rank and value).571 
When we fear that we are as low as we are treated, resentment becomes a way of denying 
the truth of that which we fear. Hence, if we do not fear it, either because we know it to be 
true or because we know it to be false, we will not feel resentment. While the latter 
alternative is difficult to attain, the former is difficult to accept. To accept that it is true 
that you deserve the disrespect you have faced is to accept shame. And shame, as we all 
will have experienced, is psychologically painful; a threat to the ego. 
To resent, is to deny shame. Through an act of defiance, we state a claim that we deserve 
better – whether this act be a verbal rebuttal, a curse, a push; or violence. To act in violence 
in response to an offense is a way of denying the shame one would experience if one 
accepted the truth of the offense.572 As Baumeister et al. put it: “By focusing on his or her 
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hostility toward the evaluators, the person avoids the dismal cycle of accepting the 
feedback, revising his or her self-concept, and experiencing the dejected feelings about the 
self.”573 
This way of understanding violence as a response to shame can also be formulated in 
psychoanalytic terms, as for instance Arne Johan Vetlesen does in his philosophical studies 
of genocide and war crimes: Violence is a way of displacing repressed feelings of shame 
onto the victim.  
[S]trong, negative feelings – like anger and rage – arise with particular 
intensity in a subject who in another human being meets feelings that he has 
long denied himself to experience, or to express openly. The soldier who 
kicks his victim again and again […] reacts to something inside himself 
which he has refused to accept as a part of himself. To kill this part of 
another – the part that shows a deep vulnerability and dependence – 
becomes a way of confirming, again and again, that one also exterminates 
this part within oneself.574 
To emotionally access the vulnerable part of oneself and experience feelings of weakness, 
of dependence, of humiliation, bitterness, mortality, etc., is psychologically painful, 
especially for those who have been taught to repress such feelings. Having contained and 
controlled these feelings, the threat of having to face them can feel like losing control. 
When a person is humiliated by another it threatens to rob the person of his sense of control 
of his self-concept, i.e. of his ability to define himself, forcing him to admit to himself that 
others do not see him as the strong and well-esteemed person that he wants to be. Katz’ 
analysis brings out the same point: “In both humiliation and rage, the individual 
experiences himself as an object compelled by forces beyond his control. That is, his 
control of his identity is lost when he is humiliated. We say, for example, that a person has 
become an object of ridicule.”575 
The same sense of a challenge from one’s ‘evaluators’ may arise even in situations without 
direct humiliation. Genocide and war crimes often provide examples of situations where 
there is no offense to react against with resentment. In such cases the perpetrators are 
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hardly objects of ridicule. On the contrary, they are often clearly superior to their victims 
who are already degraded, weak and passive. Vetlesen refers to numerous historical 
examples where the perceived inferiority and weakness of the victims did not, as one might 
think, restrain violence against them, but rather functioned as triggers of heightened 
contempt for the victims, as further ‘proof’ of their unworthiness to live.576 The weakness 
of the victims, Vetlesen claims, is a reminder to the perpetrators of their own weakness, 
which they, unlike their victims, have hidden and handled “like men”. Being hard on 
oneself is a way of controlling one’s vulnerability, thereby displaying strength. Lack of 
such control, displaying weakness, is worthy of contempt, especially in cultures where 
stereotypical ideals of the ‘hard man’ prevail. Thus, Theodor Adorno writes about the 
ideals that applied to Nazi commanders and which reinforced their brutality: “Whoever is 
hard with himself earns the right to be hard with others as well and avenges himself for 
the pain whose manifestations he was not allowed to show and had to repress.”577 
The same ‘contempt of weakness’578 is also evident in many instances of violence outside 
extreme situations of genocide and war crimes. In everyday life, violence often occurs in 
asymmetrical situations, where the inferior suffer at the hands of the powerful. We see it 
in police brutality against downtrodden alcoholics and junkies. We see it in hate crimes 
against sexual minorities. We see it in the schoolyard, when five boys stand around a 
classmate lying on the ground, kicking him. In all these cases, the victims will often have 
done nothing to provoke and humiliate their aggressors, except, of course, by displaying 
their vulnerability, reminding the offenders of something in themselves which they do not 
want to access.  
We might say, perhaps surprisingly, that there is a kind of empathy behind such violence. 
Bullies (of all kinds) are experts at detecting insecurity and weakness – they know who 
and what to comment on and attack. They have, in other words, the ability to ‘place 
themselves in the other’s place’ and perceive when and how they feel vulnerable. But 
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though they empathize with their victims, they do not sympathize with them, for the 
weakness that the victims reveal is an object of contempt both in themselves and in others. 
And just like one seeks to control and repress one’s own weakness, so one may try to 
obliterate the weakness represented in the other which threatens to reveal one’s own 
weakness to oneself and to the world. 
Even the most destitute and miserable other is thus one’s ‘evaluator’, in the sense that he 
or she reveals to you aspects of yourself, thereby providing a basis for self-reflection. With 
Hegel: the other is a source of self-consciousness. The problem arises when you do not 
like what the other reveals about you. Violence, both after direct humiliation and against 
the weak, can then be an attempt to regain control of your own self-concept. A last stand 
in defense of your ability to define yourself; a denial of other people’s power to define you 
as low and weak; a denial of your own experience of weakness. The sense of control and 
power this gives can be gratifying. Sadism, as Vetlesen defines it, is precisely such a 
“pleasure in taking control over the human experience of being a victim, of being 
vulnerable to pain, by displacing it onto another”.579  
But, as I have mentioned several times, such a strategy for regaining self-esteem is bound 
to fail in the long-run. Violence is a self-defeating strategy for recognition. As we have 
seen, the person who reacts with violence has in reality admitted to himself, if ever so 
briefly, that he is not above and beyond the other. He is vulnerable to humiliation from the 
other; he is vulnerable to the ‘evaluation’ of the other, even when the other is merely a 
mirror in which he sees his own vulnerability. The other has thus already exposed his 
insecurity and weakness that he wishes to repress. Exterminating the source of the 
humiliation is like shooting the messenger after the message has been received. The 
damage to his self-concept has already been done. And through his violent act he merely 
confirms his own vulnerability.  
Likewise, the notion of feeling big by dominating the other is equally self-defeating. I 
mentioned in my review of Hampton’s theory in Chapter 9 that both malicious and spiteful 
haters are bound to fail in their goals of elevating themselves. In the first case elevating 
one’s own worth by showing the other’s worthlessness only makes him “the lord or 
                                                        





nothing”, as Hampton puts it, which is the same problem that faces Hegel’s Lord.580 In the 
second case, where out of spite one seeks “company at the bottom”, the act is equally futile 
as means for elevating one’s self-worth. As Hampton puts it, “[o]ne who has a scarred face 
cannot become more beautiful by throwing acid in the face of everyone she meets”.581 
That violence does not provide long-term solutions to humiliation and shame is 
corroborated by accounts of offenders who soon after having committed violence realize 
the futility and irrationality of their acts. The material Katz reviewed found offenders 
frequently saying “I got carried away”; “I didn’t know what I was doing”; “I wasn’t 
myself”, expressing that what they had done was “an aberrant moment that disrupted their 
characteristic state of moral competence”.582 A similar sense of astonishment at what they 
had done, even shortly after the act, was expressed by killers who were interviewed by 
Paul Leer-Salvesen, a prison minister and researcher in Norway. Years after the homicide 
many of the killers expressed that it had not provided a sense of satisfaction, but on the 
contrary caused an “existential pain” which never completely eased.583 
Recognition of one’s identity 
Let us now look at a possible objection that can be raised against the recognition 
perspective on violence I have proposed here. If it is true that violence can be understood 
as a response to a challenge to one’s self-concept (an ‘ego threat’), and if it is true that 
such a response is self-defeating, why do some offenders continue to commit violence? 
Should we not expect that they would learn the first time that violence does not give them 
what they are after? 
One answer to this objection might simply be to accept that the recognition perspective 
provides only a partial explanation for violent behavior. The reason why some become 
habitual violent criminals might be that they get something else from violence (e.g. 
material benefit, power over others) that makes violence a recurrent temptation. Another 
answer might emphasize the affective character of violent behavior and the situational 
conditions that trigger violent reactions. This answer suggests that some offenders simply 
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do not act in their rational best interest (they do indeed pursue self-defeating strategies 
repeatedly), but tend to get carried away and lash out when pressed. 
Both are plausible answers that should likely form part of a comprehensive theory of 
violent behavior. There is a third answer, however, which suggests a further explanative 
role for the recognition perspective: Dominating another may indeed be useless for gaining 
recognition from that person, but it may provide recognition from a third-party. That is, it 
is not simply through violently suppressing the source of humiliation represented by the 
victim that one seeks to elevate oneself. Self-esteem is gained through recognition of the 
identity one conveys to others by having committed the violence. For a gang-member, for 
instance, beating up the clerk at a corner store will be futile for gaining recognition from 
the clerk, but the act may gain him recognition from his mates in the gang. In other words, 
the act may convey and secure his identity as an ‘insider’, a worthy member of his group. 
The victim, who is someone on the outside of the group, is simply used as an instrument 
for recognition from the people on the inside whose recognition really matters. 
A long tradition of research on violence has emphasized group affiliation as a motivation 
for violence. Following orders from a respected authority and otherwise acting in 
accordance with the norms of the group are ways of expressing one’s allegiance to the 
group and thereby gaining recognition as a group insider. Under certain conditions, 
researchers have claimed, normal, law-abiding citizens may come to perform terrible acts 
of violence, such as genocide, out of respect for authority and conformity to the norms of 
one’s group.584  
In addition to conveying group affiliation, acts of violence (and crimes in general) may 
convey a certain image of the perpetrator to third-parties more broadly. Establishing one’s 
identity vis-à-vis others is likely one of the motives for many different types of violence, 
from terrorism to debt collecting. For instance, political scientist Olivier Roy, who has 
compiled a database of roughly 100 persons involved in Islamic terrorism in France and 
Belgium since 1997, found that the common interpretation of their crimes as motivated by 
the wish to spread Islam and the Islamic state is at best an incomplete explanation. Though 
                                                        






that is their stated aim, it serves to some extent merely as a “theological rationalization” 
for their violence.585 The terrorists are not, contrary to common perception, characterized 
by their deep and long-term commitment to Islam.  Almost all are second- or third 
generation immigrants whom Roy characterizes as “born-again” Muslims, meaning that 
they have suddenly renewed their religious observance after a period of leading a highly 
secular life (with drinking, frequenting clubs, etc.), or have converted to Islam (25 %). 
Most start to prepare for terrorist attacks just months after having converted or 
“reconverted”. A majority (70 %) have only a basic knowledge of Islam, they usually have 
little and ambivalent contact with mosques, and many do not read or speak Arabic. None 
had taken part in proselytizing activities, none had worked for a Muslim charity, none had 
campaigned for a pro-Palestinian movement or similar anti-colonial movements, and 
almost none go back to their parents’ homeland to wage jihad. 
Roy emphasizes instead the “identity vacuum” of second- and third generation immigrants 
who have little connection with their parents’ country of origin and who have problems 
integrating into European society (for instance, 50 % have committed petty crimes, mostly 
drug dealing, and many have served time in prison and have become radicalized there). 
Joining the Jihad cause may serve as a way of asserting their identity in opposition both to 
the traditional Islam of their parents and to Western society, while at the same time 
portraying themselves as heroes of a greater cause. For example, as in the posthumous 
statement of London-bomber Mohammed Siddique Khan: “I am directly responsible for 
protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.”586 Note here the similarity to 
Breivik’s grandiose self-image as the savior of Europe. 
Another example of how identity is conveyed through the violent criminal act can be found 
in Katz’ review of research on armed robberies. Katz concluded that such acts are 
superficially motivated by economic gain, but that this motive cannot explain the modus 
and the persistence of career robbers. An economically rational way of conducting armed 
robbery would be to abort the mission upon the slightest resistance from the victim, and 
then simply move on the next and likely more cooperative victim. Instead, career robbers 
tend to go all the way once the robbery has started, thereby facing risks that far outweigh 
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the potential gains of the robbery. It takes a certain type of person to be willing to pursue 
such a career path. And it is precisely the promotion of an image as such a person, Katz 
explains, that forms part of the appeal of robbery. Career robbers express through robberies 
an identity as a “hard man”: a man who is so tough that he simply does not care about the 
excessive risks he is taking. His criminal identity expresses that he is a man whose will 
shall prevail, regardless of circumstances. He is the type of man who is brave enough to 
endure the insecurity and chaos of the robbery situation, indeed, who is powerful enough 
to define the entire situation (e.g. “This is a robbery”) and to force the world to succumb 
to his will. 
In her philosophical dialogues with inmates in a Norwegian prison, Marianne Walderhaug 
similarly encountered a ‘criminal identity’ which formed a common self-conception 
among the inmates. The identity is defined in opposition to ‘straight’, ‘normal’ people, 
whose lives are boring, filled with routines and obligations. In contrast, many of the 
inmates talked of the freedom of the criminal lifestyle, the excitement it brings, and of 
their ability to ‘play the game’ and function in a world that is chaotic and uncertain, where 
“rationality has gone on vacation”, as one inmate formulated it.587 Several inmates 
conveyed the same notion as Katz described, that being a tough and ruthless “hard man” 
is necessary to survive in the criminal world. As one inmate said, “hearing his name was 
enough to make people pay up”.588 Several conveyed that the norms of the criminal world 
require that you “don’t let yourself get stepped on” if you are to gain respect among your 
“likeminded”.589 Such respect within the criminal group is preferable to “being at the 
bottom of the social ladder in the normal society”.590 
However, several inmates conveyed to Walderhaug that after a while the criminal lifestyle 
also feels restrictive and they wish to settle into normal life. But doing so turns out to be 
difficult both due to lack of opportunity (e.g. to get a job and to make friends in ‘normal’ 
society), and because the routines and dullness of a job does not fit the desires and the self-
concept of someone who has spent years living outside the law. In several cases that 
Walderhaug mentions, the inmate did get job offers, but he did not want it or quit after a 
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short while. The freedom of the criminal lifestyle turns out to be counterproductive to a 
broader conception of freedom, both because it limits one’s opportunities as a law-abiding 
citizen, and because one’s range of desirable choices compatible with one’s self-concept 
is also limited. 
Vetlesen notes a similar counterproductivity in seeking recognition through group 
affiliation. One will not succeed in extinguishing one’s anxiety about one’s own 
worthlessness by identifying with a powerful group, because, as Vetlesen explains 
“[…] the real threat against the individual is its own group, due to its demand 
that the individual renounce everything distinct, everything genuinely 
peculiar, in order to be accepted and kept as a member. […] The price of 
belonging is the imperative to hide, repress and deny everything that can 
reveal one’s dissimilarity from the group.591 
The irony, then, is that such group recognition does not provide the ‘recognition as 
individual’ that one seeks, but is simply another type, beside abstract right, of recognition 
as ‘same’.  
13.2.4 The relevance of recognition as a theory of criminal behavior. 
Having thus explained how the recognition theory provides a coherent theory of criminal 
motivation, I turn now to the question of its relevance in explaining the disproportionate 
difficulty of law-abidance correlated with SSD. As I stressed above, any theory of criminal 
behavior must explain what attracts a person to commit a crime. Doing so means 
explaining what one gains from crime and what it is that the person lacks which makes her 
want such a gain. I labeled these the positive and the negative side of a theory of criminal 
behavior. Using this distinction, we can now address the problem of relevance in the 
following way: If it is true that recognition is an important motive for crime – i.e. that 
many, if not most crimes can be understood as motivated by the possibility of achieving 
recognition (positive) – then we can assume that this motive will be strongest where lack 
of recognition is most predominant, i.e. among those who experience unsatisfactory 
recognition (negative). By implication, we can expect the group that commits most crime 
to be characterized by their relative lack of recognition compared to other groups in 
                                                        





society. We have already seen one study showing the subjective self-perception of inmates 
to fit this claim.592 But we can also look at the objective variables that are 
disproportionately associated with criminal behavior: being male, aged 15-25, unmarried, 
living in large cities, with high residential mobility and relatively weak ties to school, work 
and family, and being at the bottom of the class structure.593 
The last variable has been discussed already in connection with Merton’s opportunity 
theory. As he emphasized, lack of opportunity for wealth is criminogenic not just because 
of the material benefits of wealth, but because wealth is regarded as an (almost) universal 
yardstick of success in a capitalist society. Hence, being poor means being deprived of a 
means for recognition, which would explain why, if recognition is a motive for economic 
crimes, the poor are overrepresented among those who seek recognition through crime.  
Similarly, ‘weak ties to school and work’ suggests that a person so characterized has fewer 
than normal opportunities for recognition in these arenas. If you do not work, you cannot 
identify with your occupation and achieve esteem through the useful function it serves for 
the common good. You will lack a particularly important venue for achieving Hegel’s third 
form of recognition. Likewise, if you have with weak ties to school, you likely do not find 
it an arena for gaining esteem. If you are academically challenged, your problem will be 
exacerbated by the kind of ‘structural humiliation’ that Braithwaite mentioned: school 
systems where ‘dunces’ are rewarded and poor students demeaned. 
Young people are particularly vulnerable to these kinds of problems. They are in the midst 
of finding their identity, searching for arenas where they can ‘be somebody’. Living in 
large cities and moving often means that you have relatively weaker bonds to neighbors 
and the local community. In other words, yet another arena where the criminal group has 
relatively fewer opportunities for ‘being somebody’. The same applies for those who have 
weaker than normal ties to family, such as the unmarried (compared to the married), and 
men (compared to women). With weaker and/or problematic familial relationships, they 
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will to a lesser extent define themselves in their relational role, and, hence, relatively more 
of their self-image will depend on achievements in other arenas.594 
We saw in the section on violence how situational contingencies might determine the 
outcome of a volatile situation. If the potential offender does not perceive an alternative 
way to re-establish his dignity, violence may be his last stand. Hence, there are foreground 
factors that trigger violence in the particular situation, such as an offensive gesture by the 
other, a refusal to back down etc. But, as we also saw, some people are more sensitive to 
these foreground factors than others. To the extent that a person is beyond resentment he 
will be quite insensitive to many of these triggers. Such a person will be less inclined to 
take offense when, say, somebody bumps into him. He will not take it as a challenge to his 
self-respect, and be more inclined to think, “That guy has a problem, not me”. 
Presumably, in order to reach the level of self-confidence required to be beyond resentment 
in a particular situation, one must experience recognition in other areas of life. If you know 
that you are loved, respected and esteemed, it will be easier to brush off an insult and 
define the problem as residing with the other person. If your self-conception is stable and 
certain, you will to a lesser extent perceive the acts of others as ego threats. Presumably, 
then, a person who lacks recognition will, all things equal, have a more insecure self-
conception and will be more sensitive to challenges to it from others. Hence, the variables 
mentioned above are background factors which, all things equal, strengthen the foreground 
triggers of violence. There might thus occur a situation of compounding humiliation: The 
more you are humiliated in your daily life – i.e. the less you experience recognition through 
family, school, work etc. – the more easily you will perceive offensive treatment from 
others as humiliating, all things equal.595 
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Katz similarly noted cases of violence that occurred due to “convergent disrespect in a 
person’s occupational and intimate life”.596 After being humiliated at work, a person finds 
the additional humiliation at home unbearable. Indeed, a typical homicide, Katz found, 
takes place not at work, “in those infuriating moments when people are humiliated by their 
bosses or realize that their careers may have been irreparably damaged by the backstabbing 
of co-workers”597, but rather in casual settings at home or at the neighborhood bar, and 
most often on weekends. As Katz indicates, 
[I]f experience at work becomes intolerably degrading, the worker can 
fantasize about respect and sensual pleasure at home. If tensions at home 
become intolerable, he can escape to the neighborhood bar. But at some 
point on this route, there may be no further escape.598 
What about those instances where violence is not preceded by insults or other forms of 
direct humiliation? In cases where violence functions as a way of displacing repressed 
feelings of insecurity and weakness onto the victim, a lack of recognition in other areas of 
life will surely contribute to those feelings of insecurity which trigger the violence. Further, 
boys, more so than girls, are influenced by a cultural ideal whereby a display of vulnerable 
feelings like grief, fear and shame is seen as a sign of weakness. Such an ideal of manliness 
disproportionately leads boys and men into what Thomas Scheff calls “the silence/violence 
pattern”: “At first merely to protect themselves, boys begin suppressing feelings that may 
be interpreted as signs of weakness […] In situations where these options seem 
unavailable, males may cover their vulnerable feelings behind a display of hostility.”599 
We see, then, that the recognition perspective on violence can accommodate what is likely 
the most important background factor of violence: being male, as is shown in the fact that 
the vast majority of violence is committed by men. Finally, the same mechanism of 
repression of vulnerable feelings can also explain why victims of childhood abuse and 
neglect (and more generally those who have high ACE scores, i.e. have had multiple and 
severe Adverse Childhood Experiences) are overrepresented among violent offenders. A 
common way of coping with childhood trauma is to repress the extremely painful feelings 
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it produces, which in turn can explain the disproportionate attraction a person with such 
repressed wounds might find in controlling and ‘exterminating’ the re-appearance of these 
feelings in another, even ‘re-enacting’ the trauma (e.g. sexual abuse) with himself in the 
dominating position. 
Though these background variables can thus be seen to correlate both with an increased 
tendency to commit crime and with a relative lack of recognition, they cannot, of course, 
be used to predict the life-situation of any individual. Within each group, most do not 
commit crime and most do probably experience (some or sufficient) recognition – e.g. 
people who are poor, but who feel respected; who have no job, but who know their worth 
to other people; who have been abused, but who have survived with their sense of self-
confidence intact. Conversely, there are many who are rich but feel they are not as good 
as the next guy; who succeed at school, but feel unpopular; who are esteemed by others, 
but cannot trust that it is deserved and fear that they will one day be exposed as frauds.600 
In any case, the data we have reviewed is enough to conclude on a general basis that the 
recognition theory of criminal motivation provides both a coherent and a relevant theory 
of what attracts a person to commit crimes. And since the theory predicts that the more of 
the background variables of crime that pertain to a person, the more statistically likely it 
is that he is wanting in recognition, and the more applicable, all things equal, will be a 
theory describing the pursuit of recognition as his motive for crime and other actions. That 
means that for the question I am mainly concerned with here, the disproportionate 
difficulty of law-abidance of those with SSD, the recognition perspective is highly relevant 
in explaining the reasons for the difficulty. 
13.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there are material, cultural and psychological factors 
pertaining to social deprivation which make law-abidance disproportionately difficult. We 
can identify the sources of this difficulty both statistically and through theories that fit and 
explain the empirical data. As mentioned at the outset of the chapter, the fact that we can 
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substantiate the link between SSD and criminal behavior is a necessary condition for taking 
SSD as an excusing condition. I have not, however, sought to determine when the difficulty 
of law-abidance due to SSD is sufficiently serious that it ought to excuse an offender. 
Clearly, most people who fit the characteristics of SSD retain their capacity for moral and 
legal responsibility. We cannot exclude, however, that in extreme cases, the deprived 
circumstances facing an offender are so severe that her capacity for choice is effectively 
negated. If, for instance, a person has been so damaged by abuse at an early stage that she 
has not developed a normal capacity for agency, then the person is not criminally 
responsible. 
An objection which has been raised against considering SSD a potential excusing 
condition is that it is over-inclusive. If SSD can be an excusing condition, the argument 
goes, we would be committed to excusing anybody whose criminal behavior can be traced 
to social conditions. William C. Heffernan thus asks: “But if RSB [rotten social 
background] is critical, why is it not possible for the child of abusive, white, racist 
skinheads or the child of rich, neglectful heroin addicts to invoke the defense?” 601 Michael 
S. Moore goes further, accusing those who advocate SSD as excusing conditions of having 
a liberal bias, since “often excluded from being considered to be excusing are causes such 
as excessive wealth […], too much free time, boredom, lack of parental supervision, 
reading too much Nietzsche at an early age, etc”. 602 Moore mentions as an example the 
famous case of Loeb and Leipold, two university students in Chicago in 1924 who after 
having read too much Nietzsche kidnapped and murdered a 14-year old boy in order to 
prove their own status as Übermenschen. 
This objection does not provide difficult to answer for a proponent of SSD as a potential 
excusing condition. One might simply concede that if the mentioned social conditions did 
influence the offender to a degree that effectively negates the offender’s capacity for 
choice, these conditions too are grounds for excuse. If, let’s say, Loeb and Leopold had 
not merely read too much Nietzsche (and obviously misunderstood Nietzsche), but had 
rather been hypnotized by an evil philosophy professor into thinking that they were 
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Übermenschen whose mission it was to commit the crime in question, then they too ought 
to be excused.  
The point is that not only the deprived can raise an excuse defense based on social 
conditions. All social conditions can hypothetically exert an influence over the will of an 
agent to the degree of negating her capacity for responsibility.603 The question is whether 
the claims of such an influence are plausible or not. It is hard to see how boredom or being 
rich could take such a toll on somebody so as to render them without moral agency. It is 
more plausible, to put it carefully, that social deprivation could have this effect, especially 
in extreme cases. The mechanisms described in this chapter go some way toward 






                                                        
603 Notice that my claim does not entail taking a stand on controversial issues about free will and 
responsibility. Somebody like Moore, who is a free-will compatibilist, will just as easily as a free-will 
libertarian accept the notion that external influences can become so strong as to negate the freedom of the 
agent (whatever conception of freedom one holds). What Moore would deny is that it is sufficient for excuse 





14. Diminished need for punishment 
I will in this chapter consider whether it is just to mitigate the punishment of severely 
socially deprived persons, punishing them less than non-socially deprived persons for 
comparable offenses.604 H. L. A. Hart explained in the following way the circumstances 
under which mitigation of punishment is appropriate: 
The special features of mitigation are that a good reason for administering 
a less severe penalty is made out if the situation or mental state of the 
convicted criminal is such that he was exposed to an unusual or specially 
great temptation, or his ability to control his actions is thought to have been 
impaired or weakened otherwise than by his own action, so that conformity 
to the law which he has broken was a matter of special difficulty for him as 
compared with normal persons normally placed.605 
Mitigation is here a matter of comparative difficulty, and not, as with excuse, a matter of 
falling below a certain standard for responsibility. The previous chapter did, indeed, give 
us reason to believe that SSD involves a special difficulty in conforming to law, compared 
with normal persons normally placed. The pertinent question, then, is why a comparative 
difficulty of law-abidance should mitigate one’s punishment. It seems intuitively obvious 
that provocation, for instance, should count as a mitigating factor.606 But merely 
establishing that there is a difference between an offender who has been provoked and a 
normal person normally placed does not by itself provide a reason why it might be just to 
lower the sentence of the former. To provide such a reason, we have to consider the 
purpose of punishment. As I have remarked more generally above, a just distribution (of 
anything) must be determined in relation to the purpose of the practice to which the 
distribution applies. Mitigation is a matter of the distribution of punishment. The just 
purpose of punishment, we have seen, is remedying the injustice of the crime. Combining 
this general claim with Hart’s statement about the features of mitigation gives us the 
following formula for the justice of mitigation:  
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Mitigation is just when, in a particular case, less punishment than normal is needed in 
order to remedy the injustice of the crime. 
Specifically, with regard to SSD as a mitigating factor, the claim is that when the offender 
is severely socially deprived, less punishment than normal is needed in order to remedy 
the injustice of the situation. Since the question of mitigation must be determined in 
relation to the just function one ascribes to punishment, there will be different mitigating 
factors (or different reasons for the mitigating factors) depending on the theory one applies. 
I will limit the following discussion to the Kantian-Hegelian purpose of re-establishing 
mutual freedom. 
14.1 Equal treatment versus treatment as equals 
Before looking closer at the grounds for considering SSD a mitigating factor upon a 
Kantian-Hegelian theory of punishment, I will discuss an objection that is potentially 
relevant regardless of which theory of retributive justice one applies: If a person, for 
whatever reason, is deemed worthy of less punishment than normal, does that not imply a 
denial of her status as equal before the law? Being a legal subject means being treated as 
equal to other legal subjects. If I get one year in prison for stealing a car, while my friend 
who was my accomplice gets only six months, we would not say that like cases are treated 
alike. Mitigating his sentence would thus be unfair to me. 
This rests on a dubious premise, however, namely, that equality before the law requires 
equal treatment. As Ronald Dworkin showed in Taking Rights Seriously, we must 
distinguish between two forms of equality: equal treatment and treatment as equals.607 
The former is not always necessary for the latter. And only the latter is necessary for 
fairness (in fact, it is fairness). For Dworkin, as for Rawls, fairness means impartiality, in 
other words, that equal concern is afforded everyone. Put negatively: Nobody counts for 
more than anybody else when a fair practice is determined.608 The function of the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ in Rawls is precisely to ensure impartiality, because nobody could conceivably 
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prioritize themselves or others if they knew not where they were placed. The principles 
determined in a fair deliberation, i.e. when each person is treated as equal, do not, however, 
entail equal treatment.  
An example: A student admission policy based on academic skills will not treat all 
applicants equally. Only some will be offered admission. Some will be disadvantaged by 
the policy compared to others (as will be the case with all policies). But this is not sufficient 
to say that the interests of those who lose out will not have been given equal concern. As 
Dworkin explains, a policy is fair when the loss to those who are disadvantaged by the 
policy has been outweighed by the gain of the community as a whole, and, in addition, 
everybody’s interests are accorded an equal weight when determining the interests of the 
community.609 The notion of ‘gain for the community as a whole’ can be given both a 
utilitarian and an ideal (justice) interpretation, though Dworkin shows that a common 
version of the former will not in principle be fair.610 In any case, with this understanding 
of fairness, many policies cannot plausibly be said to be fair. For instance, a policy which 
excludes the admission of black students cannot be said to show concern for the interests 
of those who are disadvantaged by the policy, since upon any plausible conception of how 
such a policy might benefit the community as a whole, blacks will not have been shown 
equal concern in the determination of the interests of the community.611 The policy based 
on academic skills does pass the test, however, because it is highly plausible that this policy 
will benefit the community as a whole when equal concern is afforded everyone in 
determining the gain for the community.612 
Hence, treatment as equals, and not equal treatment, is necessary for a practice to be fair. 
Fairness, in turn, is a necessary feature of any legitimate exercise of political power. “No 
government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens 
over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance”, Dworkin states.613 In 
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Rawls’ formulation, “political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance 
with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable 
and rational, can endorse in light of common human reason. This is the liberal principle of 
legitimacy”.614 The very same principle could have been formulated by Kant, who, we 
recall, poses as a test for legitimate law that a people, while respecting the innate right to 
freedom, “could impose such a law upon itself”615. Using Kantian-Hegelian terminology, 
we can say that recognition as legal subjects always requires formal, “abstract” equality, 
i.e. mutual respect for freedom. However, as we saw in Chapter 9, a certain level of 
material equality is required in order to attain (formally) equal access to freedom. We saw, 
for instance, that without assistance to the poor, material conditions would render the poor 
at the mercy of those with property in order to survive, and hence unfree and unequal. And 
even when the bare minimum for survival is achieved, there can still be so much material 
inequality in a society that the formal equality of everybody cannot be assured, as, for 
instance, when economic wealth can be transformed into political power. On a Kantian 
(republican) theory of mutual freedom, then, it will sometimes be necessary to treat 
members materially unequally (for instance by taxing some and redistributing to others) 
in order to assure their formal equality.616 
However, the reverse necessarily holds as well: If material conditions are not unequal with 
respect to some issue, there will not be a need to counteract material inequality in order to 
assure formal equality. Treatment as equals may sometimes require equal treatment. The 
question is when. Dworkin mentions as examples of practices and laws that require equal 
treatment those which protect interests that are “so vital” that everyone has them equally, 
such as elementary education.617 Presumably, we could elaborate on the concept of ‘vital 
needs’ and thereby develop an understanding of which interests are so basic that all should 
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have the right to equal treatment with regard to them. We all share a basic need for clean 
water, for instance. Since we are materially equal in this regard, the state ought to distribute 
water purification systems equally. However, it is difficult to see that this method of 
identifying vital interests could provide us with sufficient conceptual tools to determine 
hard cases such as the proper distribution of punishment. Is punishment an ‘interest’ 
sufficiently vital to require equal treatment in order to be treated as equals? 
I suggest that a better way to settle the question of when equal treatment is required for 
treatment as equals, is to apply the negative method I have proposed throughout the thesis. 
We can then simply ask whether there are any circumstances which could plausibly entail 
the injustice of equal treatment, and if there are no such circumstances, equal treatment is 
implied by treatment as equals. In other words: Equal treatment is the default distribution. 
This follows from the concept of justice as remedying injustice. For with this concept, 
there must be present an injustice which is remedied in order for justice to happen. In other 
words, an unequal distribution of anything can be said to be just only if it remedies an 
injustice. Hence, only if there would be more injustice if the distribution were equal, can 
an unequal distribution be said to be just. By implication, an unequal distribution which 
does not remedy an injustice would unjustly prioritize some people over others, thereby 
treating them not as equals but as ‘unequals’.  
Let us take government-paid parental leave as an example. There may be several purposes 
to this practice, but one plausible purpose is to compensate those who are prevented from 
working because they have taken on the burden of providing fulltime care for a baby. The 
long-term survival of any society requires the steady influx of new members. Those who 
provide babies are thus providing a social benefit. We might therefore think that this 
obligates the society receiving the benefit to compensate those who bear the immediate 
personal costs of producing the social benefit. With this framing, an unequal distribution 
of parental leave between the mother and father of the baby may be considered just, 
because the mother bears a larger burden in producing the baby, which effectively prevents 
her from working in the weeks prior to and after giving birth. If an entirely different 
distribution were introduced, whereby the government were to pay for additional weeks of 
parental leave for fathers who are, say, over 30 years old but not for those under 30, this 




fathers over 30 take on a larger burden which they ought to be compensated for with extra 
weeks of parental leave. 
Again, this is only one plausible framing of the issue of parental leave, but the point is that 
given this framing, some forms of unequal treatment will be just, while others will be 
unjust. If we took the just purpose of parental leave to be something else, we would find 
that other distributions were just or unjust accordingly. Suppose, for instance, that we see 
parental leave as equivalent to the pensions of senior citizens, in other words, basically 
one’s own money that has been saved up and returned when one is not able to work. With 
this framing, there would not be reason to distribute parental leave unequally between 
mothers and fathers; the just distribution would simply depend on what each person has 
saved respectively. 
Let us now turn to the issue at hand here, the distribution of punishment, and ask: Can an 
unequal distribution of punishment be more just than an equal distribution because an 
offender is severely socially deprived? The answer will depend, as we just saw, on what 
we take to be the purpose of punishment. I will, as mentioned, limit the discussion to the 
purpose of re-establishing mutual respect for freedom. 
14.2 Diminished need for punishment with severely 
socially deprived offenders 
Within a Kantian-Hegelian framework for criminal law, the purpose of punishment is to 
negate the infringement upon freedom constituted by crime, and thereby to assert the 
supremacy of law in accordance with mutual freedom. We have seen that there are several 
aspects of this function. For Kant, punishment primarily addresses the formal wrong 
against law. With Hegel, we saw a clearer intersubjective conception of the formal wrong 
of crime: Crime is a negation of the victim’s status as a legal subject. A negation of this 
negation requires a re-establishment of recognition of both victim and offender. In addition 
to the formal wrong of crime, many victims suffer material wrongs. On a Kantian-
Hegelian theory, it is primarily the function of compensation to remedy material wrong. 
However, as has been made clear, material conditions do affect one’s capacity for formal 
right. To the extent that a material wrong precludes a person’s access to freedom, 




negation of freedom. Examples of such material aspects of infringements of freedom are 
physical injury and psychological damage that, for instance, prevent a victim from holding 
a job or going out in public. 
These functions of punishment can be said to remedy different aspects of what is wrong in 
crime, when understood as infringement of freedom. They address, in other words, 
different needs which arise with regard to securing freedom. These needs correspond 
largely to the three needs that Phillip Pettit and John Braithwaite identify as arising from 
crime upon their republican theory, which, like the Kantian-Hegelian framework, sees 
crime as an infringement of freedom as non-domination. These are the “Three R’s”, as 
they say: the need for Reassurance, the need for Recognition, and the need for 
Recompense.618 Reassurance corresponds loosely to the Kantian demand for re-
establishing the supremacy of law. Crimes do not simply affect the parties directly 
involved. They tend also to cause feelings of uncertainty, fear, indignation, distrust etc. in 
the population at large. In short, they undermine people’s faith in the reality of mutual 
freedom, thereby effectively limiting people’s freedom. An example: If I read in the 
newspaper about multiple muggings in my neighborhood park, I will likely prefer to take 
a detour around it when I am out walking after dark. My freedom to roam about will thus 
be restricted in reality, though of course I am free to go where I want in principle. 
Apprehending and prosecuting those who commit the muggings will address my need for 
reassurance of my freedom to walk in the park. 
Recognition corresponds to the need emphasized by Hegel for a clear and public 
acknowledgment of the wrongdoing that has been done against the victim(s). The message 
entailed by the crime – the denial of the victim’s capacity for possessing rights – must be 
denounced as untrue by the polity. The rights of the victim(s) are thereby vindicated, as, 
of course, are the equivalent rights of everybody else, including the offender(s). 
Recompense corresponds to the need to address the material wrong of crime. When 
possible, recompense can take the form of restitution. When full restitution is impossible, 
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it may still be possible to compensate the victim in some measure. Finally, Pettit notes, 
when compensation is impossible or clearly inadequate, as in homicide, a form of 
reparation to those who have suffered from the crime is appropriate, thereby “sharing in 
the loss”.619 
Having thus distinguished between three aspects of what it takes to remedy a negation of 
mutual freedom, we can turn to the question of mitigation. Applying the definition of just 
mitigation from above, we can ask: Is less punishment than normal needed in order to 
remedy these three aspects of the wrong in crime when the offender is severely socially 
deprived? 
To answer this question, we must start by recalling that the material aspect of punishment 
(i.e. the pain or disutility of punishment) stands in a contingent relationship to the symbolic 
or formal function it serves as a manifestation of mutual freedom. The material aspect of 
punishment is the medium through which the formal function is achieved. As mentioned 
in Chapter 9, Kant and Hegel believed it a necessary medium – they were in other words 
retributisvists, a position I do not adopt – but they too would agree that the amount of the 
material disutility of punishment is not directly given by the formal function it is meant to 
serve. Recall Hegel’s claim that “a penal code belongs to its time and to the condition in 
which the civic community at that times is”.620 He explicitly declares that in some historical 
situations there will be less need to punish severely than in others, for reasons I will 
elaborate below. This suggests, indeed, that he would agree that the material and the formal 
function are not coextensive. 
If we look at other types of action where a material medium serves a symbolic function, 
the intuitive appeal of the separation I advocate will show itself. I mentioned earlier the 
example of giving gifts. When we send flowers to the family of someone who has passed 
away, the flowers are the medium through which we communicate our compassion. When 
I give my neighbor a box of chocolates after he has done me a favor, I provide him with a 
material benefit (the pleasure of eating chocolate), but the chocolate also serves a symbolic 
function: It expresses my gratitude. Clearly, the material aspect and the formal or symbolic 
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aspect of actions are somewhat connected. Sending flowers is a conventional way of 
expressing compassion, hence, there is normally a link between this medium and this 
message. However, the material and the symbolic are also somewhat independent of each 
other. It is not the case, for instance, that a dozen flowers convey twice as much 
compassion as a half a dozen flowers, or that an expensive gift necessarily conveys 
stronger love than, say, a homemade scarf. In other words, the same message can 
potentially be conveyed by a smaller amount of the same medium, or even by a different 
medium entirely.621 
A further reason for the contingency of the material and the formal function, is the fact 
that the same objective amount and type of punishment will be experienced subjectively 
differently by different people. Punishments have, in other words, a differential impact on 
people. As Michael Tonry puts it:  
Imprisonment may mean very different things to a young gang leader, an 
employed middle-aged parent, and someone who is seriously ill. To ignore 
such things in relation to comparably culpable people, however culpability 
is measured, is to accept huge differences in the pains imposed upon them.622 
For instance, research has shown that being incarcerated has greater impact on a person 
with a disability.623 Penalties are also considered to be more onerous for young offenders, 
a fact that is reflected in the rules for juvenile justice adopted by the United Nations.624 
The same applies, for instance, to mentally ill offenders. Offenders with children may also 
experience punishment as tougher compared to those who do not have any dependents. 
And if we take into account the experiences of the children and other third-parties as well, 
punishment may indeed have considerably differential impact in otherwise similar cases. 
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If the purpose of punishment is to balance or outweigh the material gain of crime, the issue 
of differential impact will have to be taken into account in sentencing. The matter is not as 
clear, however, when we consider punishment to serve a communicative purpose. 
Compare again with giving gifts. If two of your neighbors have helped you paint your 
garage and you want to give them each, say, a bottle of wine to thank them, should you 
give one neighbor a bigger bottle because he has a wife to share it with? Doing so would 
equalize the otherwise differential impact of the gift, but if their contributions have been 
equal, it might ‘send the wrong message’ if they are not thanked with equal gifts. Similarly, 
if two professors receive an honorary award for their achievements, should the one who 
has children to feed get a bigger check? And should the other get a bigger bouquet of 
flowers because he has such a gloomy outlook on life that it will take more to cheer him 
up? 
The examples are absurd, of course, but precisely for that reason do they reveal that 
differential impact is not necessarily relevant when the aim of the action is to make a 
statement. The material aspect (and so the material impact) is relevant only to the extent 
that it serves as a medium for the message one is trying to convey. In a setting where one 
is trying to thank somebody or confer an honor upon her, one is not trying to help her feed 
her children or trying to cheer her up. The impact with regard to the latter is irrelevant to 
one’s purpose in this setting. 
The same potential irrelevance of one (material) aspect of the action can be seen in the 
reverse case, when unequal treatment serves to avoid differential impact. Assume that you 
want to give a $ 1,000 piece of art to each of your two children. One lives close by, and 
you can hand it over yourself. The other lives overseas and the shipping expenses amount 
to $ 300. In this case, you will spend 30 % more on one of your children, yet this unequal 
treatment will hardly matter, since the shipping expenses are not directly relevant to the 
purpose of giving these gifts to your children. On the contrary, it would likely seem strange 
to give a less valuable piece of art to the one who lives overseas in order to ensure that an 
equal amount of money was spent on the two. The reason is that the amount of money 
spent is inessential to the purpose of the action.  
Turning again to the setting wherein punishment is administered in order to realize mutual 




it bears on this function. As with the examples of gifts and other transactions, it is not the 
differential impact per se that matters, but the impact of the amount of punishment – that 
is, the material aspect of punishment – on the achievement of reassurance, recognition 
and recompense.  
14.2.1 Recompense 
I will start with the function of recompense since there is least to say about it in the context 
of mitigation. As noted above, material wrong is relevant in this context when it impacts 
upon the wronged person’s access to mutual freedom. The victim’s need for recompense 
is independent of the personal circumstances of the offender (e.g. her SSD), though the 
latter will determine the offender’s ability to deliver recompense if sentenced to do so. 
From the perspective of mutual freedom, this suggests that when the offender is poor, 
recompense ought to be paid for by the state, and then recuperated from the offender to 
the extent possible.625 This follows, at least in severe cases, from the fact that the victim 
would otherwise be denied access to mutual freedom, since poor offenders do not have the 
ability to pay. In addition, saddling poor offenders with millions in debt would in effect 
deny them the chance to ever regain their status as free and equal, and is therefore 
unacceptable.  
Further, the victim’s need for recompense will presumably also be independent of 
circumstances pertaining to the criminal’s motivation for the offense. The material wrong 
is independent of whether, for instance, it was done out of a sadistic motivation or out of 
need. Neither the personal circumstances of the offender nor the subjective aspect of the 
offense influences the material wrong and so the need for recompense.626 I conclude, 
therefore, that this aspect of restoring mutual freedom (recompense) does not offer an 
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argument for mitigation due to the offender’s SSD (except if damages are reduced due to 
diminished capacity to pay).627 
14.2.2 Reassurance 
Reassurance is necessary in order to convince people that their rights are actual in time 
and place – in other words, that they are not merely in principle, but in reality, free. The 
need for reassurance is usually felt most acutely by the victim of the crime, who might 
worry, for instance, that the offender will harm her again. However, the need for 
reassurance arises also for the community. Hegel describes in the following way this link 
between individual damage and damage to the community at large:  
The fact that, when one member of a community suffers, all others suffer 
with him, alters the nature of crime, not indeed in its conception but in its 
external existence [emphasis added]. The injury now concerns the general 
thought and consciousness of the civic community, and not merely the 
existence of the person directly injured.628 
I understand this in the following way: Crime does real damage (i.e. has external existence) 
by undermining, in the collective consciousness, faith in the reality of (i.e. the external 
existence of) mutual freedom. Remedying this lack of assurance constitutes the 
prospective function of punishment, which I discussed in Chapter 9. However, the need 
for reassurance may vary, both historically and situationally, which means that the amount 
necessary for achieving the prospective function of punishment may also vary. Hegel noted 
in this regard an interesting tendency, which might seem counterintuitive at first, namely 
that the need for punishment decreases as the state’s control and power increases (i.e. as it 
achieves a monopoly of violence). The tendency makes sense, however, when connected 
to the damage that crime does via the collective consciousness as described above. For if 
the state is powerful enough to assure the supremacy of law whenever it is broken, the 
impact of each crime viewed in isolation will diminish. Isolated breaches will not be 
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enough to undermine people’s faith in the power of law enforcement. Hence, Hegel 
concludes, “the security, felt by society, lessens the external importance of the injury. As 
a result crime is now often punished more lightly”.629 
Turning now to specific criminal situations, the very same mechanism that Hegel describes 
may potentially apply: The external importance of the injury – i.e. the affect it has on the 
security of the society – may vary from one case to another. It follows from this that the 
community at large may have less need to punish to achieve reassurance in some cases as 
opposed to others. One important factor in determining whether there is greater or lesser 
need to punish an offender for this purpose (in order to achieve reassurance), is power. 
The greater power to exert one’s unilateral will through crime, the greater need society has 
for assurance against that person’s power. Again, we are reminded of Bertolt Brecht’s 
famous question, “What is a picklock to a bank share?” For there is a systematic 
discrepancy between the power of those who commit crimes in the streets and the power 
of those who commit crimes in the suites, to use Braithwaite’s phrase.630 The latter have, 
all things equal, the power to undermine law and cause damage to mutual freedom in ways 
that far exceed that of a burglar with a picklock. And there are other power structures in 
society as well, beside the economic structure, which increase the dominion of some 
groups over others, including to the point where members of one group can do criminal 
acts with relative impunity compared to others. We saw an example in the Jim Crow laws 
of the American South, which manifested white power and privilege to the extent that the 
likes of Hattie Carrol had little assurance against the violence and dominance of the likes 
of William Zantzinger. Today’s “Black Lives Matter” movement points to a similar 
relative impunity for police officers who shoot and kill black people. And similar kinds of 
abuse of power is committed to varying degrees by police officers and government 
officials all over the world. Indeed, those at the very top have the greatest reason to put 
credence in their own impunity. To give just two examples, no top bankers were 
prosecuted after the financial crisis of 2008, and no heads of state were criminally 
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investigated for their role in the attack on Iraq in 2003 – probably the two single events 
that have caused most damage around the world in later years.631 
Criminal prosecution and conviction in these cases would serve the expressive functions 
that Feinberg mentioned, “authoritative disavowal”, “vindication of law” and “symbolic 
non-acquiescence”. The polity would thereby communicate to the offender, and to other 
people in powerful positions who might be tempted to commit similar offences, that “you 
are alone in your abuse of power, the rest of us do not acquiesce”. This symbolic function 
of criminal prosecution is an important but not a sufficient means to assuring compliance 
with law in general. Put differently, reassurance is partly achieved through recognition. 
For with recognition of wrongdoing follows shame, guilt, loss of status and other social 
repercussions and informal sanctions that tend to have a deterrent effect on potential 
offenders. Conversely, without recognition of wrongdoing, what ought to be termed abuse 
of power is considered (justified) privilege, and therefore perpetuated.  
In addition to the symbolic function of punishment, the material function of inflicting 
hardship on offenders is clearly also important for assuring compliance with law. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, research on deterrence has shown a so-called ‘absolute 
deterrent effect’ of the existence of penal sanctions, though the research has not established 
an increased deterrent effect relative to the amount of punishment. This does not mean, of 
course, that the amount is unimportant.632 While the deterrent effect of exposure is 
considerable, especially for types of crime that are mala in se (i.e. independently 
condemned), it is likely that this effect is less significant for mala prohibita-offenses and 
crimes that do not to the same extent elicit shame in those who are exposed. Being caught 
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making moonshine in the basement is presumably much less humiliating than being caught 
stealing liquor from the neighbor. The worry of what people are going to think if they find 
out is presumably much less pressing in the first case than in the second. Similarly, in some 
business circles, those who “cut corners” in meeting government regulation will likely feel 
less fear of exposure thinking that “everybody else is doing it, so why can’t I?”  
In such cases, it seems reasonable to expect that the material disutility of punishment plays 
a relatively greater role in achieving deterrence, since the symbolic function of recognizing 
wrongdoing will be less important when the wrongness of the act is disputed or 
downplayed. This is not simply due to less condemnation by others, however. One’s own 
moral constraints will likely be weaker too. In short, where there are fewer moral 
inhibitions against crime (Bentham’s “standing tutelary motives”), the relative importance 
of other disincentives increases. This suggests that it may be necessary in order to achieve 
the purpose of reassurance to adjust the size of the material disutility of punishment 
according to the situation of the offender, so that in each case a credible reason to expect 
compliance is achieved. As Pettit put it, we require “the sort of penalty that we would 
expect to be effective in persuading the offender not to commit the same sort of crime 
again”.633 This means, in other words, that in cases like this, the differential impact of 
punishment is relevant in itself, precisely because it is primarily the material impact (and 
not the symbolic function) of punishment which is meant to achieve its function. A rich 
person will thus require a larger fine (or other punishment) than a poor person if the fine 
is to make enough of an impression to dissuade her from reoffending (in cases where other 
reasons for not reoffending have little force). Traffic violations are good examples. If fines 
are not adjusted to the wealth of the offender, society will not have credible assurance that 
rich people will respect the rules. A recent example from Norway showed how the courts 
take this fact into consideration: A drunk driver was sentenced to 24 days in prison and 
handed a fine of 108,000 Norwegian kroner (approximately USD $ 13,000). The high sum 
followed from the court’s practice of setting the fine to 1.5 times the offender’s monthly 
salary.634  
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To sum up, there are two main factors to consider when determining a just distribution of 
punishment for the specific purpose of reassurance: 1) the relative importance of 
reassurance in the specific case. 2) the amount of punishment needed in order to provide a 
credible assurance against (re)offending. Both these factors lead to the conclusion that 
reassurance may require, all things equal, more punishment than normal for the rich and 
powerful. The reasons for this are, to sum up, that the crimes of this group are more often 
such that they affect the lives of many, for instance by causing pollution, by defying safety 
and health regulations, by putting people’s entire savings at risk etc., thereby making it 
correspondingly more important to prevent their crimes. Many of these crimes also trigger 
our moral inhibitions to a lesser extent than crimes where the impact is more immediate 
and visible. This speaks to the need for the material disutility of punishment to provide a 
realistic disincentive. We can add to this the fact that it takes more to create such a 
disincentive for those who already have much wealth and power.  
The question, then, is whether the reverse also holds, i.e. that the purpose of reassurance 
requires less than normal punishment of the poor and powerless. The answer is both yes 
and no. By logical necessity, if we accept the argument that more punishment is needed 
for the rich and powerful, relatively less punishment is needed for the poor and powerless. 
I have already established that wealth and power are relevant factors to take into account 
for the purpose of reassurance, which means, presumably, that less of the two speaks to 
the need for less punishment. But there is one complicating factor in this otherwise 
acceptable claim. Power can mean different things in this context. A person who is among 
the socioeconomically least powerful may nevertheless wield power in his encounters with 
other people. For instance, a destitute person with little ability to influence society on a 
large scale may be a serial rapist. He has shown, then, that he is able and willing to use 
power to commit rape. He is in this sense more powerful than, say, a rich politician who 
could never bring himself to wield this kind of power of others. The need for reassurance 
that the rapist will not reoffend is no less simply because he is powerless in a different 
arena.  
Further, if we look more broadly at different types of crime, it may be the case that the 
objective harm from crimes typically committed by the rich and powerful is greater than 




Nevertheless, the effect that Hegel described on the “consciousness of the civic 
community” is not correlated with the objective harm of crime. Some types of crime make 
an impression on third-parties that is widely overblown compared to their relative 
harmfulness, and vice versa. To take an example I mentioned in Chapter 11: Almost four 
times as many people in the U.S. are killed as a direct result of employer negligence 
compared to homicides. Yet, the fear and attention devoted to homicides far outreach that 
of occupational deaths. This fear is relevant to the need for reassurance, however, because 
such subjective inhibitions limit people’s exercise of their freedom. Death by, say, food 
poisoning may be much more likely than death by gunshot, yet fear of the latter causes 
people to take all kinds of precautions, thereby limiting their freedom. To conclude, “the 
external importance of the injury”, i.e. it’s detrimental effect on mutual freedom, may 
conceivably be equally great (or greater) for typical street crimes as for typical suite 
crimes, even though the latter tend to cause greater objective harm. Together with the point 
that even the socioeconomically powerless can be dangerous to others and therefore have 
some power in this sense, this suggests that the purpose of reassurance does not generally 
justify lower punishment for those with SSD, but that sometimes and for some types of 
crime, this group’s lack of power and money is a mitigating factor. 
14.2.3 Recognition 
Finally, I will consider the purpose of recognition. It is this retrospective dimension of 
sanctioning crime that has been most closely associated with Kant and Hegel (and 
retributivism in general), though, as we have seen, their theories also proscribe a 
prospective function to re-establishing mutual freedom. Recognition means 
acknowledging that wrongdoing has been done. By publicly denying the offender’s right 
to dominate the victim, the polity thereby recognizes the equal rights of victim, offender 
and all citizens. Treatment as equals is thus essential to the very concept of recognition. 
But does it entail equal treatment? 
For conviction, yes. All infringements upon mutual freedom (at least of a certain 
seriousness) require negation, irrespective of who does them and who suffers them. 
Holding an offender responsible is a recognition of her inclusion in the moral community 




she is not considered free and equal. Hence, when it comes to the function of conviction, 
equal treatment is required for treatment as equals.  
The question is whether this also holds for the punishment to which one is convicted. Does 
recognition of the offender’s criminal responsibility always require a materially equal 
sanction? To answer this question, we must consider in more detail how the material 
function of punishment serves to achieve recognition. On Kant’s theory, we saw, 
punishment of an offender serves the function of “bring[ing] his misdeed back upon 
himself”635. The rationality of the offender is respected if his deed is turned against himself, 
thereby interpreting his maxim as a statement that the specific law does not protect his 
equivalent rights, i.e. that ‘the same’ as he has done can be done to him. This speaks to the 
need for a roughly proportional punishment, though, as I have argued in Chapter 9, a 
formal or symbolic proportionality, meaning that the amount of punishment expresses how 
serious the offense was.  
To establish such symbolic proportionality, it is first of all necessary to interpret the 
offence in order to determine its severity. How did the offence express disrespect for 
mutual freedom? How serious was the disrespect that the offender showed? Compare two 
interpretations of the same act: 1) Jim steals from a grocery store because he is greedy. 2) 
Jim steals from a grocery store because he needs food for his starving children. Upon the 
first interpretation, the disrespect that Jim shows for the grocery store owner is deeper than 
upon the second interpretation. In the first version, Jim might be said to place himself 
above the owner, clearly expressing disdain for the owner’s needs and rights by prioritizing 
his own desires. However, in the second version, although Jim does disregard the owner’s 
needs and rights, he does not express the same contempt for the owner. He does not imply 
that he is superior to the owner. He simply prioritizes his children’s more serious needs 
over the owner’s needs. He might even recognize that he has done wrong by the owner, 
and regret that the owner became an innocent victim to his unfortunate circumstances.636 
On both interpretations, the criminal offense is the same: theft. Yet, the wrongness of the 
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offense, when wrongness is understood as denial of recognition of another’s equal 
freedom, is worse in the first case than in the second. 
The same kinds of deliberations apply more generally to the subjective and objective 
aspects of the wrongness of crime. On the Kantian-Hegelian conception of crime, the 
severity of the objective wrongness of the crime is determined by how seriously it infringes 
upon mutual freedom – i.e. killing somebody is worst because it completely annihilates 
the victim’s freedom, then the scale continues downward: torture, violence, sexual assault 
does very serious injury to a person’s freedom, theft a little less, buying illegal drugs even 
less, and so on.637 The severity of the subjective wrongness, in turn, is determined by the 
extent to which the agent shows disrespect for mutual freedom. Infringing upon someone’s 
freedom purposefully entails a deeper disrespect for law than doing so knowingly, which 
in turn shows more disrespect than when the act is due to recklessness, and even more so 
than when it is due to negligence. Purposefully denying someone’s freedom entails a form 
of contempt for the other which is absent in a negligent act. In the latter case, the offender 
may show no ill-will or disrespect against the victim at all; she was perhaps merely 
distracted for a moment. She did not by her act suggest that she is superior to the other and 
that she can treat the other as if he were a mere object and not a free and equal person with 
the capacity for having rights. Her crime is therefore less wrong than an objectively equal 
crime done purposefully.  
Similarly, with recognition as punishment’s purpose, we are also provided with a rationale 
for the standard mitigating factors such as provocation, necessity, minor role in the offense, 
mental or physical illness, genuine remorse and more. Provocation, for instance, serves to 
explain why the offender did as he did in the particular circumstances, and why we cannot 
infer from this particular instance a deeper (and longer term) disrespect for mutual right. 
The offender cannot as easily be said to have shown an authentic perception of his own 
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superiority as when the same act is not “brought on” by the heat of the moment. The 
intuitive appeal of a provocation defense may stem from a common perception that “I too 
would have reacted like he did if I had been egged on like that, even though I generally 
respect mutual freedom”. Likewise, if we judge that mental illness is part of the 
explanation for why the offender committed the act (though not sufficiently to excuse her), 
we have less reason than under normal circumstances to infer that the offender sincerely 
and lastingly meant to show contempt of other people’s rights. Similarly, genuine remorse 
serves to separate the person standing trial from the message of disrespect conveyed by 
her previous act. It shows that she no longer intends the denial of recognition implied by 
her act as a truth to be accepted 
This notion of separation between actor and act is central to Jeffrie Murphy’s account of 
when forgiveness is appropriate. Though proposed as part of a theory regarding moral 
relations between wrongdoer and victim, the notion has relevance to state punishment 
when recognition is considered one of its purposes. Murphy proposes the following list 
“represent[ing] ways in which an agent can be divorced from his evil act”: 
1. he repented or had a change of heart or 
2. he meant well (his motives were good) or 
3. he has suffered enough or 
4. he has undergone humiliation (perhaps some ritual humiliation, e.g., the 
apology ritual of “I beg forgiveness”) or 
5. of old times’ sake (e.g., “He has been a good and loyal friend to me in the 
past”)638 
In all these cases, it is possible to consider the agent as more detached from the disrespect 
and harm that her act has caused than when these conditions do not apply.639 This makes 
it easier and also more justified to forswear resentment of the offender without thereby 
condoning her actions, Murphy argues. Applied to criminal sentencing: The more detached 
from the offense the offender is, the less inclined are we to attribute the message of 
disrespect entailed by the act to an authentic, deep-rooted conviction on the part of the 
offender. The more detached, the less we take the denial of recognition to be a proposed 
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truth – a normative statement intended to be left standing – and the less threatening to 
mutual freedom is the message.  
From the perspective of mutual freedom, then, the worst crimes, all things equal, are those 
where the offender purposefully commits crime and is in a position to continue to make 
the crime empirically valid, i.e. to effectuate the denial of equal freedom in time and place. 
The power of the offender is important in this regard, as discussed above. But so is the 
offender’s attachment to the denial of freedom. The more the offender “owns” the crime – 
i.e. the more it can be ascribed to an autonomous choice to deny freedom – the more we 
are inclined to take it as a denial of recognition purported to be left standing. By 
implication, the more the crime can be ascribed to background factors and special 
circumstances of the situation (e.g. provocation, necessity), the less inclined are we to see 
the act as implying a sincere statement by the offender about the status of mutual freedom. 
Put differently, the more readily we accept the notion that “I too would have done the same 
under those circumstances, even though I generally respect mutual freedom”, the more 
easily we separate the act from the message of disrespect for mutual freedom (this holds 
even to the point where there is no link at all, and therefore no crime. E.g. “I too would 
have shot him if he was threatening my family”).640 
Knowing why a person reacted the way she did, knowing what triggered her, and knowing 
why crime seemed an attractive option (as discussed in detail in the previous chapter on 
criminal motivation) thus enables an alternative message to be attributed to the crime. “To 
know all is to forgive all”, as the saying goes. There is something to this when the 
alternative message which comes with knowledge undermines the initial message of 
superiority and disrespect conveyed by the crime. If you come to know, for instance, that 
a high school student who is terrorizing and dominating her fellow students has a family 
background of neglect and sexual abuse, you might be inclined to revise your initial 
understanding of her behavior as expressing her sense of superiority. In this new light, you 
might rather see her acts as stemming from fear and weakness, and from lack of resources 
to establish relationships of recognition that we all long for. Seeing her crimes as entailing 
this alternative message, it becomes clear that less than normal amount of punishment is 
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needed in order to deny her elevated position vis-à-vis others. There is, in short, less need 
to ‘put her in her place’ by punishing her. The opposite holds, of course, for powerful 
criminals who purposefully abuse their power: The message their crimes entail increases 
the need to ‘bring them low’, as Hampton contended.  
The point is not simply that we may come to understand why the offender did what he did. 
SSD is not relevant for mitigation simply because it might provide a causal story of the 
crime. If so, then mitigation would be required whenever a causal explanation can be 
supplied.641 Recall Moore’s examples in the previous chapter. Boredom or lack of parental 
supervision might provide causal explanations in a given case. But it is hard to see why 
that would mitigate punishment. Or how about the chairman of the local Ayn Rand Society 
who is indicted for tax fraud?642 His lawyer could make the case that because of Ayn Rand 
and perhaps a convincing philosophy professor, he holds the belief that tax-paying under 
current conditions is equivalent to involuntary servitude and that he is therefore justified 
in his resistance. Clearly this causal explanation does nothing to justify mitigation of his 
punishment. In this case, as in many others, to know all is not to forgive all. As J. L. Austin 
is supposed to have said: “Understanding might just add contempt to hatred”. Knowing 
that an offender has committed his crime because his experiences have made him a bad 
person might just push our indignation one step back: We understand what caused his 
crime, but we resent him for letting himself become the kind of person who does such a 
thing. Recall Aristotle’s view that one is responsible for one’s bad character.643 
Assuming that a person’s SSD is not sufficient in a given case to negate responsibility, that 
person, like everyone else, is responsible for how she deals with the circumstances she 
meets. We might understand why, for instance, circumstances would lead a homeless 
person to steel an unlocked bicycle. But that does not take away the homeless person’s 
responsibility for having let the circumstances lead her to do so. Nevertheless, in such 
circumstances, we might find a relevant difference between her theft of a bicycle and that 
of, say, a group of bored youths who steal a bicycle to go for a joy ride, or an anarchist 
who has read too much Proudhon (e.g. “Property is theft!”). The relevant difference is the 
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message entailed by these instances of theft. While they all show disrespect for the owner 
of the bicycle, the relative unimportance of the needs of the bored youths and the conscious 
denial of the right to property by the anarchist make their messages of disrespect more 
serious. The youths prioritize themselves above the owner for no good reason. The 
homeless person, too, prioritizes himself above the owner and thereby does him wrong. 
But we cannot say that his reason is without merit entirely. Having as little as he has, it is 
understandable (though not justifiable) that he seeks to acquire things that can help him in 
his bleak situation. Again, we might intuitively recognize that we too might be moved by 
this motive if, “but for the grace of God”, we were in the same situation. Indeed, we might 
acknowledge that society is indirectly complicit in the act by allowing this person to live 
under such unjust circumstances (cf. Chapter 12) – hence, the message of the crime is less 
that he is above the law, and more that he is below the law, e.g. that his situation does not 
qualify as realizing his right to mutual freedom. 
SSD is a potential mitigating factor, then, not because it has a particularly strong influence 
on criminal motivation, but because SSD may have a particular influence on the statement 
that is entailed by crime. Hampton similarly claims, when discussing the relevance of 
psychological explanations of crime:  
[T]hat explanation is irrelevant to the way in which the action is wrongful; 
it is the expressive content of the action […] and not the causal story we tell 
to explain why it was performed, that accounts for its being wrongful. 
Although there may be times when that causal story is relevant to our 
determination of the action’s expressive content.644 
The last sentence accords with the view I am defending here: The causal story that SSD 
provides may influence the expressive content of the crime. As the previous chapter 
showed, this story is one where crime tends to express less a grand self-image and the 
feeling of entitlement, and more a sense of weakness and humiliation; less a sense of 
independence and privilege, more the experience of failure and the need for help.  
In Hampton’s words, punishment is justified because “we are morally required to respond 
by trying to remake the world in a way that denies what the wrongdoer’s events have 
attempted to establish”.645 The point I would make, then, is that part of what the severely 
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socially deprived person tries to establish is not something we are morally required to deny. 
Part of the message is not the offender’s superiority, but rather his inferiority, his social 
exclusion, his feeling of being ‘nobody’. The message is thus not just a denial of mutual 
respect for freedom (though it is, of course, by definition a denial of mutual freedom), but 
in part a demand for mutual respect, a demand for access to those goods and those 
relationships which are necessary for mutual recognition. 
SSD thus influences the perceived seriousness of the crime, potentially making us interpret 
the crime as a less forceful repudiation of mutual freedom than the objective aspect of the 
crime would normally confer. But SSD may also be relevant apart from its influence on 
the expressive content of crime. The mere fact that a person is severely deprived may 
influence directly the perceived need to bring him low, even when we do not believe that 
his act was significantly influenced by his miserable situation (as it was in the example of 
theft by a homeless person). Consider, for instance, a person who suffers a great loss after 
committing the crime. An example could be a father who drives drunk home from a party 
and then accidentally runs over and kills his own child as he pulls up to his house. The 
crime is no less serious than a normal instance of homicide by drunk driving, yet the father 
has suffered immensely from his own act. This is an instance where we might talk of the 
crime carrying the punishment with it. The criminal has in a sense “paid in advance”, in 
this case by the result of his action, but conceivably also in terms of prior unjust suffering 
(e.g. growing up in a socially deprived environment).646 Punishment of somebody who has 
already suffered greatly, we might feel, would be like kicking somebody who is already 
lying down.  
The point is not, however, that a material balance between the suffering of the victim and 
the suffering (or profit) of the offender has already been achieved, as would be relevant on 
a material theory of punishment (see discussion in Chapter 5). The point is rather that the 
miserable material state of the offender has an expressive effect on the perceived need to 
re-establish mutual recognition: The offender is not (or not any longer) perceived as 
someone who elevates himself above the law and above others. “Isn’t he already too low 
as it is?”, Hampton asks about an inner-city teenager who is from one of society’s lowest 
social rungs; “Could [he] ever be thought to elevate himself by his action, such that 
                                                        





punishment could be justified to ‘lower’ him?”647 Hampton acknowledges that on her 
theory of retribution punishing this teenager is problematic – “but that is a strength of the 
theory, because punishing such a person is problematic”.648 It is problematic for the same 
reason that Murphy includes “having suffered enough” as the third item on the list of ways 
in which an offender can become detached from his offense: “suffering tends to bring 
people low, to reduce them, to humble them. If so, then enough equality may be restored 
in order to forgive them consistent with self-respect.” Applied to criminal sentencing: 
‘Enough’ equality has already been restored in order to ensure recognition of mutual 
freedom. In other words, the fact that the offender is already ‘low’ due to his SSD means 
that the symbolic restoration of equality is partially achieved prior to punishment. A 
normal amount of punishment might degrade the offender, bringing him below the level 
of equality, creating a new imbalance that is detrimental to mutual recognition. In severe 
cases, we might talk of compounding injustice – social injustice carrying onto criminal 
injustice (in some of the ways identified in Chapters 11 and 13), in turn leading to more 
social injustice (e.g. ex-convicts that cannot get work etc.) and so on. There may come a 
point, then, at which punishment that is objectively proportional to the offense committed 
will entail suffering (on top of suffering, on top of suffering) that is incompatible with 
human dignity. In short, the unusual circumstances of the offender may make his 
punishment “cruel and unusual”, and therefore in conflict with mutual freedom. 
This is not to say that punishment should always be lowered for the severely socially 
deprived, of course. The argument in this chapter has been that SSD ought to be considered 
a potentially relevant mitigating factor when applying a Kantian-Hegelian framework for 
criminal law. I have identified how one might argue for a reduction of punishment for 
people with SSD, but I have not sought to determine how much. Needless to say, a criminal 
case will often have aggravating factors against which mitigating factors must be balanced. 
I will have more to say on balancing competing claims of justice in the concluding chapter. 
What this chapter has made clear, I believe, is that equal treatment is not necessary for 
treatment as equals when it comes to sentencing, though it is for the need to hold offenders 
responsible (conviction). This opens for the possible legitimacy of alternative sanctions, 
to which I will now turn my attention. 
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15. The justice of restorative justice 
“The restorative justice movement originally began as an effort to rethink the needs which 
crimes create, as well as the roles implicit in crimes”, Howard Zehr, one of the pioneers of 
the movement writes.649 During the last four or five decades proponents of restorative 
justice have sought to rethink fundamental aspects of how society sanctions crime. What 
are the aims of sanctioning crime? What are the needs of the parties? How should we 
address the deeper causes of crime when sanctioning crime? Inspired by conflict resolution 
processes of traditional societies around the world, especially North American First 
Nations and Maori societies of New Zealand, scholars have developed a body of 
restorative justice theory, and many countries have implemented a range of restorative 
processes.650 Restorative justice has become a collective term for a variety of justice 
processes such as victim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, community 
circles, sentencing circles and more. These processes are applied in a variety of ways, 
sometimes as a replacement for a criminal trial and punishment in a given case, other times 
as a supplement, for instance as a part of a criminal sentence.651 As Lord Justice Auld 
remarks, restorative justice has been described as “more of a philosophy than a specific 
model”652. This philosophy, which I will attempt to reconstruct here, unites otherwise 
diverse practices by defining the aims of the restorative process and its essential features.653  
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Are these aims compatible with the aims of sanctioning crime as it is understood within a 
Kantian-Hegelian framework for criminal law? In other words, can restorative justice 
processes potentially remedy the wrong of infringing upon another’s freedom, so as to re-
establish mutual respect for freedom? Or, to use Pettit and Braithwaite’s terms, can a 
restorative process serve the just functions of recompense, recognition and reassurance?654 
An affirmative answer would undermine Kant and Hegel’s retributivism, i.e. their claims 
that punishment is necessary and sufficient for justice after wrongdoing. If there exists an 
alternative to punishment that may serve an equivalent just function, punishment cannot 
be considered necessary for justice. It is conceivable, contra Kant and Hegel, that under 
certain circumstances both retributive and restorative justice are sufficient (and, hence, 
neither necessary) to achieve the just function of negating the negation of mutual freedom 
entailed by crime. Identifying the features and aims of restorative justice will allow us to 
assess this claim and to consider which circumstances must be present for the processes to 
potentially fulfill the stated function. Note that I will not be discussing the radical claim 
that restorative justice may completely supplant retributive justice – the relevant question 
here is whether and to what extent processes seeking to achieve the two can coexist within 
the same criminal justice system. 
To “rethink the needs which crimes create” means to consider how crimes impact both 
victim(s), offender(s) and third-parties (including the entire community), and to consider 
how these effects can best be remedied. This is in itself a radical proposal, proponents of 
restorative justice have claimed, for the criminal trial neglects the needs of the directly 
involved parties, aiming instead only to uphold the law. In one of the first articles of the 
restorative justice literature, “Conflicts as Property” from 1977, Nils Christie famously 
claimed that the legal system “steals” conflicts from the directly involved parties. 
The key element in a criminal proceeding is that the proceeding is converted 
from something between the concrete parties into a conflict between one of 
the parties and the state. So, in a modern criminal trial, two important things 
have happened. First, the parties are being represented. Secondly, the one 
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party that is represented by the state, namely the victim, is so thoroughly 
represented that she or he for most of the proceedings is pushed completely 
out of the arena.655 
A fundamental motive behind restorative justice has thus been to reclaim ownership of the 
conflict by its stakeholders, making them the principle participants of the process, 
excluding lawyers and experts, and letting the parties determine by consensus the 
appropriate result of the process. Note, however, that agreement is required to initiate the 
process. This means in practice that the offender must admit to at least a degree of 
responsibility for the offense, though not necessarily criminal responsibility.656 It is 
impossible to conduct a properly restorative process if one party denies having anything 
to do with the case.  
Having ownership of one’s own conflict is itself an important need (to be discussed further 
below), but the stakeholders also know best which needs are involved in the case. In other 
words, they know best where the shoe pinches. As Christie remarks, the issues that are 
deemed legally relevant in court are often not the issues of most concern to the parties.657 
In many cases, the crime has caused great psychological distress for the involved, often 
making the conflict all-consuming in their everyday lives, preventing them from 
functioning normally. They have, therefore, often a deep need for closure. Perhaps also a 
need for reconciliation, depending to some extent on the prior relationship between the 
parties.658 But in any case, a need for something that can give them a sense of being able 
to move on. In the words of Charles Barton: 
The fundamental aim and purpose in restorative justice is to bring about 
closure and healing of the effects of crime, especially the emotional harm, 
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disconnectedness and social isolation experienced by those most seriously 
affected by the wrongdoing.659 
We should note, however, that not all restorative justice scholars accept this framing of 
remedying harmful effects of crime; some insist, as I too will shortly, that the aim of the 
process is to remedy wrongs, not merely harms, particularly the wrong of denying 
recognition. Talking of the “needs” of the parties is problematic if among the needs we do 
not include the fundamental need to remedy wrongs. In any case, this focus on the needs 
of all the parties means that the process does not narrowly focus on what to do with the 
offender. “Hence, (restorative) justice is done, not when something negative is done to the 
offender, but when something positive is done to meet the needs of people harmed by 
crime”, Gerry Johnstone states.660 Restorative justice is therefore not punitive; the 
suffering of the offender is not a necessary feature of justice, as I will explain in more 
detail below.  
From what I have said so far, then, restorative justice is clearly different from a traditional 
criminal trial and punishment both in terms of how justice is done – i.e. who determines 
the just outcome – and in terms of what a just outcome may be. Since the aim in restorative 
justice is to remedy the needs of the parties involved in each case, and since these needs 
will vary from case to case, it does not presuppose a universal answer to the question of 
what justice requires. And since it is the parties themselves that determine what justice 
requires, there is not an objective answer to what this is. The concept of justice of 
restorative justice is thus singular, as opposed to universal, and intersubjective, as opposed 
to objective. This concept is thus radically different from a traditional concept by which 
the justice of a case is deduced from a universal and objective principle.  
Can such a concept of justice coexist with a traditional retributive concept of justice within 
the same criminal justice system? Or will these concepts of justice tend to undermine each 
other? Will, for instance, the ‘case specific’ nature of restorative processes undermine the 
rule-of-law principles that form the normative basis of the criminal process, such as the 
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principle of legality, the principle of proportionality and the principle of equality before 
the law?661  
As mentioned, many countries already have elements of restorative justice in their criminal 
justice systems, and positive results have inspired a trend to pursue these alternative 
sanctions further in the future. From a normative perspective, the question is whether we 
ought to view these examples as representing a pragmatic trend, where countries more or 
less explicitly make exceptions from criminal justice in order to achieve utilitarian aims, 
or whether the variety of processes and sanctions can properly be seen as serving the same 
overall purpose of criminal justice (here, especially the purpose of re-establishing mutual 
freedom, as specified above). An answer to this question will become more pertinent the 
more restorative justice is incorporated into the criminal justice system and the more 
serious the cases are to which it is applied, thus introducing a secondary question, which I 
will only briefly discuss, of how far the integration of the processes within the same 
criminal justice system ought to go. 
Let us first consider how restorative and retributive justice differ in terms of what justice 
requires in response to crime, before returning to the question of how justice is done. 
Unlike retributive justice, restorative justice does not require that the offender suffer an 
intentionally painful or burdensome sanction. 
Of course, restorative justice, too, is usually painful for the offender. Meeting the victim 
face to face and hearing him describe the harm he has suffered can be psychologically 
demanding and even considered worse (i.e. more burdensome) than simply doing time 
without having to face the victim’s pain. As Christie notes, many offenders would likely 
be perfectly willing to give away their “property right to the conflict” in order to avoid the 
confrontation of the restorative meeting.662 Duff, too, notes that an offender who properly 
understands what he has done, including the character, seriousness and implications of his 
wrong, will come to repent, “for sincerely to recognize what I did wrong is to recognize it 
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as something that I should not have done”. Repentance, Duff further notes, “is of its nature 
painful: the repentant wrongdoer cares, or has come to care, for those whom she wronged, 
for the values she violated; she must therefore be pained by that wrong and that 
violation”.663 
Duff and Barton and others have therefore claimed that the difference between restorative 
and retributive justice is exaggerated; indeed, it is a false dichotomy, they claim.664 
Because restorative justice aims at making the offender recognize the wrong he has done 
and voluntarily undertake measures to restore that wrong, and because recognition entails 
pain for the offender, a successful restorative justice process will necessarily entail pain 
for the offender, just like retribution will. 
There is nevertheless an important difference in the function that pain serves, which can 
be seen if we apply the distinction between a teleological and a non-teleological theory 
that Nozick made with regard to the function of “re-linking” the criminal with correct 
values.665 A teleological version of this theory seeks an effect in the wrongdoer, while a 
non-teleological theory like his own, Nozick claims, seeks an effect on the wrongdoer. The 
same distinction, we saw, applies to Duff’s theory of penance. Repentance must be 
voluntary, Duff claims, and a trial cannot therefore force the offender to undertake penance 
but can attempt to persuade her to do so. We can thus separate between two functions of 
punishment: inducing repentance and communicating that the offender ought to repent, the 
latter having value in itself, i.e. non-teleologically.666 
Applied to restorative processes, we see that pain is necessary only upon a teleological 
version of these theories, i.e. only to the extent that the communication with the offender 
is supposed to succeed in inducing her to repent (which is of its nature painful, as Duff 
explains). Punishment, however, is painful even when it fails to convince the wrongdoer 
to repent (and of course also when it succeeds). The difference, then, is that pain is the 
(necessary) medium by which retributive justice is achieved – retribution is per definition 
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just infliction of pain – whereas pain is contingently related to restorative justice. A 
restorative process can, in other words, serve the just, non-teleological function of holding 
an offender accountable without being painful for the offender.667 
In reality, it is often painful, as noted. In addition, restorative outcomes are also usually 
burdensome for the offender, and as Duff and others have stressed, taking on these burdens 
can serve a restorative function in themselves by expressing that the offender has 
recognized the seriousness of his wrong, and not merely by remedying harm. But the fact 
that restorative justice is often painful does not take away from the fact that pain serves a 
contingent function in restorative justice. Adopting restorative justice in response to crime 
therefore means denying the retributivist claim that criminals must suffer for their crimes. 
In order to assess the justice of restorative justice within the context of criminal law I shall 
now consider whether it can achieve the functions of recompense, reassurance and 
recognition. 
15.1 Recompense 
If a crime has caused material conditions that hinder other people’s access to mutual 
freedom, remedying the damage must be considered part of what it takes to negate the 
negation of freedom. This aspect of sanctioning crime is especially emphasized in 
restorative justice, and more so than in punitive processes. After all, punishment of the 
offender does not directly benefit the victim materially. On the other hand, repairing the 
harm done to the victims is one of the three main pillars of restorative justice, according 
Zehr.668 
Many restorative processes result in an agreement that obligates the offender to 
compensate the victim for losses, either by paying restitution, or by committing to do 
something to benefit the victim, e.g. to work for the victim. In addition, the restorative 
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meeting itself may serve to restore some of the emotional harm that the victim has suffered 
due to the crime. Victims often experience fear, anger and stress, and spend much energy 
pondering the causes of their victimization and the likelihood of it being repeated. This 
emotional harm is itself often an impediment to the victim’s freedom, preventing him from 
functioning normally. Meeting the offender face to face, asking and answering question, 
hearing each other’s versions of what has happened, may facilitate the redress of such 
harm. Meta-studies have shown that victims who have participated in a restorative process 
tend to report greater satisfaction with the process and its results than victims in a control 
group whose cases have gone through regular court proceedings.669 Heather Strang found, 
for instance, that victims who had participated in restorative conferences reported that 
Feelings of anger, fear and anxiety towards their offender fell markedly after 
their conference […] The conference usually had a beneficial effect on 
victims’ feelings of dignity, self-respect and self-confidence and led to 
reduced levels of embarrassment and shame about the offence. Overall, 
victims most often said their conference had been a helpful experience in 
allowing them to feel more settled about the offence, to feel forgiving 
towards their offender and to experience a sense of closure.670 
Braithwaite sums up research on victim experiences in a recent article, saying that 
“restorative justice reduces victim fear, post-traumatic stress symptoms, victim anger, 
vengefulness,” and increases “their belief that justice has been done” compared to victims 
after court proceedings.671 There are differences in the results on participant satisfaction of 
different types of restorative processes. Interestingly, somewhat lower satisfaction rates 
have been found for participants in so-called shuttle mediation processes, where the parties 
do not meet face to face – a finding that may further underscore the independent 
importance of the restorative meeting itself.672  
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Reassurance is necessary in order to re-establish trust in the supremacy of law. By 
apprehending and sanctioning those who challenge mutual freedom, the state enforces 
mutual freedom and gives people a reason to believe that their equal right to freedom is 
protected. Such faith is itself a prerequisite for one’s freedom. At first glance, it seems that 
the use of restorative justice may tend to undermine this function of the criminal justice 
system. For starters, the ‘singular’ or ‘case specific’ nature of restorative sanctions 
weakens legal certainty with regard to which consequences one risks by committing an 
offense. Since restorative outcomes are not specified ahead of time according to a publicly 
known rule, like punishments are, they cannot readily function as disincentives to crime. 
And further, since restorative outcomes are often less severe than punishment for 
equivalent offenses (or are at least perceived as such from a by-stander perspective), this 
might also contribute to a weaker deterrent effect compared to punishment. The result 
might thus be more crime and, hence, less assurance of mutual freedom.  
This conclusion is premature, however. First of all, we are not discussing the complete 
replacement of punishment with restorative justice. Punishments will still be specified in 
the criminal statute, ensuring legal certainty.673 From a deterrence perspective, the fact that 
punishments are specified and remain a realistic alternative to restorative processes, not 
least when the latter fail to achieve agreement, is likely sufficient to ensure that the 
disincentive toward crime is not weakened.674 
Further, recall from the discussion of deterrence in Chapter 13 that a significant deterrent 
effect stems from fear of exposure. If you think it probable that you will be exposed, you 
will likely refrain from committing the offense, not least because of the social 
repercussions it will have. The important ‘primary control’ that friends, family, colleagues 
and neighbors exert will thus be achieved through fear of exposure, and, hence, 
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independently of the ‘secondary’ or ‘formal control’ exerted by the state’s sanction. The 
potential downside to restorative justice is thus likely small for the purpose of reassurance. 
There is also a potential upside to restorative justice. Empirical studies have shown that 
there is reason to be optimistic with regard to the special deterrent effect that restorative 
processes yield. Several meta-studies of re-offending have found a statistically significant 
decline in recidivism for offenders who have completed restorative processes compared to 
control groups.675 Sherman and Strang found in their meta-study that “rigorous tests of RJ 
in diverse samples have found substantial reductions in repeat offending for both violence 
and property crime”.676 The meta-study by Nugent et al. found that “VOM [victim-
offender mediation] youth recidivated at a statistically significant 32% lower rate than non-
VOM youth”.677 Single studies of group conferencing have shown recidivism rates 
declining even more.678 Although the size of the decline in recidivism varies in different 
studies and for different types of crimes and processes, the overall trend shows that 
restorative justice, when done right, significantly reduces re-offending and thus has a 
positive effect on the function of reassurance.679 There are two theoretical points that may 
explain why there is such an effect. 
The first regards the relation of the offender and the victim. The restorative meeting lets 
offender(s) and victim(s) meet face to face without representation. The process thus allows 
for proximity between the parties, avoiding the alienating jargon of the courts and the 
(sometimes) conflict-escalating tactics of the lawyers. Using their own words, narrating 
their own experiences of the crime, the parties more easily gain insight into the perspective 
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of the other, allowing for empathy with her point of view. In the words of Paul Robinson, 
“[s]uch processes provide something that nothing else in the traditional criminal justice 
can provide. Restorative processes can provide offenders with a better understanding of 
the real impact of their offenses and can put a human face on their victim”680 Barton 
explains this process as a “reversal of moral disengagement”681. Offenders typically use a 
range of psychological mechanisms to disengage themselves from the wrong they have 
committed, such as rationalizations, lessening personal responsibility (e.g. “I just did what 
I was told”), denial of the seriousness of the harmful effects on others, and blaming, 
dehumanizing or otherwise derogating the victim (e.g. “He tried to be a hero”).682 
Upholding such moral disengagement becomes more difficult when interacting with the 
victim in a setting which focuses on the offender’s obligations to repair the harm done to 
the victim (cf. Zehr’s third pillar of restorative justice). A change in the moral engagement 
of the offender naturally effects the engagement of the victim too. Meetings thus often 
involve a transformation of attitudes on all sides, for instance by reducing anger, as we 
saw.683 
The second theoretical explanation of the decline in re-offending regards the relationship 
between the offender and his network. In many cases, family and friends attend the 
restorative conference, and sometimes also representatives from the offender’s school, 
social workers and others. The offender is then called to answer for his crime not only to 
the victim but to people whom he cares about, who are also given the chance to express 
their concern and their disappointment. Here is a potential for what Braithwaite calls 
reintegrative shaming, a specific way in which primary control is exerted. 
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Crime is best controlled when members of the community are the primary 
controllers through active participation in shaming offenders, and, having 
shamed them, through concerted participation in ways of reintegrating the 
offender back into the community of law abiding citizens.684  
Shaming without reintegration can be destructive, leading to stigmatization and further 
attraction to criminal subcultures.685 When coupled with reintegration, however, shaming 
by one’s community amounts to a positive kind of primary control that is more effective 
than the secondary control exerted by the state. In Barton’s words, “[w]hen important and 
respected people in the offender’s life disapprove of the offender’s behavior while at the 
same time show clear signs of respect and acceptance towards the offender as a person, 
positive impact on the offender is maximal”.686 The idea is that those who surround the 
offender have knowledge both about factors in the offender’s everyday life that may have 
contributed to his offence, and about what can be done to address those factors and to 
support the offender in changing his ways. The community is thus a resource both for 
communicating norms and for helping the offender to live by the norms. As Braithwaite 
says,  
You need to bring out the perspectives of a plurality of stakeholders for it to 
work. With an incident of violence at a pub, there may be a girlfriend who 
can commit to sorting out a relationship problem that was engendering 
jealousy. There may be drinking mates who can commit to changing 
drinking practices. There may be a bar manager who can commit to the kind 
of self-regulatory program Homel found to reduce pub violence in 
Australia.687 
We have seen, then, that both the empirical data and the theoretical explanations offered 
here suggest that restorative justice may be particularly well-suited to reduce re-offending, 
and in this way contribute to the purpose of creating reassurance of mutual freedom. 
However, of the many ways in which reassurance can be achieved, not all are consistent 
with the overall purpose of criminal law: ensuring and instantiating respect for mutual 
freedom. For instance, rehabilitation of criminals can easily be paternalistic. Might this 
also be a problem for restorative justice? Put differently: Braithwaite may be right that it 
is efficacious to involve the girlfriend to sort out jealousy issues, but does this not run the 
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risk of meddling in private matters? I will return to this question as we now turn to 
recognition.  
15.3 Recognition 
Right is recognition; mutual freedom is mutual recognition. This Hegelian insight is 
particularly well-suited to aid our understanding of the justice of restorative justice. How 
might it be that justice is achieved when the stakeholders to the injustice say so? How 
might it be that justice requires an elaborate scheme of recompense and penance in one 
case, while in a similar case it requires no outcome beyond an apology? With a Hegelian 
theory of right we may be able to answer these questions.  
To some scholars, these questions conflict so fundamentally with the concept of justice 
that they simply deny the justice of restorative justice. In Paul Robinson’s words, 
restorative justice serves an “anti-justice agenda”688. Other scholars criticize certain 
common approaches to restorative justice, such as Christie’s approach, for inadequately 
framing criminal cases as “conflicts” with “parties” whose needs are unfulfilled, instead 
of framing them as “wrongs” committed by an “offender” against a “victim”.689 The latter 
approach is necessary if we are to justify restorative justice in a criminal law setting. Only 
if restorative justice can be seen as remedying the relevant wrong in crime (as opposed to 
merely alleviating harm) can it be said to serve justice in this context.690 
Punishment, we have seen, remedies the wrong of negating mutual freedom by 
instantiating respect for the autonomy of the offender, “bring[ing] his misdeed back upon 
himself”691, and thus “express[ing] his own inherent will”692. If restorative justice is to be 
seen as negating the offender’s negation of freedom, it too must be seen as instantiating 
respect for his autonomy. It must be possible, putting it bluntly, to respect the offender’s 
inherent will without incarcerating him against his will. 
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The last sentence exploits the double entendre of the term “will” in the Kantian-Hegelian 
theory of punishment. Disentangling these meanings may help us understand why both 
restorative and retributive justice may conceivably respect the inherent will of the offender. 
Recall from Chapter 9 that Kant distinguishes between the homo noumenon of the 
offender, which “draws up a penal law against myself”, and the homo phenomenon, which 
is subjected to the penal law “as another person”.693 The latter is the empirical self, the 
actual will of the person, while the former is the pure reason that is imputed to her, in other 
words, the will that the person would actually have if she were purely rational.  
If legal force is to be legitimate, it must accord with this latter, purely rational will. A kind 
of hypothetical consent can thereby be imputed to the person who is coerced. In accordance 
with the principle of volenti non fit injuria, coercion does not then negate her autonomy.694 
A criminal does not therefore have to actually consent to his punishment. Even though he 
does not actually will that his negation of mutual freedom be negated, using force against 
him in order to do so respects his autonomy, because that is what he would consent to if 
he were purely rational. But what if he actually does will that his negation of mutual 
freedom be negated? His actual will would then be consistent with the rational will, in 
which case coercion in order to treat him in accordance with his rational will, would be 
redundant. It is hard to see why incarcerating someone against his actual will in order to 
respect his rational will would be required if it were possible to respect both his actual will 
and his rational will. 
Indeed, it would seem that the latter case of respecting both the actual and the rational will 
entails greater respect for autonomy. Put differently: While retributive justice affords 
actual autonomy to the offender only in the commission of the wrong, viewing him as a 
free and rational agent responsible for his act, restorative justice affords him actual 
autonomy in the remedying of his wrong as well. The offender is viewed as a free and 
rational agent capable of taking responsibility also for making his wrong right again. 
Victims and other stakeholders are likewise afforded autonomy in determining how to 
restore the wrong that has been done. Applying restorative justice thus means affording 
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more autonomy to the parties, a fact that speaks to the compatibility of these processes 
with the criminal law’s overall purpose of protecting autonomy. 
This is not to say that actual autonomy in the justice process is sufficient to create justice. 
The fact that the stakeholders feel that justice has been achieved does not imply the 
normative judgment that justice has been achieved. As Duff says, “we must ask not just 
what they in fact feel, but what they should feel”.695 Sometimes parties may agree to 
arrangements that could not be said to remedy the wrong of negating freedom. Indeed, the 
agreement itself may sometimes represent yet another instance of abuse of power of the 
other. Imagine, for instance, that a rapist who is very rich was to compensate his victim so 
abundantly that she would be satisfied with no further sanction. We might still think that 
the wrong against her had not been adequately recognized – that the compensation amounts 
to paying her off – and that she should not therefore feel that justice has been done. 
Similarly, if the offender were to agree to reparations and acts of penance that were clearly 
disproportionate to the harm he has caused, as some offenders who feel especially bad 
about themselves are willing to, such an agreement should neither be seen as just.  
This is one of the reasons why restorative processes are led by impartial mediators whose 
job it is to try to cancel any power imbalance that exists between the parties, and who must 
approve the agreement that is reached (in many jurisdictions court approval is also 
required). Clearly disproportionate agreements should not be approved as they are 
inconsistent with mutual respect of freedom. The actual will of the parties is not in such 
cases consistent with their rational wills. Another way of putting this is to say that respect 
for the autonomy of the stakeholders only applies to the extent that we trust that they are 
in fact autonomous. If their actual wills diverge substantially from what we take to be an 
objectively rational choice, we may doubt that they are actually sufficiently autonomous. 
The unjust agreement would be a sign that intimidation, extortion, lack of trust, lack of 
self-confidence, lack of self-respect or other factors have diminished the stakeholders’ 
ability to freely reach a just agreement. 
Hence, even though the outcome of a restorative process is inter-subjectively determined, 
it must conform to an objective standard in order to be just. This objective standard is 
                                                        




negative, providing a limit on the inter-subjectively determined outcome. A principle of 
negative retribution thus regulates both restorative processes and criminal trials: The 
burden that the offender is to take on cannot be such that he could not rationally will it. 
Sanctions that are disproportionately harsh are inconsistent with his humanity and, hence, 
do not serve the just function of re-establishing mutual freedom. In this sense, the outcome 
of a restorative process is not principally different from the outcome of a criminal trial. 
We defer to the parties like we defer to a judge to determine what justice requires. But we 
retain in both cases the possibility of criticizing the outcome as unjust if it does not conform 
to an objective standard of justice.  
There is an important difference between the cases, however. In a restorative process, but 
not in a criminal trial, the fact that those making the decision autonomously perceive it as 
just has independent bearing on its justice. Put negatively: It does not matter for the justice 
of a criminal sanction whether the authority administering it believes that it serves justice 
or whether she simply follows the rules in contradiction with her own normative beliefs. 
But it does matter for restorative justice that the stakeholders feel that justice has been 
done. The reason is that part of the purpose of sanctioning crime is precisely to re-establish 
recognition of mutual freedom for those persons who have experienced that recognition 
has been negated.  
Recall that upon Hegel’s theory, recognition, in its three forms, is a prerequisite for 
freedom. Specifically, this means that you must experience respect, love and esteem from 
others if you are to be free. There is thus an “experiential dimension” to recognition: If 
you do not feel recognized, you are lacking in recognition, and when you are lacking in 
recognition, you are lacking in freedom. Or put differently: Recognition is 
intersubjectively experienced, not simply objectively deduced from a principle such as the 
Universal Principle of Right. The latter does indeed express recognition of everybody as 
free and equal citizens; but Hegel’s point is that people will not in reality be free and equal 
unless they experience self-respect, self-confidence and self-esteem, which can only be 
achieved intersubjectively. 
Crime, we recall, is a formal wrong committed not just against abstract right in general but 
against a particular victim. It entails a “negative-infinite judgment” of the victim, denying 




is left standing, his rights are in effect void and he is unfree. When Zehr speaks of the “the 
needs which crimes create”, we ought thus to count among them the need of the victim to 
have this wrong against him recognized. Equivalently, the offender “needs” to be held 
responsible for denying mutual recognition. His own freedom is contingent upon 
recognition from other free and equal persons. Hence, if mutual recognition is denied, so 
is his own freedom. 
The re-establishment of mutual freedom thus requires not only recompense (as in the 
example of the rich rapist). It requires that the parties experience that their lack of 
recognition is remedied. Specifically, the victim must feel that his experience of being 
wronged has been vindicated; he must experience that he has been believed when he tells 
about his victimization; he must feel that others, including the offender, understand 
properly the moral injury he has suffered and the proper respect he deserves. The offender, 
in turn, must experience that others hold him responsible, and that they respect him as a 
person, even when they disapprove of his behavior. 
It seems safe to say that this experiential dimension of recognition is emphasized to a 
greater extent in restorative justice than in traditional criminal justice. The intersubjective 
and singular concept of justice makes sense only against this background. The parties are 
afforded autonomy precisely because it is important that they feel that justice has been 
done. As we saw, empirical studies of participant satisfaction do corroborate the view that 
restorative justice tends exceedingly to provide an experience of justice. 
Indeed, it seems safe to say that Hegel’s notion that right is recognition is not only 
normatively justifiable, but phenomenologically accurate as a description of how 
stakeholders to an injustice tend to view justice. Time and time again experience has shown 
that what are superficially conflicts about material things, are really struggles for 
recognition, as we saw many examples of in Chapter 13. When two siblings quarrel over 
an inheritance, it is usually not just about the money they feel entitled to, but about the 
respect they feel that the other has denied them. When a Western tourist is cheated out of 
ten rupees by a rickshaw driver in Delhi it is hardly the financial loss that irritates the 
tourist; it is the lack of respect. Similarly, experiences from restorative processes show that 
what victims of injustice often want the most is simply to be recognized as having been 




demands for compensation will often renounce both at the moment when he receives a 
sincere apology from the offender. What he really needs, it turns out, is to be acknowledged 
and respected. Right is indeed recognition for this victim.  
From an outsider perspective, such outcomes, which are not rare, may seem to let the 
offender off the hook too lightly. One might discuss whether or not that is true, considering 
how emotionally demanding the process can be. But we must anyhow not discount the 
importance of this experience of recognition, since it constitutes a remedy for the victim’s 
experience of a denial of recognition. When it comes to this experience, the stakeholders 
know where the shoe pinches – they know best what it takes for them to feel that justice 
has been done. Who are we, then, to say that justice is better served in another way? 
15.4 Public justice 
Well, perhaps we are indeed the ones to say so. Mutual freedom is not only a matter 
between victim and offender. It is not simply about their experiences of recognition and 
freedom. Crime is a public wrong – not just because assurance of the (external) reality of 
law is undermined by crime (as discussed above), but because mutual freedom itself is 
negated. The negation of this negation is therefore in principle everybody’s business.  
Consider the example Robinson gives: A devoted Jew finds it in his heart to forgive Dr. 
Mengele for his ghastly concentration camp experiments on her and her family. “But few 
would think justice had been done if that meant Dr. Mengele was free to skip away to a 
happy life, even if he apologized to her.”696 Of course, Dr. Mengele had thousands of 
victims, so no proponents of restorative justice would suggest that one victim should be 
given autonomy in the process against him. Nevertheless, the example triggers the intuition 
that affording autonomy to the parties is problematic in and of itself. Why should it matter 
if the victim finds it in her heart to forgive? Some victims are more forgiving than others; 
why should the sanctioning of crime depend on how “lucky” you are with your victim? 
Not only does this introduce an element of arbitrariness in the administration of justice; 
the focus on the feelings of the parties treats crime as if it is primarily a private matter 
                                                        




between two (or more) parties, while crime is also a matter between the offender and the 
polity. In Duff’s words: 
For the criminal law is concerned not with our more local, intimate and 
optional relationships as friends, as lovers, as neighbors, as colleagues, but 
simply with our (somewhat abstract, detached and non-optional) 
relationships as fellow citizens.697 
This accords with the Hegelian point that crime is a breach of the second form of 
recognition, abstract right. It is the relationships we have as right-bearing persons that is 
negated in crime. Whatever damage crime also does to our intimate relationships or to our 
esteem from fellow citizens is inconsequential to the public wrong that crime constitutes. 
It may be argued that when restorative justice is concerned with the “needs” of the parties 
for “closure” and for “healing of relationships”, as is often emphasized, it deals with 
Hegel’s first and third forms of recognition. Restorative justice represents, then, a form of 
“privatization of justice”, which ultimately would be incompatible with mutual freedom. 
However, the strength of restorative justice, as I see it, is that it shows this supposed 
incompatibility of addressing both public wrongs and private wrongs to represent a false 
dilemma. For starters, when restorative processes are applied in criminal cases, the 
processes are not private. They are referred to mediation or conferencing by a public 
authority (police, prosecutor, courts); they are structured according to legal rules governing 
the processes and led by a publicly appointed mediator; and a public authority, usually the 
courts, approves the agreement that is reached and thus has in principle the final say. 
Rather than seeing this as criminal cases being diverted to private arenas, we might see it 
as criminal cases being delegated to the most local level consistent with their resolution. 
This would be in accordance with the so-called principle of subsidiarity, a principle for 
delegating public authority which originated in the Roman Catholic church and which 
applies, for instance, in the European Union today.698 
Further, because authority is delegated to the same people whose private relationships (i.e. 
the first and third forms of recognition) are at stake, and because they are the ones deciding 
which issues to address, the restorative process can avoid the paternalistic meddling that 
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would result if government officials were to addressed these issues. Take Braithwaite’s 
example from above: It is not the state’s business to address the jealousy issues a person 
has in his love life, which are aggravating him and making him violent. Neither is it the 
state’s business to ask the person’s drinking mates to change their drinking habits to help 
him avoid becoming violent. If, however, these persons address and resolve these issues 
themselves, it does not constitute illegitimate meddling. The process may thus instantiate 
respect for the freedom of the parties (the second form of recognition) while it at the same 
time addresses issues related to the first and third forms of recognition. 
As we saw in Chapter 13 crime is often motivated by a search for recognition. In Hegel’s 
phrase, the criminal wants “to count for something”699 – he wants recognition as someone 
in the eyes of others. We saw examples of humiliation that motivated violence as an 
attempt to save face. We saw examples of structural humiliation that cuts parts of the 
population off from the opportunity to achieve success by the culturally acknowledged 
yardstick of success. We saw examples of crimes that function as expressions of a criminal 
identity or a group identity. These issues, which pertain especially to the third form of 
recognition (although also to the first and second), are highly relevant to dealing with the 
causes of crime, and so with upholding mutual freedom. Ironically, (one could say), the 
criminal courts are largely cut off from the opportunity to address these issues, because 
they are constrained to deal only with the legally relevant issues, i.e. the issues pertaining 
to recognition of abstract right. They are cut off from addressing the most important social 
causes of crime, which are then considered political, not legal issues. When Hegel warned 
that “Jurists […] look on [the law] as their monopoly”, it was presumably a warning 
against letting matters of crime be delegated to specialists who cannot deal with them in 
all their complexity. As Hegel continues, “we do not need the services of a shoemaker to 
find out if the shoe fits”.700 As I said, the stakeholders know best where the shoe pinches. 
They possess resources for addressing underlying causes of crime and conflict in each case 
that judges in a criminal court do not have and cannot legitimately have, for they concern 
first and foremost relationships between the parties and within the community. The effect 
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of tapping into these resources can be seen in lower recidivism rates as well as enhanced 
participant satisfaction after the justice process.  
To conclude, restorative justice can potentially remedy the wrong of negating mutual 
freedom by instantiating respect for mutual freedom and by fulfilling the three functions 
of recompense, reassurance and recognition. Because autonomy is conferred upon the 
parties in restorative processes, these processes give the opportunity to deal with a broader 
range of issues relevant to the crime and its causes than the criminal courts allow. 
Restorative processes have, in other words, some advantages compared to criminal trials, 
which suggest that when the purpose of sanctioning crime is to re-establish mutual 
freedom, restorative justice has a place in the sanctioning system.  
I have not so-far dealt with the issue of what exactly this place is, and how to determine 
which cases are appropriate for restorative justice, and which are not. I propose here only 
schematically the following two parameters along which to consider this issue: First, the 
fewer stakeholders, the more adequate the assignment of autonomy to the directly involved 
parties. Conversely, the more stakeholders, the more adequate a third-party decision on the 
justice of the case. More serious cases will tend to have more stakeholders, in other words 
more people concerned with the justice of the response.  Hence, there will be a division of 
labor between the procedures approximating the gradation of the seriousness of the crime.  
The second parameter is: The more likely it is that the directly involved parties will be able 
to find a solution that is genuinely experienced by the parties as just, the more adequate it 
is that they be given autonomy. If a restorative process is to take place, it must, in other 
words, be voluntary, for without the wish of the parties to participate, the likelihood of a 
truly just experience is small. Likewise, the likelihood of genuine experiences of justice is 
diminished in situations where there is great imbalance of power between the parties. And, 
likewise, where one party is a corporation or the State, incapable of experience period. 
The hard cases will then be where the solutions provided along the two parameters conflict, 
in other words, in serious cases where the parties are willing and wanting to go through a 
restorative process. How we ought to deal with these hard cases – whether, for instance, 
restorative justice may form part of a sentence in such cases – will have to be sorted out, 




most importance for now, however, is that the preceding discussion has given us reason to 
finally dismiss the theory of retributivism. I concluded in Chapter 9 with the following 
claim about the justice of retributive justice: 
If, in a given case, other ways of restoring mutual freedom is impossible, punishment, since 
it is sufficient for restoring mutual freedom, is necessary for achieving justice. 
Restorative justice is one such “other way” that restoring mutual freedom can potentially 
be achieved. In such cases, then, we can deny the necessity of punishment, and hence the 
retributivist position. But there are also situations where punishment cannot achieve the 
function of restoring mutual freedom, as we have seen examples of in this second part of 
the thesis. It is conceivable that restorative justice could still be done it such cases – i.e. 
that the stakeholders themselves remedied the negation of mutual freedom that has 
occurred. The equivalent can therefore be said about the justice of restorative justice: 
If, in a given case, other ways of restoring mutual freedom is impossible, restorative 
justice, since it is sufficient for restoring mutual freedom, is necessary for achieving 
justice. 
This concludes my discussion of the justice of not punishing. It is time to consider the 






16. Concluding remarks: On the justice of making 
exceptions 
The discussions I have conducted in Part I and Part II have shown that in any given 
criminal case there are potentially several different wrongs in need of remedying. Some 
pertain to the criminal act – the theories expounded in Part I showed plausible ways in 
which punishment can be seen to remedy different aspects of the wrong in criminal acts. 
Others pertain to the situation of the criminal agent. Part II expounded reasons why less 
or no punishment (partially) remedies the injustice which is due to the severe social 
deprivation of some offenders. Part II also provided reasons why the wrong of the criminal 
act may potentially be remedied in a restorative justice process. I will not recapitulate the 
arguments here, but rather devote these concluding remarks to a philosophical problem 
which appears when the claims of the two parts are held together: What does justice require 
when there are several wrongs and their remedies are mutually exclusive? 
There is a practical dimension to this problem: How should judges weigh competing 
concerns when sentencing offenders? To what extent should legislators constrain the 
deliberations of judges in these matters? To what extent should the parties be afforded 
autonomy in the case? My concern here, however, is with a more profound dimension to 
the problem, a meta-issue relating to the concept of justice itself: Is it just to make 
exceptions from a just rule? Put differently: Does justice allow for individual treatment, 
remedying whatever aspect of wrong is most salient in the case, or does justice require that 
we abstract from the complexity of the individual case in order to treat like cases alike 
according to a rule? 
This problem has roots all the way back to Aristotle and the conflict he identified between 
the universality of justice and the idiosyncrasies of individual cases which preclude their 
neat subsumption under the rule. “[A]ll law is universal, and there are some things about 
which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general terms”, Aristotle states.701 The 
legislators cannot possibly account for all the real-life circumstances that affect the justice 
of particular cases. “[T]he error lies not in the law nor in the legislator, but in the nature of 
                                                        





the case.”702 If we apply the law equally to all cases, it entails stretching and squeezing the 
individual cases until they fit this Procrustean bed of justice. On the other hand, if we make 
exceptions when “the nature of the case” requires it, it could mean creating an unfair 
discrepancy between those who are treated according to the rule and those who get special 
treatment. What, then, is the just solution? 
It seems we are caught in a paradox similar to the one St. Anselm identified in his 
Proslogion from 1077 A.D. St. Anselm’s concern was with the nature of God, the most 
perfectly virtuous being imaginable.703 God must obviously be perfectly just, St. Anselm 
reasons. Yet, God, who forgives sinners, is also perfectly merciful. “For You save the just 
whom justice commends, but You free sinners whom justice condemns.” But freeing 
sinners condemned by justice is an injustice. How can God be both perfectly just and act 
against justice? “But how do You spare the wicked if You are all-just and supremely just? 
For how does the all-just and supremely just One do something that is unjust? Or what 
kind of justice is it to give everlasting life to him who merits eternal death.”704 Our concern 
here is not with mercy, considered as an independent virtue, nor with the nature of God.705 
We see, however, that the paradox applies to the justice of making exceptions from a just 
rule. For if justice requires treating everybody alike according to a rule, then diverging 
from the rule by making an exception would entail diverging from justice. And similarly, 
if justice requires that the unique aspects of each case be addressed, then diverging from 
individual treatment in order to achieve equality with other similar cases would entail 
diverging from justice. Applied to our case: If justice requires that like cases be treated 
alike, then making an exception from retributive justice by applying a restorative process 
or by lowering or abstaining from punishment when the criminal agent is severely socially 
deprived, will entail diverging from justice. Conversely, if justice requires that we deal 
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with each particular case in the way that best remedies its wrongs, then abstracting from 
complexity in order to punish like criminal acts alike will entail a divergence from justice. 
There seems, then, to be no way forward that does not entail doing injustice. If we go one 
way, say, prioritizing the like treatment of like crimes, then injustice will be done toward 
the individual circumstances of the case, and vice versa. Jacques Derrida describes this as 
the aporia of justice, literally meaning the “non-passage” of justice (from Greek, a: non, 
poros: passage). We are, in other words, at an impasse. “Justice is an experience of the 
impossible”, Derrida says.706  The impossible, as I understand it, is the avoidance of 
injustice. What do we do, then, when we face this impossible situation? 
16.1 Denying the paradox 
One strategy would be to deny that there really is this fundamental conflict within the 
concept of justice. We could bite the bullet, so to speak, and say that justice is treating like 
cases alike and that diverging from the just rule is indeed simply unjust. When faced with 
hard cases where the moral problem of applying the rule is evident, we would then either 
have to deny that we ought to mitigate this situation (equity, Kant famously says, is “a 
mute divinity who cannot be heard”707, i.e. it is irrelevant from the perspective of right), or 
we would have to say that justice should be set aside for other reasons, such as prudential 
concerns, a concern for good-will, or a concern for mercy. The latter view would require 
a theory of when and why justice ought to be overridden, something which is difficult to 
square with the common view that justice is the first virtue of social institutions.708 
We could also deny the paradox by arguing that retributive justice allows us to take into 
account the social situation of the individual agent and is otherwise consistent with ways 
of tailoring the just outcome to the specific case, including restorative justice. As we saw 
in Chapter 14, the situation of the agent may affect the ‘expressive content’ of the act, 
making it a less serious denial of mutual freedom than the objective features of the act 
would normally entail. Hence, lowering punishment for a severely socially deprived 
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offender may be consistent with retributive justice, and is not therefore an exception from 
it. Similarly, as we saw in Chapter 15, restorative justice is compatible with the aims of 
retributive justice in re-establishing mutual freedom. The case-specific nature of 
restorative justice does not, then, entail making exceptions from justice; the restorative 
process is merely a different method serving the same overall purpose as the criminal trial 
and punishment. 
To frame the issue in this way does not, however, dissolve the paradox, but merely defines 
it away. For if we focus on the function of justice apart from the means by which the 
function is achieved (e.g. the amount of punishment required), then the different means of 
achieving justice will all, per definition, be just, and means that do not achieve justice will 
all, per definition, be unjust (e.g. if the “exception” were just, it would already be included 
within the just means and would not, then, be an exception from justice). Since the 
exceptions are, per definition, unjust, the paradox of the justice of making exceptions does 
not arise. 
If we focus on the means, however, we see that the paradox reappears. Let’s say five people 
rob a bank together, and they are equally involved in the planning and execution of the 
crime. One of them is severely socially deprived. If, for one of the reasons outlined in 
Chapters 11-14, the latter offender’s sentence is lowered by, say, one year, from five to 
four years in prison, then it might be that his sentence is just when viewed in isolation. The 
individual circumstances are different in his case, and this makes the need for punishment 
slightly lower than in the cases of the other four. From the perspective of the overall 
purpose of sanctioning crime, the five crimes are treated equally in the sense that justice 
is achieved in each case.  
From the perspective of the means of achieving justice, however, the cases are treated 
unequally and unfairly. The four other bank robbers might rightly say: “We all did the 
same deed and we ought to get the same punishment.” On the other hand, if their claims 
were heeded, an injustice would arise in the case of the severely socially deprived offender, 
who would be punished more than necessary (or if the sentences of the others were 
reduced, they would get less punishment than required by their crimes). Hence, either the 




offenders, or the horizontal justice between the offenders causes a vertical injustice in one 
or more cases.  
To this someone might reply that the five cases are not actually alike, and that treating 
them unequally does not constitute a horizontal injustice. This response merely begs the 
question of what constitutes likeness, however. In the planning and execution of the crimes 
they were alike, and with respect to this aspect of the crimes, their unequal punishment 
was unfair. However, when we consider broader social issues and structures that influence 
one’s likelihood of committing crime and being punished, the case of the severely socially 
deprived offender is different and may justly merit different treatment. But this simply 
means that the justice of the case depends on what we take as the basis of comparison 
between cases. In other words, when we “zoom in” and focus on the situation of the 
individual agent, the cases merit different treatment, but when we “zoom out” and look at 
only the crimes, the cases merit equal treatment. The paradox persists, then, for doing 
justice both to likeness and individuality is still impossible. 
Finally, the paradox is even clearer with regard to the division of labor between retributive 
and restorative justice. Two cases may be alike in all relevant respects, yet because of 
circumstances that are arbitrary from the point of view of the offender (e.g. the willingness 
of the victim to meet with the offender), one offender is tried and punished while the other 
goes through a restorative process. If justice is achieved in both cases, then we have once 
again an example of vertical justice and horizontal injustice. To conclude, even when a 
range of means is included in what we take to achieve justice, we cannot avoid the paradox 
of the justice of making an exception from a just rule. 
16.2 Transcending the paradox 
There is, however, a way of transcending the paradox. The means for doing so lies in the 
concept of justice as remedying injustice. For with this concept, all justice is in a sense an 
exception, and there is therefore no inherent opposition between the just rule and the just 
exception. There are simply conflicting claims of justice, of which some are more 




When we understand justice as remedying injustice, it means that there cannot be justice 
prior to or without injustice. Only when there is something which is unjust can we say that 
something else, an action that remedies the injustice, is just. Hence, without a real or 
potential injustice we cannot claim that it is just to treat a person or action or state of affairs 
in a certain way – for nothing is just if nothing is unjust. In such a situation, it cannot be 
just to treat anybody or anything differently from anybody or anything else. This means 
that the default situation, prior to justice and injustice, is one in which there is equality 
between everybody and everything. Equality, then, is not itself the aim of justice; it is the 
baseline or background from which claims of justice proceed. Put differently: equality is 
neither just nor unjust per se. This claim fits well with Monroe C. Beardsley’s claim that 
the Principle of Equality is not itself a positive rule of ethics, but a rule for adopting rules, 
“a metamoral maxim” which takes the form of an Equality Injunction: “All persons are to 
be treated alike, except where circumstances require different treatment.”709 Hence, both 
equality and inequality can potentially be just, but the former is the default situation. 
Once there is (or is perceived) an injustice, however, the need to remedy it follows with 
necessity, for, as we saw in Chapter 1, the perception of wrong entails a perception that 
the wrong ought to be remedied. Hence, when there is injustice, there is also something 
which is (potentially) just. Since an injustice always pertains only to some things or 
somebody, the just remedy for the injustice will also affect only some things or 
somebody.710 In other words, justice requires that we make an exception from the default 
equality which exists prior to justice and injustice, treating some things or persons 
differently than others, in order to remedy the injustice which relates to the group in 
question. 
This will become clearer if we take a few examples. Let us start with the justice of locking 
somebody up in a prison cell. The default situation is equality, which means that at the 
outset it cannot be claimed that it is just to lock anybody up in a prison cell. We can make 
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a just exception from this equality, however, for persons who have committed crimes that 
are above a certain threshold of severity. For this group, but not for others, incarceration 
will serve to remedy the wrongs they have caused, whether they are taken to be 
infringements of mutual freedom, freeloading, undermining the mutual benefits of law, or 
one of the other wrongs discussed in Part I. Once there is such a wrong, then, it may be 
just to single out this group for special treatment (punishment) aimed at remedying the 
wrong. Prior to or without the wrong of the crime, it would not be just to make an exception 
for this group, in the same way that it would not be just to single out any other group for 
which punishment would not remedy an injustice, say, people born on a Tuesday. 
Take another example: air pollution. For most of human history, the air we breathe has not 
been a matter of justice and injustice. Regulating the use of air at this earlier time would 
be as foreign then as regulating the sharpness of the sunlight would now. The reason is the 
same as above: If there is no problem, there is no fix – if there is no injustice related to the 
cleanness of the air, there is no justice in regulating it. Today, however, carbon emissions 
cause global warming which takes and will take the lives of millions of people. Regulating 
emissions by taxing or prohibiting certain actions (e.g. building a coal plant or clearing a 
rainforest) goes some way to remedying the injustice of the harm that carbon emissions 
cause. Such regulation is therefore just to the extent that it achieves this, and all things 
being equal. Hence, it may be just today to prohibit a landowner from clearing the 
rainforest on her land, but the same justification could not apply, say, in the Middle Ages. 
There would at that time be no injustice (at least for reasons related to air pollution) in 
cutting down the forest. Singling out this act for prohibition would not therefore be just. 
We see, then, that the justice of the exception – in this case the exception to the free use of 
property by the owner of the rainforest – depends, like any claim to justice, on the presence 
of an injustice for which the exception is a remedy. 
There is, accordingly, no difference, at the most fundamental level, between a claim to 
justice and a just exception. Justice is always an exception from a default equality that is 




16.3 The burden of proof 
Let us look closer at the consequences that this way of conceiving justice has for how we 
consider different claims to justice. At first glance, it seems to make no difference whether 
we view the abstention from punishment of an offender who is deemed unpunishable as 
an exception from the rule that criminals ought to be punished, or whether we view the 
rule that criminals ought to be punished as an exception from the default equality of all 
persons. Similarly, we might presumably either view the prohibition of clearing the 
rainforest as an exception to the landowner’s right to use her property, or we might view 
property rights as an exception to the equal right of use shared by all, and, hence, the 
prohibition as an exception to the exception. The choice of perspective does, however, 
make a difference for where we place the burden of proof. Since equality is the default 
position, the burden of proof must be placed with those who claim that inequality is just. 
In other words, absent a good reason, everybody ought to be treated equally. Beardsley 
gives an example to illustrate this: Two persons find a treasure, and A says to B, “give me 
half”, whereupon B replies, “give me a reason why you should have half”. This has it the 
wrong way, Beardsley says. It is B who must supply a reason why they should not share it 
equally. Such a reason could for instance be that B is poor and has five children to feed, 
while A is rich and single, or that B saw it first and A would not have noticed it if B had 
not pointed it out. But absent a reason, equality is the default. As Beardsley says, “there is 
a sense in which the person who asks for equal shares is not asking anything - not ‘anything 
special’, as we say”.711 Since she is asking for nothing, equality is not something for which 
she must argue that the other has a moral obligation. “There is, strictly speaking, no (moral) 
obligation to treat people equally, but only a (logical) requirement to supply a good reason 
for treating people unequally.”712 
Notice that this way of thinking has a clear affinity with the role of innate freedom in the 
Kantian framework, which I also elaborated in the discussion of Hart’s “natural right to 
freedom” in Chapter 9. The innate right to freedom entails the right to be “beyond 
reproach”, because, Kant explains, “before he performs any act affecting rights he has done 
no wrong to anyone” – in other words, he has not done anything for which the other can 
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make a claim against him.713 This entails, specifically, that a person is presumed innocent 
until others can prove that she has done wrong (i.e. affecting another’s rights), for if she 
had to prove her own innocence, she would not be free. She could then easily be put off 
track by anyone who accused her, requiring her to spend time and effort on proving her 
innocence, a project enforced upon her by somebody else. Her freedom would then be 
limited by the will of another. Hence, freedom to be beyond reproach is the default 
position, unless proven otherwise.714 Similarly, in Hart’s account of the natural right to 
freedom, the negative, ‘general right’ not to be interfered with is the default position 
against which ‘special rights’ to interfere make sense. We could not understand the special 
right to have a contract fulfilled unless, but for the contract, the parties were free not to do 
the act in question. Hence, the burden of proof falls on the claim to a special right – only 
if such a right can be established can the general right to freedom be overridden. Similarly, 
in my framework for justice, the burden of proof falls on the claim that it is just to treat 
somebody or something differently from everybody or everything else – only if such a 
claim of justice can be established can the default equality of all be overridden. 
This framework has practical implications for how we think about the justice of not 
punishing discussed in Part II. Chapter 12 and 13 discussed severe social deprivation as 
justification and as excuse respectively, and these two concepts illustrate the ways in which 
the burden of proof is implied by the notion of default equality prior to justice. To claim 
that an offense was justified, means denying that an act that would otherwise be wrong is 
wrong under the given circumstances. It is a claim, in other words, that the agent under 
these circumstances had the equivalent of a ‘special right’ to override the ‘general right’ 
of non-interference entailed by mutual freedom. The burden of proof therefore lies on 
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justification. Excuse, however, pertains to the justice of punishing the offender for her 
wrong. The claim of excuse is a claim that the state does not have a ‘special right’ to 
override the defendant’s ‘general right’ not to be punished. The burden of proof falls on 
the state to show that it does retain this special right. In other words, the state must show 
that the defendant qualifies as a member of the subgroup of society for which an exception 
from equal treatment can be made because their punishment serves to remedy an injustice. 
Specifically, the state must show that the defendant has the capacity to be held accountable 
for her wrong, because, upon the freedom perspective, that capacity is a necessary 
requirement for re-establishing mutual freedom. As we have seen, we might believe that 
this capacity has been undermined sufficiently to excuse the offender if the economic, 
cultural and psychological mechanisms described in Chapter 13 are compounded to an 
extreme degree – hence, the state cannot then prove that the defendant is punishable. Or 
we may believe that an offender’s severe social deprivation is sufficient to mitigate his 
sentence – hence, the state can then prove that it has a special right to punish, but this right 
does not go as far in this case as it usually does for similar types of crime. 
We see, then, that there is an asymmetry between the justice of punishing and the justice 
of not punishing – between aggravating factors and mitigating factors. The asymmetry lies 
in the fact that it takes less to establish the latter than the former – the former requires good 
reasons and the latter requires only absence of reasons. We might take this asymmetry as 
grounds for making the moral claim that when there is doubt, i.e. when there are conflicting 
claims pulling in different directions, it is better to err on the side of leniency. Hence, it is 
better to punish less than what retributive justice might require than to punish more than it 
might require. This claim is consistent with negative retributivism and the principle of 
ultima ratio, and it can also to some extent serve to justify the tendency in sentencing 
identified as the “Zug zur Milde”, the trend toward leniency. 
16.4 A new point of departure 
However, lowering or abstaining from punishment is also problematic, even when justice 
is achieved in the individual case. The reason is comparative: It is unfair to those who have 
committed similar crimes but who do not get to board the Zug zur Milde. We saw examples 




which one gets a lower sentence than the others. Clearly, this difference, the one between 
the sentence of the severely socially deprived bank robber and the sentences of his 
accomplices, also requires a justification (e.g. one of the reasons mentioned in Chapters 
11-14). But this means that we have turned the burden of proof around: It is lower 
punishment, not higher punishment that now requires a good reason; it is four years, not 
five years that must be justified. Our baseline – the default equality – is now five years in 
prison, and the exception from this equality requires a reason.  
We see, then, that claims of justice may not always relate to the fundamental, pre-justice 
equality of all – they can relate also to practices that are in place, established standards of 
equality, so to speak, that become new points of departure for claims about justice. 
Criminal law is one such practice that has established standards, such as punishment scales, 
that tend to be taken as basic, though, as we have seen, the justice of the practice itself 
must first be established from a more fundamental equality of all. Justice thus builds upon 
justice, we could say. Once the justice of a practice is established, the practice itself 
becomes the “just rule” from which new exceptions are made. Then these exceptions 
establish new standards of equality, for instance, regarding how much severe social 
deprivation should count toward a lower sentence. This, in turn, might breed new 
exceptions when it becomes evident that this rule, like all rules, cannot take into account 
all the real-life circumstances that pertain to the nature of the case, as Aristotle reminds us 
is inevitable.  
Which standard of equality should we take as our point of departure when different 
standards conflict? Even if the exception to the exception is consistent with the even more 
basic rule, such as when abstaining from punishment is consistent with the pre-justice 
equality of all, there will certainly be other comparisons that can be made, and from which 
a horizontal injustice results. Some such injustices stem from the complexity of the 
frameworks that might be brought to bear on the case. Part I showed a handful of ways in 
which a crime can be wrongful, and, as we saw, all of these aspects are not equally present 
in all crimes, so that remedying one requires more punishment than remedying another. 
To take but one example, a drug dealer may have gained a great undeserved profit and may 
thus require a large punishment on the profit theory, but since he has sold mild drugs to 




perspective of crime and punishment. Hence, when justice is done by remedying one 
aspect of the wrong in crime, an injustice is done by punishing too hard according to 
another aspect of the wrong. And even if we settle on one framework, like I have advocated 
with the freedom perspective, there are still numerous ways in which the case can be 
interpreted, with varying amounts of punishment as the result: Is it the objective aspect of 
the crime – the five instances of bank robbery – which establishes the baseline from which 
exceptions are made? Or is it the damage that the crime does to the assurance people have 
of the reality of their freedom? Or is it the denial of recognition that can be imputed to the 
offender? How are we to determine which is more important in a given case? 
We are thus back at the problem that Aristotle identified: If we give a general answer to 
the above questions, there will inevitably be cases that do not fit the answer. Even within 
the framework of mutual freedom, cases that are alike in one respect are unlike in another. 
A general rule for how to treat like cases alike will thus inevitably create injustice when 
cases are unlike according to other conceptions of wrong and these wrongs are not 
remedied. Let us first look at Aristotle’s solution to the problem, before concluding with 
the solution implied by the concept of justice as remedying injustice. 
16.5 Aristotle’s concept of equity 
For Aristotle, the central concept here is equity (Greek: epieikeia). Equity is the name of 
the virtue by which a link between the general law and the specific case is made. More 
specifically, its function is to remedy the rigidity of the law. “This is the essential nature 
of equity; it is a rectification of law in so far as law is defective on account of its 
generality”.715 Equity corrects the injustice that may follow from a strict application of 
law; “equity is just, but not what is legally just: it is a rectification of legal justice”716. And 
it is therefore a higher form of justice. Equity is “superior to one kind of justice”, namely 
justice which follows from the direct application of a rule.717 
This is the formal structure of equity. When it comes to the more precise content of 
equitable deliberations, there is disagreement about what Aristotle had in mind. According 
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to Eric G. Zahnd, most scholars have wrongly interpreted Aristotle as reserving equity 
for only the few cases where the law is unclear: “Most writers argue that Aristotle employs 
equity to fill gaps in the law; that is, equity enables a judge to adjudicate correctly a case 
presenting a novel issue on which the legislature has enacted no law or that law is 
incomplete”.718 Indeed, this limited role of equity is substantiated by some of Aristotle’s 
passages.719 However, other passages seem to contradict this view.720 In addition, Aristotle 
considered equity as superior to legal justice. Why, then, should its role be limited? If 
equity is superior to legal justice, does it not make more sense to abolish all the laws and 
let equity replace them? 
Both these views on the role of equity – the limited and the all-encompassing – represent 
extremes that misunderstand Aristotle’s concept. A proper explanation of equity must 
account for its essential relation to law. As Zahnd explains: 
The proper role of equity is not simply to fill gaps in the law. Instead, 
equity consists primarily in a judge's exercise of practical intelligence to 
conform universal laws to particular situations. Rather than filling a gap in 
the law, equity fills inevitable gaps in the legislatures’ foresight when the 
legislature makes a general legal rule without knowing the facts of 
any individual case in which it will be applied.721 
Equity is thus intimately connected with law; law is part of equity. But equity goes beyond 
law by subjecting it to practical reason, or phronesis, which Aristotle says “is not 
concerned with universals only; it must also take cognizance of particulars, because it is 
concerned with conduct, and conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances”.722 When 
a particular circumstance so dictates, it is equitable to set aside the universal rule. 
Aristotle gives an example of what such special circumstances might be. If, for instance, 
the law forbids striking another person with a metal weapon, striking with an iron ring on 
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the finger would qualify legally, but not equitably.723 But to what extent 
does equity include considerations about other circumstances than the act and the law? 
Aristotle emphasizes that equity includes considerations of the personal circumstances of 
the offender. He insists on the importance of looking beyond the mere act, and seeing the 
full picture: 
Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less 
about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he 
said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so 
much as his choice, or this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask 
not what a man is now but what he has always or for the most part been.724 
When we take into account “the weakness of human nature” and how the offender has 
“always or for the most part been”, we judge in a sympathetic way. Sympathy is the ability 
to ‘feel together’ with the offender, in other words, to show compassion with the offender’s 
personal situation. This is a distinctive feature of Aristotle’s equity: “An indication of this 
is the common view that the equitable man is especially sympathetic in his judgments, and 
that it is equitable to judge sympathetically in certain circumstances.”725 
This conclusion is further substantiated by Aristotle’s treatment of the subject of 
friendship, which is not limited to what we today would count as friendship, but includes 
what we might call ‘civic friendship’ among members of the polity. According to Aristotle, 
friendship is characterized by a mutual feeling of goodwill toward each other. Friends truly 
wish each other well. “[I]n the case of a friend they say that one ought to wish him good 
for his own sake.”726 Thus, friends want the good for each other by virtue of their 
friendship, not because of the other person’s merits: “For friendship asks only for what is 
practicable, not what is in accordance with merit.”727 Friendship, like equity, is a matter of 
judging sympathetically, of looking beyond the other person’s actions, and seeing the 
person for his own sake. And just like equity, friendship is for Aristotle a superior form of 
justice: “friendliness is considered to be justice in the fullest sense.”728 And the stronger 
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the friendship is, the stronger sense of justice accompanies it: “It is natural that the claims 
of justice should increase with the intensity of friendship.”729 
16.6 More and less just 
We see, then, that Aristotle’s solution to the conflict between the universality of law and 
the singularity of the nature of the case is to stake out a third way: an equitable and superior 
form of justice which includes but transcends the two sides of justice. In this lies an 
acknowledgment that both sides are indispensable. On the one hand, universality is an 
essential feature of justice. Justice is treating everybody equally according to a rule. On 
the other hand, the inevitable complexity of real-life cases means that there will always be 
more to justice than can be formulated ahead of time in a rule. Justice is remedying the 
injustices which pertain to the individual case. Singularity, is thus the other side of justice, 
the one that Aristotle emphasizes when he speaks of justice among friends. This side of 
justice entails taking in the full complexity of the case, acknowledging the unique features 
pertaining to the individual, judging him sympathetically, i.e. “for his own sake”. But even 
here is an element of universality: If there were an identical case, justice would require 
equal treatment. However, a third case might then come a long which was similar, but also 
different. Equity entails staking out a course between these two sides of justice, thereby 
achieving a more just solution than either of the two sides may achieve alone. 
Incidentally, in St. Anselm’s response to his own paradox, he too acknowledged both that 
justice must be universal and that justice requires that the full complexity of the case be 
taken into account. However, the latter is impossible to achieve for humans because of our 
lack of knowledge. Only an omniscient God can therefore achieve justice. “For that alone 
is just which You will”, St. Anselm says, acknowledging that “it certainly cannot be 
understood by any reason”730. Many people have similarly concluded that justice is 
unachievable in human affairs; we must leave it to God to be the final arbiter on the 
judgment day. We saw a secular version of this sentiment above, in Derrida’s claim that 
justice is an experience of the impossible: It is impossible to take into account all relevant 
aspects of the case. It is therefore impossible to avoid doing injustice. 
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This does not mean that we cannot do justice, however. We can acknowledge that doing 
justice does involve (an experience of) the impossibility of avoiding injustice, as I interpret 
Derrida. But justice is not impossible. On the contrary. With the concept of justice as 
remedying injustice, justice is achieved every time an injustice is remedied. Justice is done 
when a killer is sent to prison. Justice is done when the rich are taxed at a higher rate than 
the poor. Justice is done when an academically challenged child is given extra tuition. This 
does not mean that justice is perfectly achieved in these and other instances, nor that these 
ways of doing justice cannot be trumped by other, conflicting ways. Neither does it mean 
that we could potentially consider anything as just – some things are clearly unjust (like 
punishing an innocent person or denying a child education) and some things are neither 
just nor unjust (like remedying a headache with a pain killer). Only when it is plausible 
that an action remedies an injustice can we say that it is just. But since there are often other 
ways of remedying the same injustice, and since doing one just action may exacerbate 
other injustices pertaining to the case, we cannot say that justice is ever completely 
achieved. The best we can say is that the action is the most just action in the given situation. 
By considering justice in terms of more and less, we can transcend the paradox of making 
a just exception from a just rule. The paradox presupposes an either/or structure of justice: 
either justice is following the rule or justice is making exceptions from the rule in order to 
remedy the wrongs of the individual case. On the view I have advocated, however, justice 
is always an exception. There is no inherent difference between the just rule and the just 
exception. Justice is always a negation of a prior equality, a prior rule, if you will. And this 
new rule, in turn, is negated by new just exceptions establishing new rules. And other 
comparisons are always possible, as are new exceptions. Injustice thereby follows justice 
like a shadow. Still, there can be more and less (in)justice. Applying the negative method, 
we can say that an action is most just when it remedies the worst injustice pertaining to the 
case. Like Aristotle viewed equity as more just than either of the one-sided aspects of 
justice, so we can say that an action is more just when it remedies and avoids creating more 
injustice than another action would. Take the example of the bank robbers again: If one 
considers it just to lower the punishment of the severely socially deprived offender, it 
simply means that one considers the injustice of treating all the bank robbers equally worse 




We cannot determine a priori which injustice is most important, because, as Aristotle 
reminds us, there will always be cases that are different in relevant ways. However, we 
can say that determining the importance of the injustice will at least entail considering the 
salience of the proposed injustice in the given case. Put negatively, if the injustice that the 
act is supposed to remedy is not salient or identifiable in the case, then the justice of the 
act will not be salient or identifiable. Recall “The Negative Hume’s Law” from above. 
Further, the importance of the injustice will also depend on the practice in which it is 
relevant. The practice of criminal law has established a range of principles and standards 
that constrain the scope of relevant factors to be considered. A theory of retributive justice 
ought to fit within a comprehensive theory of criminal law and the legal order more 
generally, in order to ensure consistency between these principles and standards. This was 
one of the reasons why I concluded that the freedom perspective is most suitable for 
criminal law within a democratic state under the rule of law. Specifically, this has bearing 
on the determination of the most important injustice of a criminal case, because a choice 
of an injustice which is irrelevant upon the freedom perspective means denying this 
perspective’s priority, and thereby, the consistency of the practice of criminal justice based 
on this perspective. It does not necessarily mean that this can and should never happen. 
Some cases are so special that one might consider the injustice of keeping with the 
established standards to be worse than the injustice of making an exception. It simply 
means that the standard is in fact established for good reasons, which in turn means that 
the burden of proof falls on the exception to these reasons. 
This brings us the end of the thesis. There are, as we have seen, several ways in which 
justice can be done. Both punishing criminals and conducting restorative processes with 
the involved parties can, I have argued, remedy the wrong in crime. The social realities of 
our societies tend, however, to be reflected in our criminal justice systems. Social injustice 
undermines criminal justice, yet if we take full account of social injustice when doing 
criminal justice, we risk creating other forms of injustice, vis-à-vis victims and vis-à-vis 
other offenders. Because of this complexity, I have not been able to provide a definite 
answer to the question with which I began: What does justice require in response to crime? 
I have, however, been able to point out several theories and ways of sanctioning crime that 
do not, upon closer scrutiny, represent justice in a modern, democratic state. And as I have 









The thesis discusses the justice of state punishment in response to criminal wrongs. The 
introductory chapter explores the logic of the concept of justice itself, proposing that we 
understand justice as the function of remedying injustice. This negative approach – 
studying justice through injustice – allows us to critically evaluate theories of retributive 
justice via the conceptions of the wrong in crime that they entail, and for which punishment 
is perceived as a remedy. Examples of the conceptions of the wrong in crime considered 
in the first part of the thesis are: ‘infringement of mutual freedom’, ‘freeloading’, 
‘undermining the mutual benefits of law’, ‘undeserved profit’, ‘harm to the victim’ and 
‘material imbalance’. Punishment, upon each of these conceptions, is just to the extent that 
it remedies the particular wrong of the crime, for instance by cancelling its undeserved 
profits or by alleviating the harm of the victim. The first part of the thesis culminates in a 
prolonged discussion of what is deemed the most suitable theory of punishment in a 
modern democratic state, the ‘Freedom Perspective’ based on a Kantian-Hegelian 
framework, whereupon crime is wrong because it infringes upon mutual freedom. 
The second part discusses the possible injustice of punishing severely socially deprived 
offenders. Specifically, it considers four reasons for the justice of lowering or abstaining 
from punishment of this group of offenders. These reasons relate to the material, cultural 
and psychological factors which increase this group’s likelihood of committing crimes and 
of being punished. These factors are to some extent the result of unjust social structures in 
society. Hence, this part discusses the links between social (in)justice and criminal justice. 
Finally, the thesis examines the justice of an alternative way of remedying the wrong in 
crime: restorative justice processes between victim(s), offender(s) and other parties to the 
crime. 
The concluding remarks are devoted to the meta-issue of how to conceive of justice when 
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